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Foreword 
The situation of  the international economy in the early 1970s gave prominence to the 
role of  the functioning  of  the international system and of  the world financial  markets in 
Latin American development. At the same time the studies that were being conducted by 
the International Monetary Fund, in conjunction with the developing countries for  the 
reform  of  the monetary system made it clear that these countries needed technical 
support in defining  and concerting their position. 
The concern of  the Economic Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean to 
deal with these topics in a systematic manner found  echo at the headquarters of  the 
United Nations Development Programme, and the collaboration of  both United Nations 
agencies was sought to carry out studies in the international monetary and financial  field. 
This collaboration materialized in two successive projects, the first  of  which was started 
in 1975 (RLA/75/040). The second, "Implications for  Latin America of  the international 
monetary and financial  system" (RLA/77/021), followed  in 1977. 
The evolution of  the world economy and of  the international monetary and 
financial  problems has fully  justified  the interest shown by ECLAC and UNDP in these 
topics. The articles presented in this book, selected from  those produced in the financial 
field  during the last ten years through the collaboration of  these two institutions, have 
made a useful  and timely contribution to the knowledge of  the subject and have explored 
possible solutions to the difficulties  encountered. These studies exhibit a sequence closely 
related to events. Many of  the arguments advanced have come to be part of  accepted 
knowledge and many of  the predictions have been fulfilled. 
The numerous requests for  technical assistance received from  universities and 
governments and from  subregional, regional and international institutions in Latin 
America and beyond, which have been met to the extent of  their resources by the staff  of 
the ECLAC/UNDP joint projects in the financial  field,  are further  testimony to the 
services rendered to the community by these two organs of  the United Nations. 
Hugo Navajas Mogro 
Assistant Administrator 
and Regional Director 
Regional Bureau for  Latin America and 




Economic Commission for  Latin America 




This book comprises fourteen  articles which have already appeared in print and which 
were prepared under the joint projects of  the United Nations Development Programme 
and the Economic Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean, in the field  of  the 
functioning  of  the international monetary system and the external financing  of  Latin 
America. 
Since the early 1970s there has been a noticeable increase in the relative importance 
of  external financing  from  private sources as against that from  public sources which was 
traditionally predominant in the region. The first  shock of  the rise in oil prices, in 
accelerating the expansion of  the Euromoney markets, helped to accentuate the already 
existing trends. The intense capital movements at the end of  the 1960s and the beginning 
of  the 1970s put an end to the system of  fixed  exchange rates and the convertibility of  the 
dollar into gold, thus eroding the bases of  the monetary system created at Bretton Woods 
and making its revision indispensable. 
The first  article included in this work, "The revolt of  the bankers in the 
international economy: a world without a monetary system", appraises the situation of 
the monetary system in the first  half  of  the 1970s, outlines its most probable evolution 
and indicates the role that might be played by the reforms  to the Constitutive Agreement 
of  the International Monetary Fund which were at that time under scrutiny. The article 
underlines the growing importance of  private financing,  and points out that its growth 
tends to reduce the field  of  action of  the Monetary Fund. This outcome, which was not 
obvious at the time when the article was written, became apparent later on, with the 
outbreak of  the crisis of  1982. 
The article lays emphasis on the asymmetries of  the international monetary system 
in force  and the need to correct them, and points out that this means giving great 
importance to the Special Drawing Rights. He observes, however, that this does not seem 
compatible with recent financial  events, especially with the floating  of  the leading 
currencies and with the greater influence  of  the private sector on the holdings of  foreign 
exchange and on intervention in the markets. The article declares in conclusion that the 
internationally accepted aim of  placing the Special Drawing Rights in the centre of  the 
monetary system is incompatible with the characteristics of  the system and its probable 
evolution. This conclusion has been fully  corroborated by subsequent events. 
The continuing growth of  private financial  markets made them a new source of 
funds  for  financing  external imbalances; it was often  possible to obtain these resources 
without official  guarantee. The second article which appears in this volume, "The 
external financing  and indebtedness of  Latin America and proposals for  action", 
constitutes the first  attempt to evaluate the region's external debt considering not only 
the component of  the debt traditionally taken into account, namely, the publicly 
guaranteed debt, but also the debt contracted by the private sector of  the debtor country 
with foreign  commercial banks without State guarantee. The article stresses the rapid 
growth of  the debt contracted with commercial banks and the resulting change in the cost 
and average payment period of  Latin America's external debt. It also contains some 
proposals for  solution, including formulas  for  the alleviation of  interest payments, 
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improvements in the mechanisms of  renegotiation and refinancing  of  the debt, 
reinforcement  of  the multilateral financing  institutions, and expansion (instead of 
restriction) of  trade. 
This is perhaps the first  warning signal of  the rapid increase in recourse to foreign 
debt as a formula  for  financing  deficits  on the balance-of-payments  current account in the 
region. 
Confronted  by the rapid increase of  the debt, most analysts declared that its real 
value was speedily eroded by world inflation.  The third article, "World inflation  and 
foreign  debt: the case of  the improper deflator",  evaluates, and discards as incorrect, the 
argument which maintains that the external debt is not a problem, since international 
inflation  reduces its real value. The thesis of  the article came to be generally accepted later 
on; namely, that fluctuating  interest rates, which reflect  the effect  of  anticipated inflation, 
coupled with the deterioration in the terms of  trade of  the non-oil-exporting countries 
which was then taking place, tend to make the servicing of  the debt more onerous for  the 
economy of  the debtor countries, and neutralize the presumed relief  caused by world 
inflation,  which would only be effective  for  the debtor countries if  the rates of  interest and 
terms of  trade were fixed.  This article is the first  critique on the traditionally accepted 
arguments concerning the burden of  debt servicing. 
The rapid growth of  the debt led to the consideration of  alternatives for  the 
financing  of  the current deficit  on the balance of  payments. The major option is direct 
foreign  investment, which has been the subject of  considerable discussion both on the 
economic and on the political plane. The fourth  article in this book, "Oil-exporting 
countries' investment portfolio:  diversification  toward Latin America", is an analysis of 
the Latin American demand for  foreign  investment and maintains that the accelerated 
growth of  the debt as the main form  of  transfer  of  foreign  saving cannot continue for  very 
long, since its servicing, which implies a predetermined commitment as to maturity 
period and amount, may come to be incompatible with the real possibilities of  financing 
it. The article points out that one way of  coping with this problem is to stimulate the 
growth of  foreign  investment and observes, besides, that it would be expedient for  the oil-
exporting countries to invest in Latin America: it would enable the average yield of  the 
investment portfolio  of  these countries to be increased and would diminish the variability 
of  this yield. The article indicates means of  reducing or eliminating political obstacles to 
direct foreign  investment. 
Direct foreign  investment is only one of  the forms  adopted by capital movements 
between countries. However, that form  of  capital transfer  has been the only one subject to 
relatively systematic analysis in developing countries. Other capital movements —gen-
erally of  shorter terms and which reached a growing importance in external transactions 
of  those countries— had not been studied. The fifth  article included in this book, 
"International Capital Movements", presents an analytical model to explain these 
movements, including private holdings of  "divisas" and the empirical results of  the 
application of  the model to a number of  Latin American countries. The study reaches the 
conclusion that direct control of  capital movements is difficult  and that capital 
movements respond to economic incentives very rapidly in normal operating conditions 
of  external financial  markets. 
The problems of  development and the growing imbalances in the world economy 
gave rise to various attempts to find  solutions. The most important of  these was the 
setting up of  an Independent Commission on International Development Problems, 
headed by the former  Chancellor of  the Federal Republic of  Germany, Willy Brandt. The 
sixth article in the book, "Latin America and the international monetary system: some 
comments and suggestions", by Carlos Massad, is a revised version of  the exposition made 
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by the author to the Brandt Commission, at the Commission's invitation. This article 
underlines the radical qualitative transformation  of  the international monetary system 
owing to the increasing role of  the private sector both in financing  and in the 
management of  major holdings of  foreign  exchange, and points out the need for  a more 
rapid growth of  exports from  the developing countries. The article also suggests 
measures for  improving the monetary and financial  system, including both those aimed at 
improving the adjustment process at world level and those which would permit 
negotiations of  wider scope between developed and developing countries. 
The increased availability of  external financial  resources induced several countries 
to consider that the traditional bottleneck of  external credit had been finally  overcome, so 
that it seemed expedient to adopt a more liberal policy as regards trade and external 
payments. Hence rapid processes of  opening up and liberalization were initiated, 
especially in the southern cone of  Latin America. These processes differed  in respect of 
their sequence and the degree and speed of  their opening up to trade and capital 
movements. The seventh article in the book, "Financial openness and the adjustment 
process", describes the adjustment process provoked by an internal monetary shock and 
explores this process in two extreme cases: total opening up to trade in the absence of 
non-compensatory capital movements and total opening up to capital transfers  in an 
economy closed to trade transactions. The article examines the differences  between the 
two cases, particularly in terms of  the effects  on domestic interest rates and on the levels 
of  employment and prices. 
The eighth article, "The monetary and real effects  of  opening up to the exterior: the 
Chilean case 1975-1978", analyses in greater detail the consequences for  the Chilean 
economy of  the financial  opening up to the exterior in the second half  of  the 1970s. The 
author sustains that the efforts  made to contain the growth rate of  the nominal quantity 
of  money were inconsistent with the policy of  the progressive opening up of  the Chilean 
economy to the exterior and of  the fixing  of  the exchange rate, since in such conditions the 
money supply becomes an endogenous variable. He points out that the exchange rate 
should not be used as an instrument for  controlling the money supply and that an 
appropriate increase in loans from  the exterior requires active measures for  regulating 
the flow  of  foreign  currency through the capital account. The author also states that there 
should be more concern for  the different  components of  the balance of  payments and not 
only for  its global balance. He concludes that the policy applied during the period in Chile 
had important redistributive consequences both in the private sector itself  and between 
this and the public sector, and that the opening up to trade and to finance  should be 
evaluated and put into practice in a co-ordinated manner in view of  their marked 
reciprocal effects. 
These two articles are the first  in a systematic analysis of  the opening up processes 
and of  the most appropriate sequence of  changes in the degree of  opening up in the 
financial  and trading field. 
As a result of  the work already completed through UNDP/ECLAC co-operation the 
idea arose of  designing a simulation model which would permit the analysis of  the main 
economic consequences of  different  opening up strategies. To this end the co-operation of 
the IMF was requested. The results of  this tripartite effort  are reflected  in the ninth and 
tenth articles reproduced in this book: "Alternative opening up strategies: a simulation 
model", and "Trade and financial  liberalization in the context of  external shocks and 
inconsistent domestic policies". Both articles present a simulation model for  analysing 
the effects  on the main macroeconomic variables of  the modifications  (increase or 
decrease) in the degree of  opening up to foreign  trade and finance,  with differences  in 
speed and sequence, in the face  of  different  external shocks and under different  domestic 
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economic policies. These studies direct their attention to variables such as the exchange 
rate, the interest rate, the level of  ecnomic activity and the external equilibrium, and 
examine the effects  of  various shoçl^ aati alternative policies on these variables, both in 
relation to the course of  dynamic adjustment and the position of  final  equilibrium. 
The eleventh article contained in this work, "Recent southern cone liberalization 
reforms  and stabilization policies: the Chilean case 1974-1982", examines in detail the 
Chilean experience in the field  of  liberalization and economic opening up, together with 
the anti-inflationary  efforts  made in that situation. The author shows how the Chilean 
economic policy fluctuates  from  one extreme of  statism (in the early 1970s) to the other 
extreme of  privatism, from  1974 onwards, and how the latter led, paradoxically, to a 
situation in which the financial  system and a large part of  the country's productive 
enterprises ended up under State ownership. He argues that, although external 
circumstances had some influence,  the main responsibility for  this outcome is attributable 
to domestic policies. He adds that inconsistent policies with regard to the exchange rate 
and interest rates, and an absolutely inflexible  exchange-rate policy, provoked such 
enormous imbalances in the economy that their correction was only possible by way of  a 
crisis. 
Towards the end of  the 1970s anxiety began to grow in Latin American intellectual 
circles with regard to the region's external debt. This concern did not appear to be shared 
by the creditors, who continued with active offers  of  resources to the region. The twelfth 
article in the book, "The real cost of  the external debt for  the creditor and for  the debtor", 
shows that debtor and creditor have different  points of  view in assessing the burden, or 
real cost, of  the debt, since each of  them considers different  options for  the use of  their 
resources. The article proposes a method for  measuring the real cost of  the external debt 
from  both points of  view and, on the basis of  this method, presents estimates of  the real 
cost of  the external debt for  creditors and debtors in a group of  Latin American countries 
during the period 1961-1980. 
With the outbreak of  the crisis the private international financial  markets abruptly 
closed their doors against the possibility of  granting new credits, and there arose the 
evident danger of  a real catastrophe. The International Monetary Fund exerted its 
influence  to avoid it and, not having sufficient  resources of  its own, had to put pressure on 
the private financial  institutions to continue lending, although at a much slower rate than 
in the recent past. This situation imposed on the debtor countries the need for  an 
adjustment unprecedented in the past half  century, which redounded in a brusque fall  in 
real per capita income and in marked increases in unemployment. The thirteenth study 
presented here, "External financing  in Latin America: developments, problems and 
options", shows the different  factors  which, both on the demand and on the supply side, 
have influenced  the rapid growth of  the Latin American debt, considering that it is not 
only an imbalance in the public sector that can generate problems in the external sector 
but, in certain cases, it is the imbalance in the private sector that have in fact  driven the 
public sector out of  the market. The article examines the restrictions imposed by the 
increasing debt on the freedom  to apply domestic policies, the international transfer  of 
real resources and the mechanisms of  transmission of  external shocks to the domestic 
economy. It points out that in certain conditions of  interest rates, terms of  trade and 
additional credit, the external debt can be sustained, but in present circumstances these 
conditions are not fulfilled,  so that deliberate international action is required to ward off  a 
greater crisis. 
The magnitude of  the adjustment effort  embarked on by the debtor countries and 
its high cost made it necessary to reconsider the traditional adjustment policies and to call 
into question the approach to cases in isolation which is at present the practice of 
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international agencies and the governments of  creditor countries. The last article 
reproduced in this book, "The adjustment process in the 1980s: the need for  a global 
approach", underscores the need to regard adjustment as a global international 
phenomenon when there are numerous countries, and not merely a few,  affected  by the 
disequilibria. To continue to regard each country as if  it were a case apart leads to serious 
errors of  composition which increase the cost of  the adjustment and generate a marked 
recessive bias in the world economy. This article points out that a simple approach, case 
by case, is inadequate for  the solution of  the economic problems of  the 1980s, and 
reiterates the need for  a more symmetrical adjustment process. At the same time it points 
out that an improvement in the world economy within the limits that can be expected will 
not suffice  to solve the problem created by the high level of  the external debt. A solution is 
proposed on the lines of  the stabilization of  interest payments abroad. 
The debt crisis has revealed the existence of  a contradiction between the 
macroeconomic effects  of  the policies normally applied to close the external gap and 
ensure the payment of  the debt abroad and their effects  on the payment possibilities of 
the non-official  debtors. The current policies of  constraint, although they reduce, and 
even reverse, the deficit  on the balance-of-payments  current account, have negative 
microeconomic effects  on firms  and individuals, who find  it difficult  to maintain the 
punctual servicing of  their debts with institutions in their own country and abroad. Thus 
the problem of  the external debt extends to the national financial  system, affecting  its 
stability and thereby the whole process of  generation and transfer  of  savings. These 
aspects, and others relating to the financing  of  development, are now being explored 
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particularly those of  Raúl Prebisch and Andrés Bianchi. 
THE REVOLT OF THE BANKERS 
I 
Introduction 
The last ten years have witnessed profound  and rapid changes in the field  of  international 
financial  relations, extending from  the attempt to regulate the growth of  international 
liquidity in the second half  of  the 1960s to the official  acceptance of  freedom  in exchange 
matters at the beginning of  the second half  of  the 1970s. An important implication of 
these changes is that they have shifted  the main responsibility as regards exchange 
regulation. 
Thus, the system in force  since the end of  the Second World War placed the main 
responsibility for  the functioning  of  the system in the hands of  the monetary authorities, 
whereas in the present situation it is the private sector market and bodies, particularly the 
banks and the transnational enterprises, which play an accepted and decisive role in the 
short-term management of  exchange rates and the accumulation and disposal of 
international means of  payment. 
II 
The Bretton Woods system 
The earliest sporadic efforts  to organize some form  of  international monetary system to 
replace the gold standard date from  the period of  monetary disorder of  the 1930s, but the 
first  systematic proposals were made only in 1942, in government circles of  the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
These proposals were aimed at finding  a solution for  the monetary problems which 
were expected after  the Second World War. The studies and proposals were headed by 
Harry D. White of  the Department of  the Treasury of  the United States and by John M. 
Keynes in England. 
Less than three years had passed since the original proposal when the International 
Monetary and Financial Conference  of  the United Nations and their associates, meeting 
at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the United States, gave its approval to the new 
system. This was reflected  in the Articles of  Agreement of  the New International 
Monetary Fund, which were adopted at that conference  on 22 July 1944, came into force 
on 27 December 1945, and continued without changes for  almost 25 years.1 
1. The  problems  to be solved 
This international agreement pursued two main objectives: the correction of  balance-of-
payments problems and the creation and regulation of  international liquidity. 
As regards the first  point, the agreement laid down that a country could only vary 
the relationship of  its currency with gold, i.e., its "parity", when there were fundamental 
imbalances which could not be solved by any other means, and it placed emphasis on 
monetary and fiscal  policies. It was expected that, except in extreme cases, these would be 
successful  in adjusting the balance of  payments without any need to modify  parity. In 
order to ensure stable parity, the countries undertook to maintain their currencies within 
maximum limits of  variation of  one per cent above or below parity and to intervene in the 
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market to maintain those limits. Thus, through this relationship with gold, a relationship 
of  the various currencies among themselves was also established: the system of  exchange 
rates. 
Since the intervention was to be carried out with United States dollars, that country 
lost its freedom  to determine its own exchange rate. Indeed, the dollar exchange rate was 
simply the result of  the determination by the rest of  the member countries of  the system 
of  their own exchange rates with respect to the dollar. If  the United States had tried to 
establish a different  exchange rate, this would have led to a situation of  incompatibility of 
policies, so that country had to refrain  from  intervening in the market. It was, however, 
agreed to convert into gold, at the official  price of  35 dollars per troy ounce of  fine  gold, all 
dollars presented for  conversion by the monetary authorities of  the member countries. 
Thus, the dollar was the currency of  intervention and current use in international 
payments, the exchange rates of  the various currencies were established in relation to the 
dollar, and the dollar, in turn, anchored the system to gold. It was expected that the 
International Monetary Fund would recommend adjustment measures both for  countries 
with deficits  and those with surpluses in their international payments, and a system of 
medium-term loans was set up for  the countries which took adjustment measures, with 
the aim of  covering the period needed until those measures took effect. 
As regards the creation of  liquidity, the Articles of  Agreement of  the International 
Monetary Fund provided that this should be regulated through "uniform  changes in par 
values", which are no other but changes in the price of  gold, expressed in all currencies in 
the same proportion. This is the same thing as a change in the price of  gold in all 
currencies: more currency units for  the same quantity of  gold, thus increasing 
international liquidity, although naturally only in terms of  currencies and not of  gold. 
A second means of  modifying  international liquidity consisted of  the possible 
accumulation of  more gold in the vaults of  the Central Banks. Thus, the creation of 
international liquidity was linked to the total existing reserves of  gold, the annual 
production of  that metal, and its price in terms of  currency units. 
2. The  system in practice 
The economic conditions of  the countries at the end of  the Second World War were such 
that the dollar became the international means of  payment and the most sought-after 
currency for  accumulation. On the one hand the European countries needed to build up 
their reserves, while on the other, the rapid expansion of  world trade after  the war 
generated a growing need for  means of  payment. In order to accumulate these, the 
European countries maintained persistent surpluses on their international payments, 
which was only possible thanks to the persistent deficits  of  the United States, financed 
through the increase in the United States' short-term external liabilities. 
The foregoing  leads us up to one of  the great problems raised by the scheme devised 
at Bretton Woods: the lack of  incentives for  making adjustments in countries with 
persistent surpluses or countries able to finance  their deficits  with their own currency 
wich was accumulating abroad. Neither of  these types of  countries needed to have 
recourse to IMF financing,  and they were therefore  not subject to its discipline,2 which 
eventually applied in practice mainly to the countries with international payments 
deficits  and without reserve currency. 
Furthermore, the international liquidity requirements were being satisfied  through 
the accumulation of  dollars by the countries with surpluses, at the cost of  trasferring  real 
resources to the country issuing the reserve currency. 
The system therefore  contained three main shortcomings: a shortcoming as 
regards the stimuli for  making adjustments, which caused the burden of  these 
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adjustments to fall  on the countries which had deficits  and no reserve currency; a 
shortcoming as regards the obligation to intervene in currency markets which meant that 
the United States was exempted from  this requirement in return for  guaranteeing 
convertibility into gold, and a shortcoming as regards the generation of  liquidity, the cost 
of  which had to be paid by the rest of  the world to the issuing country. 
This last shortcoming calls for  a special explanation. When a country accumulates 
means of  payment from  abroad it does so by refraining  from  using those means of 
payment to obtain real resources from  other countries. For its part, the country which 
supplies the foreign  currency thus accumulated does so in exchange for  a good or service 
from  the country receiving the currency. Thus, a country which finances  its deficits  with 
its own currency is really changing that currency for  goods and services abroad. The 
country which accumulates such currency is supplying goods and services in exchange for 
it, so that there is a net flow  of  real resources from  the country which accumulates reserves 
towards the country which finances  its deficits.  The country issuing the currency is 
receiving seigniorage from  those accumulating it. 
Some of  the shortcomings mentioned above were solved more adequately in the 
plan put forward  by Keynes during the discussion on monetary reform  held in the last 
years of  the Second World War. This plan provided for  the establishment of  a clearing 
house which would act as a kind of  central bank of  the central banks and keep accounts of 
international transactions, just as a central bank keeps accounts of  the transactions 
between commercial banks. The plan provided for  interest to be collected both on 
negative and positive balances with the system, thus creating an incentive for 
adjustments not only by the debtor countries but also by the creditor countries. It limited 
both the positive and the negative balances to a certain maximum and suggested the 
creation by multilateral decision of  an international currency, "bancor", to provide the 
necessary international liquidity. It laid down certain conditions under which debtor 
countries had to devalue their currencies or creditor countries had to revalue theirs, and it 
permitted much greater exchange flexibility  than the agreement adopted at Bretton 
Woods, which was inspired by the ideas of  Harry D. White. The Keynes plan also 
proposed the creation of  an international investment organization to which automatic 
contributions would be made by countries with balance-of-payments  surpluses, an 
organization responsible for  regulating the cyclic variations in the prices of  primary 
commodities, and an international economic organization for  consultation and discussion 
on economic policy in the world. 
Both plans —that of  White and that of  Keynes— assigned great importance to the 
action of  the authorities in the functioning  of  the monetary system. This was clear both 
from  the multilateral body which was supposed to be set up and from  the policies whose 
application by governments was supposed to make exchange fluctuations  unnecessary or 
at least minimal. 
I l l 
The development and crisis of  the 
international monetary system 
After  the end of  the Second World War, the economies of  Europe and Japan began to 
recover from  the effects  of  the world conflict,  to grow more rapidly than the United States 
economy, arid to increase their productivity at a rapid rate. International trade expanded, 
and the demands on official  reserves increased. Private holdings of  international liquidity 
were of  no importance whatever: the rigidity of  exchange rates and the decreasing 
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importance of  exchange restrictions enabled the private sector to obtain the foreign 
exchange it needed from  the monetary authorities at a given price. Since there was no 
serious uncertainty about exchange rates and the money markets were relatively limited, 
there were no abrupt short-term international movements of  capital. 
1. The  development  of  the system 
A situation thus took shape in which the European countries and Japan registered 
continual balance-of-payments  surpluses and thus accumulated the reserves which they 
needed. The United States balance of  payments, for  its part, registered a persistent deficit, 
financed  by an increase in its external liabilities matching the accumulation of  dollars by 
the countries which had a surplus. 
Although the United States was not obliged to intervene in the markets to maintain 
the parity of  the dollar, the system did provide for  the convertibility into gold by the 
United States monetary authorities, on demand, of  the dollar balances of  official  currency 
holders. It was assumed that this convertibility would induce the United States to apply 
adjustment measures to its balance of  payments in view of  the sustained deficits  and the 
consequent accumulation of  dollars abroad. These incentives proved ineffective,  however, 
in view of  the vigorous world demand for  dollars with which to build up reserves. Already 
at the beginning of  the 1960s official  holdings of  dollars abroad exceeded the gold 
reserves of  the United States, and by the end of  1970 they came to 25 billion dollars3 
whereas in the same year the United States' holdings of  gold amounted to only 13.8 billion 
dollars.4 
As foreseen  by Robert Triffin,5  by the middle of  the 1950s the massive 
accumulation of  dollars outside the United States created a risk of  inconvertibility, since 
the monetary authorities of  that country would not have been able to convert most of  the 
official  foreign  holdings of  dollars if  these had been presented for  that purpose. 
2. The  symptoms of  the crisis 
The growing lack of  confidence  in the system led to the appearance of  various crisis 
symptoms. When doubts arose regarding the capacity (or the willingness) of  the United 
States to convert into gold the dollars accumulated abroad by official  holders, this caused 
an unstable situation in which rumours were responsible for  the movements of  the 
market. As far  back as I960 the price of  gold on the private market rose above 40 dollars 
per ounce, and this led Germany, Belgium, the United States, France, the Netherlands, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Switzerland to enter into an agreement to pool their gold 
reserves in order to keep the market price at not more than 35.20 dollars per ounce. In 
December 1967 the United States lost almost a billion dollars —some 750 tons of  fine 
gold at the official  price of  35 dollars per ounce— when there was a wave of  conversion of 
dollars into gold because of  the fear  that the United States exchange policy was likely to 
change. The losses continued in the early months of  1968, and in March the countries 
which had pooled their reserves declared that they would no longer support the price of 
gold on the free  market and that the official  price would be maintained only for 
transactions between central banks.6 
The heavy conversions of  dollars into gold in 1967, together with the growing 
accumulation of  dollars abroad in contrast with the limited gold reserves of  the United 
States, gave rise in the late 1960s to the generalized impression that the latter country 
would be obliged to apply adjustment measures to its economy in order to eliminate its 
balance-of-payments  deficit.  Such measures would bring about the closing down of  the 
main source of  new international liquidity, with the consequent danger that there would 
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be a shortage of  liquidity and a generalized tendency towards restrictions on foreign  trade. 
In view of  this prospect, the countries began to interest themselves in the possible 
creation of  a substitute for  the dollar as a means of  international liquidity, the idea being 
to determine the value of  that substitute by international agreement on the basis of  some 
reasonable estimate of  world liquidity requirements. 
This is how Special Drawing Rights, which were linked to gold at the same parity as 
the dollar and which it was hoped would become the main form  of  international reserve 
assets, were born. Special Drawing Rights correspond to accounting entries between the 
IMF and the participating countries, and each country is assigned a certain amount of 
these rights, which it can use to obtain convertible currency. Special Drawing Rights have 
no physical existence and can only be held and used by institutions which carry out the 
functions  of  central banks. The amendment to the Articles of  Agreement of  the 
International Monetary Fund which set up Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was adopted 
on 31 May 1968 and came into force  on 28 July 1969. This was the first  amendment to the 
Articles of  Agreement of  the Monetary Fund since these came into force  at the end of 
1945, almost 25 years before. 
The prophecies which had led to the establishment of  Special Drawing Rights 
were not fulfilled.  Not only did the United States balance-of-payments  deficits  continue, 
but there was also a big increase in the holdings of  dollars and other currencies outside the 
issuing countries, thus giving a strong impulse to the Eurocurrency market. 
Towards 1958 the Socialist countries, and especially the Soviet Union, began to 
deposit dollars in European banks to avoid possible action against them if  they deposited 
the money in the United States, and these deposits gave rise to credits in the same 
currency. A little earlier the United Kingdom had introduced restrictions on the pound 
sterling for  international trade purposes because of  a heavy external deficit.  These two 
facts  gave rise to the Eurodollar market, made up of  deposits in dollars outside the United 
States, both by central banks and governments and by commercial banks and other 
private bodies. Furthermore, as the international trade position of  currencies other than 
the dollar was strengthened, deposits and credits in these currencies also began to be 
made outside their country of  origin, thus diversifying  and expanding the Eurocurrency 
market. These deposits and credits are not subject to the regulations and restrictions of 
the countries issuing the respective currencies, nor are they generally subject to regulation 
in the recipient country, so the Eurocurrency market is the freest  and least regulated 
money market in the world. 
The increase in the private holdings of  foreign  currencies, their diversification  and 
the growing volume of  official  holdings brought still further  instability into the system. 
As soon as rumours of  some change in the parity of  a particular currency arose, this led to 
strong destabilizing movements of  capital. Because of  their magnitude, the monetary 
effects  of  such movements on the countries whose currencies were involved were 
impossible to compensate, even through non-traditional measures such as negative 
interest rates on deposits by aliens. Not even direct controls were sufficient  to stop the 
short-term capital movements, since these were able to assume forms  which were 
difficult  or impossible to control, such as deferred  or advance payments for  imports and 
exports. By means such as those indicated, the capital movements sometimes took place 
through current transactions, which, according to the Bretton Woods agreement, could 
not or rather should not be regulated through direct controls. 
3. Crisis  and confusion 
As the accummulation of  dollars in official  and private circles outside the United States 
continued, this in turn generated lack of  confidence  in the convertibility of  the dollar into 
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gold and gave rise to strongly destabilizing capital movements. In these circumstances, on 
15 August 1971 the United States Government officially  suspended the convertibility of 
the dollar into gold, thus breaking the very basis of  the monetary system set up at Bretton 
Woods. This date marks the final  crisis of  this system. 
After  this measure by the United States, there was great confusion  in the markets 
and repeated attempts to find  a new set of  parities capable of  being maintained. At the 
end of  1971, at a meeting held in the Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D.C., the 
highest financial  authorities of  11 industrial countries' agreed to vary the exchange rates 
of  their currencies by devaluing some of  them (mainly the dollar) and revaluing others, 
such as the Japanese yen and the German mark. In effect,  the devaluation of  the dollar 
represented an increase in the official  price of  gold from  35 to 38 dollars per ounce. At the 
same time, with the aim of  trying to cushion short-term capital movements, it was 
decided to expand the permissible margin of  fluctuation  of  the currencies each side of 
parity from  17c  to 2.259?. When it ratified  these agreements,8 the IMF created a new-
concept, that of  "central exchange rates". These, unlike the former  "parities", do not 
necessarily assume a relationship with gold, but rather with another currency or with 
Special Drawing Rights. 
The aim of  the expansion of  the permissible margins of  fluctuation  around parity 
or around the central rates was to establish an instrument which would cushion, through 
the functioning  of  the market forces,  the short-term capital movements recorded in the 
recent past. It was hoped that, by increasing from  2% to 4.5% the width of  the band 
within which the various currencies fluctuate  without it being necessary for  official 
intervention to take place to maintain the exchange rate, this would considerably weaken 
the incentive for  short-term capital movements. 
The new band was not sufficient  to achieve its purpose either, however, and 
scarcely six months after  the Smithsonian Agreement this had been completely smashed 
by events, while a very wide variety of  exchange systems had sprung up in the various 
countries. For reasons which will be analysed later, the majority of  the developing 
countries had no alternative but to link their currencies to that of  some industrial country 
with which they had important trade and capital transaction links. 
IV 
The "snake", the "tunnel" and floating 
The independent floating  of  the main currencies discourages economic integration to 
some extent, since it changes the degree of  protection agreed in advance for  each of  the 
economies which form  part of  an integration scheme with regard to the others. Such 
changes tend to create friction  between the countries and to weaken agreements which 
often  reflect  a delicate balance of  interests. 
Because of  their awareness of  this situation, and with the object of  continuing to 
advance towards their aims of  economic integration, a group of  European countries, 
basically those of  the European Economic Community, tried to find  ways of  limiting the 
relative fluctuations  between their currencies and agreed to set up a system under which 
they undertook not to allow the exchange rates to diverge from  each other by more than 
2.25% with respect to the central parities or exchange rates agreed upon. Consequently, 
the group of  currencies was to move more or less in unison within maximum margins of 
fluctuation  equal to half  the total margin of  4.50% permitted by the Smithsonian 
Agreement. Thus arose the "snake", made up of  the group of  European currencies which 
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fluctuated  less than the rest. The maximum margin of  fluctuation  of  4.50% was called the 
"tunnel", so that a monetary system was set up for  the major countries which consisted of 
a "snake in a tunnel". 
In practice, the maximum margin of  4.50% of  fluctuation  soon lost its validity, 
while some of  the members of  the "snake" abandoned and rejoined it according to 
circumstances.9 
Some countries such as Canada, the United States, Italy, Japan and the United 
Kingdom decided to allow their currencies to float  independently. This did not mean that 
their authorities gave up intervening in the market, but simply that they ceased to stick to 
any fixed  or previously revealed rules in this respect. Other countries fixed  their exchange 
rates with respect to a set of  currencies or to Special Drawing Rights and intervened in 
the market in order to maintain that rate, while others linked their currency to that of 
some other country. This latter category includes most of  the developing countries. 
Thus, the system of  parities established at Bretton Woods, which had operated for 
25 years, was replaced by a variety of  systems which reflected  the diversity of  interests and 
economic situations of  the countries. For some of  them, exchange rate floating  has proved 
a relatively efficient  solution, with relatively small alterations in exchange rates proving 
sufficient  to bring about corrective movements, but for  others floating  may involve a high 
economic and social cost. 
V 
To float  or not to float 
If  small exchange rate changes are sufficient  to bring about marked corrective movements 
in the balance of  payments, then countries would be well advised to allow their currencies 
to float  and the balance of  international payments would be facilitated  by only slight 
exchange rate modifications.  In contrast, if  severe exchange rate fluctuations  are required 
in order to bring about a given corrective movement in the balance of  payments, the 
countries probably would not be willing to allow their currencies to float  freely  or even 
with some degree of  intervention. At the same time, while the existence of  exchange 
markets —particularly for  future  transactions— enables exporters and importers to 
cover themselves against the risk of  exchange rate changes, if  such markets do not exist or 
if  their scale is very limited this makes such coverage more difficult.  Thus, a country 
where the existence of  well-developed money markets is accompanied by a relatively high 
elasticity of  response of  the balance of  payments to exchange rate movements will prefer 
the system of  floating  to other possible systems, whereas if  such markets do not exist and 
there is poor elasticity of  adjustment to exchange rate movements this will act as a 
considerable deterrent to floating. 
The responsiveness of  the balance of  payments to exchange rate movements will 
depend both on the price elasticities of  the demand for  imports and the supply of  exports 
and on the probable magnitude of  the changes in the conditions being faced  by the 
country. This probable magnitude will influence  the capital movements. 
The smaller the proportion of  imported products in the total and the more 
diversified  are both imports and national production, the greater will be the price 
elasticity of  the demand for  imports. Thus, for  example, a country which imports only a 
small proportion of  the total domestic supply of  particular products will find  that the 
elasticity of  demand for  imports goes up in inverse proportion to the share of  total 
demand, at each price, which is imported. 
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Furthermore, a country with diversified  production which generally exports 
domestic production surpluses that are relatively small compared with total production 
will find  that small exchange rate movements will suffice  to alter the price relationship 
between exported products and those consumed in the country; such alteration will be 
sufficient  to cause the changes in demand thus generated to absorb an appreciable 
proportion of  the exportable product or to increase considerably the balance available for 
export. 
If  these circumstances are present at the same time, then small variations in the 
exchange rate will produce substantial movements towards the adjustment of  the 
balance-of-payments  current account and, consequently, the probability that there will be 
very sharp changes in the exchange rate is only small. Moreover, if  it is unlikely that the 
external or internal conditions faced  by a country will change very substantially, then this 
set of  circumstances will mean that the changes to be expected in the exchange rate will 
only be small. This will have an influence  on capital movements, since limited 
movements in the domestic interest rates with respect to the external rates will be 
sufficient  to compensate for  possible gains through speculative transactions in 
connection with exchange rate changes.10 
Generally speaking, these conditions exist more markedly in the United States than 
in any of  the countries of  the European Economic Community taken separately. The 
European integration efforts,  however, together with the joint float  of  the European 
countries' currencies, mean that the comparison should not be with each country, but with 
the whole group of  countries. Viewed in this way, the countries of  the European 
Economic Community show conditions very similar to those of  the United States, so that 
the system of  floating  seems suitable for  both. 
For most of  the developing countries, in contrast, the situation is exactly the 
opposite. The price elasticity of  the demand for  imports is usually lower, since imported 
products normally represent a high proportion of  the total consumption, or such goods 
simply may not be produced in the country at all. The exports of  these countries, for  their 
part, are highly concentrated in just a few  goods, almost the entire production of  which is 
sold abroad. Consequently, on both the export and the import side, the change in the 
relative prices between products traded with the exterior and products used inside the 
country must be large in order to bring about an adjustment of  a given size. Thus, the 
probability of  large fluctuations  in the exchange rate is greater, since it is more difficult  to 
compensate the incentives for  capital movements through variations in interest rates. 
Furthermore, the developing countries do not have substantial foreign  exchange 
markets, and in most of  them there are no future  markets for  their currencies, so that it is 
not possible for  exporters and importers to cover themselves against foreign  exchange 
risks in the domestic markets. 
Moreover, in most of  the developing countries revenue from  taxes on export and 
import activities forms  an appreciable part of  fiscal  income, so that changes in exchange 
rates are also transmitted to the rest of  the economy through their repercussions on fiscal 
financing. 
To sum up, then, while currency floating  is a suitable possibility for  the United 
States and Europe it is the least attractive or most costly option for  most of  the developing 
countries. This is why the developing countries have not welcomed with any degree of 
enthusiasm the breakdown of  the Bretton Woods agreement, and why in general they 
have linked their currencies with those of  some industrial country with which they have 
substantial trade and financial  links. 
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VI 
The effect  of  floating  on the 
developing countries 
As we have seen, the developing countries have generally been impelled to link their 
currencies to those of  some industrial country with whom they trade. If  there is a 
fluctuation  in the mutual relationships of  these currencies, then there will be changes in 
the effective  exchange rate of  the developing country in the same direction as the 
movement in the main currency. It is to be expected that the movements of  the main 
currency will have a balancing effect  for  the country issuing that currency, but they will 
not necessarily have such an effect  from  the point of  view of  the developing country. 
In practice, the exchange rate variations required in order to achieve a balancing 
influence  on the balance of  payments of  a developing country are generally different  from 
those which would make possible a correction of  the international payments of  the 
industrial country to whose currency the developing country's currency has been linked. 
This unbalancing bias does not disappear even when the currency of  the developing 
country is linked to a group of  currencies of  industrial countries, since what interests every 
importer and exporter is the exchange rate of  the currency in which a transaction is being 
carried out, and not an average. The elimination of  this problem involves relatively 
frequent  adjustments to the exchange rate of  the developing country with respect to the 
main currency. While such changes are made in some countries,11 they are only possible in 
an inflationary  environment in which advantage can be taken of  the exchange rate 
movements made necessary by inflation  in order to move the real exchange rate also in 
the desired direction. In countries where the rate of  inflation  has been low for  a long 
period and where there is a tradition of  exchange rate stability, these frequent 
adjustments are often  politically impossible and may even be economically dangerous 
because of  the expectations which they may generate. 
Floating therefore  introduces an additional element of  risk into the external trade 
transactions of  the developing countries and consequently tends to reduce the volume of 
resources devoted to the production of  internationally saleable goods, since uncertainty is 
an additional cost in international transactions as compared with transactions on the 
domestic market. 
Some countries have tried to tackle these problems by changing the currency to 
which their own currency is linked. These changes cannot be made too frequently, 
however, since this would increase the risks involved in international transactions instead 
of  reducing them. 
VII 
The role of  private holdings of  foreign  currency 
in the generation and transmission 
of  international imbalances 
While there is no clear proof  of  this, it might be expected that the floating  of  the main 
currencies would reduce the demand for  reserves for  the purpose of  intervention by the 
authorities, as compared with the demand generated under a system of  fixed  parities. In 
this latter system, the private sector can minimize the balances which it maintains in 
foreign  currencies, since it is possible to obtain such currencies at any moment from  the 
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monetary authorities. The latter bear the entire responsibility as regards intervention in 
the markets, particularly when only a small fluctuation  is permissible around the 
established exchange rate. In a system of  floating  exchange rates, in contrast, the task of 
intervening in the market falls  entirely or partially on the private sector. When a 
perfectly  clean float  is involved, i.e., when the official  sector never intervenes in the 
market, the responsibility of  the private sector is complete, whereas when the monetary 
authority aims to regulate exchange rate fluctuations  in some manner through its own 
intervention the responsibility of  the private sector is partial. 
At all events, whether the monetary authorities do not intervene at all or intervene 
partially in the market, floating  creates a stimulus for  private intervention in the 
exchange markets with a view to reducing variations in exchange rates or else spreading 
them Over a period of  time. 
The private sector must accumulate stocks of  the foreign  exchange in which it is to 
intervene in order to play a part in the markets and thus try to reduce uncertainty about 
the exchange rates. Naturally, the bigger this accumulation of  foreign  exchange, the 
bigger will be the effect  which the action of  the private sector can have on the exchange 
markets, since when it has its own resources this sector is less vulnerable to control or 
regulatory measures that may be adopted by the authorities. 
Consequently, it may be expected as a result of  floating  that there will be a reduction 
in the official  demand for  reserves and an increase in the private demand for  these. 
On the other hand, the greater the diversity of  currencies which are of  importance 
i n the international market, the greater must be the diversity of  the reserve holdings, both 
official  and private, if  there are changes in the exchange rates of  these currencies. Such 
diversification  may tend to make exchange rates more volatile by creating opportunities 
for  speculative movements among the various currencies accepted in international 
payments. This is particularly so when a considerable part of  the accumulation of  reserve 
currencies is concentrated in the private sector, since the official  sector may be expected to 
be less sensitive to the possibility of  speculative gains. 
For the private sector this generates a problem of  the composition of  assets, which 
may be dealt with through the well-known models of  the composition of  these. If  we 
follow  the logic of  these models, we may conclude that when the private sector 
accumulates foreign  currency it does so by disposing of  other forms  of  assets, including 
national currency. Thus, the private accumulation of  foreign  currency may generate 
pressures similar to those produced when the accumulation takes place in the official 
sector. Whereas in the latter case there would be an issue of  money for  the purchase of 
foreign  currency, in the former  case there would be a reduction in the demand for  other 
assets, including money, matching the total demand for  foreign  currency. 
Let us suppose, for  example, that starting from  a situation of  equilibrium there is a 
deficit  in the United States balance of  payments, measured in terms of  liquidity, although 
the equilibrium of  the balance is maintained when measured in terms of  official 
transactions.12 This equilibrium will be maintained as long as there is no official 
intervention, but the absence of  intervention will not guarantee equilibrium in the 
balance of  payments measured in terms of  liquidity. 
In the example described, additional balances of  dollars in the hands of  the private 
sector would be building up abroad, thus generating inflationary  pressures towards the 
exterior. Through this mechanism, the disequilibrium in the United States balance of 
payments would be transmitted to the rest of  the world, even if  the exchange rates were 
floating. 
Naturally, the process of  transmission also functions  through the exchange rates. A 
devaluation will produce an increase in the cost of  imported products and will also apply 
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upward pressure to the domestic prices of  exported goods, thus causing an increase in the 
average domestic prices, whereas revaluation will not produce a similar reduction in these 
prices, because prices do not go down as easily as they go up. It will thus be observed that 
the system of  exchange rate floating  contains an inflationary  element even when, over a 
long period of  time, the average exchange rate remains constant. There are those who 
assert that this bias towards inflation  is increased by the fact  that exchange rate floating 
conceals behind the movements of  the exchange rate the unbalancing effects  of  domestic 
policies, so that it reduces the incentive to apply anti-inflationary  policies. 
To sum up, there are various ways in which an imbalance can be transmitted 
internationally, even with completely floating  exchange rates. 
VIII 
The reform  of  the system 
The breakdown of  the international monetary system in 1971 immediately generated 
greater interest in the discussions about its reform.  Although some economists had long 
ago drawn attention to the need to make changes in the system. These proposals had 
taken shape only in the creation of  Special Drawing Rights. The rest of  the features  of  the 
system had remained completely untouched until their complete breakdown. 
The existing institutional machinery did not facilitate  the study of  a broad type of 
monetary reform  in which the participants would be not only the most important 
industrial countries, but also the rest of  the members of  IMF, including the developing 
countries. The Board of  Governors of  the Fund, its highest authority, was not a suitable 
mechanism for  the study and discussion of  such a complex problem, as it was difficult  both 
to arrange for  relatively frequent  meetings of  over 120 Governors and to organize a 
fruitful  discussion in such a large assembly. In view of  this, the Executive Directors of  the 
IMF proposed to the Board of  Governors the establishment of  a committee of  20 
Governors representing the various countries or geographical areas of  the world: with a 
small Executive Secretariat and through frequent  technical-level meetings this could take 
upon itself  the study of  monetary reform.  This Committee, which was set up with the 
name of  the Committee of  20, worked in 1972 and 1973 to prepare the bases for  the future 
monetary reform. 
The Committee of  20 tried to conceive the basic characteristics of  a monetary 
system of  the future  which could solve in a suitable manner both the problems of 
adjusting the balance of  payments and those of  creating liquidity. The Committee agreed 
on the need to ensure greater similarity between the adjustment obligation of  countries 
which had deficits  and those which had surpluses and on the desirability of  ensuring 
better control of  the creation of  liquidity. There was general agreement that the Special 
Drawing Rights should be the centre of  the monetary system, thus replacing gold, and 
that it was desirable to set up a system of  stable but adjustable parities. 
The Committee of  20 was subsequently replaced by what was known as the Interim 
Committee,15 which was the forerunner  of  another committee later set up as a permanent 
organ of  IMF through an amendment to its Articles. This Interim Committee ratified  the 
basic characteristics of  the system as agreed in the Committee of  20, although it changed 
the approach of  its work somewhat. It devoted itself  essentially to determining what 
amendments should be made immediately to the Articles of  Agreement of  the Fund with 
a view to establishing some legal basis for  the functioning  of  the international monetary 
system. At the Fifth  Meeting of  the Interim Committee of  the Board of  Governors of  IMF 
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on the international monetary system held in Jamaica in January 1976, it gave its final 
backing to a set of  new measures which substantially modified  the Articles of  Agreement 
of  the Fund.14 
IX 
The developing countries, the amendments to the 
Articles of  Agreement of  the IMF, and the 
agreements of  the Jamaica Meeting15 
The amendments to the Articles of  Agreement of  the IMF approved at the Jamaica 
Meeting refer  to five  basic aspects of  the monetary system: the function  of  gold, the 
exchange system, Special Drawing Rights, the operations and transactions of  the Fund, 
and its institutional structure. 
1. Gold  in the reformed  monetary system 
The new measures mean the abolition of  the official  price of  gold and of  the set of  rules 
designed to enforce  that official  price, including the end of  the limitations of  central banks 
or monetary authorities on free  operations in the gold market. Without an official  price, 
gold ceases to be the centre of  the monetary system, since these measures eliminate all 
predetermined links between gold and currencies. Gold thus comes to play within the 
monetary system, the same role as any other non-perishable product, the only difference 
being that this metal has a very generalized acceptance. 
Generally speaking, the Fund is authorized to sell gold at a price linked to the 
market price in exchange for  currencies, subject to certain limitations and after 
consultation with the country whose currency is being acquired in exchange for  gold. The 
Fund is also authorized to sell gold to the countries which were members on 31 August 
1975, in proportion to their memebership quotas at that date, in exchange for  their own 
currencies and at the official  price. 
Every time that the Fund sells gold at the market price it must pay into its General 
Account the proportion correspondig to the official  price, while the surplus must be paid 
into a Special Disbursement Account serving to pay both for  ordinary operations and for 
financing  special operations not considered in the Articles of  Agreement, including 
possible direct distribution of  the money to the developing countries in proportion to 
their quotas. When special operations are involved, these must be approved by the Board 
of  Governors with a majority of  85% of  the voting power. 
By eliminating the official  price of  gold, the system of  parities based on gold 
disappears not only de  facto  but also de  jure so that the need arises for  a new exchange 
system. 
2. The  exchange system 
The changes in the exchange system provide that every country can use the system of  its 
choice: floating,  frequent  gradual adjustments, joint floats  with other currencies, fixed 
exchange rates with respect to the intervention currency, Special Drawing Rights or a 
group of  various currencies, or such other systems as may be adopted by the central banks. 
It is specified,  however, that whatever the system used, the Fund shall exercise general 
supervision of  the functioning  of  the systems in use, in order to ensure the collaboration 
of  their members with a view to solving any problems which may arise. 
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In other words, the new articles of  the Fund do not establish ah exchange system 
but rather simply give their sanction to the existing situation,16 although they do 
authorize the Fund to restore a system of  parities whose basis is described only in general 
outline. Thus, the draft  states that, with a majority of  85 % of  the voting power, the Fund 
can decide that the international economic conditions permit the introduction of  a 
general foreign  exchange system based on "stable but adjustable" parities which may be 
established in terms of  Special Drawing Rights or of  some other common denominator 
which is neither gold nor national currencies. They also provide that the maximum and 
minimum exchange rates for  spot transactions between the currency of  one country and 
those of  others which maintain this system of  parities may not differ  by more than 4%, 
although this margin can be changed by the Fund subject to an 85 % majority vote. Since 
these parities are not expressed on the basis of  currencies, the margin is applied in the 
same way to all of  them.17 
In order to be able to restore the system of  parities, in addition to the 85% voting 
majority required, the Fund must take account of  the situation of  the world economy, 
particularly as regards the generation of  liquidity and the process of  adjustment. As 
regards the former,  it was hoped that there would be good control of  the growth of 
international liquidity, and as regards the latter it was hoped that arrangements would 
come into effect  under which both members in surplus and members in deficit  in their 
balances of  payments would take "prompt, effective  and symmetrical action" to achieve 
adjustment. The Fund must also make its determination on the basis of  the underlying 
stability of  the world economy, taking into account price movements and rates of 
expansion in the economies of  its member countries. 
3- Special  Drawing  Rights 
The amendments connected with the characteristics and use of  Special Drawing Rights 
are designed to make these the main reserve asset of  the international monetary system. 
They put an end to the link between Special Drawing Rights and gold and authorize the 
Fund to determine the mode of  valuing them and even make substantial changes in the 
systems of  valuation. In general terms, they maintain the provisions which limit the use 
of  Special Drawing Rights to situations of  need rather than cases where there is simply a 
desire to change the structure of  a country's reserves. The principle of  "designation" is 
preserved, whereby the Fund can designate a country to provide currency in exchange for 
Special Drawing Rights, provided that the country's reserve position is sufficiently 
strong. In addition, the majority needed for  modifying  or eliminating the obligation to 
reconstitute funds  is reduced.18 
The limitations on the rate of  interest payable on Special Drawing Rights are 
eliminated, and gold is eliminated as a means of  payments for  obtaining Special Drawing 
Rights in order to pay the charges applied. The countries participating in the Special 
Drawing Account undertake to collaborate to ensure that SDRs are converted into the 
principal asset of  the international monetary system. In addition it is laid down that 
countries may pay the Fund in currencies of  other member countries in exchange for 
Special Drawing Rights, provided that the countries issuing the currency in question are 
agreeable to the transaction. 
4. The  operations  of  the Fund  and its  institutional  structure 
The new articles also provide for  modernization of  the operations and transactions of  the 
Fund and expansion of  the categories covered by them and facilitate  the use of  the Fund's 
resources to finance  contributions to international buffer  stocks of  primary commodities; 
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in addition, it is hoped that the IMF will use its holdings of  all currencies in its operations, 
and not just its holdings of  some of  them, as occurs at present: the concept of  "currency 
convertible in fact"  is replaced by that of  "freely  usable currency". 
As regards the institutional structure of  the Fund, the new articles authorize the 
Board of  Governors of  the Fund to set up, as a new IMF body, a Council of  Governors to 
serve as an organ of  analysis and discussion of  a political nature which will be more 
flexible  and efficient  than the Board itself.  The Council will have as many members as 
there are Executive Directors of  the Fund, and these members will be elected by the same 
countries or groups of  countries which elect the Executive Directors. 
5. Other decisions  of  the Interim  Committee 
In addition to approving the amendments to the Articles of  Agreement of  the IMF, the 
Jamaica Meeting of  the Interim Committee ratified  the decision to sell one-sixth (some 25 
million ounces) of  the Fund's gold holdings by public auction over a period of  four  years 
and to devote all the profits  thus produced to the developing countries both by directly 
supplying them with a proportion of  the profits  corresponding to their quotas and 
through the formation  of  a special aid fund  for  developing countries which are going 
through difficult  conditions. In the latter case, the per capita income of  the member 
country in question will be taken into account.19 
The meeting also ratified  the decision to provide each member country, in 
exchange for  payment in its own currency, with a proportion corresponding to that 
country's quota of  an additional amount of  25 million ounces of  gold, valued at the official 
price of  0.888671 grams of  fine  gold per SDR unit. 
At the Jamaica Meeting, the Interim Committee endorsed the IMF Executive 
Directors' proposals for  a global increase of  32.5% in the quotas of  member countries.20 
This increase would be so distributed that it would double the proportion of  quotas 
accounted for  by the oil-exporting countries (from  5% to 10% of  the total), the 
proportion of  the other developing countries would remain the same, while that of  the 
industrial countries would be reduced. At the same time, the Committee decided to 
support the proposal for  a 45 % increase in each of  the credit tranches of  the Fund as a 
temporary measure until the increase in the quotas came into effect. 
In addition, the Committee noted with satisfaction  the decision of  the Executive 
Directors of  the Fund to modify  the arrangements for  compensatory financing  to make 
up for  temporary shortfalls  in export incomes. These modifications  will liberalize the 
system and enable more account to be taken of  the most recent developments, including 
the price increases recorded in international trade. 
6. Effects  on the developing  countries 
Out of  this set of  decisions, the most noteworthy because of  their effect  on the developing 
countries in general and the Latin American countries in particular are those connected 
with the abolition of  the official  price of  gold, the use of  all currencies in operations and 
transactions, the acceptance of  the existence of  multiple foreign  exchange systems, the 
changes made in the compensatory financing  facility,  the temporary increase in the credit 
tranches of  the Fund, and the establishment of  a Trust Fund.21 
First of  all, the abolition of  the official  price of  gold means in practice —as long as 
its general acceptance lasts— an increase in that price. Market prices already influenced 
the decisions of  the central banks in the past, but the freedom  to carry out gold 
transactions at market prices gives official  sanction to the consideration of  gold at higher 
prices than the official  rate of  1 SDR unit per 0.888671 grams of  fine  gold (equivalent to 
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about 42 dollars per ounce). In reality; the Fund had already agreed with at least one 
member country that the member could value its gold reserves, for  domestic purposes, at 
a higher price than the official  figure. 
A higher price for  gold means an increase in liquidity as expressed in terms of 
currency, in proportion to countries' gold holdings. Since there is uncertainty about the 
market price, however, it is probable that in measuring the liquidity created it will be 
necessary to reduce the apparent result by a certain amount in order to take this 
uncertainty into account. 
If  a difference  in price of  60 dollars per ounce is assumed between the official  price 
and the market price, the legitimation of.  the latter price for  official  operations will, if  the 
proposed amendments to the Articles of  Agreement are approved, affect  the conduct of 
official  holders of  gold. If,  in view of  the uncertainty about the market price, the profit 
margin influencing  the decisions of  these official  holders of  gold is reduced to a figure  of 
50 dollars, the resultant increase in liquidity would be some 50 billion dollars. Out of  this 
total, no more than 2.6 billion dollars would correspond to the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries.22 
Moreover, the provisions concerning the Fund's use of  all currencies in its 
operations mean that use will also be made of  the currencies of  the developing countries, 
which are not generally considered reserve currencies and will therefore  be converted into 
such currencies. The reserves of  the developing countries would thus be committed to 
some extent, although exactly how much is difficult  to specify.25 
The new agreements would probably also have other longer term but perhaps more 
important effects  on the developing countries. The endorsement of  floating  as a system 
might oblige countries to diversify  their reserve currency holdings, thus reducing instead 
of  increasing the importance of  Special Drawing Rights. For the developing countries, 
whose currencies will not generally be accumulated by other countries, these holdings 
could signify  an extra cost in terms of  resources delivered in exchange for  the currencies of 
the other countries which are being accumulated. This cost is also difficult  to estimate in 
advance, and its measurement will have to await the course of  events. 
Moreover, as already noted, floating  does in itself  impose an additional cost on most 
of  the developing countries which, because of  the lack of  exchange markets for 
transactions in their currencies or because of  the small size of  such markets, are obliged to 
link their currencies to those of  some other country or group of  countries with which they 
trade. Naturally, if  floating  manages to minimize the fluctuations  in the international 
trade of  the developed countries it will in this way have a positive effect  on the developing 
countries, but what has been observed so far  does not seem to point in this direction. 
The changes made in the compensatory financing  facility  enable the developing 
countries to use it more easily,24 and the estimates made by IMF seem to indicate that these 
countries would be able to draw on about 1 billion dollars in this way in 1976.25 Assuming 
net increases of  1 billion dollars per year until the figure  of  an additional 5 billion dollars is 
reached, the current value of  this greater access to credit, calculated at an actualization rate 
of  7 % per year, would be less than 4.4 billion dollars. 
The temporary 45 % increase in the credit tranches of  the Fund also represents an 
increase in the resources at the disposal of  all member countries: in this way, the 
developing countries could obtain some 500 million dollars in 1976.26 If  it is assumed that 
these countries will be able to count on net increases of  500 million dollars per year under 
this heading until the figure  of  2 billion dollars is reached, then the present value of  such 
resources, also at an actualization rate of  7 % per year would be some 1.8 million dollars. 
Finally, the Trust Fund could mean an additional contribution in favour  of  the 
poorest developing countries of  400 to 500 million dollars. 
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The liberalization of  the compensatory financing  facility  and the temporary 
increase in the credit tranches would thus mean some 5.2 million dollars more for  the 
non-oil-exporting developing countries, measured in terms of  the present value of  the 
sums involved. The freeing  of  the price of  gold and the establishment of  the Trust Fund 
would represent about an extra 3 billion dollars. 
At the same time, however, the termination of  the Oil Facility would mean the loss 
of  rights to draw resources amounting to some 2.8 billion dollars, which is the present 
value of  the drawings by developing countries made or approved in 1974, 1975 and 
1976.27 
The developing countries are also affected  by the greater need to adjust their 
economies to cope with the fluctuations  of  the main currencies and the need to accumulate 
additional currencies in their reserves. For the developed countries, in contrast, floating 
seems to solve some problems of  capital movements which would be difficult  to handle by 
other means, while the accumulation of  currencies by these countries is compensated 
because each of  them accumulates the currencies of  the others. Thus, in net terms, the 
accumulation of  currencies by the developing countries signifies  the absorption by them 
of  currencies issued by the developed countries. 
Moreover, the developed countries and the oil-exporting countries will receive an 
increase in their liquidity, measured in terms of  currency, of  some 48 billion dollars, while 
they will also have the possibility of  using the expanded credit tranches of  the Fund, 
which may signify  a current value of  some 5.6 billion dollars more, thus making a total of 
about 53.6 billion dollars. Furthermore, these countries will no longer have to contribute 
to the financing  of  the Oil Facility, which involved (after  deduction of  the drawings made 
by developed countries) the provision by them of  financing  with a current value of  some 
2.8 billion dollars. Their total benefits  thus rise to some 56.4 billion dollars. 
MEASURABLE  EFFECTS OF THE REFORM OF THE MONETARY  SYSTEM 
AND OTHER AGREEMENTS BY THE FUND ON THE DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES AND OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES OF IMF 
CBillions  of  dollars) 
Non-oil-exporting 
developing  Other members 
countries 
Compensatory financing  4 387 " — 
Credit Tranches 1 812* 5 616c 
Gold* 3 000 48 000 
Oil' -2 757 +2 757 
Total 6 442 56 373 
"Calculated on the assumption that only the non-oil-exporting developing countries make use of  this facility.  The 
calculations also assume that there will be a net increase in drawings of  1 billion dollars per year for  five  years and that 
from  then on there will be no net increases. In order to work out the present value, an actualization rate of  1% per year 
was used. 
'Calculated on the assumption that there will be a net increase in drawings by the developing countries of  500 million 
dollars per year until a total of  2 billion dollars is reached. 
'Calculated on the assumption that there will be a net increase in the drawings by the other member countries of  2 billion 
- dollars per year until a total of  6 billion dollars is reached. 
Calculated on the assumption of  a gain of  50 dollars per ounce in the price of  gold kept as reserves. 
'The effective  data were actualized at the rate of  7% per year. 
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As may be seen from  the following  table, the quantifiable  effects  of  the Jamaica 
agreements and the other measures adopted by the Fund represent resources worth 
almost 64 billion dollars, of  which only 10% corresponds to the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries, although these countries contribute 22% of  the quotas of  the Fund 
and generate at least 15% of  the total national product of  the Fund members. 
X 
The effects  of  the present situation 
on the future  system 
The objective which should be achieved by a new international monetary system and 
which had been endorsed at various ministerial-level international meetings are those of 
reducing the role of  gold in the system, making Special Drawing Rights the central 
element, achieving suitable control of  the expansion of  liquidity, and ensuring 
symmetrical incentives for  adjustments by both deficit  and surplus countries. Another 
objective which has been mentioned is that of  achieving a system of  stable but adjustable 
parities: more stable than the present exchange rates, but also more easily adjustable than 
the old parities. The strategy selected for  achieving these objectives is that of  gradual 
evolution in order thus to ensure that every further  step is taken only when the general 
economic circumstances make this possible. 
Today, however, the situation of  the system seems to be pointing, as we shall see, in 
a different  direction from  that indicated. At present, a group of  industrial countries has 
agreed on a joint float  of  their currencies, while those of  other industrial countries float 
independently and the vast majority of  the developing countries have linked their 
currencies to those of  one or other of  the industrial countries. 
The joint floating  of  a group of  currencies calls for  official  intervention in order to 
maintain each of  them within the limits which have been accepted by the group. This 
intervention calls for  the constant use of  the various currencies which make up the group 
and for  financing  which is generally obtained through some form  of  mutual credit 
support between the central banks. While the financing  needs would be very small or zero 
in the long term if  the system were stable, this stability is nevertheless not guaranteed, 
and at the same time there is a short-term need for  financial  resources in order to 
intervene. Naturally, this intervention is carried out with the use of  currencies, and not of 
other international assets. 
Moreover, the group of  currencies which float  together moves, with respect to the 
currencies which are floating  independently, in a direction which is generally balanced for 
the group of  countries involved, although not necessarily for  each individual country. If 
this is a free  or "clean" float,  the authorities do not need to intervene in the markets. From 
this point of  view, while the authorities need to possess resources in order to intervene in 
order to maintain the exchange rates within the limits agreed by the group of  countries 
whose currencies are floating  together, they do not need to intervene in respect of  any 
currencies outside the group. In this case, however, as already stated, there will be 
incentives for  the private sector to intervene in the markets of  the currencies which are 
floating,  and this sector will consequently have to accumulate currencies with which to 
intervene. 
The developing countries, for  their part, which are generally forced  to link their 
currencies to those of  some industrial countries, have to accept unlimited intervention by 
their central banks in order to maintain the exchange rate fixed  in respect of  the currency 
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to which they are linked. Since this link can produce destabilizing effects  it may also 
increase the need for  official  reserves in order to intervene. Thus, considerations of 
uncertainty will assuredly lead the central banks of  the developing countries, like other 
holders of  foreign  currencies, to diversify  their holdings. 
This situation has various effects  on the demand for  reserves. As already stated, the 
monetary authorities of  the countries whose currencies are floating  together cover their 
requirements for  the intervention financing  needed to maintain the exchange rates 
prevailing between them through a system of  mutual credits, so that the net demand for 
additional reserves by the group for  this purpose will be close to zero. Moreover, the 
floating  with respect to the other main currencies will tend to diminish their demand for 
reserves and to change the composition of  such reserves in favour  of  a larger 
accumulation of  the currencies of  the countries outside the group which are accepted as an 
international means of  payment. The private sector, for  its part, will display a bigger 
demand for  currency with which to carry out the sector's expanded intervention in the 
currency markets. 
It is difficult  to gauge the relative effect  of  these influences  in view of  the limited 
number of  observations available and the fact  that the float  has not been really clean. It is 
possible, however, to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the real transfers  of 
resources implicit in the accumulation of  reserves. The incentives which are inherent in 
the system seem to point towards a slight reduction in the official  demand for  reserves in 
those countries whose currencies are floating,  as against an increase —sometimes 
considerable— in private demand. At all events, the countries whose currencies are used 
in international transactions will observe that the increase in holdings of  the currencies of 
other countries is compensated, at least partly, by the increase in holdings of  their own 
currency by other countries. 
In the case of  the countries whose currencies are floating  jointly, it may be hoped 
that, if  the system is stable, the purchases and sales of  each particular currency will tend to 
cancel each other out in the long run. Consequently, for  the countries whose currencies are 
used in international trade, any additional accumulation of  reserves will take place 
without real transfers  of  resources or else with very small transfers.  This contrasts with 
the situation before  1970, when the European group of  countries accumulated the dollar 
without the United States having to accumulate European currencies. As a result of  these 
influences,  there will be a relative increase in the demand for  currency compared with 
other reserve assets, and particularly compared with Special Drawing Rights. 
In the developing countries, the demand for  official  reserves will tend to increase 
because of  the additional requirements for  adjustment created by the linking of  their 
currencies to another floating  currency. This accumulation will take place without 
compensation, since the other countries will not accumulate the currencies of  the 
developing countries.28 Consequently, these countries will accumulate reserves at the cost 
of  transferring  real resources to the countries whose currency they are accumulating. A 
link is thus established between the generation of  liquidity and the transfer  of  real 
resources, but it is a link which operates in the opposite direction to that which is desired: 
resources are transferred  from  the developing countries to those whose currency is 
accumulated. 
This analysis enables us to conclude that the international monetary system does 
not help to strengthen the role of  Special Drawing Rights. The requirements for  reserves 
for  the purpose of  public or private intervention are concentrated essentially in the main 
currencies. If  there is any increase in the demand for  reserves, it will be an increase in the 
demand for  currencies, and not for  Special Drawing Rights. Although in the industrial 
countries there may be a reduction in the demand for  reserves by the official  sector, there 
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can be no doubt that there will be an increase in the demand by the private sector, which 
requires currency for  its action and cannot, by the very nature and characteristics of  these 
instruments, use Special Drawing Rights for  this purpose. Thus, in these countries the 
main effect  will probably be that of  a change in the composition of  the overall reserves, 
both public and private, in favour  of  currencies and to the prejudice of  Special Drawing 
Rights. 
The same is not necessarily true of  the developing countries, since the greater 
adjustment requirements created by the floating  of  the currencies to which the 
developing countries' own currencies are linked will generate a bigger demand for  official 
reserves. This bigger demand for  reserves could also be reflected  in an increase in the 
demand for  Special Drawing Rights, but because of  its small size this is not likely to 
increase the importance of  the latter in the international monetary system. Thus, the role 
of  Special Drawing Rights in the system may well be reduced instead of  increased, even if 
these are maintained as a useful  unit of  account. 
It should be stressed that the function  of  Special Drawing Rights as a unit of 
account, important though it may be, does not endow these instruments with a central 
role in the system, since the same unit of  account could be constructed with a group of 
currencies, without any reference  to Special Drawing Rights. 
The greater the importance of  currencies as a reserve instrument, and the greater 
the proportion of  private holdings in the total, the more difficult  it will be to achieve 
suitable regulation of  the growth of  international reserves. On the one hand, the 
accumulation of  currencies will depend on the economic policy of  each country, and not on 
a rational collective decision, and on the other hand, the action of  the private sector may 
help to create or destroy international means of  payment through the operation of  the 
banking systems, thus introducing into the picture an additional element which is 
extremely difficult  to manage. 
In the Eurocurrency market, a banking multiplier is in operation which is similar to 
that which exists in any national banking system with fractional  reserves.29 In national 
banking systems, the decisions of  the private sector —banks, enterprises and 
individuals— as regards the reserves to be maintained to cope with possible withdrawals 
of  deposits and as regards the preferred  composition of  currency holdings will determine 
the capacity of  the banking system to create more or less money. The same elements 
operate in the Eurocurrency market, with the difference  that generally there are no 
minimum legal cash requirements which tend to impose a relatively low limit on the 
banking muliplier. At all events, private decisions can reduce or increase the total volume 
of  deposits of  Eurocurrencies as well as cause changes in their composition. If  private 
holdings grow sufficiently,  then it will be the action of  the private sector which 
predominates in matters of  intervention, and there will be no guarantee whatever that 
this will take place with suitable attention to the international adjustment requirements. 
At the same time, the private sector can now evade the monetary and credit policies 
of  the national central banks more easily than ever by the simple expedient of  operating 
through banks located outside the national frontiers.  The veritable revolution which has 
taken place as regards private international financing  means that it is now much more 
difficult  for  the monetary authorities of  the countries to control the domestic monetary 
and credit situation. The private sector is therefore  now at the centre of  the international 
monetary machinery. 
Generally speaking, then, the countries which are of  greatest importance in 
international trade feel  quite comfortable  about the floating  of  currencies, and their 
demand for  Special Drawing Rights tends to go down, while the influence  of  the private 
sector tends to increase, thus solving the floating  requirements. 
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For the developing countries, in contrast, floating  is a costly business, and in order 
to obtain additional liquidity resources they are obliged to transfer  real resources in 
exchange. As these countries are not sufficiently  important in quantitative terms in 
international transactions and their power of  decision at the international level is rather 
limited, it is unlikely that their interests will predominate over those of  the industrial 
countries, so that it can hardly be expected that the stated objectives of  monetary reform 
will be fulfilled.  Furthermore, the influence  of  private decisions on exchange and credit 
matters has come to be decisive. 
XI 
Conclusions 
As will be gathered from  the analysis made in the foregoing  pages, the short-term 
situation is that the importance of  Special Drawing Rights tends to go down, while that of 
currency floats  tends to increase, as does the importance of  certain individual currencies in 
international trade. At the same time, the authority of  the body responsible for 
supervising the entire system diminishes, while the role of  private decisions and actions 
in the adjustment process is increased. 
In this latter aspect, the private banks and bankers which operate in the 
international financial  field  have ever-increasing responsibilities. Their future 
expectations tend to make themselves come true, consequently provoking devaluations or 
revaluations if  a devaluation or revaluation is what they expect. Thus, they have come to 
play a leading role in exchange fluctuations  and in the international adjustment process. 
The private sector is more sensitive than the official  sector to variations in relative 
interest rates or expected exchange rates, so that the extraordinary volume now assumed 
by private holdings of  foreign  currencies introduces a dangerous element of  instability 
into the picture. In addition, the changes in the desired composition of  the assets and 
liabilities of  the private sector may lead to important effects  on global internal demand. 
Because of  this, the existing situation is not stable. It could lead to repeated crises 
and consequently bring about desirable modifications  in the system, but such an effect 
would not be achieved through a peaceful  evolution, but through the growing 
dissatisfaction  caused by the crises. 
As an illustration of  this, the case of  "snake" is particularly interesting. Because of 
the conditions in which the world economy is evolving, the continued existence of  the 
"snake" is only possible as a result of  frequent  adjustments in the parities or central rates 
of  the countries making up this system, or successive withdrawals and re-entries into the 
group, that is to say, frequent  crises in the mechanism. 
It would seem that only repeated crises in the international financial  field  could 
finally  bring about the achievement of  the objectives considerd desirable. The highest 
authorities of  the member countries of  IMF have agreed that it is necessary to have stable 
but adjustable exchange rates, and to reduce the importance of  currencies while increasing 
that of  Special Drawing Rights in international payments. The present situation, 
however, is leading in exactly the opposite direction. 
It is not even possible to achieve the objective of  regulating the expansion of 
international liquidity in the present circumstances. The growing influence  of  private 
transactions in the international monetary markets30 makes it practically impossible to 
exercise adequate control over international liquidity, yet this is necessary in order to 
guarantee the sustained development of  international trade without inflationary  or 
depressive pressures. Such control calls for  greater influence  by the official  sector and by 
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the international organizations, including suitable regulation of  the Eurocurrency 
markets. In this aspect also, however, the tendency has been in the opposite direction. 
In short, either the true objectives sought in the international financial  field  are not 
those which have so far  been accepted internationally, or else the procedures adopted in 
order to try to achieve them are not the right ones. 
NOTES 
' An excellent description of  the various proposals made, the debates which took place and the 
negotiations which led to the Bretton Woods agreement may be found  in Y. Keith Horsefield,  The 
International  Monetary  Fund  1945-1965, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 1969. 
2 Except, in the case of  the former,  for  the possibility that their currency might be declared a "scarce 
currency". This punishment was never applied, however. 
JNot counting official  holdings of  Eurodollars. If  these are taken into account, the figure  rises to 34.2 
billion dollars. See IMF Annual Report,  1975, p. 39. 
4Including 2.8 billion dollars in Special Drawing Rights and IMF loans. 
5 Robert Triffin,  Europe and the Money  Muddle,  New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957: see 
especially pp. 296-299. 
6 France left  the group at the end of  1967. 
7 West Germany, Belgium, Canada, the United States, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. 
"The Smithsonian agreements are the first  in which it was agreed to make generalized changes in 
exchange rates. 
9 West Germany, Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands were the original members of  this 
group, the formation  of  which was announced on 12 March 1972. On 16 March it was joined by Sweden, on 24 
April by Italy, and on 1 May by the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. These latter countries withdrew 
from  the agreement on 23 June 1972, but Denmark re-entered it on 10 October. Italy left  the group in 
February 1973. Finally, France left  the group temporarily in January 1974, rejoined it in the last quarter of 
1975, and left  it once again at the end of  the first  quarter of  1976. 
10Let us assume, for  example, that a 3% devaluation in a country's currency is expected in the year. It 
will be sufficient  for  domestic interest rates to rise 3 % compared with external rates in order to eliminate any 
incentive to take capital out of  the country. Similarly, however, if  the expected devaluation is 159?, then the 
domestic interest rates must rise by at least that figure  with respect to external rates in order to achieve the 
same purpose. The necessary movements in interest rates would have to be even bigger if  the devaluation was 
expected at a certain moment in time instead of  taking place over a whole period. 
"Such as Brazil, Chile and Colombia, for  example. 
1 2 This means that although the situation as regards the official  external assets and liabilities of  the 
United States does not change, the net liabilities to private creditors increase. 
"The Committee of  20 submitted its final  report, with an outline of  the reforms  needed, on 14June 
1974. It was replaced on 2 October of  the same year by the new Interim Committee of  the Board of  Governors 
of  the International Monetary Fund. 
1 4 In April 1976 the Board of  Governors ratified  what had been approved by the Interim Committee at 
the Jamaica Meeting. In order for  the amendments to the Articles of  Agreement to come into force,  however, 
ratification  by the legislature is needed in most of  the Fund's member countries. 
"A similar analysis of  the subject dealt with in this section, made by the same author, previously 
appeared in Temas  del  nuevo orden  económico internacional,  Cuadernos de la CEPAL, NQ11, Santiago, Chile, 
1976. 
1 6 It is proposed to change the title of  Article IV of  the Articles of  Agreement of  the International 
Monetary Fund, "Par values of  currencies", to "Obligations regarding exchange arrangements". 
17 If  the parities were expressed in terms of  a currency, then the possible margin of  variation of  the 
latter would be half  the margin of  variation of  the other currencies. 
1 8 The present provisions state that each participant shall so use and reconstitute its holdings of  Special 
Drawing Rights that at the end of  each calendar quarter the average of  its total daily holdings of  Special 
Drawing Rights over the most recent five-year  period shall be not less than 30% of  the average of  its daily net 
cumulative allocation of  Special Drawing Rights over the same period. If  the average is below the minimum, 
the participant is obliged to "reconstitute" its holdings, i.e., to acquire Special Drawing Rights in order to 
comply with this obligation. 
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1 9 This means that special preference  will be given to countries with a per capita income of  less than 300 
SDR units (some 360 dollars), thus ruling out most of  Latin America. 
2 0 The increase in the quotas has already been approved by a vote of  the Governors, but it will not enter 
into force  until the legal requirements are completed in each country and until the reforms  to the Articles of 
Agreement of  the Monetary Fund are approved. The whole.process may last for  another year or more. 
2 1 The Trust Fund will be set up with part of  the profits  from  the sale of  the Fund's gold and will be 
designed to help the poorest member countries on highly concessional terms. 
2 2 These estimates are based on the assumption that the total gold holdings of  the member countries of 
IMF are 1 billion ounces, of  which 5% corresponds to holdings of  the non-oil-exporting countries. It is 
assumed that the price of  gold which influences  the decisions of  holders of  this metal is below the market 
price, since the latter is subject to quite substantial fluctuations. 
2JIf  a country, in drawing on the Fund, obtains currencies which are little used in international trade, it 
can approach the country issuing that currency to obtain reserve currencies in exchange for  it. 
"It is not yet possible to measure the greater ease of  use of  the compensatory financing  facility  in 
concrete terms, since this will depend not only on the new operating rules, but also on the specific  policies 
which the Fund puts into practice. 
2 5 Statement by the Managing Director of  IMF at press conference  held on 8 January 1976, IMF Survey, 
19 January 1976, pp. 24 and 25. 
26Ibid..,  pp. 24 and 25. 
2 7 The Oil Facility was set up by the Fund in 1974 with the aim of  helping to avoid restrictive measures 
on international trade which might arise in oil-importing countries as a result of  the sharp rise in the price of 
this fuel. 
2 8 Except for  the currencies of  the oil-exporting countries. 
2 5 For a detailed explanation of  the process of  "creation" of  money in the Eurodollar market, see M. 
Friedman, "The Eurodollar market: Some first  principles", in The  Morgan  Guaranty Survey,  October 1969. 
3 0 In 1964, the private holdings of  international liquidity, which amounted to some 24 billion dollars, 
were one-third of  the total official  reserves. By 1973, however, they amounted to some 125 billion dollars, that 
is to say, over two-thirds, and far  exceeded the official  reserves of  the countries in whose currencies such 
holdings were maintained. See, for  example, IMF, Annual Report, 1974, p. 44, which gives estimates of 
private holdings of  international liquidity. 
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EXTERNAL FINANCING AND INDEBTEDNESS OF LATIN AMERICA 
I 
Introduction 
1. The  use made of  external  financing 
In recent years the external financing  of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries 
has undergone profound  changes both as regards its magnitude, terms and conditions and 
as regards the evolution which has taken place in the sources of  external resources for  the 
region. 
Thus, the average balance-of-payments  current account deficit  of  these countries, 
which was slightly over US$ 1 500 million per year in the period 1965-1970 and a little 
over US$ 4 billion per year in the three-year period 1971-1973, rose abruptly in 1974 to 
almost US$ 13 billion and in 1975 to over US$ 16 billion. In 1965-1970, these deficits 
represented less than 15 % of  exports of  goods and services, but in 1975 that proportion 
rose to over 50%. 
In the mid-1960s, Latin America's external financing  came mainly from  bilateral 
and multilateral official  sources and direct investments. In the mid-1970s, however, the 
bulk of  the financing  came from  foreign  private banks. 
The current account deficits  in question have been covered through net external 
financing.  Sometimes, this has had to be supplemented through a reduction in the 
countries' reserves, whereas on other occasions it has made it possible to increase them. 
Consequently, in order to measure the use made of  net external financing,  it is 
appropriate to add the increases in reserves to the balance-of-payments  current account 
deficits  and to deduct the reductions in reserves from  them. Table 1 shows the current 
account deficits  and the variations in the international reserves of  the Latin American 
non-oil-exporting countries, together with their sources of  financing.1 
In the five-year  period 1966-1970, one-third of  the financing  came from  direct 
investments and donations, while the remainder came in equal parts from  official  and 
private loans: credits from  commercial banks represented 12% of  the net external 
financing  of  the region. 
In 1974-1975, the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries were obliged to 
reduce the level of  their reserves in order to finance  their deficits.  The use made of 
financing  in this two-year period, in nominal terms, increased sixfold  compared with the 
second half  of  the previous decade. Direct investments and donations represented only 
15% of  the net external financing;  the remainder was obtained through net loans. 
Within the latter, official  loans only represented 18%, while those from 
commercial banks accounted for  55 % of  the net external financing  of  the countries of  the 
region: that is to say, while the resource needs for  covering the current account deficits 
and variations in reserves increased sixfold,  the financing  from  private international 
banks grew by a factor  of  over 27. 
It can thus be seen that in the last few  years the sources of  external financing  of  the 
non-oil-exporting countries of  the region have undergone considerable changes, 
especially as regards the growing importance of  the commercial banks as sources of 
financing  for  the region. This has been due fundamentally  to the fact  that the member 
countries of  the Organization for  Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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have decided to give priority, in their development aid programmes, to the relatively less 
developed countries which have almost ço access to the international capital markets. At 
the same time, the financing  needs of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries 
have grown as a result of  the increase in oil prices and thç drop in the terms of  trade. Thus, 
these countries have been forced  to compete for  private sources of  financing,  mainly by 
seeking bank loans but also by trying to obtain or increase access to the long-term capital 
markets. 
As already noted, the private banks, which contributed 12% of  the net external 
financing  of  the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region in the five-year  period 1966-
1970, provided 55% of  such financing  in 1974-1975. This naturally reflects  the fact  that 
official  financing  has grown much less than the ever-increasing needs of  these countries. 
Table 1 
E X T E R N A L F I N A N C I N G OF THE L A T I N A M E R I C A N 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G COUNTRIES 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
1966-
1970 1974 1975 1976 
Current account deficit" -2.0 -13.4 -16.3 -12.8 
Reserves'" +0.4 -0.7 -2.2 +2.3 
Use made of  external financing 2.4 12.7 Í4.1 15.1 
Net external financing' 2.5 14.3 15.4 
Direct investment 0.7 2.1 2.2 2.3 
Donations 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Net loans'* 1.7 12.1 13.1 
Loans from  official  sources 0.9 2.0 2.5 2.8 
Multilateral 0.4 1.1 1.4 
Bilateral 0.5 0.9 1.1' 
Loans from  private sources 0.8 10.1 10.67 
Supplier loans 0.4 0.7 1.0' 1.1 
Commercial banks 0.3 8.2 8.2 7.2 
Non-assigned balance 0.1 1.2 1.4 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of  Payments  Yearbook;  Inter-American Development Bank, 
Financiamiento  externo de  los países  de  América  Latina,  June 1976; Bak for International Settlements, 
Supplement  and Yearbook',  ECLAC estimates. 
Note: The flow of loans from commercial banks was estimated on the basis of the annual variation in the net external 
position (assets less liabilities) of the region with foreign commercial banks. 
"Excluding official  donations. 
'Plus sign indicates an increase in reserves. 
' Excluding Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela because they are oil exporters and Panama because it is a 
financial centre. 
''including long, medium and short-term non-compensatory and compensatory loans. 
'Calculated by differences,  with the total figure for official  resources being estimated on the base of the growth (20%) in 
the total provided by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to the developing countries. 
•'Figure estimated according to the growth in supplier credits granted by the DAC to non-oil-exporting developing 
countries. 
* Preliminary figures for period up to September 1976. 
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2. Official  financing  flows 
Official  flows,  which include donations and bilateral and multilateral loans, have certain 
conditions as regards periods of  grace, interest rates and terms which make them more 
advantageous than private loans. As indicated in table 1, the importance of  this type of 
financing  within the total for  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries has gone 
down drastically. 
According to preliminary data from  the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC), in 1975 official  development assistance —as a proportion of  the gross national 
product (GNP) of  the industrialized countries— came to 0.36%, so that it was obviously 
still very far  from  the goal of  0.7 % of  the gross domestic product laid down by the United 
Nations for  the transfer  of  this type of  resources to the developing countries. Moreover, 
when we consider that in the 1960s the proportion was 0.44%, it can confidently  be said 
that in the 1970s we have been losing ground instead of  advancing in this field. 
Table 2 gives an idea of  the volume of  this official  aid transferred  to the developing 
countries as a whole and its evolution between I960 and 1975. 
Ten years ago, the developed countries provided concessionary resources for 
development which amounted to 60% of  the total resources transferred  to the developing 
countries, but by the mid-1970s this percentage had dropped to 35%. 
Projections prepared by international agencies2 show that over the next five  years 
official  development assistance provided by the member countries of  the DAC is likely to 
decline to 0.33% of  their 1979/1980 gross national product. In the case of  the United 
States, whose behaviour has the greatest impact on Latin America, official  development 
assistance as a proportion of  the gross national product amounted to 2.79% in 1949, 
when the Marshall Plan was initiated; 0.53% in I960 and 0.31% in 1970, while the 
projection for  1980 is 0.21%. 
Table 2 
MEMBER COUNTRIES O F D E V E L O P M E N T ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE: 
N E T F I N A N C I A L RESOURCES TRANSFERRED  T O T H E 
D E V E L O P I N G COUNTRIES 
(Net  disbursements) 
Annual 
average 1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
1961-1970 
a) Billions of  dollars 
Total net financial  resources transferred 
to developing countries 11.0 17.8 19.7 24.6 27.6 38.8 
Official  development aid 6.0 7.7 8.5 9.4 11.3 13.6 
Private disbursements 4.2 8.0 8.6 11.4 13.3 21.2 
Other official  resources 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.5 2.2 2.7 
Private donations - - 0.9 1.4 1.2 1.4 
b) As percentage of  GNP 
Total 0.77 0.80 0.77 0.79 0.82 1.02 
Official  development aid 0.44 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.36 
Source: OECD-press release, Paris, 29 June 1976, table 4. 
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Not only has there been a decline in the relative share of  official  financial  flows 
—and, within them, in the proportion of  flows  of  a more concessionary nature (especially 
in the case of  the United States, which most directly affects  the Latin American 
countries)— but the geographical distribution of  the concessionary financial  flows  also 
confirms  Latin America's unfavourable  position compared with other regions. 
In table 3, the term "concessionary flows"  covers donations and those loans whose 
concessionary element amounts to at least 25%. 
It can be seen from  these data that the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries 
are the only developing group (other than Europe) which has suffered  a reduction in the 
proportion of  concessionary financial  resources within the total net resources coming 
from  the DAC. Furthermore, this proportion has dropped to only a little over half  what it 
was in 1971, and the absolute volume of  the concessionary flows  directed to these 
countries in 1974 was smaller in real terms than in 1971. 
Moreover, the average terms of  the loan agreements also display an unfavourable 
tendecy for  the region. Table 4 brings out this deterioration and shows the very low 
concessionary percentage in the resources provided for  Latin America, compared with 
other geographical areas. It is interesting to note that the more advanced Mediterranean 
countries —Spain, Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Turkey and Yugoslavia— receive a 
larger proportion of  their resources on concessionary terms than Latin America, although 
their level of  development is obviously higher than that of  most of  the Latin American 
countries. 
In short, everything indicates that the importance of  official  loans as a source of 
external financing  for  the region has gone down markedly and that Latin America has 
been displaced, as regards the volume of  loans on favourable  conditions and the 
percentage of  concessionary loans, by other developing regions. 
Table 3 
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (DAC) 
AND MULTILATERAL  AGENCIES": GEOGRAPHICAL  DISTRIBUTION 
OF NET FINANCIAL RESOURCES TRANSFERRED  TO CERTAIN 
NON-OIL-EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 








ary as % 







ary as % 




3 333 555 16.7 7 039 62 6 8.9 
Africa 3 760 1 962 52.2 4 752 2 935 61.8 
Asia' 3 815 2 774 111 3 804 2 788 73.3 
Oceania 389 284 73.0 608 495 81.4 
Europe 1 245 223 17.9 1 885 129 6.8 
Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; DAC, Report 1975,  tables 26 and 28. 
"Not including multilateral agencies whose tranfers of resources have a concessionary element of less than 25%. 
''Including unspecified amounts for South America and America in general. 
'Exclung Middle East and Indonesia. 
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Table 4 
A V E R A G E  T E R M S O F O F F I C I A L L Y - G U A R A N T E E D  L O A N C O M M I T M E N T S A N D 











































































































Source: World Bank, Annual Report, 1976,  p. 121. 
In the face  of  the international financial  situation prevailing at the end of  1973, 
efforts  were made to expand and facilitate  the access of  the countries to resources from 
certain international organizations, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Although the recent expansion of  the credit tranches of  IMF pending the 
realization of  the increase in quotas already agreed upon, the establishment of  the Oil 
Facility (which closed its operations in March 1976) and the greater freedom  of  access to 
the Compensatory Financing Facility have helped to relieve the financing  problems of 
deficit  countries, they have only done so to a very modest extent when we consider the 
magnitude of  the problem and the previous levels of  official  financing.  This is particularly 
true of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries, the great majority of  which 
cannot take advantage of  the resources from  the new IMF Trust Fund, since access to this 
Fund has been restricted to countries with a per capita income of  less than US$ 300 per 
year. 
It seems clear that the measures adopted up to the end of  1973 by various 
international organizations, and especially the International Monetary Fund, with the 
aim of  providing new official  sources of  liquidity for  financing  the balance-of-payments 
deficits  of  non-oil-exporting developing countries have not been sufficient  to satisfy  the 
needs of  the Latin American countries which do not export this product. 
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3. Private  loans 
The importance assumed by the international commercial banks in the external financing 
of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries in recent years is clear, as maybe seen 
from  table 1. 
In 1974 and 1975, approximately 85% of  the total net external financing  of  these 
countries came from  private sources. The commercial banks became their main creditors 
in this period, accounting for  55% of  the net resources transferred. 
Although the information  available is incomplete, it may be estimated that in these 
years the countries received between 75% and 80% of  the commercial bank financing 
provided to the non-oil-exporting developing countries as a whole, whereas their deficit 
corresponded to only about 40% of  the total deficit  of  the latter. 
To view the matter from  another angle, in the three-year period 1974-1976 the 
first-named  countries ran up a current account deficit  of  US$ 43 billion. The global 
external debt has almost doubled since 1973, and it is estimated that it came to some 
US$ 80 billion at the end of  1976. Of  this amount, approximately US$ 50 billion or two-
thirds, was owed to commercial banks. 
The importance which the commercial banks have acquired in the external 
financing  of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries has brought with it a 
number of  consequences. In particular, the repayment terms and interest rates involved 
make it difficult  to use this financing  for  long-term productive investments and help to 
aggravate the problem of  debt servicing and creditworthiness of  the countries. Table 5 
shows that the average repayment term of  bank loans has been systematically shortening 
in recent years. 
These facts,  together with the high balance-of-payments  deficits  of  recent years, 
have led to steady growth in the region's external indebtedness and progressive 
deterioration of  its debt structure, so that Latin America has become more vulnerable and 
more dependent on private bank financing  sources. 
Table 5 
PUBLICLY A N N O U N C E D EUROCURRENCY  B A N K L O A N S , 
B Y R E P A Y M E N T  PERIODS 
(  Percentages) 
1973 1974 1975 2976" 
Industrial countries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 to 6 years 17.7 16.1 52.9 31.4 
7 to 10 years 58.3 70.7 40.4 49.0 
Over 10 years 11.7 9.3 1.0 -
Term not known 12.3 3.9 5.7 19.53 
Developing countries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1 to 6 years 6.5 19.2 74.8 71.1 
7 to 10 years 48.8 62.8 21.2 24.2 
Over 10'years 26.7 14.5 1.7 -
Term not known 17.9 3.5 2.3 4.6 
Source: World Bank, Borro win); 
"As at June 1976. 
in Capital  Markets,  February 1975 and August 1976. 
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Because of  the persistent deficits  on current account, rapid increases in external 
debt servicing costs and the need to recover and maintain a reasonable level of 
international reserves, the future  external financing  of  the Latin American non-oil-
exporting countries will depend to a large extent on resources coming from  the private 
international banking system. 
For the private banks, the possibility of  continuing to satisfy  the demands of  debtor 
countries depends essentially on the creditworthiness of  the latter. This creditworthiness 
rests basically on three elements: a) the contribution made by the deficit  countries to the 
adjustment of  their balance of  payments through domestic measures aimed at reducing 
their aggregate demand and changing relative prices, increasing those of  internationally 
tradeable goods; b) the contribution made by the industrial countries which register 
surpluses, through suitable policies of  economic expansion and the elimination of  trade 
barriers so as to increase their demand for  imports and open up their markets to products 
coming from  developing countries; and c) the participación of  official  bodies —to a much 
greater extent than in the previous three-year period— in order to help to finance 
transitory imbalances and to settle the problems of  adjustment and international liquidity 
in the near future. 
In general, the majority of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries have 
taken adjustment measures, although in some cases their authorities consider that the 
deficits  must be further  reduced. Recovery by these countries of  their export markets, 
together with additional official  financing  resources, would help considerably to reduce 
the length and severity of  the restrictions that must be imposed on the aggregate demand 
of  these countries. 
It seems clear that more active participation by multilateral international agencies, 
in the form  of  measures to increase the access of  the countries to their resources and to 
supplement the latter, would directly help to solve the problem. It would also help to 
solve the problem indirectly, as it would facilitate  access to private sources of  financing  by 
giving greater backing to member countries. This would reduce and make more 
manageable the cost of  financing  the balance-of-payments  deficits  of  the deficit  countries 
in general and the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries in particular. 
II 
The external indebtedness of  Latin America 
1. The  magnitude  of  the problem 
The figures  given above for  the current account deficit  only partly reflect  the size of  the 
total external financing  needs. In reality, if  it is not desired to sacrifice  the countries' 
growth rates, then in order to determine the size of  this figure  it is necessary to add to the 
current account deficit  the resource requirements in connection with the necessary 
increase in reserves and the amortization of  the debt already contracted. At the same time, 
it is necessary to subtract direct investments and net inflows  of  medium and long-term 
capital. 
The available information  does not permit the preparation of  reliable complete 
series. On the one hand, the figures  for  direct investment are not always reliable, and on 
the other the errors and omissions in the balance-of-payments  calculations also make the 
picture less accurate. The changes in the size of  the current account deficit  and debt 
amortization commitments, however, are a good indicator of  the increase which has 
taken place in the external financing  needs of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting 
countries.3 
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As we can see from  table 6, the figures  show heavy concentration of  indebtedness 
inArgentina, Brazil and Mexico. This concentration, however, is broadly similar to the 
concentration of  the gross domestic product of  the countries of  the region. In 1974-1975, 
the total of  the current account deficits  and amortization commitments of  Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico represented a little under 75% of  the total corresponding to the Latin 
American non-oil-exporting countries, whereas the gross domestic product of  these three 
countries came to 76% of  the corresponding total product. 
By 1975, the external situation of  these three countries had deteriorated still further 
because of  the insufficient  effects  of  the adjustment measures adopted. Consequently, 
during 1976 these countries applied additional measures aimed at relieving their external 
situation through different  policies. 
a) The  balance on current  account 
The main causes of  the deficit  figures  of  the last few  years lie in the increase in the 
prices of  imports of  capital and intermediate goods, the rise in oil prices, and the steady 
increase in foreign  capital service payments: all these elements have been characteristic of 
the last three years and were further  exacerbated, in 1975, by the recession which affected 
the industrialized world, with its consequent effect  on the balance of  payments of  the 
economically weakest countries. 
It should be noted that in the face  of  the rise in oil prices, the industrialized 
countries rapidly applied adjustment measures which, although they led to the most 
serious recession since the war, nevertheless enable them to correct their current account 
imbalance, passing from  a deficit  of  US$ 11 billion in 1974 to a surplus of  US$ 16 billion 
in 1975. 
The majority of  the Latin American countries, for  their part, had not up to early 
1975 applied severe policy measures aimed at reducing aggregate demand, particularly for 
imports. Thus, up to the end of  1974 the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region 
Table 6 
LATIN AMERICAN NON-OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES: BALANCE OF 
PAYMENTS CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS" AND 
DEBT AMORTIZATION'' 
1965-1970 1971-1973 1974-19751' 
Millions  Millions  Millions 
of  Percentages  of  Percentages  of  Percentages 
dollars  dollars  dollars 
Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico 2 119 (62) 5 044 (67) 14 213 (74) 
Colombia, Chile, 
Peru and Uruguay 706 (21) 1 595 (21) 2 838 (15) 
Other countries 567 (17) 901 (12) 2 043 (11) 
Total 3 392 (100) 7 540 (100) 19 094 (100) 
Source: Prepared on the basis of official  balance of payments figures of the countries. The figures correspond to annual 
averages for the periods indicated. 
"Excluding official  donations. 
'Refers to long and medium-term non-compensatory debts. 
'For 1974 and 1975 the 1974 debt amortization figures were used. 
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showed a growth rate of  the gross domestic product which was quite satisfactory  and 
stable (the annual average in 1972 was 7%), together with steady growth rates of  their 
exports, especially of  manufactures.  In order not to sacrifice  their volume of  imports, 
economic growth and standards of  living, however, they covered their external imbalance 
with greater indebtedness. 
In 1975, most of  these countries began to apply balance-of-payments  adjustment 
measures, as a result of  which their growth rate went down to less than half  of  that 
registered in 1971-1974. Because of  the recession being suffered  by the industrial world 
(with the consequently lower demand for  imports), the greater flexibility  of  the 
industrialized economies for  responding to their own adjustment measures, and the 
deterioration of  approximately 12% which had taken place in the terms of  trade, 
however, the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries saw their efforts  largely 
frustrated,  and their deficit  on current account increased to levels even higher than those 
of  1974, while their external indebtedness accelerated. 
Various estimates by international agencies all coincide in stating that in 1976 the 
trade deficit  of  these countries went down by some US$ 4 billion. This figure  is estimated 
on the basis of  a projected 14% increase in the value of  exports, in view of  the recovery of 
the industrial countries and the absence of  major variations in the terms of  trade. 
Furthermore, in view of  the maintenance of  fiscal,  monetary, credit, income and foreign 
exchange policies aimed at reducing aggregate demand in order not to have to reduce still 
further  the levels of  their international reserves nor increase as rapidly as in the past their 
already high external debt, it is estimated that the value of  their imports was kept more or 
less constant in nominal terms. The foregoing,  together with other background data, 
enables us to estimate that the countries in question registered a growth rate of  the gross 
domestic product which was slightly higher than that of  1975, that is to say, around 4% or 
5% per year. 
Although in 1976 this group of  countries had to pay more in respect of  interest on 
their external debt (because of  greater indebtedness on more onerous terms), there was 
an estimated reduction in their current account deficit  to around USS 13 billion. In 1974 
and 1975, over two-thirds of  the deficit  had corresponded to Brazil and Mexico; in 1976, 
the current account deficit  of  these two countries represented 80% of  the total deficit  of 
the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region. 
This does not mean that the recent external situation of  the other Latin American 
non-oil-exporting countries has been easy. Although Brazil and Mexico accounted for  a 
large part of  the total deficit  in absolute terms, the deficit  of  other countries was large in 
relation to their economic scale. In the period 1970-1973, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, 
Peru and Uruguay had current account deficits  which amounted to 8% of  their exports 
(for  the group of  non-oil-exporting countries of  the region as a whole the corresponding 
proportion was over 20%). In 1975, however, the corresponding figure  was close on 
50%: that is to say, in relative terms their situation deteriorated almost three times more 
than that of  Brazil and Mexico taken together. 
b) The  State-guaranteed  external  debt 
As already noted, in order to estimate the external financing  needs it is necessary to 
take account not only of  the deficit  on current account but also of  the disbursements in 
respect of  amortization of  the external debt. The figures  given in table 6 include the 
payments corresponding to past indebtedness. 
In order to assess the future  evolution of  external debt servicing it is necessary to 
look at the present situation. 
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In spite of  the small reduction in the deficit  estimated for  1976, the external 
financial  position of  most of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries continues to 
be vulnerable. Although the delay of  these countries in adjusting to the new international 
conditions has permitted a more gradual and programmed adjustment process, it has also 
brought some problems with it. Deficits  of  the order of  US$ 12 billion to US$ 15 billion 
for  the third year running reflect,  at least in part, imports aimed at trying to keep up levels 
of  consumption, with effects  which can easily be foreseen  as regards the future  effort 
needed to service a fast-rising  debt. 
As a result of  these heavy consecutive deficits,  the external indebtedness figures 
also reflect  the increase in financing  needs. Latin America's external debt has grown 
appreciably in recent years and the countries of  the region have had to have recourse 
mainly to private sources of  loans, so that repayment terms and interest rates have 
become less favourable. 
The external debt4 of  the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region, which came to 
USS 10 billion in 1967, amounted to US$ 24 billion by the end of  1973 (100% of  the 
value of  their exports) and US$ 32 billion in 1974. It is estimated that at the end of  1975 
this indebtedness was approximately US$ 43 billion (over 130% of  the value of  those 
countries' exports), and that in 1976 it will come to not less than US$ 49 billion (see 
table 7). 
This means that in the course of  three years the external debt of  these countries has 
doubled, whereas it is estimated that the value of  their exports has grown by not more 
than 50%. 
The external debt of  the other non-oil-exporting developing countries, for  its part 
(i.e., excluding the Latin American ones), grew from  US$ 47 billion at the end of  1973 to 
around US$ 64 billion in 1975 and an estimated figure  of  almost US$ 80 billion in 1976. 
It may thus be noted that between 1973 and 1976 the indebtedness of  the other non-
oil-exporting developing countries appears to have grown proportionately less than that 
corresponding to the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries. 
Table 7 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
O F F I C I A L L Y - G U A R A N T E E D  E X T E R N A L DEBT" 
(  Billions of  dollars) 
1967 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Latin American non-oil-
exporting developing 
countries (l.ANOCO) 10 15 24 32 43 49 
Most advanced Mediterranean 
developing countries'" 5 8 13 16 19 23 
Others 17 23 34 39 45 56 
Total non-oil-exporting 
developing countries 
(NODEVCÒ) 32 46 71 87 107 128 
Source: World Bank, World  Debt Tables  1976  and estimates based on partial information  from  the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
"Refers  to effectively  disbursed medium and long-term debt outstanding at end of  each year. 
'Comprise Greece, Israel, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
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Table 8 
L A T I N A M E R I C A N  N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G COUNTRIES: 
ESTIMATES OF G L O B A L D E B T 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 
Official-  Non-guar- Official-  Non-guar- Official-  Non-guar-
ly guar- anteed Global ly guar- anteed Global ly guar- anteed Global 
anteed bank debt anteed bank debt anteed bank debt 
debt debt debt debt debt debt" 
Argentina 3.34 2.39 5.73 3.16 3.07 6.23 3.63 2.63 6.26 
Brazil 9.30 9.29 18.59 15.50 9.33 24.83 17.82 12.21 30.03 
Mexico 8.01 6.01 14.02 11.25 8.51 19.76 12.94 11.17 24.11 
Subtotal 20.65 17.69 38.34 29.91 20.91 50.82 34.39 26.01 60.40 
Chile 3.73 0.55 4.28 4.06 0.39 4.45 4.67 0.51 5.18 
Colombia 2.10 1.36 3.46 2.31 1.48 3.79 2.66 1.32 3.98 
Peru 2.05 1.08 3.13 2.67 1.25 3.92 3.07 1.45 4.52 
Uruguay 0.51 0.06 0.57 0.61 0.09 0.70 0.70 0.08 0.78 
Subtotal 8.39 3.05 11.44 9.65 3.21 12.86 11.10 3.36 14.46 
Other countries'" 2.85 .02 2.87 3.48 .56 4.04 4.01 .37 4.38 
Total'" 31.89 20.76 52.65 43.04 24.68 67.72 49.50 29.74 79.24 
Source: World Bank, World  Debt Tables  7976; Bank for International Settlements, Annual Reports  and Press Review, 
March 1977; ECLAC estimates. 
Note : All the figures refer to the effectively  disbursed debt at the end of each year. The officially  guaranteed debt covers 
only medium and long-term debt. The non-guaranteed bank debt is the debt without any official  guarantee 
contracted with foreign commercial banks operating in the following countries —Belgium/Luxembourg, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, the United States and 
Switzerland— and with branches of United States banks in the Caribbean and the Middle East. These figures are 
considered to be under-estimates, since they only include partial data on the operations of non-national financial 
centres. In addition to this under-estimation, it should be noted that theestimates of the global debt do not include 
non-guaranteed debts to suppliers nor IMF loans. 
"Debt outstanding as at 30 September 1976. Preliminary United States figures for the fourth quarter of 1976 indicate that 
Brazil's short-term bank debt increased by 500 million dollars, while that of the Latin American non-oil-exporting 
countries increased by nearly 1 billion dollars. 
^Excluding Panama because it is a financial centre. 
Consequently, the situation of  the latter shows a deterioration both in absolute 
terms and in comparison with the other non-oil-exporting developing regions. 
The cost of  servicing the officially  guaranteed external indebtedness of  the non-oil-
exporting countries of  the region amounted in 1973 to US$ 3 900 million, while in 1975 it 
is estimated to have amounted to US$ 6 billion, so that its growth rate (65%) was higher 
than the growth of  the value of  exports over the same period (32%). It is estimated that 
in 1976 the percentage growth rate of  the servicing of  this debt was very similar to that of 
exports. As already noted above, while the future  cost of  servicing the debt will increase 
there will probably be some relief  in the current account deficit  (although this will 
continue to be very high in absolute terms), but the gross requirements for  external 
financing  will continue to rise. 
It should be noted that the figures  on indebtedness given up to this point do not 
include debt for  terms of  less than one year,5 nor that of  a compensatory nature,6 nor 
externally indebtedness which is not officially  guaranteed. 
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c) Non-guaranteed,  bank debt  and the global  debt 
As already noted, the above figures  do not include credits from  private sources 
which are not officially  guaranteed. 
The importance which has now been assumed by bank debt can be appreciated if  we 
look at recent statistical data on the indebtedness of  the countries with the commercial 
banks of  the main world financial  centres. These data give grounds for  concluding that the 
figures  on officially  guaranteed external indebtedness are far  from  reflecting  the total 
debt of  the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region. 
The preliminary information  available indicates that at the end of  1975 the debt7 of 
these countries with banks of  the United States, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the 
Federal Republic of  Germany, Italy, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland,"the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Japan was at least8 US$ 42 300 million. Their non-guaranteed bank debt, 
which amounted to some US$ 2 550 million in 1965, came to US$ 25 billion in 1975 and 
US$ 30 billion in September 1976. 
Consequently, it may be estimated that at the end of  1975 the total guaranteed and 
non-guaranteed external debt of  the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region amounted 
to at least US$ 67 billion,9 after  having been over US$ 50 billion in 1974 (see table 8). 
The guaranteed external debt of  these countries rose by almost 80% during 1974 
and 1975, while over the same period their bank debt (including non-guaranteed debt) 
grew by nearly 100%. Furthermore, in the two-year period 1974-1975 the banking 
community helped to finance  70% of  these countries' current account deficit,  but no more 
than 30% of  the deficit  of  the other non-oil-exporting developing countries, yet the latter 
Table 9 
G E O G R A P H I C A L  DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS A N D LIABILITIES 
OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS" 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
1975 1976" 
Assets liabili-ties Balance Assets 
Liabili-
ties Balance 
Industrial countries 262 286 -24 282 311 -29 
Eastern Europe 22 6 16 27 6 21 
International agencies 4 -4 1 3 -2 
Oil-exporting countries 14 51 -37 19 58 -39 
Financial centres 62 41 21 78 52 26 
Non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries 42 15 27 50 16 34 
Other non-oil-exporting 
developing countries 32 38 -6 38 42 -4 
Total non-oil-exporting 
developing countries 74 53 21 88 58 30 
Not specified 7 6 1 6 8 -2 
Total 442 447 -5 500 496 4 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Reports  and Press Review, March 1977. 
" Refers to banks operating in Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Japan, the United States and Switzerland, plus branches of United States banks in the Caribbean and Middle East. 
Information as at 30 September 1976. 
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Table 10 
L A T I N AMERICAN  N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G COUNTRIES: E X T E R N A L 
POSITION W I T H FOREIGN COMMERCIAL BANKS" 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
1974 1975 1976b 
Assets Liabili-ties Balance Assets 
Liabili-
ties Balance Assets 
Liabili-
ties Balance 
Argentina 2.03 3.03 -1.00 2.54 3.59 -1.05 2.75 3.23 -0.48 
Brazil 5.29 13.94 -8.65 5.01 16.73 -11.72 5.34 20.72 -15.38 
Mexico 3.15 9.92 -6.77 4.18 15.17 -10.99 4.14 18.83 -14.69 
Subtotal 10.47 26.89 -16.42 11.73 35.49 -23.76 12.23 42.78 -30.55 
Chile 0.60 1.02 -0.42 0.64 0.89 -0.25 0.77 1.08 -0.31 
Colombia 0.50 1.61 -1.11 0.76 1.78 -1.02 0.95 1.67 -0.72 
Peru 0.58 1.93 -1.35 0.47 2.59 -2.12 0.45 2.99 -2.54 
Uruguay 0.34 0.18 +0.16 0.44 0.18 +0.26 0.63 0.18 +0.45 
Subtotal 2.02 4.74 -2.72 2.31 5.44 -3.13 2.80 5.92 -3.12 
Other countries' .31 .39 - .08 .85 1.40 - .55 .71 1.70 - .99 
Total' 12.80 32.02 -19.22 14.89 42.33 -27.44 15.74 50.40 -34.66 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Reports  and Press Review, March 1977, and ECLAC estimates. 
Note: The liabilities include short, medium and long-term guaranteed and non-guaranteed debts. 
"These refer to banks operating in Belgium/Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, the United States and Switzerland, and branches of United States banks in the Caribbean and 
the Middle East. 
'Assets and liabilities as at 30 September 1976. Preliminary figures for the United States indicate that in the last quarter of 
1976 the external position of the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries with United States banks improved by 
approximately US$ 600 million. 
'Excluding Panama because it is a financial centre. 
accounted for  60% of  the total deficit  accumulated by the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries as a whole. Up to September 1976 these countries as a whole had obtained 
US$ 14 billion from  the banking community, of  which 60% went to the non-oil-
exporting countries of  Latin America (see table 9). 
Furthermore, if  we look at the net position with the banks (that is to say, assets less 
bank liabilities), we see that at the end of  1975 the net position of  the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries as a whole was positive, whereas that of  the Latin American non-
oil-exporting countries showed a net debit balance amounting to US$ 27 billion. In the 
first  three quarters of  1976, the first-named  countries reduced their positive position by 
US$ 2 billion, while the latter increased their negative position by approximately US$ 7 
billion. 
Very few  of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries have credit balances 
with banks, but the debit balances, in contrast, are very high in some cases. In 1975, three 
countries —Mexico, Brazil and Peru— received over 95% of  the net resources obtained 
by the region.10 Preliminary figures  indicate that up to September 1976 there was a net 
flow  of  bank loans to Latin America of  US$ 7 200 million, but the three countries 
mentioned above increased their debit balances with the banks by more than the global 
total corresponding to the region. This means that countries such as Argentina, Colombia 
and others reduced  their debit balances, as may be seen in table 10. 
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It may be noted that the increase in Latin America's external indebtedness has not 
helped to bring about any appreciable relief  in the official  international reserve position 
of  the region. These reserves, which in 1965 had represented 25 % of  the total imports of 
the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries and had been equivalent in 1973 to 45% 
of  their imports, only came to 20% of  them in 1975, subsequently recovering slightly to 
23% in 1976. 
2. Evolution  of  the structure  of  the external  debt 
The total increase in the financing  needs of  the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region 
has not only considerably accentuated their indebtedness but has also made the 
composition of  their debt more unfavourable. 
In 1974, Latin America's guaranteed external indebtedness from  official  bilateral 
sources was equivalent to 23% of  its total indebtedness, whereas for  the rest of  the 
developing world the percentage was 56%. At the same time, for  Latin America the debt 
contracted with the private foreign  sector represented over 60% of  its guaranteed 
external indebtedness, whereas for  the other developing regions the figure  was not more 
than 27%. 
Official  development aid to Latin America has not evolved favourably  either. The 
concessionary resources within the total net flows  from  member countries of  the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) —bilateral and multilateral, including direct 
investment— have gone down steadily from  17% in 1971 to only 9% in 1974 (see 
table 3). For the other developing countries, in contrast, not only has the relationship 
between official  development aid and the rest of  net external financing  from  the same 
source remained stable, but such aid has also represented around 50% of  the total 
resources coming from  the member countries of  the DAC. 
Furthermore, Latin America and the Caribbean received an average of  31-5 % of  the 
loans from  the World Bank group between 1964 and 1968, 27.8% between 1969 and 
1973, and only a little under 22% in 1976. 
As already noted, credits from  private sources have grown much more rapidly than 
those from  official  bilateral or multilateral sources. These latter loans normally provide 
for  some period of  grace, they are generally of  medium or long term, and they have a total 
cost in respect of  interest and other charges which is normally less than that of  credit from 
private sources. 
Guaranteed and non-guaranteed credits from  private bank sources came to two-
thirds of  the total in 1975: almost twice the proportion of  rather more than one-third 
which they represented in 1965. 
Between 1973 and 1975 the non-bank external debt of  the Latin American non-oil-
exporting countries grew by 60%, whereas the increase in bank debt was close on 100%. 
As a result of  the growing importance of  private sources of  finance,  and especially those of 
bank origin, the external indebtedness of  these countries is now much more burdensome. 
The change in the debt structure by source has brought with it a deterioration in 
repayment terms and costs. Thus, of  the total publicly announced Eurocurrency loans 
granted to developing countries, in 1973 and 1974 those whose repayment period was 
over seven years accounted for  75 % of  the total, whereas in 1975 arid the first  half  of  1976 
such loans only accounted for  less than 25%. In 1973, loans with a repayment period of 
over ten years represented 27% of  the total, but this went down to 15% in 1974 and to 
less than 2% in 1975, disappearing altogether in the first  six months of  1976 (see 
table 5). 
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Furthermore, the average spread over the basic reference  rates11 rose from  1.25 
percentage points at the beginning of  1973 to 1.70 points in 1975 and 1.78 in the first 
quarter of  1976. 
Finally, the bulk of  the concessionary credits and other official  flows  tends to go to 
the relatively less developed countries or those which are in the most serious difficulties, 
thus excluding most of  Latin America. 
3. Future  prospects 
Interest payments on the external debt have been growing considerably, both because of 
the increase in total indebtedness and because of  the greater importance being assumed 
within that indebtedness by bank debt. Furthermore, the interest rates on bank loans 
already contracted vary a little more slowly than LIBOR, so that it is estimated that in 1977 
there will be a rise in the total cost of  interest payments on the external debt, because of 
the increase in interest rates.12 
Furthermore, the periods of  grace in respect of  recent indebtedness will already 
have expired in 1977, which means, together with the foregoing,  that the traditional 
indicators of  creditworthiness —such as the percentage of  export income needed to 
service the debt and the proportion of  exports represented by external indebtedness— 
will tend to deteriorate. 
In addition, doubts have been expressed about the possibility of  the non-oil-
exporting developing countries —and especially the Latin American countries— being 
able to maintain their access to international bank finance  and keep up their levels of 
indebtedness with such institutions. 
The reasons for  these doubts would appear to be mainly the growing concern of  the 
banking community over possible problems of  solvency of  these countries (because of  the 
size of  their indebtedness, the shortening of  the term of  repayment of  their debt, and the 
more burdensome terms on which loans have been obtained recently), together with the 
banks' tendency to try to keep a suitable relationship between the loan portfolio  and their 
capital. Furthermore, if  the cyclical recovery of  the industrialized countries speeds up 
there will be a bigger demand for  loans on the part of  these countries and of  other 
preferential  borrowers, and this could hinder the access of  the non-oil-exporting 
developing countries to private commercial sources of  international finance. 
The net result of  these phenomena and of  the smaller requirements for  financing  as 
a result of  the projected smaller deficit13  is difficult  to foresee.  The end of  the recession in 
the industrialized countries will bring with it some improvement in the export income of 
the debtor countries and thus improve their creditworthiness, and furthermore  up to 
mid-1977 the demand for  loans by the industrialized countries has not risen sufficiently  to 
leave the developing countries in a difficult  position. However, the problem of  the 
creditworthiness of  the debtor countries continues to be a limitation.14 This latter point is 
corroborated to some extent when we see that the most recent loans to countries with a 
high level of  indebtedness are characterized by an increase in the spreads applied over 
basic interest rates, special commissions, and shorter average repayment periods. 
It is estimated that if  the flow  of  official  capital continues to grow at a moderate 
rate, the smaller supply of  bank funds  and the smaller current account deficit  of  the Latin 
American non-oil-exporting countries will mean that the latter will need to have less 
recourse to private credit, and particularly bank credit. This phenomenon will tend to be 
repeated in the coming years if,  as is hoped, the current account deficit  of  these countries 
gradually decreases. An ever-increasing gross inflow  of  capital will continue to be needed, 
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however, because of  the build-up of  commitments in respect of  principal and interest on 
the present debt (especially that contracted in recent years), so that this will increase the 
vulnerability of  the debtor countries to any significant  change in their access to external 
credit. 
4. Creditworthiness  criteria  and indebtedness 
The current account deficit  of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries has grown 
sharply with respect to their exports. The same has occurred as regards the ratio between 
debt amortization commitments and exports, while the official  international reserves, 
after  having fallen  sharply in proportion to imports up to 1975, showed only a slight 
recovery in 1976. The average repayment period of  the debt has become shorter, and the 
cost of  the debt has risen in relation to market costs, as reflected  in the rates usually 
considered as representing reference  levels. 
On the other hand, the possibility of  continuing to obtain loans will depend to a 
great extent on the resources available in the financial  centres, and these resources are 
intimately linked, in the short term, with the rate of  recovery of  the developed countries. 
The possibility of  obtaining such loans in coming years will also be substantially 
conditioned by the dynamism of  the developing countries' exports and the achievement 
of  an improvement in the structure of  their external debt, especially as regards repayment 
periods. The international banking community could play a very active role concerning 
this latter point. 
Among the creditworthiness criteria currently used by the creditor countries, the 
evolution of  debt servicing as a percentage of  exports is of  importance. As the debt 
servicing burden is bound to grow considerably in the coming years, its possible 
refinancing  and the rate of  activity of  the export sector will continue to be the crucial 
factors  in relieving the external financing  problem. A great deal of  realism is therefore 
called for  in the domestic economic policies of  the debtor countries (especially as regards 
external trade), as well as greater facilities  on the part of  the industrial countries for  the 
entry of  exports from  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries. 
Furthermore, the criteria of  creditworthiness which are useful  for  considering the 
situation of  an isolated country when the other countries are not experiencing similar 
situations cease to be useful  when the situation is more generalized, since in this case it is 
more favourable  for  the world economy that certain groups of  deficit  countries should 
decide to pay more attention to financing  than to adjustment. 
Naturally, if  public and private institutions in the great financial  centres and the 
multilateral financing  agencies ceased to pay much attention in their decisions to the 
behaviour of  the traditional indexes, they could find  themselves in difficult  situations. 
Nevertheless, the fact  remains that all the indexes in question are static indexes which do 
not take the future  into account. 
A steady increase in the exports of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries 
and an improvement in the terms of  trade would make it possible for  them to sustain 
increasing levels of  indebtedness without serious difficulties.  If  this could be achieved, not 
only would their access to credit be improved but their current deficits  would also be 
reduced, thus relieving the pressure to seek still more financing.  In this way, it would be 
possible to slow down the growth rate of  the external debt and improve the international 
reserves situation of  this group of  countries, especially in relation to their imports and 
service payments on external capital. We thus see that the future  solvency of  the debtor 
countries is linked not only to the static indexes mentioned earlier, but also to such aspects 
as the access to large external markets for  the sale of  their export goods, and measures 
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aimed at avoiding the deterioration (and even if  possible improving the level) of  the 
terms of  trade. The close relation between solvency, trade and financing  is thus clearly 
revealed. 
Likewise, the future  structure of  the debt is linked to the possibility of  the debtor 
countries having increased access to medium and long-term capital markets, which shows 
the direct relation between solvency and access to external capital markets. 
Access to markets for  the sale of  goods and the procurement of  capital depends not 
only on the policies adopted by the countries seeking such access, but also on the policies 
applied by the countries whose markets are being sought, as well as on the existence of 
international or regional machinery to facilitate  the sought-for  access. In the financial 
field,  any multilateral co-operation scheme which improves the solvency of  the debtor 
countries can have the desired effect.  There are two outstanding proposals in this field: 
the establishment of  a financial  safety  net, and the creation of  a refinancing  facility. 
A financial  safety  net would provide a second line of  financial  defence  to help 
countries with short-term difficulties.15  A refinancing  facility,  which could be used in 
specified  cases for  refinancing  external debt payments, particularly in respect of  debt 
from  private sources, could give greater security to lender countries and institutions and 
thus facilitate  the process of  the transfer  of  resources.16 
5. The  diversity  of  the Latin  American countries 
In the financial  field,  as in some other aspects, the features  of  the various Latin American 
countries are by no means identical. The degree of  diversification  of  exports towards a 
greater proportion of  industrial products achieved by these countries differs  considerably 
from  one to another, and there are equally great differences  in their degree of  access to 
external financial  markets. 
With regard to the external indebtedness of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting 
countries, at the end of  1975 six of  them accounted for  90% of  the total guaranteed 
external debt and 97% of  the total bank debt of  the region. Brazil and Mexico alone 
accounted for  62% of  the guaranteed external debt and over 75% of  the total bank debt. 
Of  the total bank loans obtained by the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region by 
September 1976, Mexico and Brazil had received 95% of  the gross flow  of  loans to the 
region and over 100% of  the net flow,  so that they continue to be the main borrowers as 
regards this type of  credit. Similarly, in the Eurocurrency loan market these two countries 
were the most important borrowers among all the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries in 1975 and the first  nine months of  1976. 
Generally speaking, in view of  the situation of  the external sector as a whole, 
perhaps a classification  into three groups would reflect  Latin American circumstances 
better. The first  of  these groups would of  course include Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 
which stand out above the others by their industrial expansion. A second group would 
include those countries of  intermediate size which have begun a vigorous process of 
expansion and diversification  of  their exports. The rest of  the non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries, although still with differences  from  one to another, would make up 
the third group. Venezuela could be added to the first  group because it has extensive 
resources derived from  oil and its access to capital markets. This latter feature  —the 
access to capital markets— is shared by all the countries of  the first  group, which have not 
only obtained very substantial loans from  the private international banking system byt 
have also floated  issues of  medium or long-term bonds on world markets. The countries 
of  the second group have had a certain degree of  access to short and medium-term bank 
credit, but they have not yet been able to sell bonds on external markets in the recent past. 
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The countries of  the third group, for  their part, have economies which are very poorly 
diversified,  their export income depends on one or two products, and except in a few  cases 
they have only very recently begun to gain access to external bank financing.  Generally 
speaking, their coefficients  of  indebtedness are the lowest of  the Latin American non-oil-
exporting countries. 
This third group of  countries requires systematic access to concessionary resources. 
The countries of  the second group, which are vulnerable to changing conditions on 
international markets for  both goods and capital, need some degree of  occasional access 
when external circumstances are not favourable  to them. Only the countries of  the first 
group can endure for  a prolonged period the treatment currently given to the greater part 
of  the Latin American countries as regards access to official  financing. 
For the two groups of  countries which have not gained access to private medium 
and long-term capital markets it is particularly important that something should be done 
to facilitate  such access. Means to ensure this must be developed and put into practice 
before  the access of  these countries to official  sources of  long-term financing  is restricted. 
If  this were done, it would be possible to bring about an easier transition from  official  to 
private sources. 
6. The  significance  of  external  indebtedness 
Any country which needs financing  has three possible courses of  action open to it: to take 
domestic economic policy measures to reduce its financing  needs, that is to say, to take 
adjustment measures; to seek the additional financing  needed, that is to say, to finance  its 
needs; or, of  course, to combine both these approaches. 
Each country's choice between adjusting or financing  would appear to be a decision 
whose consequences only affect  the country itself.  Adjusting means reducing the country's 
present growth rate or even, if  the financial  deficit  is very large, reducing its standard of 
living. On the other hand, financing  means postponing the domestic sacrifice  and 
spreading it over time. 
When the problem of  a financing  deficit  affects  several countries at once, however, 
it must not be forgotten  that the decision taken will have repercussions for  the rest of  the 
world. Thus, at a time when world economic growth is only weak, the decision by a group 
of  countries to adjust instead of  seeking finance  weakens the growth rate even further. 
This happens because countries which adopt domestic adjustment programmes 
necessarily reduce their demand for  the products of  other countries and increase their 
supply of  goods for  export. In contrast, if  it is decided in the same circumstances to finance 
the external deficit  instead, the external demand of  the countries in question will not go 
down and will thus help to sustain the economies of  the other countries. 
The circumstances which have prevailed in the world economy in the last two years 
made it advisable for  the countries of  Latin America to seek a set of  policies in which 
financing  predominates over adjustment, thus contributing to a better balance in the 
world economy. This is particularly true because the main causes of  the sharp increase 
registered in all indexes of  financial  needs in the last three years are beyond the control of 
these countries. 
It is worth stressing that the non-oil-exporting developing countries, including 
those of  Latin America, must of  necessity —as part of  their develpment process— 
continue for  some time to come to be net importers of  capital in order to supplement their 
domestic saving effort  and achieve growth rates which will enable them to ensure rapid 
and self-sustaining  development. 
The foregoing  is particularly relevant when we consider another aspect of  the 
evolution which has taken place in the main sources of  external financing  for  Latin 
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America. Before  the 1930s, several Latin American countries had access both to the short 
and long-term financial  markets of  Europe and the United States (particularly through 
the sale of  bonds). Subsequently, this access was denied to them and the main source of 
external resources was government credits and loans from  international agencies such as 
IBRD, IDB, IDA, etc. Today, the region is becoming increasingly marginated from  this 
form  of  financing  and has to have recourse to private banks on less favourable  conditions. 
Furthermore, neither the banks nor the countries seem to be prepared to resume a 
form  of  financial  relationship which is on a growing scale and has more permanent 
characteristics. Owing, inter  alia,  to the restrictions on their access to longer-term capital 
markets, some countries are already displaying a high level of  bank indebtedness which 
makes it more difficult  for  them to obtain additional resources. This aspect is somewhat 
less serious when there are close trade links between the debtor country and the country 
where the bank has its headquarters. The non-oil-exporting countries of  the region, for 
their part, have lost much of  the substantial experience in international financial  markets 
which they had before  the crisis of  the 1930s, while the current conditions and needs for 
financing  have undergone substantial changes compared with 40 years ago. 
All the foregoing  means that it is necessary to stress that, just as the international 
division of  labour imposes a state of  interdependence on the trade between countries, it 
also establishes interdependence in the financial  field.  When the process of  development 
is associated with external financing,  as has been particularly the case in Latin America in 
recent years, a growing relationship of  financial  interdependence is created between 
debtor and creditor countries, and this interdependence is further  heightened by the close 
link between trade relations and bank financing. 
This does not mean that the domestic policies of  the countries do not play an 
important role in determining their external financing  needs. Such policies help to 
mobilize domestic saving, to guarantee its most efficient  use, and to assign the available 
resources between the domestic market and the external market in the most appropriate 
manner. The emphasis placed on these policies must be moderated, however, in the light 
of  the elements which make external financing  necessary and the international 
consequences of  optional policies. The co-ordination of  economic policies at the 
international level thus plays an increasingly important role. 
7. Consultation  and negotiation  machinery 
Due to the high levels of  indebtedness of  the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries, 
the use they will be making of  international financing  will increase even though their 
current account deficit  may tend to go down gradually. The change in the sources of 
financing  has been so rapid that it has left  the existing international negotiation and 
consultation machinery behind in some important aspects. With the rapid increase in 
bank financing,  the relative importance of  the IMF resources has been reduced. 
This process has acquired new dimensions in recent years and there has been a 
qualitative change in the relationship between banks and borrowers in the sense that the 
banks are now interested not only in the creditworthiness of  individual debtors but also in 
economic and financial  development and in the economic stability of  the countries where 
they are domiciled. 
Mutual efforts  and co-operation between creditors and debtors appear to be called 
for  with a view not only to helping the debtor countries to finance  their balance of 
payments and their development plans but also to maintaining a certain degree of 
stability of  international financial  flows.  The latter could also be aided by a considerable 
expansion in the resources of  the international financing  agencies. 
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The interest in giving stability to these flows  is mutual. If  the banks and other 
lenders decide, because of  an unfavourable  evaluation of  the creditworthiness of  some 
country of  the region, to reduce their loans drastically, they would in fact  be provoking 
international payments difficulties  in that country because of  the size of  the figures 
involved. This would not only restrict the development process of  the country in question 
but could also lead to problems of  arrears of  payment, with possible consequences for  the 
liquidity situation and subsequent lending capacity of  the creditors. 
In view of  the foregoing  and of  the industrial countries' decision to direct their 
official  resources towards the relatively less developed countries, it would be advisable for 
the governments of  the creditor countries to encourage their private banking systems to 
increase their links with Latin America so that some kind of  guarantee or other 
mechanism can be offered  to ensure that in proportion as official  flows  go down, private 
financial  flows  to the region tend to increase. 
As already noted, the indebtedness of  the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region 
will tend to increase in coming years, and this will necessarily make the relationship 
between the private financial  centres and these countries even closer. 
It is therefore  clear that both the private creditor banks and the debtor countries 
have every reason to take measures to prevent a serious problem from  arising regarding 
financing. 
In addition to the measures taken at the international level, or those taken by the 
creditor countries, the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries would be well advised, 
if  they do not want to sacrifice  their present economic growth rates, to improve their 
financial,foreign  exchange, etc. structures in order to attract external resources and enjoy 
more uniform  access to the international capital market, especially for  long-term loans. 
At the same time, the desirability of  working out policies to step up considerably the 
growth rate of  exports is increasingly obvious. 
Ill 
Proposed solutions 
The proposals put forward  as regards the international financing  of  the developing 
countries have emerged as a result of  the latter's increased financing  problems in recent 
years. These problems are the result both of  the operation of  the international monetary 
system and of  the recent generalized economic crisis, and they do not lend themselves to a 
rapid and automatic solution through the simple operation of  the market mechanisms, 
unless the developing countries are to be asked to make a drastic sacrifice  of  their already 
precarious standards of  living. 
The fact  is that the financing  difficulties  referred  to in the foregoing  paragraphs 
have obliged the developing countries to have increasing recourse to short-term loans. As 
a result of  this, not only has the total amount of  the debt rapidly increased, but also, as 
already noted, its structure has deteriorated, further  complicating the future  outlook as 
regards the international payments of  these countries. 
As noted earlier, the developing countries which have reached a certain level of 
industrial development and of  exports of  manufactures  have been especially hard hit by 
this phenomenon. Since they have been excluded from  the special forms  of  international 
assistance to the relatively less developed countries, they receive an ever smaller 
proportion of  bilateral official  aid, so that they have been forced  to have much greater 
recourse to short-term bank financing. 
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This is not a problem which will solve itself  simply with the recovery of  the 
economies of  the industrial countries. Although such a recovery would bring about some 
reduction in the current account deficits  of  the non-oil-exporting developing countries, 
those deficits  would still continue, in the years to come, to stand at about the same level as 
at present (US$ 25 to US$ 35 billion per year for  these countries, about half  of  this being 
accounted for  by the Latin American countries). Only a dramatic upturn in the terms of 
trade could bring about rapid relief  of  the situation, but such an event does not seem likely. 
1. The  measures proposed 
The proposals for  a solution have been centred mainly in six areas: direct action regarding 
future  payments of  the debt; action regarding the solvency of  the debtors; action 
regarding access to financial  markets and flows  of  capital; action regarding balance-of-
payments financing;  action regarding commodity prices, and action regarding the 
possibilities of  expanding and diversifying  exports. 
a) Direct  action regarding  future  payments of  the debt 
In view of  the seriousness of  the problem, proposals in this area have even gone so 
far  as suggesting the condonation of  the official  debt of  the most seriously affected 
relatively less developed countries. In addition, it has been proposed that the commercial 
debts of  the developing countries which so request should be consolidated into a single 
debt payable over a period of  at least 25 years. It has also been proposed that a conference 
should be convened under the auspices of  UNCTAD between the main developed creditor 
countries and the debtor countries.17 
These proposals have not received the unanimous backing of  the developing 
countries. Those countries which use private external financing  to a considerable degree 
feel  that their possibilities of  obtaining additional loans could be adversely affected.  These 
countries fear  that, in the face  of  the risk of  a relatively generalized renegotiation, the 
creditors could withdraw into their shells, which would lead to serious difficulties  in 
continuing to service the current debt. They also fear  that as a result of  this, their 
possibilities of  access to private finance  markets could be prejudiced for  a long period 
without it being possible to replace such markets with official  sources. 
Many of  the main creditors have sharply rejected the foregoing  proposals. These 
creditor countries maintain that the external debt problem does not lend itself  to 
generalized solutions but only to the individual treatment of  debtors through 
m e c h a n i s m s such as already exist. A t the U N C T A D session in Nairobi, all that was 
achieved was the recognition that a problem did exist, a declaration of  good will on the 
part of  the creditor countries, and a request to the appropriate international agencies to 
study the past experience with regard to debt renegotiation. 
ECLAC, for  its part, has suggested the establishment in some appropriate 
international agency of  a "refinancing  facility".  This facility,  financed  through special 
contributions from  the creditor countries and the oil exporters, through the use of  the 
resources of  the agency in question itself,  and through the sale of  b o n d s o n the capital 
markets, would deal with the cases of  individual debtor countries which so request within 
a certain g e n e r a l f r a m e w o r k  of  o p e r a t i n g rules. T h i s p r o p o s a l has the advantage of 
combining the general frame  of  reference  with the individual treatment of  the countries. 
Furthermore, the establishment of  a facility  like this would not adversely affect  any 
country; on the contrary, its very existence would be an additional guarantee of  payment 
for  the creditors, which would make requests for  credit from  the d e v e l o p i n g countr ies 
more acceptable. 
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Furthermore, there is an important precedent for  a similar facility:  the Oil Facility 
set up by the IMF to help the countries which have to import this commodity to spread 
over a certain period the adjustment problems generated by the rise in oil prices. The 
operating procedure of  this facility  was to deal individually with the cases of  countries 
which approached it, within a certain general action framework. 
In the case of  the Oil Facility, which has already ceased to operate, the IMF set up 
machinery in August 1975 to relieve the burden of  future  debt payments for  a limited 
group of  countries. This machinery consists of  a subsidy account designed to reduce by 
some five  percentage points the interest costs on loans granted by the Oil Facility to the 
most seriously affected  countries.18 This subsidy account is financed  from  contributions by 
the oil-exporting countries and some others, and it is hoped that the amounts contributed 
will enable the subsidy to be maintained until the debt is wiped out. 
This account has only very limited scope, however. On the one hand, it only applies 
to the interest on funds  drawn under the 1975 Oil Facility, and on the other it only covers 
the "most seriously affected"  countries. According to the commitments already entered 
into by contributor countries, it is hoped to obtain from  24 countries a total of  some 160 
million SDR units (a little over US$ 180 million) in order to finance  the subsidy.19 
So far,  there has not been any substantial international agreement regarding the 
external debt, and this topic is one of  those dealt with at the Conference  on International 
Economic Co-operation held in Paris. At all events, at their meeting in Colombo, Sri-
Lanka, the "non-aligned" developing countries agreed to convene a ministerial 
conference  to decide on the joint action called for  if  the Paris Conference  does not succeed 
in finding  a satisfactory  solution to the problem.20 
b) Action regarding  the solvency of  debtors 
If  a refinancing  facility  such as that mentioned earlier were set up, the mere fact  of 
its existence would have a favourable  effect  on the solvency of  debtors. Even more direct 
action has been proposed for  achieving this aim, however. Thus, for  example, mention 
has been made on various occasions of  the desirability of  studying the possible 
establishment of  multilateral machinery to guarantee external indebtedness.21 
One specific  proposal in this field  is that of  creating a financial  safety  net in Latin 
America, as a multilateral mutual financial  aid mechanism which would include 
guarantees for  external indebtedness.22 This project provides for  the collaboration of 
creditor countries from  outside the region in the scheme, in order to supplement the 
solidarity among the debtors themselves, which might not be considered a sufficient 
external guarantee. With such collaboration, it could be ensured that none of  the debtors 
would become insolvent, and the access of  all of  them to private sources of  external 
finance  would be facilitated. 
c) Action regarding  access to financial  markets  and capital  flows 
The proposals made in this field  have covered a wide range of  aspects extending 
from  an increase in official  development assistance to preferential  treatment as regards 
access to private capital markets. The most complete set of  proposals is to be found  in the 
Manila Declaration formulated  at the Third Ministerial Meeting of  the Group of  77 early 
in 1976.25 This document covers three aspects: official  aid, resources from  multilateral 
development agencies, and access to capital markets. 
i ) Official  aid.  Although there is an internationally accepted target whereby official 
development aid should amount to at least 0.7% of  the gross national product of  the 
donor countries, the tendency is to sink further  and further  below this figure  instead of 
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approaching it. In 1961-1962, such aid represented 0.53% of  the gross national product of 
the OECD countries.24 In 1974, however, the corresponding figure  was 0.33% (see 
table 2). The proposals in this respect clarify  the definition  of  the 0.7% target and stress 
the need for  its fufilment. 
ii) Resource flows  from  multilateral  development  financing  agencies.  The 
proposals in this respect are very general. They refer  in particular to increasing the 
contributions by developed countries to multilateral agencies and the terms of  the loans 
granted by such agencies to developing countries. 
iii) Access to the capital  markets  of  the developed  countries.  The proposals in this 
field  assume growing importance as the official  development aid becomes smaller and 
smaller and there is a steady decline in some developing countries' possibilities of 
obtaining resources from  multinational financing  agencies for  this purpose. 
This section also includes the proposals regarding multilateral guarantee 
mechanisms, since the judgement of  the market regarding the solvency of  a debtor 
country is of  decisive importance when trying to obtain resources. In addition to such 
proposals, consideration should also be given to such measures as the exemption of 
developing countries from  administrative restrictions on the sale of  their securities and 
similar exemption of  investor institutions of  the creditor country from  such restrictions 
or from  other legal measures, including those concerned with the control of  outflows  of 
capital in respect of  securities issued by the developing countries. 
In this field,  greater active concern on the part of  the developing countries is called 
for,  both in order to specify  more exactly the nature of  the difficulties  which restrict their 
access to external capital markets, and to negotiate their elimination or reduction. The 
situation varies from  one developed country to another, so that the negotiations should be 
aimed at establishing a clear declaration of  intent and a frame  of  reference  at the 
multilateral level, after  which it would be necessary to seek direct agreements with the 
various developed countries.25 
Some developing countries already make use of  external capital markets to a 
relatively substantial extent. Their experience is very valuable for  the others, so 
consideration should be given to the possibility of  their giving technical assistance in this 
field  to other developing countries in order to help in the preparation of  issues of  bonds or 
other securities on external markets and even in their actual sale on the market. 
d) Action regarding  balance-of-payments  financing 
The multilateral agencies, especially the IMF, have not been able to meet the need 
for  a sharp increase in financial  flows  which arose when the international payments 
imbalances got worse. Because of  their scanty resources and the conditions demanded for 
their use, financing  from  these agencies has lost relative importance in the past six or 
seven years, although there was perhaps a slight recovery in 1975. The countries have 
therefore  been driven to resort to the international banking system both for  depositing 
their surpluses and for  covering their deficits. 
For this reason, the big banks on international markets are increasingly playing the 
role of  an international clearing house: that is to say, the role traditionally played in each 
individual country by the Central Bank. At the same time, it is these big banks which now 
generate a substantial proportion of  international liquidity, without necessarily doing so 
in accordance with criteria consistent with the objectives of  the stability and development 
of  the world economy. 
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The proposals which have been made in this field  coincide as regards the need to 
increase resources and the importance of  the appropriate multilateral agencies, as well as 
the need to liberalize the conditions governing the use of  these resources. • 
It should be borne in mind that there are at least two types of  situations which 
require financing:  those basically due to external influences  which are beyond the control 
of  the authorities, and those which are mainly the result of  domestic policy decisions. 
The financing  needs caused by balance-of-payments  adjustment problems due to 
external causes such as drops in the prices of  main export commodities or higher prices of 
imported products should be satisfied  in such a way as to minimize the present or future 
burden of  adjustment for  the developing country concerned. For this reason, such 
financing  should be on a medium or long-term basis and it should be granted on terms 
which include a concessionary element. 
The present IMF machinery for  providing compensatory financing  for  drops in 
export income fulfils  only part of  this objective, for  although the requirements 
concerning its use have recently been liberalized to some extent, this machinery still 
operates on bases which do not take due account of  the world increase in prices; its 
repayment periods are relatively short; it only comes into effect  when there is a drop in 
income from  exports of  goods, and it does not take into account possible increases in the 
cost of  imports (due to increases in volume or price) for  reasons beyond the control of  the 
authorities. 
The financing  requirements deriving from  domestic policy decisions are connected 
with the advisability of  spreading over time the burden of  necessary adjustments in 
external payments and extending the period needed for  the adjustment measures adopted 
to come into effect.  The IMF meets these needs, like others not covered by specific 
machinery, by giving countries the possibility of  drawing IMF resources in a certain 
proportion to their quotas. In proportion as the drawings exceed certain limits, the 
requirements for  making use of  these resources become more and more severe.26 
In general, countries are expected to bear the burden of  adjustment measures in 
proportion to their own responsibility for  the problem created. Although this 
responsibility is very difficult  to establish in practice, no country has made proposals 
which deny the validity of  this. The proposals mentioned in various forums  are designed 
to increase the IMF's resources and to introduce into the conditions governing each 
drawing a better appraisal of  the developing countries' need to grow. It has been agreed to 
increase the credit tranches of  the IMF temporarily by 45% until legal approval can be 
obtained in the countries for  a 35% increase in the quotas. 
e) Action regarding  commodity  prices 
Action in this field  mainly covers: i) the measures to be adopted in order to 
implement UNCTAD resolution 93 (IV) on the Integrated Programme for  Commodities, 
and ii) the decisions taken as regards the reduction or elimination of  tariff  and non-tariff 
barriers to commodities in the GATT Multilateral Trade Negotiations. 
The measures laid down in UNCTAD resolution 93 (IV) are basically connected 
with the negotiation of  an international commodity agreement. The proposed agreement 
includes the establishment of  a common fund  for  the financing  of  buffer  stocks in order to 
give greater stability —within an overall tendency of  dynamic growth— to the exports of 
the developing countries, to reduce or weaken the sharp fluctuations  in prices on 
international markets, and to defend  the countries' purchasing power. It also includes the 
conclusion of  international commodity agreements aimed at securing the same objective. 
The common fund  and the commodity agreements are consolidated in the UNCTAD 
Integrated Programme for  Commodities. These measures do not rule out any action that 
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developing exporter countries may wish to take through the organization of  producers' 
associations. Such action could lead to understandings and co-ordinated export policies, 
designed to stabilize and improve export income. 
At their meeting in Colombo, the non-aligned countries decided to give their full 
support to the Integrated Programme for  Commodities proposed by the UNCTAD 
Secretariat. They also agreed to set up a special fund  to finance  buffer  stocks in order to 
regulate the prices of  raw materials if  the negotiations on the common fund  proposed by 
the UNCTAD Secretariat did not obtain satisfactory  results in the short term. 
The multilateral trade negotiations can mean a major opening-up of  the markets of 
developed countries for  the commodity exports of  the developing countries in two ways: 
through the reduction of  the high levels of  agricultural protection applied in the first-
named countries, and through the complete exemption from  duties of  imports of  tropical 
products. In both cases, greater access to such markets would have a favourable  effect  on 
price levels and on the total export income of  the developing countries. 
f)  Action regarding  trade 
On a more general level, it is necessary to consider all the actions tending to expand 
and diversify  the developing countries' exports. A brief  list would include the following: 
i) A significant  improvement in the existing generalized system of  preferences  in 
favour  of  the manufactures  and semi-manufactures  of  the developing countries, 
through a greater range of  products, an increase in the margins of  preference, 
liberalization of  the rules regarding origin, reduction of  other non-tariff 
barriers, and other similar measures; 
ii) Special concessions —within the framework  of  the multilateral trade 
negotiations— in favour  of  the developing countries' trade, particularly in the 
field  of  non-tariff  barriers, the use of  safeguard  clauses, the application of 
compensatory duties, etc. These concessions would supplement (instead of 
offsetting,  as often  happens) the domestic efforts  made by the developing 
countries through their programmes and policies to promote exports of 
manufactures  and semi-manufactures; 
iii) Measures to support regional and subregional integration processes; 
iv) More liberal terms for  the transfer  of  technology. 
2. Other aspects 
At their meeting in Colombo, the non-aligned developing countries formulated  a 
programme of  action in the economic field  which adds a set of  new proposals to those 
already made in other forums,  particularly in the field  of  co-operation among developing 
countries. 
The non-aligned countries have made a fresh  appeal for  collaboration among 
developing countries. In this spirit, they have decided to set up special expert groups to be 
responsible for  the study of  a possible common international currency for  the developing 
countries and the establishment and operation of  a developing country bank operating in 
the field  of  trade. They have also agreed to hold meetings of  representatives of  ministries 
of  finance  and central banks of  the countries concerned, with a view to considering the 
establishment of  a joint financial  institution for  promoting monetary and financial  co-
operation among the developing countries, the creation of  a payments union among these 
countries, and possible forms  of  co-operation and association of  their commercial banks. 
These meetings will also deal with the registration and co-ordination of  information  and 
other forms  of  co-operation in financial  matters; the possible operation of  interest 
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subsidy schemes; the creation of  links between financial  institutions of  developing 
countries in order to finance  large-scale projects, and possible additional arrangements as 
regards export credits and guarantees or insurance for  such credits. 
At the same time, and as another step towards still more comprehensive co-
operation schemes, the non-aligned countries agreed to consider the establishment of 
monetary arrangements among developing countries which would include the 
strengthening of  the existing payments clearance arrangements, the establishment of 
new arrangements —open to all the developing countries— at the subregional, 
interregional and regional levels, and the establishment of  links between them. 
3- Latin  America and the proposed  solutions 
The special features  of  a substantial group of  Latin American countries, which have been 
placed in the highest category among the developing countries, leaves them in an 
intermediate position where they cannot obtain concessionary financing  resources but 
they cannot gain sufficiently  flexible  access to other forms  of  financing  either. The fact  is 
that most of  the countries of  the region have been excluded from  the categories of  the 
poorest or most seriously affected  countries. 
Within Latin America, as already noted in section II, the situation of  the individual 
countries is not the same in all cases. While a few  of  them fall  within the category of 
poorest or most seriously affected  countries, many are excluded from  this category in spite 
of  their obvious need to continue receiving concessiónary financing.  One group of 
countries of  the region already has some degree of  access to private financing  markets, but 
such access is still basically limited to short-term financing. 
The international classifications  of  the developing countries, which divide them 
today into two categories, are not in line with the needs of  Latin America and do not serve 
them. In the case of  Latin America, a triple classification  such as that suggested in section 
II could be much more useful  and significant.  In such a classification,  the countries with 
more than US$ 300 of  per capita income per year could be divided into two groups, taking 
into account not only the per capita income but also other characteristics. The latter 
should include the production structure and degree of  industrial development, the 
effective  export possibilities, and the countries' access to short- and long-term private 
financial  markets. The group made up of  those countries which are still dependent on the 
export of  a few  basic commodities and have only limited access to private financing 
markets could receive economic and financial  co-operation along lines not very different 
from  those of  the aid Latin America received in the late 1960s. On the other hand, the 
countries of  the region which have more diversified  economies and have greater access to 
private sources of  financing  could receive a different  type of  international economic co-
operation in line with their actual economic situation, with emphasis on financing 
involving a smaller concessionary element, whether from  public or private sources, and 
with a strong emphasis on trade aspects. 
For most of  Latin America, it is particularly important to establish mechanisms to 
facilitate  the countries' access to private sources of  credit, such as multilateral guarantee 
schemes and secondary markets for  bond issues, as well as the liberalization or 
elimination of  restrictions on their access to the capital markets of  the developed 
countries. As regards public sources of  financing,  the efforts  of  governments to help the 
Inter-American Development Bank to provide resources for  Latin American countries 
which request its aid are of  particular importance. Increasing the resources of  the World 
Bank is also worthy of  special attention, to the extent that this agency continues to 
support the region. 
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Another measure of  particular interest for  Latin America is the expansion of  the 
resources of  the United Nations Development Programme, which provides important 
assistance for  the countries and requires a firm  and stable financial  basis for  its activities. 
The tendency towards a rapid increase in the proportion of  Latin America's 
external financing  which comes from  private sources heightens the need to establish 
institutional machinery to help, on the one hand, to avoid abrupt fluctuations  in such 
financing  and, on the other to facilitate  the region's access to such sources. At the regional 
level, such machinery should include measures designed to improve the solvency of  the 
countries, such as the proposed financial  safety  net. 
The growing importance of  the private external financing  referred  to above raises 
the question of  the possible desirability of  establishing machinery which would make it 
possible, on an experimental basis, to bring in three important groups of  participants: 
i) public and private sources of  financial  and technical assistance; ii) the recipient 
countries, and iii) institutions or individuals of  very high technical calibre and intellectual 
independence. Machinery including these three groups of  participants could facilitate 
joint financing  from  public and private sources and would give greater security for 
planning for  the future.  At the same time, it would make possible an objective appraisal of 
the performance  of  both creditors and debtors in the economic field. 
From a more general point of  view, a matter of  special interest for  the Latin 
American countries is that of  measures designed to regularize the expansion of  the 
Eurocurrency markets and make it less erratic. Such markets are generally outside the 
radius of  action of  national monetary authorities and do not benefit  directly from  the 
national rediscounting and other mechanisms which contribute to the fluidity  of  domestic 
credit. The éstablishment of  collective rediscounting machinery, perhaps within a 
suitable international agency, would have the double advantage of  promoting more stable 
functioning  of  the Eurocurrency credit market and facilitating  natural supervision of  the 
conditions on such markets. Such machinery could also give other international or 
regional agencies the possibility of  investing part of  their resources in shares of 
Eurocurreny credits aimed in the directions most compatible with the objectives of  each 
agency. 
Finally, the possible establishment of  a refinancing  facility  could also be useful  to an 
important group of  Latin American countries. Such a facility  could play an outstanding 
role if  it proves impossible to achieve a really substantial increase in the resources of  the 
IMF, to serve as an extra line of  defence  against external payments difficulties. 
The above proposals put forward  both for  the developing countries in general and 
for  Latin America take account of  a broader framework:  the new international economic 
order and, in particular, the reform  of  the monetary system. To the extent to which it 
proves possible to generate incentives for  symmetrical adjustment by all countries, to 
regulate the creation of  international liquidity, to establish machinery to distribute that 
liquidity in a manner more in keeping with the needs of  the countries, and to avoid 
movements of  real resources in undesirable directions, directing them instead to the areas 
where they are most needed, a decisive step will have been taken towards avoiding the 
resurgence of  the problems observed in the external financial  field. 
If  Latin American exports are considerably expanded, it will not be necessary to 
place so much emphasis on measures of  a financial  nature. It can thus be seen that such 
measures are closely linked with those that may be taken in the trade field. 
The suggestions mentioned above could not only offer  relief  in the present 
situation, but also, if  placed in a coherent general framework  covering a broad range of 
aspects of  international economic life,  help to prevent serious imbalances from  being 
created again in the future. 
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NOTES 
1A better measurement of  the external financing  requirements would be the total of  the current 
account deficit,  the amortization payments on debts already contracted, withdrawals of  capital, and desired 
variations in reserves. The latter could be determined by estimating the demand for  reserves: a task which 
will be undertaken in another study. However, no figures  are available on indebtedness gross of  amortization 
payments, and capital movements in general are also expressed in net terms. Consequently, in order to 
analyse the use made of  different  forms  of  financing,  we have preferred  to add together only the deficit  on 
current account and the variation recorded in the international reserves, regardless of  whether this was 
desired or not. In contrast, as we shall see below, in order to seek an indicator of  the need for  additional 
external financing  we have decided to add the current account deficit  to the debt amortization payments. This 
procedure involves the assumption that all variations in the reserves are desired variations: an assumption 
which can only be eliminated when we have at our disposal the studies on the demand for  international 
reserves. 
2 Address delivered by the President of  the World Bank at the Thirty-First Annual Assembly of 
Governors, Manila, Philippines, September 1976. 
'See note 1. 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, the figures  used in this section refer  to the officially  guaranteed disbursed 
debt having a term of  over one year; they do not include indebtedness with the International Monetary Fund. 
5 Partial data available on the Latin American non-oil-exporting countries indicate that their debt for  a 
term of  less than one year grew more than three-fold  in 1974 compared with the average for  1972 and 1973. 
6 If  we look at the net accumulated drawings of  the non-oil-exporting countries of  the region on the 
IMF, which represent only part of  those countries' indebtedness with that institution, we see that between the 
end of  1974 and the end of  1976 they grew by over 120%, which, when considered in conjunction with what 
was said in note 5 above, indicates that the picture of  the region's situation given above tends to under-
estimate the magnitude of  the countries' indebtedness. 
7 The bank debt figures  given below, unless otherwise indicated, include both guaranteed and non-
guaranteed debt. 
"The bank debt figures  referred  to in the previous note include the indebtedness of  non-national 
financial  centres only with United States banks. To the extent that these centres have debts with other banks, 
act as financial  intermediaries, or reassign a substantial part of  their debt to non-oil-exporting developing 
countries, especially those of  Latin America, the effective  bank debt of  the latter will be greater than the figure 
given here. 
'That is to say, it represented 63% of  the total external debt of  the region. 
1 0 The term "net resources" is used here to designate the balance between the debt with foreign  banks 
net of  amortization payments, and deposits and other assets of  the countries in those banks. 
"The London Interbank Offer  Rate (LIBOR) and the New York prime rate. 
12In the last quarter of  1976, LIBOR stood at its lowest value for  the last 13 quarters. 
1 5 It may be recalled that the deficit  projected for  the coming years, although smaller than that of  1975, 
is still excessively high, particularly when compared with those registered before  1974. Furthermore, as 
already noted, there are two elements which tend to increase the gross financing  needs: on the one hand there 
is the future  increase in the cost of  servicing the external debt, and on the other, there is the need of  the Latin 
American non-oil-exporting countries to restore the levels of  their inernational reserves. 
14See IMF  Survey, 22 August 1976, pp. 244 and 245. 
"See ECLAC, Possible features  of  a financial  safety  net for  Latin America, E/CEPAL/1009, Santiago, 
Chile, 31 July 1975. 
16See ECLA, Temas  del nuevo orden económico internacional,  "Cuadernos de la CEPAL" series, No. 12, 
Santiago, Chile, 1976, pp. 71-73. 
17  Manila  Declaration and Programme of  Action, UNCTAD, TD/195, pp. 25 and 26. See also Action 
Programme for  Economic Co-operation,  Fifth  Conference  of  Heads of  State or Government of  Non-Aligned 
Countries, Colombo, Sri-Lanka, 19 August 1976 (NAC/CONF.5/S/4). 
18Resolution No. 4773 (75/136) of  the Executive Directors, adopted on 1 August 1975, set up the 
Subsidy Account. Resolution No. 5144 (76/102)SA,of  12 July 1976, provided for  the first  payment of  the 
interest subsidy. 
19 IMF  Survey, supplement on the Fund, Washington, D.C., Fall 1975, p. 5. 
2 0 Fifth  Conference  of  Heads of  State or Government of  Non-Aligned Countries, Colombo, Sri-Lanka, 
19 August 1976, Action Programme for  Economic Co-operation,  op.cit., p. 18. 
2 1 See UNCTAD IV, New  Directions and New  Structures  for  Trade  and Development,  Report by the 
Secretary-General of  UNCTAD to the Conference,  Nairobi, May 1976. In addition, theSecretariat of  the Joint 
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Committee of  the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for  Development has prepared some 
preliminary studies on the matter. 
2 2 ECLAC, Possible features  of  a financial  safety  net for  Latin A merica, E/CEPAL/1009, Santiago, Chile, 
1975. 
2 5 Manila Declaration and Programme of  Action, Note by the Secretary-General of  UNCTAD, op.cit. 
2 4 Latin American Economic System (SELA), Informe  de la Secretaria Permanente  del SELA  sobre el 
Tercer  Período  de Sesiones de la Conferencia  sobre la Cooperación Económica Internacional  (Part Two), 
CL/0-II/Div.NQ 4/Add.l, 26 May 1976, p. 4. 
2 5 The Executive Director of  the IMF has agreed to include in his regular consultations with the 
developed countries an appraisal of  the progress made by the latter as regards liberalizing access to their 
capital markets. 
2 6 It is not always possible to distinguish clearly between the effects  of  domestic policies and those due to 
causes w'hich are beyond the control of  the authorities. For this reason, solutions appropriate to one of  these 
cases are sometimes applied in order to try to solve cases of  the other type. 
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WORLD INFLATION AND FOREIGN DEBT: THE CASE OF THE IMPROPER DEFLATOR 
Writers on external indebtedness usually hold that debtor countries benefit  from 
international inflation,  since it reduces the real value of  their external debt. Indeed, some 
studies assert that, in order to measure the real value of  the debt, it is necessary to deflate 
its nominal value by an index of  export or import prices.1 
This article intends to demonstrate that the effect  of  international inflation  on 
external indebtednees is to say the least uncertain, and that in certain circumstances 
inflation  can increase the debt burden. 
1. The  amount of  debt 
The way in which the amount of  debt is calculated is not satisfactory  on several grounds. 
In the first  place, the figure  taken as a basis for  calculation is the total nominal amount of 
credit obtained (or drawn) minus amortization payments made to date.2 This total 
nominal amount of  debt outstanding does not necessarily correspond to the present value 
of  future  amortization and interest payments, the latter being a more correct 
approximation to the amount of  debt as measured from  the point of  view of  its burden. 
The two approaches mentioned will normally yield different  results due to the fact  that 
the internal rate of  return implicit in the stream of  amortization and interest payments3 
and the discount rate actually used by debtor countries to obtain a present value of  future 
payments will generally differ.  In addition, from  the point of  view of  the debtor countries, 
the present value of  future  payments (in terms of  the real cost of  servicing the debt) may 
differ  from  the net nominal amount of  debt, if  the social cost of  foreign  exchange does not 
remain constant over time. 
The contractual interest rate on a loan is not always the same as the effective  rate. 
The most important cause of  any difference  between the two is the time profile  of 
amortization and interest payments. For example, if  there is a grace period the effective 
rate, or the internal rate of  return implicit in the loan, will be lower than the contractual 
interest rate. In other words, the effective  rate equating the present value of  the future 
amortization and interest payments with the net nominal value of  the loan will differ 
from  the contractual interest rate. 
In turn, the effective  rate will generally differ  from  the rate which a country regards 
as most appropriate for  applying to future  amortization and interest payments in order to 
obtain the present value of  such payments. This difference  is attributable to a variety of 
reasons: the risk considerations as perceived by the lender country may differ  from  those 
of  the borrower; the relative scarcity of  capital, and the social time preference  in the two 
countries, will generally differ;  and, finally  the external inflation  rate expected by the 
debtor country may differ  from  the rate expected by the creditor country, so that for  a 
given nominal interest rate there will be different  expected real rates. Of  course, the 
expectations of  inflation  on the part of  both the debtor and the creditor countries may fail 
to coincide with the actual inflation. 
Thus, even if  there are no concessionary elements in the loans, and no expectations 
of  inflation,  it can be seen that the present value of  the future  amortization and interest 
payments may differ  from  the net nominal value of  the debt because of  the different  rates 
applied by the creditor and debtor countries for  discounting purposes. 
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The assumptions needed to measure the present value of  the future  payments on a 
debt through its net nominal value are extraordinarily restrictive. In general, the present 
value of  future  payments will differ  from  the net nominal value of  the debt. 
From the point of  view of  the debtor country, its debt burden should be measured in 
terms of  the cost the country faces  in making the future  amortization and interest 
payments. For example, for  a country with a debt whose net nominal value is US$ 5 
billion, the debt burden will be quite different  depending on whether the debt is to be paid 
' off  over 10 years at an annual rate of  interest of  3%, or over the same period but at a 10% 
annual rate. Assuming equal amortization payments in each case, and interest calculated 
on the unpaid balance, the present value of  the future  payments will be US$ 4 421 million 
in the most favourable  case and US$ 5 980 million in the least favourable  case.4 Thus, for 
the same net nominal value the debt burden is completely different  in the two cases —but 
this difference  is concealed when the debt is analysed in terms of  its net nominal value. 
This value would only be important (apart from  the possible effect  on the country's 
subsequent borrowing) if  the debt had to be paid back immediately in a single sum, which 
of  course is not an option to be considered here. 
The sacrifice  the country must make to meet its external commitments on the 
terms agreed is the relevant magnitude to measure in an analysis of  the debt burden. As 
we have seen, this sacrifice  is measured in terms more of  future  payments than of  net 
nominal amount, and in measuring it the lower consumption or lower investment which 
are necessary in order to repay the debt must be taken into account. 
In other words, the debt burden should be measured in the light of  the real 
resources which a country must allocate for  debt servicing by transferring  them away 
from  domestic consumption or investment and channeling them to the production of 
internationally tradeable goods with the aim of  generating the surplus necessary to pay 
the debt. Thus the process consists of  two stages: first,  generation of  the necessary saving; 
and second, conversion of  these (domestic) resources into foreign  currency. 
The marginal cost of  transferring  resources to the production of  tradeable goods is 
given by the social cost of  foreign  exchange. Consequently, in order to measure a country's 
future  debt servicing commitments in terms of  real resources, it is necessary to estimate 
the future  trend of  the social cost of  foreign  exchange.5 
This last point is most important. Even if  the internal rate of  return of  a loan 
coincided with the social discount rate used by the debtor country, a rise in the expected 
future  social cost of  foreign  exchange will increase the present value of  future  payments 
on the debt in terms of  real domestic resources, while if  the social cost of  foreign  exchange 
falls,  less real resources will be needed to pay the debt in the future;  in other words, in the 
latter case a smaller amount of  real resources will be channelled to serve the purpose of 
paying the debt.6 
It is clear from  all these considerations that there is a degree of  uncertainty in 
estimates both of  the cost of  the real resources needed to make future  payments in order 
to service the debt, and of  the present value of  future  debt servicing payments. The 
expected future  rate of  international inflation  may differ  from  the effective  rate, and both 
the real social discount rate and the social cost of  foreign  exchange may change with time. 
2. The  deflation  procedure 
The effect  of  world inflation  on the foreign  debt of  developing countries is generally 
taken into account by deflating  the net nominal value of  the debt in various years using an 
index of  international prices, with the aim of  measuring the cost of  debt servicing in 
terms of  real resources. 
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This operation makes it possible to estimate, at constant prices, the goods and 
services which could be purchased on the international market if  the net nominal value of 
the debt was used for  that purpose. What the debtor country is really interested in 
knowing, however, is the value of  the real resources or the goods and services which it 
must channel towards future  amortization and interest payments on the debt, and not 
what amount of  goods and services might be purchased on the market of  the creditor 
countries with the net nominal value of  the debt. 
A correct appproach to the problem of  measuring the real burden of  foreign  debt 
would need to take into account mainly three effects  of  world inflation7  on the real value 
of  debt servicing payments. Firstly, it may modify  future  interest payments, so that for 
this reason alone the net nominal value ceases to be a sound indicator of  external debt. It is 
also necessary to bear in mind, as was pointed out above, that world inflation  has an 
impact on the nominal discount rate applicable to future  debt service payments. 
Secondly, world inflation  affects  the social value of  foreign  exchange, which is a 
vital variable in determining the real cost of  servicing the external debt. Thus, 
multiplying the debt servicing payments in dollars by the social cost of  foreign  exchange 
gives the value of  the debt servicing payments in terms of  domestic resources. 
Finally, world inflation  may also affect  the domestic sacrifice  necessary to obtain 
the resources needed to make these debt servicing payments. This sacrifice  (lower present 
and/or future  consumption) made in order to service the external debt is, in the final 
analysis, the true cost incurred during each period in generating the resources required to 
service the debt. 
Obviously, when a series expressed in nominal terms is deflated  by a rising price 
index the real values obtained will be lower than the nominal values. What is not obvious 
is whether it is correct to apply such a procedure to the nominal amount of  the debt. Let us 
imagine, for  example, two consecutive periods during which the net nominal value of  the 
debt remains constant. Let us also assume a world inflation  rate of  10% which is fully 
reflected  in the internationally prevailing interest rates applicable to the debt. If  the 
amount of  the debt is deflated  using an appropriate price index it will be seen that in the 
second year, in real terms, the amount appears 10% smaller than in the first.  As a result of 
the fact  that the interest rates reflect  international inflation,  however, the present values 
of  the future  payments in real terms will be the same in both years and, consequently, the 
debt burden from  the point of  view of  the debtor country will not have been altered by 
international inflation. 
If  the interest rate reflects  expectations of  inflation  and these expectations do in 
fact  correspond to the actual inflation,  such inflation  does not reduce the present value of 
the future  payments on the debt, which remains constant. Only if  the actual inflation  is 
higher than the level reflected  in the interest rate will there be a drop in the discounted 
value of  the future  payments on the debt (even though this would probably still be higher 
than the net nominal value). On the other hand, if  actual inflation  is lower than expected, 
there will be a rise in the present value of  the external debt. 
The same facts  may be explained in another way. If  actual inflation  is higher than 
the level implicit in the interest rate for  the loan, the rate at which the future  payments 
will have to be discounted will be higher than the loan rate, and consequently the present 
value of  future  payments on the debt will fall.  Note that this situation is due to the 
discrepancy between the expected and actual rates of  inflation,  and not to the mere fact 
that there is inflation.  If  the interest rate incorporates expected inflation,  then the 
measurement of  the debt burden (even if  there is no concessionary element, nor any 
discrepancy between the discount rates of  the debtor country and the rate of  return 
implicit in the loan) obtained by deflating  the net nominal value of  the debt by some index 
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of  international prices leads to an underestimation of  the debt burden, which may be 
substantial. 
In the past ten years the structure of  the external debt of  the developing countries 
has changed drastically, with a sharp drop in loans from  official  sources with some 
concessionary content and an increase in debt from  private sources which are non-
concessionary and bear floating  interest rates revised every six months. This 
phenomenon, which has been particularly notable in the case of  Latin America, 
underlines the importance of  taking into account the expectations of  inflation  implicit in 
the interest rates when estimating the debt burden of  a given country. 
Strictly speaking, the burden involved in debt servicing in each period is composed 
of  two elements: the saving (lower present consumption) or smaller investment (lower 
future  consumption) required to serve the debt, and the conversion of  this amount of 
domestic resources into foreign  exchange. For this latter purpose, the social cost of 
foreign  exchange is used. 
In other words, in each period it is necessary to multiply the amount or foreign 
exchange to be paid by its social cost in order to obtain a correct assessment of  the real 
domestic resources required to service the external debt. The discounted value of  these 
flows  (measured in constant currency units of  the debtor country) corresponds to the real 
domestic resources which must be used to ensure future  payments. 
In most developing countries there are no reliable time series for  the social cost of 
foreign  exchange. Anyway, since the main point of  interest here is the effect  of  world 
inflation  on the real cost of  servicing external debt, no account will be taken of  a number 
of  elements which are unconnected with the evolution of  international prices but affect 
the value of  the social rate of  exchange, such as natural disasters (droughts, frosts, 
earthquakes), strikes in important export and import activities, changes in the net inflow 
of  external capital, modifications  in trade policy, and so on. 
If  dyring the process of  world inflation  domestic prices in the debtor country 
remain constant, and if  there is no change in the terms of  trade, the social cost of  foreign 
exchange falls  as a result of  international inflation.  If  the rate of  interest of  the loans 
correctly reflect  international inflation,  debt service payments will rise with inflation,  so 
that the value of  the domestic resources used for  that purpose will not change greatly. 
If  international inflation  is accompanied by a deterioration in the terms of  trade, 
welfare  in the debtor country will fall.  It should also be noted that, while international 
inflation  reduces the social cost of  foreign  exchange, a deterioration of  the terms of  trade 
tends, in the short run, to increase it when the elasticity of  import volume with respect to 
the unit value of  imports, in absolute terms, is less than 1; in this case, the direction of 
change of  the social cost of  foreign  exchange becomes uncertain. Nevertheless, in most 
cases the reduction in the social cost of  foreign  exchange due to world inflation  will be less 
than proportional to the inflation  rate, so that the domestic sacrifice  required in order to 
service the external debt will tend to increase. 
If  international inflation  is accompanied by an improvement in the terms of  trade 
of  the debtor country, it is obvious that in addition to an improvement in the general level 
of  welfare  in that country, there will be a fall  in the burden of  servicing the debt. The 
reason for  this fall  is that the social exchange rate falls  because of  world inflation  and the 
improvement in the terms of  trade, so that the proportional drop in the social cost of 
foreign  exchange tends to be larger than the proportional increase in debt service. Thus 
the cost of  servicing the external debt tends to fall. 
It can be seen from  the above that it is a serious error to try to measure the real value 
of  the debt, with a view to identifying  the debt burden for  the debtor country, by deflating 
the net nominal value of  the debt using an index of  external prices for  the debtor country. 
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It should be emphasized that what we should really attempt to measure is the use of 
real resources to service the debt. If  the increase in prices largely takes the form  of  higher 
prices for  goods imported by the debtor country, then in order to maintain the same level 
of  national welfare  it will be necessary to devote a greater volume of  resources to export 
production, thus reducing present or future  consumption in the debtor country and, as a 
consequence, its level of  welfare.  The problem may also be viewed as follows:  in order to 
maintain the value of  imports unchanged, it will be necessary to reduce their volume, thus 
also bringing down consumption and/or investment, and consequently the country's rate 
of  economic growth. A similar (but in this case reverse) analysis applies if  the world-wide 
rise in prices largely takes the form  of  an increase in export prices. 
Consequently, the evolution of  export prices is just as important as the evolution of 
import prices when estimating the net effect  on the position of  the debtor countries of  a 
rise in prices in world markets. In particular, the fairly  widespread practice of  deflating 
external debt using an index of  prices of  the debtor country's imports involves two errors. 
Firstly, by taking the net nominal value of  the external debt as an indicator of  the debt, it 
fails  to incorporate the effect  on debt service of  a probable increase in future  interest 
payments. Secondly, with an index of  import prices as a deflator,  it takes no account of  the 
evolution of  export prices. If  the current account of  the balance of  payments is in 
equilibrium8 and export prices rise at a similar rate than import prices, the real value of 
the debt remains unchanged, whereas if  export prices rise at a slower rate than import 
prices, this will tend to raise the cost of  debt servicing. In both cases, however, the 
traditional deflation  procedure results in an apparent substantial fall  in the real value of 
the debt, while if  export prices rise faster  than import prices, the traditional approach 
understimates the reduction in the real value of  the debt. 
It would therefore  appear that a more appropriate deflator  (that is to say, one 
which incorporates less error) would be the terms-of-trade  index of  the debtor country. In 
this case (assuming that the value of  the debt is measured "correctly"), "neutral" world 
inflation  leaves the real value of  the debt unchanged. When this deflator  is used, a 
deterioration in the terms of  trade raises the real value of  the debt (which seems fairly 
reasonable for  short periods), while an improvement in the terms of  trade reduces the 
real cost of  debt servicing. 
It may be noted that the use of  the terms-of-trade  index as a deflator,  together with 
proper measurement of  the amount of  the external debt, may not incorporate all the 
effects  of  world inflation  on the real value of  the debt but it does appreciably reduce the 
margin of  error involved in the traditional calculations. 
In general, when the international scenario is characterized by inflation  and the 
industrialized countries adopt policies designed to check the rise in prices, the 
recessionary effect  of  such policies has a large impact on the prices of  the primary 
commodities generally exported by the developing countries. Consequently, although 
world inflation  may, while building up and accelerating, benefit  many countries which 
export primary commodities, it is probable that the opposite occurs in the stabilization 
phase. 
From this point of  view, the industrialized countries' emphasis on stabilization 
policies, which is emerging as a characteristic of  the world economy in the near future, 
does not bode well for  developing countries. 
Finally, we may ask why it is that almost all the studies on external indebtedness 
tackle the problem on the basis of  the net nominal value of  the debt and an export or 
import price index. There appear to be two reasons: one is that the problem has in many 
cases been approached from  the point of  view of  the creditor countries, which suffer 
capital losses as a result of  world inflation  and assume, consequently, that inflation 
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benefits  debtor countries; the other reason is that the discussion has referred  to a period 
when the major part of  the developing countries came from  official  (bilateral and 
multilateral) sources, with service payments fixed  in nominal terms. 
We may conclude from  the above that the method of  taking the net nominal value 
of  the debt and deflating  it using an international price index is not the most illuminating 
approach to the analysis of  the real burden of  external debt for  the debtor countries in 
present circumstances. There are three major determinants of  the burden of  foreign  debt 
which are not taken account of  in the usual deflation  procedure: the variations of  the 
terms of  trade of  the debtor, the evolution of  the social cost of  its foreign  exchange, and 
the change in the sources of  external finance,  with the consequent modifications  in the 
term structure of  the debt and the incorporation of  expected inflation  in interest 
payments. 
With the sole aim of  illustrating the quantitative importance of  the factors 
mentioned above, we present below comparative figures  for  a number of  Latin American 
countries showing the net nominal value of  the debt deflated  both by import price indexes 
and by terms-of-trade  indexes. 
3- World  inflation  and the external  debt  of  some 
Latin  American countries 
In the period 1967-1974, the cumulative annual average nominal growth in Brazil's 
guaranteed external debt was 26.2 %. If  the total debt is deflated  by an import price index, 
the growth rate falls  to less than a third of  that figure  (8.3%). On the other hand, if  it is 
deflated  by Brazil's terms-of-trade  index, the average growth is 18.9%, which indicates, 
firstly,  that the terms of  trade improved during the period in question, and secondly that 
the "real" annual average rate of  increase in the guaranteed external debt was about 2/3 of 
that of  the nominal increase, while the rate of  growth of  the debt obtained from  simple 
deflation  by and index of  import prices is less than 1/3 of  the rate of  increase of  the 
nominal debt. 
A similar conclusion is obtained for  Chile during the same perior. As can be seen 
from  table 1, the "real" rate of  growth of  Chile's guaranteed external debt was very 
similar, on the average, to the rate of  growth of  the nominal debt. On the other hand, the 
Table 1 





Brazil 26.2 8.3 18.9 
Chi le 17.3 8 .0 16.6 
Honduras 21.4 9.8 23.5 
Note: GED = guaranteed external debt; 
MP = index of import prices; 
XP = index of export prices. 
"Net nominal value of the guaranteed external debt. World Bank figures. 
'Annual averages (compounded). 
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Table 2 
GROWTH RATE OF EXTERNAL DEBT, 1975 
(Percentages) 
A B C 












Argentina 1.9 28.5 10.7 -10.3 -2.5 19.5 29.8 
Mexico 31.6 41.6 35.3 20.4 23.8 31.2 34.8 
Peru 15.2 15.7 15.4 3.3 3.4 30.4 30.5 
"External debt deflated using an index of the unit value of imports. 
'External debt deflated using an index of the terms of trade. 
use of  an index of  import prices as a deflator  leads to the conclusion that the external debt 
increased at an average annual rate of  8%, which is less than '/2 of  the rate of  growth of  the 
nominal debt. 
The case of  Honduras is even more interesting, as the "real" annual increase is 
larger than the increase in the nominal debt. While the nominal debt increased by an 
average of  21.4%, the rate of  "real" growth reached 23.5%. In constrast, the rate of 
growth of  the guaranteed external debt as deflated  by the import price index was less than 
10% a year. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the figure  used for  the value of  the debt in 
these calculations is the net nominal value of  the guaranteed external debt. In view of  the 
changes in the breakdown by sources of  Latin America's external debt, it is highly 
probable that both the amount and the rate of  growth are underestimated as a result of  the 
growing importance of  non-guaranteed debt at floating  interest rates. If  this factor  is not 
taken into account, the net nominal value of  the debt underestimates the "correct" value. 
Now, if  we consider the year 1975 alone, we can see that the growth in the non-
guaranteed component of  the external debt of  some Latin American countries was much 
larger than the increase in the guaranteed part, thus confirming  the importance of  using a 
present value approach to estimate the amount of  foreign  debt for  the purposes of 
assessing its burden on debtor countries. 
If  non-guaranteed debt is taken into account, and a terms-of-trade  index is used as a 
deflator,  the results differ  substantially from  those obtained when an index of  import 
prices is used to deflate  the nominal figures. 
For Argentina, Mexico and Peru, the guaranteed external debt increased in 1975 by 
1.9, 31.6 and 15.2%, while the non-guaranteed debt grew by 28.5, 41.6 and 15.7% 
respectively (see table 2). 
The effects  of  world inflation  and of  changes in the terms of  trade on the pattern 
and growth rates of  the debt are of  great importance. In Argentina, while the total 
nominal debt increased by 10.7%, the debt when deflated  by the index of  import prices 
fell  by 2.5% (the guaranteed external debt dropped by 10.3%, having grown in nominal 
terms, without deflation,  by less than 2%). In contrast, if  deflated  by XP/MP, the growth 
of  the total debt amounts to 29.8% (as against an increase of  under 20% in the guaranteed 
external debt), a figure  which is higher  than the rise in the total nominal debt (TND). 
In Mexico, the TND increased by 35.3%; deflated  using MP the debt rose by 23.8%, 
while deflated  using XP/MP it grew by 34.8%, or almost the same rate as the TND. 
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Finally, in Peru, while the TND rose by 15.4% and the debt deflated  by MP rose by 
3.4% (a rate 78% lower), the "real" debt increased by 30.5%, twice as much as the rise in 
the TND. 
As in the analysis of  the period 1967-1974, it should be borne in mind that the 
external debt figures  used here show the net nominal value, and do not include the effect 
of  floating  interest rates, thus undoubtedly understanding the real value of  the debt. 
NOTES 
'See, for  example, World Bank, World  Debt Tables,  External  Public Debt of  LDCs,  31 October 1976, 
vol. I, and R. Aliber, Perspectives  on LDC External  Indebtedness,  Conference  on External Financial Policy, 
Santiago, 31 March-2 April 1977. 
2 This discussion does not deal with the degree of  coverage of  the present figures  on external debt, nor 
with the measurement of  such debt on the basis of  disbursed or undisbursed outstanding debt actually used. 
For present purposes external debt is considered to be any commitment, with a known amount or method of 
determination, involving future  payments abroad on specific  dates. 
'Leaving aside risk considerations, possible future  renegotiations and deliberate insolvency. 
4 It is assumed here that the social value of  foreign  exchange remains constant over time. 
5 Some theoretical analyses of  this topic, together with empirical estimates, may be found  in E. Bacha 
and L. Taylor, "Foreign Exchange Shadow Prices: A Critical Review of  Current Theories", The  Quarterly 
Journal  of  Economics, vol. LXXXV, N° 2 (May 1971), pp. 197-224, and A. Guadagni, Los precios sombra en la 
evaluación social de proyectos de inversión, Fondo Nacional de Preinversión, Junta Nacional de Planificación, 
Inter-American Development Bank, Quito, March 1976. 
6 As will be seen below, it is necessary to study the effect  of  world inflation  on the social cost of  foreign 
exchange together with its impact on the nominal amount of  debt service (in current dollars). 
7 For present purposes, the international rate of  inflation  is defined  as a weighted average of  the rates of 
increase in prices in the countries with which the debtor country carries out transactions. The effect  of 
variations in the exchange rates between the currencies of  such countries and the intervention currency used 
by the debtor country on these prices should be eliminated, while the weighting coefficients  should reflect  the 
relative importance of  each of  the countries in transactions with the debtor country, including not only goods 
and services, but also capital movements. 
8 The annex also contains an analysis of  a case where the current account of  the balance of  payments is in 
deficit. 
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ANNEX 
The effect  of  world inflation  on the social 
cost of  foreign  exchange 
On the assumption that, over a period of  time, the absolute price level of  internationally 
traded products follows  an upward trend, the following  analysis is designed to assess the 
effect  of  such trend on the social cost of  foreign  exchange. 
For the purposes of  this analysis, the concept of  the social cost of  foreign  exchange 
is defined  as the price of  foreign  exchange that would prevail under free  international 
trade conditions. 
It will be assumed that the net flow  of  foreign  currency from  sources other than the 
current account of  the balance of  payments is constant, and, in particular, that such flow  is 
independent both of  the rate of  international inflation  and of  the evolution of  the terms of 
trade of  the debtor country. 
Where 
pi = unit value of  imports 
t = nominal equilibrium exchange rate under free  trade conditions 
p = domestic price level 
y = real income (including the effect  of  the change in the terms of  trade) 
pe = unit value of  exports. 
Total differentiation  of  (1) and (2) gives 
If 
D = flow  demand for  foreign  currency per unit of  time 
O = flow  supply of  foreign  currency per unit of  time 
Then 
D = D (pi, t/p, y) 





dD = dO — 
ÔD , ÔO , ÔO 
<50 <5D 
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If  we ignore the effect  of  the change in the terms of  trade on national income, we 
may deduce from  (5) that: 
piqi (1 + N) Ü_L - peqe (1 + E) -H-Î-
( t/P> = W ÔD — ( 6 ) 
«(t/p) S(t/p) 
Where 
x = is the total derivative of  x with respect to time 
qe = quantum of  exports 
qi = quantum of  imports 
N = partial demand elasticity of  the volume of  imports with respect to its unit 
value 
E = partial supply elasticity of  the quantity of  exports with respect to its unit 
value. 
I. Assuming that the current account balance is in equilibrium, defining  VI = piqi; VE = 
peqe (VI = VE = Vo), and expressing the denominator of  equation (6), which is positive, 
as H, we obtain: 
(t/p) = i d + N) - L i - - (1 + E) P- i . ) (7) 
H v pi pe ' 
From equation (7) it can be seen that 
(i) If  / N / â 1 and (p e, p' i > O), (t/p) < O 
(¡i) if  ü i = O, (t/p) < O 
p i 
(Hi) If  P_L = o, (t/p) I O if  / N / I 1 
pe ^ 
Finally, if 
¿ J _ = ( l + a ) ¿ í . (8) 
pi pe 
where a ^ - 1, the following  basic situation may be distinguished: 
(A) a = O 
Thus (7) may be expressed as 
(t/P) = [ ^ - ] ( £ - L ) [ N - E ) (9) 
H pe v ' 
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Since E is O and N ^ O, it may be deduced from  (9) that tf  there is world  inflation 
and no change in the terms of  trade,  the social  cost of  foreign  exchange will  fall  on the 
inflation. 
(B) a # O 
In this case (7) may be expressed as 
(t/P) = ( ^ f  ) ( ( d + N) (1 + a) - (1 + E) } = ( § - ) ( S (10) 
H pe v ' H pe 
Whence (t/p) ^ O if  S ^ O 
(B.l) a > O 
S = O if  (1 + N) (1 + a) - (1 + E) = O 
(1 + N ) (1 + a) I (1 +E) 
For / N / < 1, (1 + N)> O, and so, 
S = O if  (1 + a) = 1 + E 
1 + N 
(t/p) ^ O if  a ^ < < 1 + N 
To sum up, if  together with world inflation  there is a worsening in the terms of 
trade (but p i > O and p e > O), the social cost of  foreign  exchange will tend to rise with 
inflation  only" if  two conditions are met simultaneously: that / N / < 1, and that the unit 
value of  imports is growing at a percentage rate E - N t j m e s higher than the rate of 
growth of  the value of  exports. 1 + N 
(B.2) a < O (and a ^ - 1) 
S = O if  (1 + N) (1 + a) - (1 + E) = O 
Since ( l + a ) è O , then if  / N / < 1 
c ^ n - f i j .  > 1 + E S 5 O i f l + a  5 < < 1 + N 
S j o i f a ^ ^ -  ( I D 
< < 1 + N 
But as (E - N) and ( 1 + N) are positive, and as a is negative, it may be deduced from 
(11) that (t/p) < O, if  a < O for  any value of  N and E. 
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To sum up, if  together  with  world  inflation  there is an improvement  in the terms of 
trade,  the social  cost of  foreign  exchange will  necessarily  fall. 
II. If  we assume that the current account balance is negative and constant, 
Vi = Ve + Z (12) 
where Z > O 
From equations (6) and (12) we obtain: 
Ve [ (1 + N) - (1 + E) -E-^-] + Z (1 + N) 
« / p ) - — e S - ( i 3 ) 
From equation (13) we observe that 
(i) If  / N / ^ 1 and (p e, p' i > O), (t/p) < O 
(ii) If  = O, (t/p) < O 
p i 
(iii) If  P_L = o, (t/p) I O if  / N / I 1 
pe ^ ^ 
In turn, if 
(A) a = O, we obtain from  equation (13): 
(1 + N) -B-i-Vi - (1 + E) -2J- Ve 
( t / p , = — 
H 
Accordingly, 
w» ( 1 4 > 
From (14) we may deduce that if  there is no change in the terms of  trade and if 
/ N / < 1, world inflation  produces a rise/no charge/a fall  in the social cost of  foreign 
exchange if  the current  account deficit  expressed  as a percentage  of  exports  is higher 
than/equal to/lower than the quotient of  the sum of  the absolute values of  elasticities E 
and N, and the sum N + 1. 
Alternatively, since / N / < 1, if  a = O, the probability that (t/p) > O is a direct 
function  of  the size of  the current account deficit  and is an inverse function  of  the value 
of  E. 
(B) a # O 
In this case (13) may be expressed as 
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P * (t/p) = Pj^. { (1 + N) (1 + a) - (1 + E) ) + Z (1 + N) (1 + a) ^ 
(t/p) = ( Vi (1 + N) (1 + a) - Ve (1 + E) ) (15) 
Whence, if  W is defined  as W = Vi (1 + N) (1 + a) - Ve (1 + E) 
(t/p) = O if  w I O 
(B.l) a > O 
For / N / < 1, W $ O i f l  + a 
Or, 
/ > n -i ^ E - N Z 1 + E , 
( t / p ) < < T T Ñ " vï~ T T Ñ " 
It may be seen that in this case (in comparison with the situation where Z = O), a 
smaller deterioration in the terms of  trade is needed, where / N / < 1, for  world inflation 
to produce and increase in the social cost of  foreign  exchange. 
(B.2) a < O (a sã - 1) 
As (1 + a ) > 0 , if  / N / < 1 
W J o i f ( l + a ) |  YSLÍJL+EL 
< < Vi (1 + N) 
As (1 + a) < 1, a sufficient  condition for  W < O, is that 
Ve (1 + E) ^ j 
Vi (1 + N) 
Or E N 
Ve 1 + N 
Similarly, a necessary condition in these circumstances for  W ë O is that 
Z
 _ > E N 
Ve 1 + N 
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Values of  the coefficient: 
Ve 
1974 1975 1976 1974/1976 
Brazil 0.84 0.71 0.54 0.70 
Chile 0.18 0.38 -0.02 0.18 
Honduras 0.38 0.44 0.31 0.38 
Argentina -0.24 0.37 -0.13 0.07 
Mexico 0.46 0.66 0.49 0.54 
Peru 0.41 0.92 0.60 0.64 
It can be seen that, in general, the coefficient  does not rise above 0.7 as indicated 
E - N 
above. This result should be in some of  the cases studied, compared with (/N/<1), 
1 + N 
in order to deduce the change in the social cost of  the currency. If  N = -y2 this means that in > E - N < order for  0.7 = ^ ; E = 0.85. 
NOTE 
"A deterioration in the terms of  trade may reduce (or even reverse) the net capital flows  towards the 
country in question. This is due to the fact  that such a deterioration may create expectations (correct or 
incorrect) of  a devaluation. As a result there is an increased probability that a worsening in the terms of  trade 
will raise the social cost of  foreign  exchange. 
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OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES' INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO 
I 
Introduction 
The oil-exporting countries are extracting wealth from  the ground to secure a future 
stream of  income. Instead of  investing by leaving oil underground, they are extracting 
enough oil to maintain a given level of  consumption and make other investments. 
Placement of  funds  in the monetary and financial  markets as well as acquisition of  real 
assets are part and parcel of  this policy. Yields in different  financial  markets, including 
allowances for  exchange rate movements and risks tend rapidly to attain equality, since 
financial  resources can move easily from  one market to another. The composition of  a 
given portfolio  of  financial  investments will be very influenced  by the investor's 
possibility of  predicting, better than the market, future  variations of  exchange and 
interest rate. 
This is not so where the acquisition of  real assets is concerned. Rates of  return on 
investments in real assets differ  among countries tending to equality with extremely long 
delays, while the variability of  those returns also differ  from  country to country. 
Commodities, labour technology, and capital goods do not move with the same ease as 
financial  resources, and natural elements such as climate, land quality, altitude, etc., are 
extremely expensive to reproduce in a different  environment. The composition of  an 
investment portfolio  in real assets is influenced  by a large number of  factors,  from 
religious and cultural considerations to economic and security factors.  This is not 
necessarily so in the case of  financial  investments, since the cost of  changing the portfolio 
composition in such a case is not substantial. The cost of  changing the composition of  a 
real assets investment porfolio  is usually higher, so that such composition will be more 
influenced  by long-run considerations. 
The purpose of  this chapter is to explore the economic advantages for  Arab oil-
exporting countries to internationally diversify  their real assets investment portfolio  by 
giving higher importance to investments in Latin America. The first  part of  the chapter 
examines the use of  foreign  savings in Latin American development and the main factors 
that have tended to increase the area's reliance on resources from  abroad and hence Latin 
American demand for  foreign  savings. The second part explores the possibility of 
international diversification  of  investments of  Arab oil-exporting countries and the 
economic advantages of  increasing the share of  their investments in Latin America. It 
also examines briefly  other areas of  financial  co-operation and some possible institutional 
channels to facilitate  investment diversification  of  the investing countries. 
II 
Domestic and foreign  savings in Latin America 
1. Past  and present trends 
The non-oil-exporting countries of  Latin America have been traditionally net users of 
foreign  savings. Their balance-of-payments  current account have been persistently in 
deficit,  which reached a yearly average for  the group of  around US$ 2 billion in 1965-
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1970. This was a complement to domestic savings and ensured investment levels high 
enough to contribute to an economic growth rate of  6% as an average for  the period, and 
slightly lower than that for  the decade of  the 1960s. During this period, domestic savings 
were used to finance  85 % of  gross domestic fixed  investment, while deficit  in the balance-
of-payments  current account covered the rest. 
The balance-of-payments  disequilibrium referred  to above, which represented 
about 16% of  total exports of  goods and services, did not create generalized balance-of-
payments problems. Exports were growing rapidly, while the financing  of  the current 
imbalance came from  direct foreign  investment, borrowing from  official  and private 
sources in approximately equal shares. Since borrowing from  official  sources usually 
involves medium- or long-term debt, the form  taken by foreign  financing  did not create 
an excessive burden in any particular future  period and the foreign  debt profile  of  the 
region showed an adequate distribution of  debt repayments through time. 
The second half  of  the 1960s and the early 1970s witnessed an impressive 
expansion of  foreign  trade by non-oil-exporting countries in Latin America. Total 
exports grew at an annual average rate of  almost 17% through aggressive efforts  in most 
countries to gradually open their economies and expand exports at the subregional, 
regional, and world levels. Such efforts  included the application in some inflation-ridden 
countries of  smaller and frequent  adjustments in the nominal échangé rate to avoid sharp 
fluctuations  in the real rate. Multiple exchange rate practices were substantially 
eliminated in most countries and a general environment of  openness in trade substituted 
the highly protectionist trends prevailing in the previous decade. Sustained expansion of 
Table 1 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF L A T I N 
AMERICA:"  C U R R E N T A C C O U N T F I N A N C I N G 





1977 1978 1979 
Current account deficit'' -2.0 -13.6 -7.9 -10.5 -18.0 
Variation of  reserve assets 0.4 0.7 3.9 7.6 5.5 
Requirements 2.4 14.3 11.8 18.1 23.5 
Net external financing 2.5 13.6 12.7 16.3 24.4 
Direct investment 0.7 2.1 2.3 3.0 3.0 
Grants 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Net borrowing 1.7 11.4 10.2 13.1 21.2 
Official  sources 0.9 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.0 
Multilateral 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.5 
Bilateral 0.5 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 
Private sources 0.8 9.5 8.0 10.2 18.2 
Suppliers credits 0.4 0.5 1.2 2.2 1.0 
Private banks 0.3 8.0 4.7 5.8 18.0 
Other sources and errors 0.1 1.0 2.1 2.2 -0.8 
Source: ECLA, "Balance of  Payments", on the basis of  data published by international  Monetary  Fund  ( IMF) , September 
1981; IDB, "External public debt of  the Latin American Countries" (Washington, D.C.July 1981); BIS, "Annual 
Reports" and "Supplements", and ECLA estimates. 
"Includes Mexico and Peru. 
''Net total balance on goods and services, and private transfers. 
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Table 2 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G COUNTRIES IN L A T I N AMERICA: 
FOREIGN A N D DOMESTIC F I N A N C I N G OF GROSS 
DOMESTIC FIXED INVESTMENT" 
(  Percentages) 
1960-1961 1969-1970 1974-1975 1978-1979 
Domestic savings 85.8 91.6 78.1 84.9 
Current account deficit  14.2 8.4 21.9 15.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: ECLA, "Balance of Payments" and "National Accounts", on the basis of data provided by the IMF and reporting 
countries, September 1981. 
"Calculated by converting national currencies to dollars, through applying conversion factors  published in IMF, 
International  Financial  Statistics,  various issues. 
the world economy with relative price stability in the latter part of  the 1950s and through 
the 1960s provided the appopriate framework  for  outward growth of  most Latin 
American countries. 
Through this period, increasing demand for  foreign  reserves in Europe and Japan 
provided a counterpart to persistent deficits  in the U.S. balance of  payments. The 
monetary system of  Western countries worked smoothly and international money and 
capital markets reappeared after  the collapse that followed  the Great Depression of  the 
thirties. As their external economic relations expanded, the larger countries in Latin 
America —and some of  the smaller ones— found  increasing access to private foreign 
banks as sources of  credit. Latin American trade expansion helped in this direction, but 
the ground was set by the rapid growth of  European currency markets (see tables 1 
and 2). 
In the early 1980s, the continued deficit  in the U.S. balance of  payments together 
with the growth of  European currency markets gave rise to the expectation that some 
European currencies would be revalued against the dollar. Such expectation produced 
sizable capital movements which countries were unable to control. Economic 
circumstances thus compelled important industrial countries to float  their currencies, 
marking the beginning of  a new state of  adjustment in the world economy. Inflationary 
tendencies already present in the late 1960s became more evident and proved more 
stubborn than in the past, so that anti-inflationary  policy resulted more in a weakening of 
the growth rate of  the world economy than in a substantial alleviation of  rapidly 
increasing prices. 
Oil price increases at the end of  1973, a consequence of  such trends accentuated 
them and contributed to a modification  of  the traditional structure of  world balance of 
payments. The current account deficit  of  non-oil-exporting countries in Latin America, 
which had already doubled to about US$ 4 billion in the early 1970s, increased 
substantially to an average of  US$ 13 billion in 1974-1979. Industrial countries, which 
traditionally registered a current account surplus, showed a substantial deficit  in 1974, 
which gave additional stimulus to the application of  restrictive economic policies. 
As a consequence of  this situation the increase in the external gap of  non-oil-
exporting countries in Latin America was accompanied by a substantial reduction in the 
relative importance of  direct foreign  investment and borrowing from  official  sources, 
while borrowing from  commercial banks increased markedly to fill  the gap. Borrowing 
from  commercial banks abroad in the second half  of  the 1970s was 32 times larger than 
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the yearly average of  the second half  of  the 1960s. At the same time, loan terms 
deteriorated: the concessionality factor  decreased by almost 73% in 1969-1979 (see 
table 3). The increased current account imbalance induced non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries both to look for  additional financing  and to adopt adjustment policies 
to avoid excessive sacrifice  in terms of  their growth rate. 
The general outcome of  these policies is one of  success. The current account deficit 
increased again after  1978, but economic growth rates, even though lower than early in 
the decade, were higher than those registered in other areas of  the world. The region also 
kept high investment rates to ensure a sustained growth in the future.  Investment rates in 
1975-1976 were higher than in any year since 1966. The policy mix of  adjustment and 
financing  in Latin America resulted in a reduction in the external imbalance without 
sacrificing  either investment rates or future  growth rates. ECLAC data show that 
investment rates over gross domestic product, which were 17.6% in 1966, grew steadily 
to an average of  21.7% in 1975-1980. 
2. Adjustment,  financing,  or both: the picture  of  the near future 
The level of  current account external imbalance of  recent years will probably be lower in 
the future.  Oil-exporting countries' imports are expected to continue growing rapidly. 
Policies in industrial countries will probably be more successful  than they have been in 
diminishing substantial imbalances among them, so that the sum total of  surpluses in the 
world economy should decrease, with a corresponding decrease in deficits. 
It is unlikely that imbalance figures  will go back in the near future  to the 
magnitudes registered before  1974. Between 1967 and 1973, the sum total of  current 
account deficits  of  IMF member countries reached an annual average of  US$ 13 billion, 
which jumped to an average of  over US$ 82 billion in 1973-1980. If  this figure  were to 
decrease continuously at a rate of  US$ 10 billion per year, a rate high enough to be rather 
improbable, it would take six to seven years for  the annual figure  to return to the 1967-
1973 average. Most probably, the time required would be even longer. 
Table 3 
D A C MEMBER COUNTRIES A N D MULTILATERAL  AGENCIES: 0 GEOGRAPHIC 
DISTRIBUTION OF N E T F I N A N C I A L FLOWS TRANSFER  T O 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 





Latin America 2.64 0.81 
Africa6 2.08 1.35 
Asia' 3.86 2.49 
Europe'' 1.41 0.31 






Total  , 2/1 




































Source: OECD, "Geographical distribution of  financial  flows  to developing countries, 1969-1975" (Paris, 1977); and OECD, 
Development  Cooperation  Review (1980). 
"Multilateral agencies with concessional component in their lending of  less than 25% are not included. 
'Excludes Gabon, Nigeria and Argelia. 
'Excludes Middle East, Israel and Indonesia. 
^Includes Portugal, Cyprus, Gilbraltar, Greece, Malta, Spain, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Israel. 
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Table 4 
NON-OLL-EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF L A T I N AMERICA: 
RESERVES  AS A P R O P O R T I O N OF IMPORTS-SELECTED 
COUNTRIES A N D PERIODS 
(  Percentages) 
Country 1951- 1956- 1961- 1966- 1971- 1974-
1955 1960 1965 1970 1973 1980 
Argentina 40.0 24.2 15.7 34.9 29.4 64.1 
Bolivia 19.9 5.7 12.6 20.7 22.9 22.1 
Brazil 29.7 27.7 23.1 23.1 71.3 41.1 
Colombia 30.7 27.9 14.7 16.9 26.7 72.6 
Chile 16.8 17.0 12.8 25.2 13.3 35.1 
Ecuador 37.3 24.2 27.4 24.6 34.6 32.3 
Guatemala 45.8 37.0 29.0 23.2 34.4 37.5 
Mexico 29.7 33.5 29.5 24.2 27.8 17.7 
Uruguay 112.2 84.7 86.7 74.0 65.8 65.6 
Source: IMF, International  Financial  Statistics  (May 1978); ECLA, "Balance of  Payments", on the basis of  data published by 
the IMF, September 1981. 
As a byproduct of  this general picture, non-oil-exporting developing countries, 
including those of  Latin America, will register a sustained deficit  in their current account 
balance of  payments for  a relatively long time. If  deficit  countries as a whole made efforts 
to eliminate the deficit,  they would only succeed in transferring  it elsewhere. In so far  as 
there remain sizable surpluses in the world, they must have a counterpart in the form  of 
deficits.  The only alternative would be a substantial reduction in world income, an option 
rejected by all concerned. 
Latin American non-oil-exporting countries —and maybe some oil-exporting 
ones— will register a deficit  in their current account balance of  payments and will 
continue to demand foreign  savings, under one form  or another, for  some time to come. 
This would not be so, or at least not in the same magnitude, if  these countries were to 
reduce their income and investment level and/or if  they were in a position to accept a 
substantial reduction in their external reserves. Latin American countries are making 
efforts  to reduce their external disequilibrium to more manageable proportions, and the 
question is whether the world economy is interested in providing foreign  savings to 
prevent excessive adjustment policies in Latin America. I think the answer to this 
question must be positive. 
Even though some countries of  the region have accumulated external reserves 
which are substantial in absolute magnitude they are not higher as a proportion of 
imports than they were in 1951-1955, also a period of  high reserves by historical 
standards (see table 4). The fact  that there is easier access to short-term financing  in the 
European currency markets acts toward reducing the amount of  reserves needed; but 
terms of  trade have shown a volatility in the 1970s that justifies  additional prudence in 
reserve management. 
Reductions in income and investment will endanger the future  growth rate of  the 
countries, while producing negative effects  on the world economy. Non-oil-exporting 
countries in Latin America comprise a market of  more than 360 million people with an 
average per capita income of  about US$ 1 600. For the United States, these countries are 
more important than the European Economic Community or Japan as consumers of 
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equipment and chemicals, and for  the European Economic Community their purchases of 
those products are nearly as important as those of  the United States and more important 
than those of  Japan. Latin America is not negligible as a market for  industrial nations; a 
reversion or substantial weakening of  growth rates in the region would affect  the world 
economy. As a consequence of  such effect,  Latin America would be contributing to 
unemployment and stagnation in the world economy, which would also affect  oil-
exporting countries. This effect  is small, but it is there. From the point of  view of  balanced 
growth in the world economy, current account deficits  which are the counterpart of 
surpluses that would remain as such for  a long time, should be financed. 
The net amount of  resources required is not negligible, since it may involve some 
US$ 20 to US$ 30 billion per year for  non-oil-exporting countries of  the region, if 
allowance is made for  the need to increase foreign  exchange reserves. These figures  do 
not take into account repayments of  foreign  debts. If  such repayments were included, the 
figure  of  gross financial  requirements would approach and perhaps exceed US$ 50 billion 
per year. 
These figures,  if  obtained through borrowing abroad, would imply an increase in 
global debt (public and private, guaranteed or not) of  some 20% per year. Up to now the 
monetary and financial  world markets have been able to absorb amounts even higher 
than these. However, two important points are to be noted. First, the amount of  debt a 
country can manage is not unlimited, and it is lower the shorter the average repayment 
period; increasing reliance on private bank borrowing will tend to shorten such period. 
Second, the role industrial countries have played in the supply of  financial  resources has 
changed. In the 1960s and early 1970s they transferred  abroad part of  their own net 
savings, since they experienced a sustained surplus in their current account balance of 
payments. In recent years they have functioned  as intermediaries for  net savings from  oil-
exporting countries and from  a few  industrial nations, transferring  those savings among 
themselves and between them and other areas of  the world. The figures  suggest that 
recycling foreign  savings among themselves is substantially more important than 
between them and other areas of  the world. The latter may be a residual, more volatile 
figure.  Table 5 illustrates this assertion. 
Table 5 
ESTIMATED USES OF OPEC'S N E T C O N T R I B U T I O N T O 
THE EUROPEAN C U R R E N C Y  MARKET 
(Percentages  ) 
1975  1976  1977  1978 
Developing countries 11 
Eastern Europe 36 
Developed countries and rest of  the world" 53 
Net OPEC contribution 100 
(Billions of  dollars) 29 
1979 1980 
10 1 1 14 32 
40 48 74 45 34 
50 50 25 41 34 
100 100 100 100 100 
36 38 30 51 76 
Source: Estimated on the basis of  data obtained from  BIS, Annual Report  48 ( 12 June 1978); Annual Report  51 (June 
1981). 
"Rest of  the world includes off-shore  banking centres and unallocated. In so far  as off-shore  banking centres orient part of 
their resources to developing countries, the relative importance of  the latter would increase, and that of  the developed 
countries would diminish. 
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Table 6 
NON-OIL-EXPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN L A T I N AMERICA: 
R A T I O OF D E B T SERVICE T O EXPORTS A N D EXPORT G R O W T H RATES 
(Average  of  annual ratios, 1971-1979) 
Ratio of  official Ratio of  total Rate of 
Country debt  service debt  service growth  of 
to exports to exports export 
Argentina 19.7 32.0 20.2 
Brazil 20.5 48.8 22.5 
Colombia 12.3 22.8 21.6 
Costa Rica 12.8 25.1 18.3 
Chile 23.7 43.0 19.3 
Dominican Republic 6.9 16.3 18.5 
El Salvador 4.8 13.0 21.5 
Guatemala 3.8 9.9 20.2 
Guyana 10.3 12.4 8.5 
Honduras 6.0 15.1 18.3 
Jamaica 9.9 11.4 10.5 
Mexico 34.6 41.1 22.6 
Nicaragua 13.3 16.3 13.9 
Panama 16.5 15.3 13.1 
Paraguay 9.9 18.2 25.5 
Peru 24.6 42.2 18.2 
Uruguay 29.5 33.5 21.5 
Source: ECLA, "Balance of Payments", on the basis of data provided by the IMF, September 1981; IDB "External Public 
Debt of the Latin American Countries" (Washington, D.C., July 1981). 
This analysis is a clear indication that while it is in the interest of  Latin America and 
the world community to finance  current account disequilibria of  the former  group of 
countries rather than to rely on excessive adjustment, it is also in the interest of  all 
concerned to take a careful  look at the form  this financing  may take. Aside from  a 
reduction in gross reserves, there are two main ways of  financing  a current account deficit: 
straight borrowing and direct foreign  investment. 
3. Borrowing  as a form  of  obtaining  financial  resources 
Latin America has increased its reliance on private bank borrowing with the effect  of 
increasing its cost and reducing the repayment period as compared with the situation 
prevailing in the 1960is. Latin America's recourse to borrowing from  official  sources, both 
national and international, has decreased substantially. This change is perhaps 
irreversible, since there is growing interest in the world to orient low-cost resources to 
least developed countries of  which, according to UN definitions,  there is only one in Latin 
America. 
Bank borrowing by developing countries is coming under closer scrutiny, as some 
banks reach portfolio  compositions which include a sizable component of  lending to such 
countries. This development includes the application of  some indices to measure credit-
worthiness of  borrowing countries. The most commonly used indicator of  credit-
worthiness is the ratio of  debt service to exports. The classification  of  Latin American 
countries by this indicator shows that countries which register a high ratio of  debt service 
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to exports are also among those that enjoy better acceptability as debtors in private 
financial  markets (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay). These data also indicate that 
countries with high export growth can sustain, unimpaired, a high ratio of  debt service to 
exports. 
This particular indicator of  creditworthiness, despite its popularity, does not give 
an appropriate perpective. It is static and says nothing about export prospects. In the case 
of  most Latin American countries, this indicator might be better interpreted as one of 
access to foreign  credit than as an advanced warning of  future  trouble (see table 6). 
No single indicator, short of  a global evaluation of  the economic perspectives of  a 
particular country, can give a balanced picture of  creditworthiness. The capacity shown by 
Latin American countries to weather the difficult  economic conditions of  the mid-1970s 
together with their development potential are better clues to the future. 
There is a form  of  borrowing which is becoming increasingly important for  a few 
countries in the region and which is better adapted to their present external financial 
situation: long-term borrowing from  private capital markets through the sale of  bonds. 
This form  of  borrowing was already well known in the nineteenth century and developed 
progressively until the crisis of  the 1930s. In recent years only Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
and Venezuela in Latin America have made some use of  this means of  borrowing. A 
rapidly growing debt is not a situation Latin American countries consider desirable. 
Hence, they are increasingly interested in other forms  of  obtaining financing,  including 
direct foreign  investment. 
The preceding discussion can be summarized as follows:  non-oil-exporting 
countries of  Latin America have deficits  in their current account balance of  payments 
which are substantially larger than those prevailing in previous decades; these deficits  are 
expected to decrease, but still to remain at relatively high levels for  several years. Hence, 
there is a demand for  foreign  saving both in the form  of  borrowing and of  direct foreign 
investment. Latin American countries have had, and continue to have, open access to 
bank borrowing, but these countries would not like to see a foreign  debt which continues 
to rise rapidly and to shorten in terms of  maturity. So there is a demand in Latin American 
countries for  longer-term, bonded debt, as well as for  direct foreign  investment. 
Latin America's demand for  direct foreign  investment is there. The next question 
to explore is whether it might be interesting to Arab oil-exporting countries to consider 
expanding their investment portfolio  in Latin America. From an economic point of  view, 
direct Arab investments in Latin America could be attractive because of  their yields 
and/or because of  their effect  on the variability of  returns on their investment portfolio  as 
a whole. 
Ill 
Investment portfolio  diversification:  the case for 
increased investments in Latin America 
1. International  portfolio  diversification:  economic advantages 
Portfolio  diversification  to minimize the variance of  returns at any given level of  the rate 
of  return is common practice. Several models have been developed to provide guidance 
for  the optimal composition of  an investment porfolio.1  International diversification  of 
portfolios  is an important dimension of  diversification.  Rates of  return on investment in 
particular countries will tend to be influenced  by the latter's general economic picture. A 
change in the economic growth rate of  any one country will affect  rates of  return on 
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investment generally. Such influence  need not imply perfect  correspondence of  rates of 
return in different  sectors of  the economy. Therefore,  there is an advantage in investment 
diversification  even within a country's boundaries. 
The faa  that different  countries' economic growth rates do not move exactly in 
unison is an indication that rates of  return on investments will not all move in the same 
magnitude or even in the same direction. Even if  the average rate of  return on 
investments for  all countries were the same, if  their movements over time were different, 
there would be an advantage to international diversification  of  investments. Such 
diversification  would result in a reduction óf  the variability of  returns on the diversified 
portfolio  for  the same level of  average returns. 
It is general practice in the economic profession  to assume that there is a cost 
attached to uncertainty, so that given any level of  returns the investor will prefer  lower 
variabiliy to a higher one. The same argument can be carried over to the situation of  a 
country as a whole. This seems particularly reasonable for  countries which are 
transforming  an exhaustible natural resource into a stream of  future  income. For any 
given average level of  such income, less variability would be preferable  to more. 
If  in order to get higher rates of  return on investment, a country had to accept larger 
variability of  returns, the choice between possible combinations of  average returns on 
investment and variability would not be obvious. To obtain a higher return, a country 
would have to accept more variability, and the particular selection would depend on the 
country's preferences  regarding returns and variability as well as on the market 
opportunities to exchange average return for  lower variability. In a case like this it might 
be advantageous to a country to accept a lower rate of  return on its investment portfolio,  if 
that were the cost of  a substantially reduced variability of  returns. However, if  a country or 
group of  countries could obtain higher returns on their investments with the same 
variability or lower, such a course would be unambiguously preferable  to one with lower 
returns and the same or higher variability. 
2. Average return  and variance of  a diversified  portfolio 
Rates of  return on investments in different  sectors and countries, developed and 
developing, have not been at my disposal while writing this chapter. However, as 
indicated above, a country's economic growth rate exerts a general influence  on the rates 
of  return on investment, so that growth rates can be used as a proxy for  the rates on 
investment. Economic theory indicates that under certain circumstances the rate on 
investment will equal economic growth rate in long-run equilibrium.2 
Data published by the OECD show that the economic growth rate of  member 
countries as a whole for  1960-1980 reached an average of  4.1% per year. On the other 
hand, data published by ECLA show that the economies of  the non-oil-exporting countries 
of  Latin America as a whole grew at an average rate of  5.6% per year during the same 
period.* If  averages per decade are taken, the growth rate of  Latin American non-oil-
exporting countries was consistently higher than that of  OECD countries for  the three 
periods included, the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The variability of  the growth rate as 
measured by the variance was 2.9 for  the non-oil-exporting countries of  Latin America 
and 3.7 for  OECD during 1950-1980 as a whole. The covariance was 0.25 (see table 7). 
With these results, it is possible to calculate the average rate of  return as well as the 
variance of  a combined portfolio  of  investments in both areas of  the world. Since the 
average rate of  return, as measured by the economic growth rate, is higher for  Latin 
America than for  OECD, the combined portfolio  will show a higher rate of  return than an 
exclusively OECD portfolio.  This is true whatever the relative importance of  investments 
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in non-oil-exporting Latin American countries, as long as such relative importance is 
greater than zero. On the other hand, the variance of  the combined portfolio  will be 
smaller, the smaller the covariance of  the two series of  rates of  return.4 
Assume for  example a portfolio  in which investments in OECD countries 
comprised 80% of  the total, while investments in Latin American countries comprised 
the remaining 20%. The average return on this portfolio  would be 4.4 while its variance 
would be 2.6, which is lower than the variance of  both OECD (3.7) and non-oil-exporting 
Latin American countries (2.9) taken separately. Hence, a diversified  portolio would have 
a higher yield and a lower variance than an exclusively OECD portfolio.  So a diversified 
portfolio  would be unambiguously preferable  to a non-diversified  OECD one. As the 
importance of  investment in Latin America increases in the combined portfolio,  the 
average return will increase continuously, while the variance will decrease to some 
miminum point and then increase again.5 
Table 7 
G R O W T H R A T E OF REAL G D P A N D ITS VARIABILITY:  O E C D A N D 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G COUNTRIES IN L A T I N AMERICA 
{Percentage  changes) 
Year Area Year Area Year Area 





1951 7.6 5.7 1961 4.3 6.8 1971 3.7 7.0 
1952 3.6 2.6 1962 5.3 3.9 1972 5.4 7.2 
1953 4.6 4.7 1963 4.7 3.1 1973 6.1 8.3 
1954 1.1 6.0 1964 6.0 7.3 1974 0.6 7.4 
1955 7.2 6.2 1965 5.3 5.3 1975 -0.3 3.5 
1956 3.2 3.8 1966 5.6 4.6 1976 5.1 5.2 
1957 2.8 5.8 1967 3.6 4.3 1977 3.6 4.6 
1958 0.6 5.2 1968 5.5 7.0 1978 3.8 5.2 
1959 5.6 1.6 1969 4.7 7.4 1979 3.3 6.9 
1960 4.5 8.2 1970 3.1 6.9 1980 1.3 6.4 
Aver- Aver- Aver-
age 
51-60 4.1 5.0 
age 
61-70 4.8 5.7 
age 
71-80 3.3 6.2 
1950-1980 
OECD Latin America 
Average (percentages)" 4.1 5.6 
Variance 3.7 2.9 
Covariance 0.25 
Correlation coefficient  0.08 
Source: OECD, Economic Outlook  (December 1972,1977,July 1981);ECLA,on the basis of data provided by the reporting 
countries, as of September 1981. 
"The difference  in the averages is statistically significant. 
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3. Optimun composition  of  the investment  portfolio 
Using the rates of  return, variances, and covariances obtained from  growth rate, it is 
possible to determine the composition of  the portfolio  that would achieve miminum 
variance. Such a portfolio  would be composed of  44% of  investment in OECD countries 
and 56% of  investments in Latin America, with a variance of  1.7 and an average yield of 
4.9%. As the importance of  Latin America in the investment portfolio  continues to 
increase above 56%, the variance would start increasing again from  the minimum of  1.7 
reached, but it would still be lower than the variance of  an investment portfolio  in any one 
of  the two areas, until investments in Latin America comprised 100% of  the total. At that 
point the variance of  the portfolio  would be that of  returns on investments in Latin 
America, while the average rate of  return would also be that of  investments in Latin 
America. 
From the minimum variance portfolio  on, further  increases of  relative importance 
of  investments in Latin America will, as indicated, increase the variance of  the combined 
portfolio,  but the rate of  return of  the portfolio  will also increase. So the selection of  a 
particular portfolio  composition would depend on relative preferences  between rates of 
return and variances in the investing countries. Instead, the selection of  a portfolio 
composition including investments in Latin America with a relative importance equal to 
or lower than 56% would be unambiguous. Within this limit, a portfolio  containing more 
investments in Latin America would be unambiguously preferred  to one containing less, 
since the former  would yield a higher return and a lower variance than the latter. 
That data on growth rates that have been used as a proxy for  the rates of  return on 
investment conceal several important aspects which should be taken into consideration 
for  an investment decision. First, growth rates in any particular country represent an 
average of  different  sectors of  the economy. An investor would like to consider the whole 
set of  rates of  return rather than only an average, since he might select sectors or projects 
for  his investment among the best available in the economy. Since this is true in both 
OECD and Latin American countries, the argument for  international diversification  of  the 
investment portfolio  still applies. 
Second, the growth rate may be a good proxy of  the rate of  return on investment in 
general, including investments such as road construction, education, and other sectors 
closed to foreign  investors. One way to find  out whether the growth rate is a reasonable 
proxy of  the rate of  return on investments open to foreign  investors is to see whether the 
scanty data available on rates of  return on foreign  investment behave in a way similar to 
the growth rates. 
The U.S Department of  Commerce publishes figures  of  the U.S foreign  investment 
position in different  countries and areas of  the world, and earnings (after  taxes) from 
those investments from  1967 to 1979.6 These data should be viewed with care, since 
earnings can be shifted  among affiliates  of  the same companies in different  countries 
through pricing of  products sold or bought among affiliates.  This would imply that the 
variability of  earnings appears greater the smaller the amount of  investments considered 
as separate from  the global portfolio.  Therefore,  it should be expected that the variance of 
the rate of  earnings in Latin America, calculated using these data, would increase relative 
to that of  developed countries. 
Rate of  return calculated using the U.S Department of  Commerce data show that 
the average rate on U.S non-oil direct investment abroad is higher for  Latin America 
(13 6%) than for  developed countries (12.8%), while the variances are 5.9 and 6.5 
respectively. The covariance is 3.96. Since the rates of  return are not corrected for  world 
inflation,  they tend to overestimate the real rates. 
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The variance of  the portfolio  composed of  80% investment in developed countries 
and 20% investments in Latin America would have a rate of  return of  13%, higher than 
that of  developed countries, and a variance of  5.7, lower than the variance of  rates of 
return on investments in developed countries. The minimum variance portfolio  would be 
comprised of  54% investments in Latin America and 46% in OECD, with an average yield 
of  13.2% and a variance of  5.1. Again, as investments in Latin America are increased to 
over 54% of  the portfolio,  the average return of  the portolio would increase continuously, 
but the variance would increase also, approaching that of  a portfolio  composed of 
investments in Latin America only. 
There is an unambiguous advantage to portfolio  diversification  in favour  of  Latin 
America until its participation in the total portfolio  reaches 54%. From there on, there 
might also be an advantage, but it would not be unambiguous: it would depend on relative 
preferences  of  investing countries between rate of  return and variance. The general 
conclusions obtained using growth rates data as proxy for  rates of  return on investments 
are thus strengthened. 
Table 8 
RATES OF RETURN O N U.S. N O N - O I L DIRECT I N V E S T M E N T ABROAD: 
DEVELOPED C O U N T R I E S A N D L A T I N AMERICA 
(Percentages) 
Year Developed countries Latin America 
1967 9.2 11.3 
1968 10.1 12.7 
1969 11.4 12.9 
1970 10.6 10.8 
1971 11.3 9.3 
1972 13-0 11.5 
1973 15.9 13.5 
1974 14.1 16.3 
1975 11.7 16.1 
1976 12.9 15.0 
1977 12.2 14.8 
1978 15.6 16.2 
1979 18.1 16.7 
1967-1979 
Developed countries Latin America 
Average (percentages)" 12.8 13.6 
Variance 6.5 5-9 
Covariance 3.96 
Correlation coefficient  0.64 
Source: Calculated on the basis of U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of  Current  Business (August 1977-1980). 
Adjusted Earnings divided by the average of the beginning of and end of year Direct Investment Positions. 
"The difference  in the average is statistically significant. 
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4. Political  risks and the "mutual  advantages"  approach 
Third, neither rates of  growth nor of  return give a measure of  political risks, including 
capital losses from  expropriation. The analysis of  the convenience of  international 
portfolio  diversification  takes into account economic costs and benefits  and does not allow 
for  cost arising from  political instability. The latter's effect  on the rate of  return on 
investments, as distinct from  the general effect  already reflected  in the economic growth 
rate, boils down to the so-called stability of  the rules of  the game. 
There are two main ways which are not mutually exclusive, to obtain stability of 
treatment of  foreign  investment. One is to have enough influence  on the host 
government so that it will resist pressures for  the modification  of  rules. The other is to 
make it advantageous for  all parties involved not to change the rules. The first  way does 
not operate efficiently,  since political power may change hands once in a while in host 
countries, and foreign  influence  may become a conflictive  issue —as has in fact  happened. 
So the potential influence  approach to stability of  the rules of  the game may be unstable in 
itself. 
The mutual advantage approach has a lot to offer.  It uses the criterion of  mutual 
advantage as one important element in the selection of  investment projects that can 
provide such an advantage. For example, development of  projects which enhance 
production in the host country of  products that find  a market in the investing country or 
countries may be an important inducement for  stability of  the rules of  the game. The 
investing country provides both financial  resources and markets, so that any element that 
might negatively affect  the investment may also have a negative effect  on the buyer 
markets. 
Joint projects undertaken with some equity participation of  the host country or 
countries, and which include international complementarity in production, may also 
satisfy  the criterion of  mutual advantage. This latter type of  projects implies production 
of  components in more than one country, including the main investor country; it also 
implies final  assembly in more than one country. Though more complex to develop, these 
projects facilitate  access to both the Latin American and the investor countries' markets 
and permit the undertaking of  projects of  greater scope, while still satisfying  the mutual 
advantage criterion. 
Arab investment providing both financial  resources and markets will be less 
vulnerable than if  the provision of  only financial  resources were involved. This 
vulnerability would be reduced even further  if  a mechanism could be established for  Arab 
oil-exporting countries to invest as a group rather than individually. By acting as a group, 
since Arab countries have different  political orientations, they would offer  the host 
countries a possibility of  diversification  of  their political portfolio,  thus reducing the 
political risks that come as a byproduct of  political conflict.  From the point of  view of 
Latin America, a wider nationality diversification  in foreign  investment would certainly 
be welcome. 
5. The  magnitudes  involved:  are they bearable? 
At present annual investment rates, non-oil-exporting countries of  Latin America are 
investing some US$ 100 billion annually, of  which less than 5 % represents direct foreign 
investment. If  Arab oil-exporting countries decided to invest in Latin America one-fifth 
of  their flow  of  long-term investment abroad per year, this would mean about one-eighth 
of  their current account surpluses and about 4% of  total annual investment in Latin 
America.7 Figures of  this order of  magnitude should not create any absorption problem in 
the area unless they were concentrated in one or two countries. This latter possibility does 
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not necessarily maximize the benefits  of  international portfolio  diversification.  So the 
global magnitudes of  investment that would help obtain the benefits  of  international 
diversification  of  the portfolio  do not seem, at least from  a global point of  view, difficult  to 
assimilate in the area. 
The next question is whether there are specific  investment opportunities which 
could provide the advantages of  diversification  from  the Arab countries' point of  view and 
which would also be advantageous from  a Latin American point of  view, while containing 
elements which could induce stability in the treatment of  foreign  investment in the host 
countries. An answer to this question would require a more detailed look at the economy 
of  various Latin American countries, and this is beyond the scope of  this chapter. 
However, a general review of  these problems may disclose the existence of  areas of 
common interest. 
One of  the most difficult  problems Latin America continues to face  is an accelerated 
rate of  rural-urban migration. This tends to aggravate both economic and social 
problems: urban unemployment is high, while housing, transportation, sanitation, and 
other services are overburdened by the rapid increase of  population. At the same time, an 
abundant resource in the region is left  underutilized: agricultural land. 
The development of  agricultural and agroindustrial production exports is of 
substantial interest for  Latin America. The production of  wheat, corn, soybeans, beef  and 
mutton, sugar, coffee  and tobacco, as well as fruits,  vegetables, and their pulps and juices, 
could be advantageously expanded. Timber, wood products, pulp and paper, shoes, and 
cotton and wool textiles are among other interesting possibilities. Taking advantage of 
the mineral raw materials existing in the region, several products such as copper wire and 
pipes, and a wide variety of  goods in the light industrial field,  could be advantageously 
manufactured  in the area. All these products could find  a market in oil-exporting 
countries and other countries in the Arab world. 
Latin America needs both financial  resources and foreign  markets to continue 
growing, and the Arab oil-exporting countries could provide both. A programme of  co-
operation involving Arab investment in the production of  commodities destined to Arab 
markets could benefit  all parties involved. For Latin America the advantages would be in 
the further  development of  its agriculture and industry, thus helping to stop the fast  rate 
of  rural-urban migration and alleviating unemployment or hidden unemployment; 
assisting in the continued diversification  of  exports, thus increasing both the level and 
stability of  foreign  exchange inflows  with a positive effect  on the stability of  foreign 
finances  and of  the economy as a whole; and contributing to sustained overall economic 
growth. For Arab oil-exporting countries the economic advantages would be in the 
security of  supply of  a wide variety of  products and the attractive rates of  return on 
investments in the market where such products come from.  Analysis of  the political 
advantages is outside our present scope. 
6. Institutional  arrangements  for  co-operation 
Apart from  direct investments there are many other areas of  financial  co-operation 
between Arab oil-exporting countries and Latin America. Latin America is interested in 
longer-term borrowing, so that an expanded access of  Latin American countries to the 
capital markets of  oil-exporting countries would certainly be welcome. However, this 
area of  co-operation may be more difficult  to develop, since the differential  rates of  return 
for  investing countries of  Latin America or other financial  investments would not be 
substantial. Here the main advantages would be, from  the investor's point of  view, in 
spreading political risks, a subject not explored here. 
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Oil-exporting countries have already been contributing to facilities  in the IMF and 
the World Bank, and such contributions are also important to Latin America. There is an 
important gap at present in financial  facilities  available to Latin American countries, 
which is the lack of  arrangements that supply credit in the five  to ten years maturity 
range. This gap could be filled  either through contributions to the IDB or through setting 
up a special facility  for  the purpose. 
Our main conclusion is that it would be in the interest of  Arab oil-exporting 
countries to diversify  their direct investment portfolio  toward Latin America. This 
requires a conscious effort  of  exploring specific  investment opportunities in particular 
areas in different  countries. Despite the fact  that in most Latin American countries Arab 
immigration has been important in the past, information  on investment opportunities 
which might be of  interest to Arab countries is not easily available. Hence, if  there is a 
decision to diversify  their investment portfolio,  it should be accompanied by a systematic 
effort  to find  the specific  investments or projects which would be undertaken. Such effort 
requires organization. 
The recent establishment of  the Arab Latin American Bank with capital from 
several Arab and Latin American countries may provide a base to undertake the required 
studies. Arab contributions to the bank come from  only a few  countries, and that might be 
a somewhat narrow base. A special project under UN auspices could perhaps provide a 
wider base to explore investment possibilities of  mutual interest to Arab and Latin 
American countries. Whatever the arrangements, the important aspect to be underlined 
is that investment portfolio  diversification  cannot be achieved without the cost of  a 
systematic effort  of  exploration of  investment opportunities. 
NOTES 
'See H.G. Grubel, "Internationally Diversified  Portfolios:  Welfare  Gains and Capital Flows", 
American Economic Review 58 (1968): 1 299-1 314. 
2See Harry G.Johnson, Macroeconomics  and Monetary  Theory  (London: Lowe and Brydone, 1971), 
ch. 20. 
'These figures  correspond to a weighted average of  the growth rate of  gross domestic product of  each 
country, using the GDP as weights. 
4The variance of  the combined portfolio  is obtained from:  S2(A,B)=a2S2(A)+(l-a)2S2(B)+a(l-
a)S(A)(B), were S2(A) and S2(B) are the variances of  each of  the series of  returns and S(A)(B) is the 
covariance. The weights are a and (1-a). 
'This chapter takes broad economic areas as a whole without exploring diversity within them. This 
approach, which would be erroneous if  one attempted to describe the areas in question, is still useful  to tackle 
problems of  international diversification  of  investments. The fact  that each area is composed of  different 
economic units that behave differently  is already taken into consideration in the calculation of  the average 
growth rate and of  variances and covariances. Obviously, if  economic policy decisions were taken by each area 
as a unit, their interaction would be higher than it is at present and the covariance calculated would also be 
higher, reducing the advantages of  international investment diversification. 
6U.S. Department of  Commerce, Survey of  Current  Business, August 1977, table 12; August 1980. 
7 These figures  assume a flow  of  long-term investments abroad by Arab oil-exporting countries of 
US$ 20 billion per year, and a current account surplus of  US$ 32 billion. 
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INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
I 
Introduction 
The study of  international capital movements figures  prominently in today's economic 
literature. It has received growing attention in recent years as a result of  the 
intensification  of  capital movements and, since 1971, the widespread practice of  basing 
national exchange rate systems on floating  currency rates.1 
One of  the topics to which a great deal of  attention and research has been devoted is 
the interrelationship between capital movements and the development efforts  of  the less 
advanced countries. Numerous papers have been published which provide detailed 
discussions of  such factors  as the foreign  exchange needs entailed by a development 
process, the problems stemming from  insufficient  domestic savings and foreign 
exchange shortages, the need for  official  transfers  of  real resources to the developing 
countries, the problems caused by the external debt and how this affects  the selection of 
development strategies, the terms for  gaining access to the developed countries' capital 
markets, etc All such efforts  have been positive to some degree, inasmuch as they have 
added to the overall body of  knowledge concerning the various aspects of  this subject and 
to the available statistical information. 
The subject has awakened particular interest in Latin America because many 
countries of  the region depend heavily upon international capital movements to finance 
and maintain their consistently rapid rates of  economic development. For this reason, 
efforts  have been made at the international level to study the subject more thoroughly, 
and a call has been made for  an examination of  this matter at the highest political level, on 
an equal footing  with other aspects of  international monetary reform.  The fact  that a 
number of  countries in the region are either currently facing  external debt problems or 
are on the verge of  doing so has also been an incentive to conduct such studies. The 
creation of  an international committee at the ministerial level (the Development 
Assistance Committee of  the IMF and the World Bank), whose main purpose is to look 
into the transfer  of  real resources from  the developed to the developing countries, and 
recent debates in various forums  concerning the developing countries' debt problems are 
a direct consequence of  these efforts  and demonstrate the importance —and timeliness— 
of  the subject. 
Unfortunately,  most of  the studies on capital movements to and from  developing 
countries focus  on their institutional aspects while paying little or no attention to the 
causes of  non-compensatory international capital movements. At the same time, the 
growing number of  recently-published analytical studies refer  only to capital movements 
between developed nations, and are therefore  of  little help in analysing the experiences of 
developing countries, which have been subject to much greater distortions than the 
developed countries have. There is thus a clear need to expand the analytical scope of 
studies relating to the developing countries and, especially, to conduct a more thorough 
analysis of  the determination of  the policy variables which have such a strong influence 
on international capital movements. Studies of  this type would not only lead to a better 
understanding of  past events, but would also make it possible to project future 
movements more accurately, thereby contributing to a better planning of  economic policy 
in general and of  external sector policies in particular. The main objective of  this study is 
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therefore  to evaluate the progress which has been made in the analysis of  capital 
movements and to adapt such analyses to the economic and institutional realities of  the 
region with a view to pinpointing the main factors  influencing  capital movements to and 
from  Latin America. 
In section II, a brief  description is given of  the theoretical models underlying the 
development of  the "simplified  combined model" upon which the empirical estimates are 
based. In section III, which is markedly empirical in nature, the main economic variables 
accounting for  the behaviour of  capital movements are specified,  and mention is made of 
the measurement problems encountered throughout the study as regards the 
quantification  of  such variables. The final  part of  this section contains an assessment of 
the empirical results obtained for  the various countries of  the region considered in this 
study. A summary and the main conclusions of  the study are presented in section IV; in 
this section, special emphasis is placed on the conclusions which can be drawn from  the 
study with regard to economic policy in the hope that they may contribute to the design of 
policies for  the external sector. The study includes a statistical appendix which describes 
the methodologies used to reconstruct the data series employed in the empirical 
assessment; these series have also served as the basis for  the estimates that are made of 
non-residents' private holdings of  external assets. The basic statistical material is 
presented in a second appendix. 
II 
The model 
The techniques used to evaluate international capital movements have developed in 
parallel with the advances made in other fields  of  economic thought. Specifically,  most 
recent studies have been based on the models for  portfolio  selection under risk conditions 
introduced by H. Markowitz,2 or are directly derived from  what has been called the 
"monetary approach to the balance of  payments".3 
1. Portfolio  selection  models 
The models for  portfolio  selection under risk conditions based on the work of  H. 
Markowitz deal with the general problem of  allocating available investment funds  among 
various options where the rates of  return on assets are differentiated  and uncertain. These 
models represent an attempt to identify  that combination of  solutions which will 
maximize the anticipated rates of  return while minimizing risk by eliminating obviously 
lower-yield investment opportunities and establishing selection criteria for  those 
requiring a clearer specification  on an individual basis of  preferences  between rates of 
return and risk. In a recent article, Rolf  Mantel mentions the methods which have been 
used, or suggested, for  solving this problem: 
1. Approaches based on the theory of  inventories and on dynamic programming. 
2. Baye's theorem (and the theory of  sequential decisions). 
3. Simulation. 
4. Two-stage aleatory programming. 
5. Programming with probabilistic constraints. 
6. Quadratic programming. 
7. Markowitz' portfolio  selection theory (1959), as in the Cheng model (1962). 
8. Multistage aleatory programming, using the Dantzing and Wolfe  principle of 
primal decomposition, as in the Bradley and Crane model (1972).4 
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The model can very easily be adapted for  use in accounting for  international capital 
movements merely by including external assets (foreign  exchange, deposits, direct 
investment, public bonds, etc.) among the investment options.5 Under these 
circumstances, external assets are in competition with domestic assets, and any change in 
the composition of  domestic and external investment portfolios  can give rise to 
international capital movements. There are thus two sources of  such capital movements: 
i) altered conditions with respect to anticipated profitability  or risk leading to changes in 
portfolio  selection which affect  holdings of  domestic and external assets, thereby giving 
rise to capital movements; and ii) the allocation of  increases in investment funds  among 
the various options; this can also generate capital movements even when the conditions 
as regards profitability  or risk remain unchanged. 
Any empirical study of  capital movements based on the portfolio  selection model 
necessarily involves the use of  simplifying  assumptions. In the real world, the range of 
investment options and their different  variations, in combination with the factors  of  risk, 
liquidity, associated operations, etc., which are usually considered when taking an 
investment decision, is so vast that it exceeds any model's specification  capacity, especially 
if  the number of  statistical observations is very limited. The best approach in this case (in 
view of  the main objective of  the study) is to confine  ourselves to a few  domestic and 
external investment options which, by virtue of  their importance, can serve as 
representative variables for  the remaining alternatives as regards investment in domestic 
and external assets. Thus, the simplest procedure is to regard all domestic assets as 
homogenous items whose rate of  return is represented by "the" interest rate on the 
domestic market and to regard external assets as being homogenous as well, with a rate of 
return which is represented by "the" external interest rate. Capital movements would 
therefore  be determined by the differential  between the domestic and external interest 
rates. 
This functional  relationship between capital movements and the differential 
between domestic and external interest rates was the most frequently  used method of 
incorporating the subject of  international capital movements into the various open-
economy macroeconomic models prior to the development of  the portfolio  selection 
models. 
Of  course, this model oversimplifies  reality; all products cannot be dealt with as if 
they were homogenous (a direct investment cannot be treated as if  it were similar to a 
short-term financial  investment). Moreover, the model entirely ignores other relevant 
factors,  such as risk, and such aspects as liquidity preferences,  the degree of  international 
acceptance of  various assets, etc. The problem becomes even more serious, however, with 
the widespread use of  floating  currency exchange rates because exchange risk then takes 
on a vital importance which is equal to or greater than that of  the nominal rate of  return. 
A number of  recent studies have attempted, quite successfully,  to modify  this simple 
model in order to bring it into line with actual market conditions while retaining its basic 
simplicity.6 
In the case of  some Latin American countries, however, even these modified 
models are not entirely useful  due to the high level of  government intervention in 
exchange and financial  markets. Such intervention has completely distorted the 
representativity of  "the" interest rate as a means of  measuring profitability  and, through 
the intensive use of  control mechanisms, has also distorted (but not prevented) capital 
movements themselves. Nonetheless, a correct definition  of  the various components of 
the concept of  the various investment options' "effective  yields" should permit an 
empirical verification  of  the overall validity of  the model used and of  the importance of 
the role played by portfolio  selection mechanisms in the generation of  international 
capital movements. 
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2. The  monetary approach to the balance of  payments 
and capital  movements 
The model for  portfolio  selection under risk conditions is extremely useful  for  studying 
capital movements in imperfect  markets, but it has some limitations with respect to 
international capital markets which are functioning  flexibly  and efficiently.  In the latter 
case, tiny variations in the conditions on domestic financial  markets would tend to bring 
on large-scale capital movements which would soon eliminate any interest rate 
differential.  Under these circumstances, it would be virtually impossible to verify  the 
existence of  a significant  relationship between interest rate differentials  and capital 
movements on an empirical basis. On the other hand, it is important to note that the 
portfolio  selection model is based on the definition  of  differences  in effective  yields as an 
explanatory variable; in the above case, however, it cannot be used to draw conclusions 
with respect to economic policy because that definition  does not allow researchers to infer 
the determinants of  differentials  in effective  yields, which are, in essence, the factors  that 
give rise to capital movements. 
The "rediscovery" of  what has been called the "monetary approach to the balance of 
payments" sparked a wide range of  new research projects in connection with the balance 
of  payments, including the study of  capital movements in the light of  this new approach. 
Although it is an over-simplification,  the "monetary approach to the balance of 
payments" basically maintains that any disequilibrium in the balance of  payments is the 
result of  disequilibria in domestic monetary markets, i.e., assuming a perfect  mobility of 
goods and capital, the internal creation of  money in excess of  the incremental demand 
required by the economy would simultaneously give rise to a surplus demand for  goods 
and a surplus supply of  money which would lead to a deterioration in the current account 
of  the balance of  payments and to an outflow  of  capital brought on by a temporary 
reduction in the domestic interest rate vis-a-vis  external rates. The existence of  a 
"monetary imbalance" would therefore  account for  the temporary existence of  interest 
rate differentials  and, in the final  analysis, would constitue the true cause of  capital 
movements. 
3. Limitations  on capital  movements 
There is a basic difference  between the models discussed above: the model based on the 
"monetary approach to the balance of  payments" assumes that there is a high elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and external assets (in the pure model, the substitution 
elasticity between domestic and external assets is infinite)  whereas in the portfolio 
selection model, the substitution elasticity may vary as a function  of  market imperfections 
and rigidities. 
Experience with respect to capital movements indicates that differentials  in 
effective  yields between countries often  continue for  prolonged periods without giving 
rise to a large enough volume of  capital movements to eliminate them; moreover, on 
some occasions, capital movements tend to become a destabilizing factor.  In most such 
cases, the inefficient  operation of  adjustment mechanisms stems from  the risk factor;  this 
is not taken into due consideration by the monetary approach, but does play a leading role 
in the portfolio  selection approach. There are two clearly differentiated  aspects of  the 
identification  of  the "risk" element in so far  as its influence  on international capital 
movements is concerned: firstly,  there is the particular risk of  an investment in a given 
asset, and this risk can be compared with that of  other investment options, whether they 
involve domestic or external assets; secondly, there is the risk associated with any 
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operation involving a given country's assets. In other words, in conjunction with the risk 
inherent in each particular asset, there is an element of  risk which is common to all the 
assets of  a given country. 
The first  of  these elements can only be partially taken into account when estimating 
the anticipated effective  yields of  domestic versus external assets; in an empirical study, 
adequate specification  is impossible due to the problems involved in attempting to isolate 
each element of  individual risk. The degree of  collective risk (the second aspect of  risk) 
can be more easily identified  than the first  by using risk-assessment variables, which are 
commonly employed in international financial  markets; these variables are intended to 
provide simple and comparable measurements of  the degree and nature of  the risk 
associated with financial  operations in a given country. Examples of  such commonly used 
variables are the level of  international reserves, the ratio between reserves and the 
amount of  imports, the level of  external debt, the ratio between the debt service and 
exports, etc. None of  them is really reliable as a measurement of  the levels of  risk; 
nonetheless, in view of  their widespread use in international financial  markets, these 
variables serve extremely well as measurements of  their own effects  (as tools for 
measuring levels of  risk) on capital movements. 
Other institutional elements also have a marked effect  on the elasticity of  capital 
movements' response to variations in effective  yields. These elements include 
administrative restrictions, distortions in domestic financial  markets, political instability, 
non-economic transfers,  etc. To a greater or lesser degree, all these elements affect  capital 
movements and should be taken into consideration in theoretical and empirical 
assessments of  such movements. 
4. A simplified  combined  model 
The diversity of  the Latin American countries' economic experiences prevents the 
widespread use of  simple models, making necessary the specification  of  more complex 
models capable of  reflecting  the particular features  of  the different  countries. The 
identification  of  a model which fits  each country is far  beyond the scope of  this study 
inasmuch as it would require an enormous amount of  research into each nation's 
economic history. 
An intermediate solution can be based on the possibility of  combining the models 
described in sections 1 and 2 while adding some of  the variables suggested in section 3 
plus a few  highly significant  variables corresponding to each country. Basically, this 
model is derived from  an analysis of  the monetary approach to the balance of  payments. It 
is based on the hypothesis that, in a small economy having a system of  fixed  exchange 
rates and totally open to movements of  capital and goods, domestic "monetary 
imbalances" are the main source of  capital movements. In theory, this simple scheme 
should provide an adequate explanation of  capital movements; however, any market 
imperfection  which prevents or delays an immediate adjustment of  monetary imbalances 
x  : uugh the exchange markets will have an impact on domestic markets and will affect 
the scale and nature of  capital movements and, hence, the functional  relationships 
between monetary imbalances and capital movements. Under these circumstances, the 
existence of  a monetary imbalance will affect  the balance-of-payments  and capital 
movements in the manner described in the preceding paragraph, but it will also tend to 
affect  domestic interest rates, thereby having an impact on the overall economic 
equilibrium of  the economy and generating additional capital movements in response to 
interest rate differentials.  If  observations are spaced far  enough apart, then the original 
model will yield satisfactory  results; but if  observations are made during brief  periods (or 
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if  the adjustment is slow), then the original model will not be adequate. It would then 
have to be modified  by incorporating a new explanatory variable to measure the influence 
of  interest rate differentials. 
Interest rate differentials  may also be caused by factors  totally unrelated to 
monetary imbalances and, in general, may be linked to economic policy decisions that 
distort financial  and exchange markets. In such instances, a variable must be incorporated 
which reflects  the effects  of  differentials  in the effective  yields of  domestic versus external 
assets. 
The final  element needed to complete this "simplified  combined model", as noted 
in the preceding section, is the incorporation of  a variable that reflects  the degree of 
overall risk associated with the country in question (e.g., the level of  reserves, the level of 
debt). Thus, the use of  these three variables ("monetary imbalance","differentials  in 
effective  yields" and "the level of  reserves"), together with statistical adjustments to 
correct such factors  as seasonal fluctuations  and/or trends, should suffice  to produce 
satisfactory  empirical results in the case of  most countries not subject to great 
distortions.7 However, the economies of  some of  the countries in the region have been 
either continuously or sporadically subject to a wide range of  direct and indirect controls; 
in the case of  such "complex" economies, the above model is not adequate and must be 
expanded. In order to do so, an in-depth understanding of  these countries' economic 
history is needed so that the policy variables which may have influenced  capital 
movements can be identified.  Examples of  such policies are those providing for  direct 
controls on capital movements (exchange controls), subsidies on the entry of  financial 
loans (swap operations), the existence of  parallel foreign  exchange markets, etc. 
The empirical aspects of  this study are presented in the following  section, which 
contains a detailed description of  the main variables used in each case, including those 
mentioned here. 
Ill 
An empirical evaluation of  international capital movements: 
the experience of  some Latin American countries 
1. A general  description  of  the study 
In dealing with the empirical aspects of  this study, it was felt  that the first  step should be 
to focus  the overall analysis on the particular case of  one country in the region for  which 
extensive statistical and economic information  was available. By using this procedure, it 
was then possible to extend the analysis to include other countries of  the region with a 
minimum of  adaptation based on the experience that had been acquired. 
In view of  the author's greater experience with economic policy regulations in the 
countries of  the Southern Cone, particularly Argentina, most of  the "exploratory" work 
was based on the available information  for  that country. The specification  model which 
emerged from  the study of  Argentina's experiences was subsequently used, with slight 
modifications,  to identify  the main causes of  capital movements in such countries as 
Brazil and Chile. The results were satisfactory  due to the great similarity among the 
economic policies applied throughout the history of  these three countries.8 
In selecting the countries upon which the empirical study was to be based, the 
availability of  statistics was only one of  the factors  taken into account; others were the 
need to include both large and small countries, closed and open economies, countries with 
a great deal of  experience in the use of  restrictions on capital movements and countries 
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without such experience. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Guatemála exhibit these 
characteristics and provide a varied sample of  experiences which constitute an ideal cross-
section for  testing how well the combined model fits  various sets of  circumstances and for 
drawing conclusions with respect to the identification  of  the causes of  international 
capital movements.9 
One of  the greatest difficulties  encountered during the empirical study of  capital 
movements was that the number of  observations (at intervals of  one year) was very small, 
which limited the opportunities for  a simultaneous analysis of  all the relevant variables. 
Three different  methods were used to solve this problem. The first  was to carry out 
a number of  multiple regressions for  each country; in each regression a small number of 
variables, which always included the main elements of  the "simplified  combined model", 
were combined with a small number of  variables intended to reflect  the individual 
features  of  each country. In successive runs, those variables which the results showed to be 
of  little significance  were gradually discarded, the end result being that the final 
regressions were confined  to a few  significant  variables, with a view to increasing the 
number of  degrees of  freedom. 
The second method consisted in combining the analysis of  time series and of  cross-
sections in a single regression, treating all the basic data on different  countries as if  they 
corresponded to a single nation. The main disadvantage of  this second method is that it 
entails an assumption that the regression coefficients  of  the different  variables are equal 
for  all countries. Some improvements in the significance  of  the results were achieved 
using this method, but these improvements were not incorporated into this study because 
the results for  each individual country do not provide grounds for  assuming that the 
coefficients  are equal. 
The third —and perhaps most suitable— method was to base the work on quarterly 
data. This not only made it possible to increase the number of  observations and degrees of 
freedom,  but also made it much easier to reflect  the effects  of  variables which constantly 
fluctuate  over time. The use of  quarterly data is undoubtedly the most suitable method for 
most purposes; unfortunately,  the possibility of  using such data is severely limited by the 
fact  that only a very few  countries have quarterly series which permit the quantification  of 
the main relevant variables as regards balance-of-payments  data and other variables, 
including the flow  of  private holdings of  internationally liquid assets. 
2. Specification  of  the main variables  used,  in the 
"simplified  combined  model" 
a) The  concept of  capital  movements 
Over the past fifteen  years, various institutions have made a considerable effort  to 
refine  and systematize balance-of-payments  data, especially as regards the format  for  the 
main entries relating to capital movements. 
i) Entries  included  in official  balance-of-payments  information:  In the traditional 
balance-of-payments  format,  capital movements are classified  into two major groups: 
official  transfer  payments and autonomous —or non-compensatory— capital 
movements, on the one hand, and compensatory financing,  on the other hand. The first 
group includes both short- and long-term (private and official)  non-compensatory capital 
movements, while the second heading includes loans and other capital inflows  obtained 
by the authorities for  the sole purpose of  financing  balance-of-payments  deficits  and 
offsetting  movements of  international reserves. 
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Non-compensatory capital movements merit special attention from  an analytical 
standpoint because they are much more difficult  to predict than are compensatory 
movements and, for  the most part, they are beyond the direct control of  monetary 
authorities. Moreover, non-compensatory capital movements are precisely the type of 
operations that conforms  to the model set forth  in this study, since compensatory 
movements, as their name would indicate, are intended to compensate for  the effects  of 
the variables relating to non-compensatory capital movements described above. The 
basic information  on these non-compensatory movements is given in appendix B for  the 
countries covered in the empirical assessment; this information  is given in the same form 
in which it was provided by the countries themselves in their balance-of-payments 
reports. 
ii) Unrecorded  capital  flows:  The main difficulty  in evaluating non-compensatory 
capital movements is that the available information  covers only officially-recorded  capital 
movements and therefore  does not reflect  all the non-compensatory movements which 
have occurred, in many cases. It is important to point out that a country's balance-of-
payments data do not necessarily reflect  the external payments of  that country as a whole, 
but only those of  its monetary authorities. This means that it is quite possible (and, 
actually, it is quite common) for  a country's overall balance of  payments to show a surplus 
while the same country's official  balance shows a deficit,  or vice versa. This situation 
arises each time the private (non-banking) sector of  a country decides to increase its 
holdings of  internationally liquid assets by acquiring them on the market either legally or 
illegally; in the final  analysis, this has implications for  the monetary authorities. 
The possibility that a country, as a whole, might have a payments surplus while at 
the same time having a deficit  on its official  balance of  payments (or vice versa) means 
that the concept of  the balance of  payments must be redefined  for  the purposes of  this 
analysis. 
From a theoretical point of  view (particularly in relation to such problems as the 
determination of  overall international liquidity needs, the stability of  the international 
monetary system and the establishment of  a widely-used system of  convertibility), greater 
accuracy can be achieved by using a broad definition  which includes unrecorded private 
flows  both in the balance of  payments and in the definitions  of  international liquidity. 
However, from  the standpoint of  the selection of  economic policy tools and the 
assessment of  possible development strategies, it would seem more suitable to focus  the 
analysis on the official  definition  of  the balance of  payments while adjusting the 
respective concepts to take unrecorded capital movements into account. 
Adjusting the official  figures  in order to include unrecorded capital movements is a 
long and tedious job, but an essential one if  the results are to be of  some use. Unrecorded 
capital movements often  total more than recorded movements and frequently  follow 
trends that are opposite to those of  recorded capital. Such movements are particularly 
marked in economies where exchange controls are used extensively. 
Clearly, it is impossible to identify  all unrecorded capital movements; fortunately, 
however, quite detailed data can be obtained on some such movements, which makes it 
possible to upgrade the available information.  The most accessible source of  information 
in this regard is the "errors and omissions" entry in the balance of  payments. The 
operations included in this category should be reclassified  as either transactions on 
current account or as non-compensatory capital movements. However, a detailed 
examination of  the "errors and omissions" entry in order to reassign all the operations 
recorded under this heading correctly, although possible, goes beyond the scope of  this 
study. Here, a less rigorous but more easily-applied approach will be used, such as that of 
treating the entire "errors and omissions" entry as non-compensatory capital 
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movements, while compariang the behaviour of  the adjusted data with'that of  the official 
data in the regression analysis. Appendix B contains the relevant information.  An 
improvement in the empirical results should be regarded as the only valid evidence that 
this procedure is a suitable one. 
In order to conduct the empirical assessment, another adjustment of  the data must 
be made to take into account changes (flows)  in private holdings of  internationally liquid 
assets. Although it is difficult  to establish the existing relationship between 
internationally liquid private holdings and international capital movements, it can be 
deduced from  the observation of  normal practices in the exchange and capital markets. In 
markets where no restrictions are placed on capital movements (as regards both the 
purchase and sale of  foreign  currency), changes in private liquid holdings are channelled 
through the purchase and sale of  those assets in official  markets, and they are therefore 
usually recorded as non-compensatory capital movements.10 However, when a system of 
exchange controls does not allow the purchase of  foreign  exchange for  purposes of 
hoarding, foreign  exchange is usually accumulated through the common practice of  over-
invoicing imports and under-invoicing exports and through false  movements on the 
accounts included in the "services" heading (tourism, dividends, bonuses, port costs, etc.). 
All the available information  on private holdings of  internationally liquid assets is 
given in appendices A and B on both a quarterly and an annual basis; unfortunately, 
however, this information  is not sufficient  for  the purposes of  this study, and it was 
necessary to reconstruct the required series based on the existing data.11 
b) Differentials  in effective  yields 
Theoretical inputs and the available empirical evidence regarding developed 
countries both indicate that differentials  in the effective  yields of  domestic and external 
assets are one of  the main determinants of  international capital movements. The term 
"effective  yield" is defined  in the broadest possible sense and includes such concepts as 
interest rates, variations in the capital value of  an asset, tax advantages, etc. 
If  financial  and exchange markets were efficient,  the task of  quantifying  these 
effective  yields for  both direct investments and financial  investments would be 
tremendously simplified.  However, the widespread use of  controls and restrictions in 
capital and exchange markets makes the quantification  of  such yields very difficult  indeed. 
Most of  the empirical or theoretical studies on the subject have focused  almost 
exclusively on differentials,  between interest rates, these being considered as 
representing differentials  in "effective  yields". Since the use of  floating  exchange rates 
has become widespread, however, these studies had tended to include variations in the 
value of  an asset occasioned by changes in exchange rates in their definition  of  "effective 
yield" as well. 
In small countries with unrestricted financial  and exchange markets whose 
exchange systems are based on fixed  exchange rates, the practice of  associating the 
concept of  "effective  yield" with the interest rate in the market place should provide 
satisfactory  results; this, in turn, would tremendously simplify  the task of  quantifications. 
In countries with unrestricted markets but whose exchange systems are based on a 
floating  rate, the quantification  of  the concept of  "effective  yield" would require no more 
than the inclusion of  values reflecting  expectations of  changes in the exchange rate. The 
frequent  use of  exchange and financial  restrictions and controls and the recurring 
exchange crises in most Latin American countries, however, rule out the use of  simple 
procedures and call for  more complex quantification  methods capable of  adequately 
reflecting  the differentials  in effective  yields. Moreover, interest rates are not always 
representative of  the rate of  return on direct investments. 
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In the various countries of  the region, interest rates have generally been subject to 
differing  degrees of  government control thus giving rise to informal  markets. Not only 
does the quantification  of  the concept of  "yield" in regard to financial  assets become more 
difficult  under such circumstances, but it also becomes impossible to substitute financial 
interest rates for  a variable measuring the marginal yield of  capital. In addition, short-
term financial  flows  are seriously affected  by interest rates and official  exchange 
movements, as well as by transactions on parallel exchange markets, informal  credit 
markets, etc. 
It is self-evident  that there is no one single motivation for  all capital movements. 
Direct investments are inherently longer-term investments than most financial  ones and 
are usually based on expectations of  returns from  production activities rather than on 
expectations of  very short-term gains. Moreover, although official  (non-compensatory) 
capital movements should in theory be guided by the same system of  costs and incentives 
as private movements are, this is not what happens in actual practice; the economic and 
political motivations for  such movements do not necessarily coincide with those of 
private movements. In addition, the relative inefficiency  of  some State enterprises in the 
countries of  the region often  gives rise to capital movements which are undertaken in 
order to avoid budget controls rather than because of  differences  in effective  yields. 
Due to the absence of  reliable information  on the rates of  return on direct 
investments, other variables must be used to reflect  this. At first  glance, a seemingly 
obvious solution is to use dividends and returns on shares sold on the stock exchange for 
that purpose, but due to the lack of  transparency of  the region's stock markets and the fact 
that most companies exhibit strong leanings towards self-financing,  this information  is 
not useful  as a reflection  of  the yields on direct investments. One possible indirect avenue 
would be to use anticipated GDP growth rates as indicators of  estimated domestic rates of 
return by employing some of  the methods that have been developed for  quantifying 
expectations. 
Although the measurement of  the effective  yields of  financial  operations may 
appear to be simpler, it is actually much more complex. In countries with high and 
persistent inflation,  unstable exchange rates and distorted financial  and exchange 
markets (and with large parallel markets), the measurement of  differentials  in effective 
yields is complicated by the effect  of  expectations of  variations in exchange rates and by 
the possibility of  making a further  profit  by purchasing external assets at official  prices 
and then selling them on parallel markets. Since foreign  exchange rates on parallel 
markets are sometimes twice or three times as high as they are on official  markets, the 
profits  realized from  such exchange transactions entirely overshadow the importance of 
simple interest rates differentials. 
The specification  of  the "differentials  in effective  yields" variable is based on the 
assumption that a large part of  capital movements in the Latin American countries have 
their origin in the actions of  the economic agents of  the country in question,12 which 
compare not only the alternative yields from  various domestic and external financial 
assets, but also the options for  investment in real goods. Basically, the problem can be 
simplified  by viewing it in terms of  a comparison between the purchasing power of  an 
investment in domestic assets (the most profitable  one) at the end of  the period in 
question and the purchasing power of  an investment abroad for  which the required 
foreign  exchange is purchased at the official  exchange rate, while the return on that 
investment is converted, at the end of  the period, on the parallel market.13 
Of  course, this form  of  measurement combines various operations which could 
have been dealt with separately (such as, for  example, the purchase of  foreign  exchange at 
the official  price, using any of  the possible mechanisms for  doing so, and its immediate 
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sale on the parallel market). This procedure, however, would contribute nothing to the 
analysis of  capital movements and would exacerbate the problems involved in having a 
small number of  observations. 
c) Monetary  imbalances 
As noted in the section containing a description of  the model based on the 
monetary approach to the balance of  payments, ever since D. Hume's implicit utilization 
of  this model and its later use in a more explicit form  in the work of  F.Y. Edgeworth and 
A. Marshall, it has emphasized the importance of  monetary policy's effects  on the balance 
of  payments, primarily through its repercussions on the flow  of  real goods. 
The same line of  reasoning which gave rise to that approach can be applied just as 
validly to non-compensatory capital movements: if  the monetary authorities create credit 
in excess of  the public's incremental demand for  money, the public will rapidly distribute 
this credit among a number of  alternative assets: the involuntary accumulation of  money 
(delays in adjusting holdings of  real monetary balances to desired levels), the purchase of 
domestic and imported goods and services, the purchase of  internationally liquid assets, a 
reduction in foreign  borrowing (these last factors  being ones which give rise to outflows 
of  capital), etc. Likewise, a tight credit policy obliges the public to decrease its holdings of 
internationally liquid assets and to seek foreign  loans in order to meet its needs for  credit 
and money. 
The second component of  monetary imbalances —the demand for  money— will 
have the same effects,  but works the other way around; i.e., an increase in the demand for 
money, in its broadest sense, will have the same effects  as a tight credit policy. It should be 
noted that the emphasis is on the concept of  credit policy rather than monetary policy 
because credit is the monetary authorities' instrument of  control, while monetary policy is 
the result of  the credit policy in conjunction with its and other measures' effects  on the 
balance of  payments. 
The fact  should be underlined that the concept of  "monetary imbalance" was 
defined  in terms of  the relationship between credit policy and the incremental  demand 
for  money (both being concepts of  flow)  rather than defining  it in terms of  static stocks 
(differences  between the stock of  credit and the overall demand for  money) because 
capital movements (flows)  come about in response to changes in overall imbalances 
rather than in response to those imbalances as such. At the same time, the process of 
adjusting a "monetary imbalance" is not an instantaneous one and a long time may pass 
before  it is completed; thus, in terms of  empirical conclusions, an observed capital flow 
may be an aggregate of  a number of  flows  associated with the partial adjustment of  a 
number of  past monetary imbalances. This delay in the adjustment process may not be of 
great significance  for  empirical evaluations based on annual data (although it is 
impossible to make such a statement a priori).  However, such delays may have a 
significant  effect  on the results of  evaluations based on quarterly data and, in such cases, it 
may become necessary to use lagging variables which adequately reflect  the effects  of 
partial adjustments of  monetary imbalances. 
In addition, a monetary imbalance's effect  on capital flows  may also be heavily 
influenced  by that same imbalance's effect  on the current account; an imbalance which is 
partially offset  by the flows  registered in the current account of  the balance of  payments 
will generate a smaller capital flow  than there would be if  the current account did not 
offset  part of  the imbalance. This relationship, which is derived from  the main line of 
reasoning involved in the monetary approach to the balance of  payments and from  the 
process of  the creation of  money under a system of  fixed  exchange rates, makes it 
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necessary to take the effects  of  the current account results into account either by adjusting 
the figures  in specifying  the concept of  "monetary imbalances" or by treating it as another 
alternative independent variable, as described further  on in the text. 
Another complication in evaluating monetary imbalances' effects  on capital 
movements is that these imbalances simultaneously affect  other markets and other 
variables, primarily of  the simplified  combined model, thus making it difficult  to correctly 
identify  the effects  of  each variable. Moreover, some of  these other variables are, in their 
turn, important factors  in determining the demand for  money, which is a basic element in 
determining the "monetary imbalance" variable. Another difficulty  in the definition  of 
this variable is that consistent estimates of  the "demand for  money" in the countries in 
question are not available; with respect to some of  the countries, it therefore  becomes 
necessary to estimate them for  the sole purpose of  defining  the variable in question. A 
more detailed description of  the quantification  methodology used for  this purpose is 
provided in the relevant section. 
d) Official  reserve holdings 
Senior economic officials  often  draw attention to repeated cases in which a country 
that is in a solid balance-of-payments  and reserve position finds  itself  with an abundant 
supply of  external funds,  whereas the supply of  such funds  tends to diminish or even 
disappear when that same country experiences external payments difficulties. 
This inclusion in this study of  a variable representing the degree of  risk associated 
with operations with a given country makes it possible to incorporate this datum in the 
empirical assessment; it also allows the availability of  international funds  to be 
quantified.  Generally, this can be interpreted as one of  the variables representing the 
status of  international capital markets in relation to the country in question. 
The tendency in the international banking system is to decide periodically upon the 
degree to which it wishes to commit its investments in each country; in order to arrive at 
this decision, it assesses the future  prospects of  each country's external sector and its 
borrowing capacity based on a group of  simple indicators, including the level of  reserves, 
the degree of  indebtedness, its debt profile,  the medium-term outlook as regards its 
balance of  payments, etc. 
In this study, gross reserves are used as the representative variable for  that 
assessment and for  the attitude taken in capital markets towards the country in question. 
No attempt was made to use other variables such as the level of  net reserves, the level of 
indebtedness, etc., because the empirical results obtained using the gross reserves variable 
were highly satisfactory.  Nonetheless, this subject would merit further  exploration if  a 
revised version of  this study is prepared at some future  date. 
One element which should be considered with the utmost care in the course of  the 
empirical evaluation is the fact  that a capital flow  towards a country will automatically 
increase its level of  reserves; even when one of  the variables is a flow  variable and the 
other is a static stock variable, in exceptional cases this relationship could introduce a 
problem of  causality between the dependent and the independent variable while at the 
same time exhibiting a high simple correlation coefficient  between the two variables. 
This problem does not come up in most empirical assessments. Nevertheless, 
when using the total level of  reserves as an explanatory variable it is possible to use 
various methods to solve the problem in those cases where there is a high autocorrelation, 
including the use of  lagging variables or variables expressed in terms of  annual averages. 
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e) The  use of  direct  restrictions  on capital  movements 
The Latin American countries have repeatedly used exchange restrictions to deal 
with balance-of-payments  problems and have used them in highly innovative ways. The 
economic grounds for  using exchange restrictions are very simple: foreign  exchange is 
perhaps the scarcest input in developing countries' economies and is therefore  a public 
good whose allocation to various users should be clearly defined  by the economic 
authorities. 
The degree to which exchange restrictions are used varies from  country to country 
and from  year to year, depending on economic circumstances and the governments' 
economic thinking. Without going into the economic results of  such restrictions, it is 
important to evaluate them in terms of  their objective i.e., to halt outflows  of  capital at 
times of  balance-of-payments  difficulties  without reducing the normal inflow  of  foreign 
exchange.14 If  controls on capital movements work effectively,  the impossibility of 
obtaining foreign  exchange at the official  price for  speculation will make foreign 
exchange transactions less attractive, and the net result of  placing controls on capital will 
probably be positive15 in the sense that the net outflow  will be less than what it would 
have been without controls. If,  on the other hand, such controls are ineffective,  they will 
only act as an incentive for  the purchase of  external assets and, hence, the outflow  of 
capital. The effectiveness  or ineffectiveness  of  controls on capital is a purely empirical 
question that cannot be resolved within the realm of  theory. 
This study provides a simple means of  ascertaining the overall effectiveness  of 
controls on capital movements in the region. If  the controls are effective,  the results of  the 
regression of  the "non-compensatory capital movements" variable on the "restrictions" 
variable must necessarily show an inverse relationship between the two variables even in 
those cases where the behavioural relationship is not completely specified;  otherwise, the 
overall effect  of  such restrictions would run counter to their objectives. If  the simple 
regression of  these two variables yields results which are contrary to the measures' 
objectives, a better specification  of  the function  (incorporating other variables such as the 
differentials  in effective  yields,16 as one example, in order to take the distortions produced 
by the controls into account) would yield a functional  relationship with the expected 
signs; in this case, the "restrictions" variable would tend to measure only the effects  of 
such operations' legality of  illegality. The net effect  of  such restrictions would in any case 
be negative. 
Finally, such restrictions are usually introduced when the country is experiencing 
balance-of-payments  and/or reserves problems, and in such instances the close 
relationship between these independent variables may create problems similar to those 
described in the preceding section. 
f)  The  balance on current  account: The  joint  treatment  of  the "reserves" and 
"current  account" variables 
Economic authorities usually assert that international lending institutions tend to 
cut back on their loan operations with a country experiencing difficulties  in relation to the 
current accounts on its balance of  payments by limiting new loans and demanding the 
payment of  operations which would normally have been extended. If  this is true, there 
would be good reason to expect that non-compensatory capital transfers  would move in 
the same direction as the current account balance, thereby heightening current account 
fluctuations  rather than mitigating them. In addition, it is also a common practice in the 
countries of  the region to oblige external suppliers to finance  their exports during a brief 
period during times of  payments difficulties  while encouraging State enterprises to 
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increase their external borrowing. These two opposing trends introduce an element of 
uncertainty into the evaluation of  this variable's behaviour. Generally speaking, it may be 
expected that as the specification  of  the overall function  improves, the relationship 
between the balance on current account and non-compensatory capital movements will 
tend to strengthen the second of  these two arguments and will therefore  have a negative 
sign: suppliers of  foreign  goods, being reluctant to finance  exports,17 will fulfil  the formal 
financing  requirement but will then immediately withdraw those funds  through non-
institutionalized markets. With a good specification  of  the behavioural relationships, the 
first  movement would be reflected  by the "current account" variable and the second would 
be picked up by the "differentials  in effective  yields" variable. One possible way of 
reflecting  both effects  would be to —simultaneously— use the balance on current account 
during the period in question and during the immediately preceding period as 
independent variables; in this way, the datum for  the period would reflect  the effect  of 
external suppliers' legal obligation to provide financing,  while the balance from  the 
preceding period would indicate the element of  "risk" and the attitude of  international 
credit markets. 
These are not the only complications involved in the use of  current account 
balances as an explanatory variable. The developing countries have repeatedly proposed 
the creation of  mechanisms to ensure the transfer  of  real resources to them, arguing that 
they are by nature net capital importers. Achieving the objective of  transferring  real 
resources18 from  developed to developing countries would therefore  involve the 
recording of  a deterioration on current account at the same time as an inflow  of  capital to 
the country; similarly, direct capital investments are generally accompanied by imports of 
capital goods, which would also produce the result described in the preceding paragraph. 
Lastly, if  one accepts the premises of  the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments, the creation of  credit in excess of  what is required by the incremental changes 
in the demand for  money would simultaneously generate a deterioration on current 
account and an outflow  of  capital. 
All these lines of  reasoning show how difficult  it is, on a theoretical level, to 
discover a definite  relationship between the "current account" variable and non-
compensatory capital movements. The problem therefore  becomes an empirical one, but 
even then the results are unlikely to be conclusive 
One possible way to facilitate  the interpretation of  empirical results in terms of 
some of  the above hypotheses is suggested by an analysis of  the methods of  evaluation 
currently used by the international banking system. Obviously, when a country with a 
solid reserves position and a promising balance-of-payments  outlook experiences 
temporary current account imbalances, the international banking system will be quite 
willing to finance  that imbalance since this is a highly profitable  and low-risk operation. 
In some cases, the banking system may even be willing to finance  persistent current 
account imbalances (as in the case of  Brazil during the past decade) when such imbalances 
are part of  a sound and well-balanced programme for  managing the external sector. 
However, it seems reasonable to expect that the banking system will not aid those 
countries displaying a tendency towards a persistent deterioration in their current 
acounts along with low or steadily-declining international reserves. Evaluating these 
factors  is a complex task and cannot be represented by a simple variable but it 
nevertheless seems worthwhile to attempt to define  a variable for  these characteristics 
which would, if  nothing more, at least reflect  some of  the "current account" variable's 
major effects  on non-compensatory capital movements. One possible way of  defining  a 
variable to accomplish this objective may be to use the ratio between the current account 
balance and the level of  reserves as a means of  attempting to establish a direct 
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relationship between this ratio and capital movements; in other words, the greater the 
current account deficit  is in relation to the level of  reserves, the more reluctant the 
international banking system will be to finance  such imbalances. 
Finally, the same comments made in regard to the various alternative definitions  of 
capital movements are equally applicable to the definition  of  current account balances. 
The use of  exchange restrictions encourages the formation  of  parallel markets and leads 
to the existence of  differentials  between the rates on parallel and official  markets. An 
exporter who is obligated to exchange his export earnings at the official  rate will, because 
of  this exchange rate differential,  be tempted to falsify  his export declarations by under-
invoicing them so that he may sell the undeclared portion on the parallel market; in the 
same way, an importer will also be tempted to use his access to official  markets in order to 
apply for  more foreign  exchange than necessary by over-invoicing the imports for  which 
he has permits. In this manner, over- and under-invoicing become the preferred  vehicle 
for  capital movements, together with delayed and early charges and payments and the 
over- and under-invoicing of  transactions included on the services account. As a result, the 
current account will tend to be used as a means of  channelling private flows  and should 
therefore  be corrected in tandem with the corrections made in the capital account. 
Further discussion is also called for  here of  some of  the concepts set forth  in the 
section concerning the specification  of  the "monetary imbalance" variable in connection 
with the association between such an imbalance and the current account and hence, its 
effect  on capital movements. The creation of  an inadequate amount of  credit in relation to 
the incremental demand for  money affects  the balance-of-payments  current account and 
capital account at the same time, both of  which tend to serve as vehicles for  the 
adjustment of  the imbalance. However, if  other incentives cause the current account 
results to be the opposite of  what was expected, the attendant decrease in money will 
exacerbate the monetary imbalance and capital movements will therefore  have to play a 
greater role in the adjustment process. 
There are two ways to take this problem into account: either the current account 
balance can be incorporated into the definition  of  monetary imbalances, using adjusted 
figures  in the model's specification  or the current account balance can be incorporated as 
an independent variable. Both alternatives have the same objective and should yield 
satisfactory  results. The first  seems more appropriate for  countries that do not use 
restrictions and in those cases where the number of  observations is small; the second 
seems more appropriate for  complex economies where the number of  observations is 
high and restrictions are heavily used. 
3. Variables  used  to adapt  the model  to specific  situations 
A somewhat detailed description has been given in preceding sections of  the explanatory 
variables forming  the core of  what we have called the "simplified  combined model". 
In the course of  the above description, it was noted that this model, in its simplest 
form,  can only be applied to countries that are free  from  major distortions or regulations; 
in the case of  countries with a long history of  detailed control regulations, these 
regulations and individual features  must be evaluated so that the model can be adjusted to 
incorporate them. 
In view of  the author's greater experience with the case of  Argentina, a thorough 
examination of  Argentina's recent experience with restrictions on capital movements 
was undertaken in order to determine the probability that some of  those measures may 
have had effects  that are not reflected  by the main explanatory variables, including the 
"restrictions" variable. 
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It was ascertained, for  example, that in addition to the country's other exchange 
provisions, a "financial  swap" policy was in place whose particular features  could not be 
picked up by any of  the other variables. On various occasions the Argentine authorities 
implemented a financial  swap policy, which was primarily used at times of  payments 
difficulties;  this consisted of  extending "exchange insurance" to individuals or 
institutions bringing capital into the country (usually financial  capital, but sometimes 
even import financing).  This insurance guaranteed that such funds  would be bought back 
at a set date and at a predetermined rate of  exchange. The premium implicit in this 
exchange insurance was set at a level that was always lower than the expected rate of 
devaluation, than the rate of  inflation  and, what is more, than the domestic interest rate 
(which was also regulated), the objective being to create an incentive for  inflows  of 
capital. An idea of  the size of  the subsidy implicit in this operation is provided by the fact 
that, in late 1975, the exchange insurance premium was lower than 30% per year, 
whereas the devaluation rate on the parallel market in 1975 was over 1 000%. Under 
these circumstances, it was to be expected that an enormous inflow  of  capital would take 
place under this arrangement (as in fact  did occur) and that this capital would then 
immediately be withdrawn through the parallel market. 
The full  scale of  these operations cannot be captured by the model's main 
explanatory variables, and it therefore  became necessary to incorporate a new variable to 
reflect  the effect  of  these operations. This was the "swaps" variable (the purchase of 
exchange under a buy-back agreement), which was constructed on the basis of  the 
differences  between the rates of  return on operations involving capital inflows  that made 
use of  this arrangement and those that did not. 
In a similar way, it was found  that there were other aspects of  economic policy 
whose importance was such that they should be considered in conducting any analysis of 
this type. One example is the transfers  received by Nicaragua and Guatemala as a result of 
the earthquakes which occurred in the mid-1970s and the impact they had on their 
current accounts. Permits for  imports not involving the use of  foreign  exchange (a 
commonly used measure during the 1950s) are another example; under this sort of 
arrangement, importers received import permits for  a wide range of  products on the 
condition that they would not apply to the monetary authorities for  the corresponding 
foreign  exchange. In such cases, the domestic price of  the products in question was many 
times higher than the price of  a foreign  product even after  calculating all the surcharges 
and intermediation costs, and the rate of  return on capitai inflows  (which are an inherent 
part of  inflows  of  merchandise) were much higher than the rate of  return of  simple 
financial  operations and were conceptually similar to those described in the preceding 
paragraph. 
The evaluatory problems connected with clandestine imports should also be 
mentioned. These imports are usually not recorded either as imports or capital inflows, 
but the payments for  them are consistently recorded on the capital account. 
Last but not least, the frequent  political conflicts  in the countries of  the region are a 
major cause of  capital movements and are impossible to associate with any of  the 
previously mentioned economic variables. In those cases where such conflicts  have clearly 
discernible results, they can be incorporated into the empirical analysis by using dummy 
variables which reflect  the influence  of  these factors.  This method is of  little use, however, 
in those cases where the effects  of  these events do not lend themselves to an unequivocal 
evaluations. 
All of  the above leads to the conclusion that spectacular results as regards the 
empirical aspects of  the study cannot be expected on an a priori  basis in the case of 
countries that have been subject to frequent  distortions and political crises. Satisfactory 
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results can be expected, however, for  countries with stable economies not affected  by 
significant  distortions (i.e., it is to be expected that they will fit  the model described here 
and will generate a certain degree of  predictive capacity). 
4. Quantification  of  the main variables 
One of  the main constraints with respect to a correct evaluation of  the hypotheses set 
forth  in the preceding section is the lack of  adequate information  for  the countries of  the 
region in connection with many of  above-mentioned variables. This lack of  information  is 
particularly notable in regard to interest rates, private holdings of  internationally liquid 
assets, special régimes, etc. 
a) The  adjustment  of  official  figures  on capital  movements 
The first  problem which arises is therefore  the quantification  of  capital flows  that 
have been adjusted to take variations in the private sector's holdings of  internationally 
liquid assets into consideration.19 
Very little information  is available on these holdings, but the situation is 
improving. The main source of  data on private holdings of  internationally liquid assets is 
the United States Federal Reserve, which has been publishing information  on short-term 
dollar deposits held by foreigners  in United States banks for  over 20 years. This 
information  also covers deposits for  a term of  over one year and government bond 
holdings. If  the study were focused  on the analysis of  capital flows  in the 1950s, these 
statistics would have been adequate, if  not complete. Nonetheless, given the tremendous 
growth of  Eurocurrency markets and the proliferation  of  offshore  markets, the statistics 
on deposits in United States banks have not adequately represented the total volumen 
since the mid-1960s. Fortunately, in 1972 the Bank of  England began to publish annual 
data on foreigners'  deposits of  European currencies other than the pound sterling in 
banks within the United Kingdom. Prior to 1972, the available information  was not 
classified  by country, although it did include data for  various regions as a whole. 
Beginning in 1974, the Bank of  England has published this information  on a quarterly 
base. Finally, since late 1975, the Bank for  International Settlements in Basel has 
published quarterly data on deposits by foreigners,  denominated in different  currencies, 
in the banks of  Europe (including Switzerland), the United States, Panama, Singapore 
and other offshore  markets. 
As the above paragraph makes clear, a substantial improvement is gradually being 
made in the coverage, quality, homogeneity and frequency  of  publication of  the available 
information  on private-sector holdings of  external assets.20 
Since the necessary information  was lacking, a special procedure had to be 
employed in order to carry out the empirical evaluation which consisted of  a stage-by-
stage study entailing the use of  various statistical methods to estimate unrecorded capital 
flows.  With reference  to Argentina, this involved experimenting with five  alternative 
definitions  of  non-compensatory capital movements: i) unadjusted statistics on non-
compensatory movements, just as they appear in national balances of  payments; 
ii) figures  arrived at by adding the "errors and omissions" entry to the concept of  non-
compensatory capital movements; iii) figures  that have been adjusted for  unrecorded 
flows  estimated on the basis of  existing data on private liquid holdings and a linear 
extrapolation of  the missing data; iv) figures  that have been adjusted for  unrecorded 
flows  estimated in the same way as above except that there were based on the 
extrapolation procedure described in appendix A; and v) figures  that have been adjusted 
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for  unrecorded flows  estimated on the basis of  autoregressive time series analyses using 
the procedure described in appendix A. 
In all these cases, a special effort  was devoted to making certain that the statistical 
methods used to reconstruct these series would be such as to ensure that if  favourable 
results were obtained, they would be due to a well-conceived specification  of  the model 
rather than to interferences  from  the process of  constructing the series itself.  The 
methods described in the preceding paragraph meet this requirement, and if  any 
comment might be made in this respect, it is that, since they do not include subjective 
elements, their results will almost certainly be less satisfactory  than those which could be 
obtained using the same model if  complete statistical information  were available. 
In view of  all the foregoing,  the fact  should be stressed that the empirical 
evaluation's main purpose is to establish the model's general validity and the degree of 
significance  of  the different  explanatory variables so that conclusions can be reached 
which will contribute to the formulation  of  economic policies in general and external-
sector policies in particular; these empirical estimates can in no way be characterized as 
predictive tools, however, because the coefficients  will have been derived from  data that 
are not sufficiently  precise, although they do suffice  to indicate general trends. 
b) Adjusting  the balances on current  account 
All that need be done to measure the "balance on current account" variable is to 
correct the official  current account figures  using the flows  of  privately held foreign 
exchange. In both cases, the way in which transactions go unrecorded in the official 
system deserves special attention, because it may be that capital inflows  and outflows  take 
place through the current account or that only outflows  are channelled through this 
account while inflows  are recorded on the capital account. 
c) Generalization  of  the concept of  effective  yields 
It was quite difficult  to quantify  the "differentials  in effective  yields" variable. 
Almost no information  is available on interest rates, since most of  the countries with 
regulated interest rates have no information  concerning the interest rates on non-
institutionalized markets and, what is more, do not even publish statistical series on the 
regulated rates. However, with the assistance of  the central banks of  the region, it was 
possible to reconstruct this information  for  some countries.21 In those cases where this 
information  could not be obtained the rate of  inflation  was used as the variable for  the rate 
of  return on domestic financial  assets.22 
The only point that need be underscored with respect to this variable is that it is a 
simplification  of  reality whose purpose is to provide an uncomplicated means of 
representing how a wide range of  domestic investment options compares with a wide 
range of  foreign  investment options. 
d) Quantification  of  the concept of  "monetary imbalances" 
The quantification  of  the "monetary imbalances" variable does not present any 
major problems from  the standpoint of  the availability of  data (monetary data are 
generally the most highly refined  information  in almost all the countries of  the region). 
Difficulties  do arise, however, because of  the lack of  consistent estimates of  "the demand 
for  money", since preparing such estimates for  the countries in question would, in some 
cases, entail an entire research project in its own right. In addition, since one of  the main 
explanatory variables of  the demand for  money is the interest rate structure, we once. 
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again encounter difficulties  in connection with the lack of  information  on these rates. In 
the particular case of  this study, estimates of  monetary imbalances were prepared for 
Argentina and Guatemala, and experiments will be conducted with respect to Brazil and 
Chile. As is customary, the figures  on monetary imbalances were converted to dollars so 
that they could be compared with the balance-of-payments  figures.  The adjustments for 
the balance on current account were made using the figures  derived from  the analysis 
discussed in the preceding section. 
e) Official  and private  capital  movements 
The definition  of  non-compensatory capital movements includes the flows  set in 
motion by the official  sector (with the exception of  the monetary authorities) and private-
sector flows.  Although the situation may differ  from  country to country, it seems 
reasonable to expect that these two sectors will not behave in exactly the same way, since 
their actions are taken in response to different,  and sometimes contradictory, incentives. 
For example, in some countries of  the region, public-sector institutions often  use external 
credit as a way of  sidestepping budgetary controls; in such cases, the profitability  of  the 
operation is of  little importance to them. If  the above is true, then the coefficients  of  the 
variables will differ  substantially depending on whether the evaluation is based on the 
data concerning private flows  or on the data concerning total non-compensatory flows; 
an aggregate treatment will therefore  tend to lower the quality of  the evaluation. For this 
reason, it was important to try to conduct a separate evaluation for  each of  these flows,  the 
assumption being that all foreign  exchange holdings abroad correspond to either the 
private sector or the public monetary sector. 
f)  Other considerations 
The remaining variables have already been described in the preceding section and, 
generally speaking, their quantification  did not present any major difficulty.  For example, 
the case presented by Brazil's use of  a swap policy is similar to that of  Argentina. This 
variable would clearly have been a very important factor  in rounding out the explanation 
of  Brazil's experience; the necessary information  could not be obtained, however, so this 
variable had to be left  out of  the study at this stage. In regard to the transfers  made to the 
countries hit by earthquakes, it was impossible to obtain statistics indicating how much of 
the aid was in the form  of  direct transfers  and how much was in the form  of  loan renewals. 
5. Assessment of  the empirical  results 
The various results of  the empirical evaluations of  Argentina (on a quarterly basis)25 and 
Brazil, Chile and Guatemala (on an annual basis) are presented in this section. 
Unfortunately,  the results for  the various cases are not entirely comparable; the 
difficulties  encountered in obtaining data, together with the vast amount of  work that 
would have been required to conduct a complete empirical evaluation for  all the 
countries,24 made it necessary to select those cases in which complex procedures had to be 
applied and to separate them from  those in which a less detailed assessment was to be 
conducted. 
The model has been applied on a complete basis in the cases of  Guatemala (an 
example of  an economy which is almost entirely free  of  restrictions) and Argentina, on a 
quarterly basis (an example of  an economy in which restrictive exchange and financial 
regulations are heavily used; it is also an interesting case because of  the frequency  with 
which its economic policies have been modified,  thus providing an opportunity to test the 
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validity of  the model's assumptions under changing circumstances). A less complete 
assessment was conducted on an annual basis for  Brazil and Chile. 
In all these cases, the evaluation was done first  on the basis of  unadjusted figures  on 
capital movements and then on the basis of  adjusted figures.25  The evaluation also 
included separate analyses of  total non-compensatory movements and of  private 
movements. 
a) Unrestricted  economies: The  case of  Guatemala 
Guatemala is an extremely interesting case to use in assessing the model described 
in the second part of  this study. It fits  the assumptions of  the "monetary approach to the 
balance of  payments" almost perfectly,  in that it is a small country that is almost entirely 
free  of  restrictions on the movement of  goods and capital whose exchange system is based 
on a fixed  exchange rate. In addition, Guatemala exhibits a high degree of  stability as 
regards its economic policies. The only distortion in its economy stems from  the control 
of  interest rates on financial  markets; nonetheless, since the economy is open to the 
movement of  goods, this distortion is not overly significant. 
The main conclusions drawn from  the empirical estimates are the following: 
1. An adequate analysis can be conducted on the basis of  official  figures  because 
private holdings abroad are very small and, due to the absence of  controls, these 
flows  are reflected  in the official  statistics. 
2. The "monetary imbalance" variable consistently indicated that the ratio between 
monetary resources from  domestic sources and the overall demand for  money is too 
low. Guatemala therefore  has to be a net capital importer in order to meet the 
economy's liquidity requirements. This persistent imbalance also exists, virtually 
without exception, in terms of  flows  (adjusted according to the current account 
balance), which is why, in order to correct for  its incremental monetary imbalances, 
the country has also consistently been an importer of  capital in terms of  flows.26 
3. The "non-compensatory capital movements" entry persistently shows a positive 
balance (inflows)  with respect to both private movements and total non-
compensatory movements. 
4. In all cases, the model's explanatory capacity was eminently satisfactory,  with all 
regressions yielding very high coefficients  of  determinations (R2). The minimum 
value of  this coefficient  in any of  the regressions was 0.90, which demonstrates how 
well this model fits  a country with an economy like Guatemala's. 
5. The dependent variable and most of  the independent variables exhibited a strong 
element of  trend, which was not eliminated when the calculations were conducted 
in real terms. This made it necessary to include another variable to isolate the 
influence  of  this trend. Incorporating this variable allowed those policy variables 
having an influence  on capital movements to be more clearly identified. 
6. The "pure simple combined model" yielded highly satisfactory  results in relation to 
both total non-compensatory capital movements and private capital movements. 
These regressions are summarized by the following  equations: 
GCAT = - 13.56 - 0.387 GDEM* + 93-91 GRENT + 0.23 GRT + 1.94 t 
(-2.14) (-4.41) (1.99) (5.83) (2.14) 
R2 = 0.97 D.W* = 2.32 
GCPT = - 11.62 - 0.27 GDEM* + 78.79 GRENT + 0.248 GRT + 1.36 t 
(-1.87) (-3.05) (1.70) (6.12) (1.54) 
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Total non-compensatory capital movements for  Guatemala, 
including the "errors and omissions" entry. 
"Adjusted monetary imbalance", were flows  = A total credit - A 
estimated demand for  money, + the balance on current account. 
Differential  between the effective  yields of  Guatemalan financial 
assets and of  external assets. 
Unadjusted total gross reserves. 
Variable representing the trend. 
Private capital movements, adjusted for  the "errors and omissions" 
entry. 
7. These results corroborate the overall validity of  the model in question as well as the 
fact  that the simplified  version of  the combined model is well suited to a simple 
economy that is free  of  restrictions. The sign of  all the coefficients  was as expected 
and the ranking of  the different  variables' coefficients  of  significance  matched the 
ranking indicated by the model. 
8. The variable with the highest level of  significance  was "total gross reserves", which 
represents the level of  risk associated with external operations with Guatemala. 
This high degree of  significance  stems from  the close simple correlation (0.95) 
shown by the two variables, which tends to obscure some of  the other functional 
relationships (actually, all the independent variables had close simple correlations 
with the dependent variable). 
Such a close simple correlation raises a question as to the possible presence of  an 
autocorrelation between the two variables, particularly when it arises in association 
with a relatively high Dursin-Watson coefficient.  Theoretically, the possibility of 
there being an autocorrelation between the "total gross reserves" variable (a static 
stock concept) and the "capital movements" variable (a flow  concept) is remote, 
but cannot be ruled out. A monetary imbalance simultaneously affects  capital 
movements and the current account, and hence the flow  of  reserves. Although in 
most countries there is virtually no direct relationship between the level of  reserves 
and the flow  of  capital (resulting from  this process), it is possible to construct a case 
in which capital flows  generate a series of  total reserve levels that are closely related 
to the series of  flows. 
In theory, the use of  the lagging "total gross reserves" variable would disrupt any 
theoretical relationship between the two variables. Nonetheless, although its 
inclusion in the case of  Guatemala lowered the significance  of  the Dursin-Watson 
coefficients,  the coefficient  for  the simple correlation between the two variables 
remained extremely high (0.94). At the same time, the overall results of  the 
empirical evaluation, using the lagging GRT variable, continued to be very 
satisfactory  indeed, although the relative importance of  the "monetary imbalance" 
and "differentials  in effective  yields" variables was the reverse of  what it was in the 
results describeH in paragraph 6. 
9. The "adjusted monetary imbalance" variable exhibited a high degree of 
significance  in the empirical evaluations of  private capital movements and of  total 
non-compensatory movements. This result corroborates the model's overall 
validity and its particular applicability to economies free  of  restrictions. 
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10. The existence of  this close relationship between monetary imbalances and capital 
movements can be confirmed  by ascertaining the empirical relationship between 
the residuals of  both variables and their respective trends; the results of  this 
relationship yielded the correct signs, a high degree of  significance  and a simple 
correlation coefficient  of  0.45. 
11. After  the initial evaluation, it seemed somewhat surprising that the "monetary 
imbalance" variable's coefficients  were more significant  with respect to non-
compensatory capital movements than they were for  private capital movements. 
These results are logical, however, if  the public sector is actively seeking funds  on 
international capital markets. When examining private flows  in such a case, the 
concept of  monetary imbalances should perhaps also be adjusted to include the 
authorities' capital inflows  (non-compensatory, with monetary effects)  inasmuch 
as a portion of  the original imbalance is covered by such capital inflows. 
12. The coefficients  of  the "differentials  in effective  yields" variable were of  the correct 
sign and were significant,  and did not vary a great deal when the definition  was 
switched from  that of  total non-compensatory capital movements to that of  private 
capital movements. These results are consistent with the theoretical model 
because, although Guatemala's economy is open to capital movements, its interest 
rates regulations modify  the hypotheses of  the pure model.27 Under these 
circumstances, differentials  in effective  yields can be expected to play an important 
role in accounting for  capital movements, although they may be a less important 
factor  than the "monetary imbalance" variable. 
13. The "restrictions" variable is entirely irrelevant in the case of  Guatemala since its 
economy is free  of  such restrictions. 
14. The "current account" variable yielded highly significant  results when dealt with 
separately, and the coefficients'  signs were opposite to those of  capital movements; 
this result suggests that non-compensatory capital movements offset  current 
account imbalances, thereby ensuring that such movements are actually transfers  of 
real resources. The stability of  Guatemala's economic policy, together with a wise 
management and adequate level of  reserves, allows the country to maintain a 
continuing imbalance on current account that is financed  by capital inflows  without 
occasioning a loss of  international confidence.  However, the inclusion of  the 
current account as an independent variable caused the "monetary imbalance" 
variable to become less relevant, since it is impossible to distinguish its direct effect 
on capital movements from  the indirect effects  it has via the current account. 
15. The coefficients'  significance  was initially affected  by the simultaneous presence of 
autocorrelation and multicolinearity in the results of  the empirical evaluations. 
These phenomena, which are quite common in analyses of  economic series, made it 
impossible to be entirely certain of  the accuracy of  each coefficient.  Nevertheless, in 
view of  the high level of  the correlation coefficients  and the high degree of 
significance  of  each coefficient,  it was very unlikely that these problems would 
invalidate the overall conclusions described in previous paragraphs. 
To solve the problem of  autocorrelation, the information  was reprocessed on the 
basis of  statistical methods that were specifically  designed to resolve this difficulty. 
This increased the significance  of  all the coefficients,  thereby corroborating all the 
original conclusions and confirming  the model's applicability to the case of 
Guatemala. 
The problems of  multicolinearity posed greater difficulties  due to the lack of  a 
programme for  correcting them. Under these circumstances, the only possible 
procedure was to undertake all the evaluations on the basis of  first  differences;  this 
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Table 1 
GUATEMALA: CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, 1958-1976 
Dependent 
variable Constant GDEM GRENT GRT GRT-1 t GCC R
2' * DW 
13.56 -0.387° 93-92 0.231 1.943 0.97 2.33 
Non-compensa- (-2.14) (-4.41) (1.99) (5.83) (2.14) (adjusted) 
tory capital -24.46 0.376 120.41 0.376 1.844 -0.439 0.96 1.99 
movements (-3.55) (-0.69) (2.61) ' (8.70) (2.00) (-3.53) 
Total -34.80 -0.135" 182.25 0.516 2.99 0.90 2.39 
(-2.65) (-0.92) (2.18) (4.75) (1.67) 
-11.62 -0.27" 78.79 0.248 1.36 
(-1.88) (-3.05) (1.70) (6.12) (1.54) 0.97 2.42 
Private (adjusted) 
capital 25.03 0.081 125.52 0.384 1.836 -0.448 0.96 2.06 
movements (-3.38) (0.62) (2.65) (6.90) (1.98) (-3.09) 
-31.71 -0.190° 165.92 0.467 2.74 0.91 2.33 
(-2.46) (-1.90) (2.04) (-4.09) (-4.09) (1.60) 
"Coefficients  in which the GDEM variable was adjusted according to current account balances. 
procedure solved the problems of  multicolinearity, but it generally requires 
extremely close behavioural relationships if  it is to yield adequate results. The 
results of  using this procedure in the case of  Guatemala can be described as highly 
satisfactory: 
A GCAT = - 1.16 - 0.318 A GDEM* + 155.26 A GRENT + 0.17 A GRT 
(-0.10) (-2.98) (1.50) (1.59) 
R2* = 0.58 
All the signs are correct and the various coefficients'  relative order of  significance 
matches the order indicated by the theoretical model; moreover, the coefficients' 
relative stability when working with first  differences  corroborates the validity of 
the results of  the model in its original version. 
16. The picture ultimately created by these results, from  a long-term viewpoint, is that 
of  a wisely-managed economy in which credit almost always expands more slowly 
than does the economy's overall demand for  money. The economy's liquidity 
shortages are therefore  covered by issuances based on increases in reserves, since, at 
the same time, the current account consistently shows a deficit,  capital inflows  have 
to offset  those deficits  and cover liquidity shortages. The use of  external savings 
allowed the country to grow more rapidly than would have been possible if  only 
domestic savings had been used; moreover, domestic saving is held back by 
domestic regulations on interest rates, thus forcing  the authorities to resort to more 
external borrowing than would be necessary if  they had an appropriate interest rate 
policy. 
17. The standard error of  estimate, despite the fact  that it is the smallest yet achieved in 
any of  the empirical evaluations, is still too large for  the estimated functions  to be 
used for  purposes of  prediction. The main regressions are summarized in table 1. 
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b) Economies in which restrictions  are common: The  case of  Argentina 
Argentina is one of  the South American countries which has made the most use of 
restrictions and regulations, not only in exchange markets, but also in financial,  labour, 
capital and other markets. Another important feature  of  the Argentine economy is its 
lack of  stability with respect to economic policy, which change with remarkable 
frequency:  at times, controls have been all but completely eliminated (primarily exchange 
and price controls) while during other periods, controls have been applied to virtually all 
spheres of  the economy. These two characteristics make Argentina an ideal choice for 
testing the model's validity empirically and for  ascertaining its explanatory capacity in 
regard to continually changing economies which are far  removed from  the assumptions 
made in the simple model. 
Quarterly estimates relating to Argentina were prepared on the basis of  four 
different  series for  non-compensatory capital movements. The first  was based on 
balance-of-payments  figures  that had not been adjusted in any way; the second was 
constructed by adjusting those figures  for  the "errors and omissions" entry; the third 
involved adjusting the figures  in order to take unrecorded private flows  into account 
based on the reconstruction of  series on deposits outside the country using linear 
methods; in the fourth,  the figures  were adjusted to reflect  unrecorded capital movements 
based on figures  for  private holdings of  internationally liquid assets obtained by 
reconstructing series using autoregressive time series analyses. 
The main conclusions drawn from  these evaluations are the following: 
i) Unadjusted  capital  movements 
The quarterly regressions in which the figures  on non-compensatory capital 
movements were taken directly from  the balance of  payments and used as a dependent 
variable yielded very poor results, even when the model was adapted to take the features 
of  the Argentine economy into consideration. 
ii) Capital  movements adjusted  for  the "errors and omissions" entry 
Quite satisfactory  results can be attained by adjusting the figures  to take the 
"errors" entry into account. The best results for  this definition  were obtained in regard to 
private capital movements that had been adjusted for  "errors and omissions" in the 
evaluation covering the period from  1968 (second quarter) to 1977 (fourth  quarter). The 
best specification  was supplied by the following  equation: 
ARCA2 = - 123.56 + 91.65 ARRENT + 0.147 ARRT - 0.021 ARDM -
(-2.09) (1.116) (3.95) (-0.92) 
- 1012.32 ARS + 82.35 ARREST - 0.208 ARCC - 383.88 ARDI + 
(-2.34) (1.04) (-2.01) (-3.91) 
+ 452.54 ARD2 
(3.37) 
R*2 = 0.76 D.W = 1.79 
Where: 
ARCA2 = Non-compensatory capital movements according to the balance 
of  payments, adjusted for  "errors and omissions". 
AED1 and AED2 = Dummy variables designed to eliminate two atypical 
observations. 
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ARS = The rate of  return on a financial  swap operation. 
ARREST = A variable representing the intensity of  the use of  restrictions. 
ARCC = Balance on current account according to the balance of  payments. 
The rest of  the variables have the same meaning as in the case of  Guatemala, except 
that the letters AR, which identify  the country in question, are substituted for  the letter G. 
The following  conclusions can be drawn from  these results: 
1. All the coefficients  are of  the expected sign, with the sole exception of  the 
"restrictions" variable. The fact  that this variable has a positive sign means that the 
greater the restrictions on capital movements, the greater the outflow  of  such movements 
and vice versa; in other words, the effects  produced by restrictions are diametrically 
opposed to the objectives of  such measures. This conclusion is not surprising in itself 
(and, actually, it was to be expected, as noted in the section where the model is described) 
but it could not be assumed beforehand  that, with an adequate specification  of  the model, 
the coefficient's  sign might not tend to change so as to show the pure effects  on capital 
movements of  the "illegitimacy" resulting from  such controls. A complete specification 
of  the model should make it possible to isolate the measure's direct effects  (restriction) 
from  its indirect effects  (parallel markets, etc.). 
2. The main explanatory variable was the level of  reserves, which should not be 
surprising in the case of  a country whose economic policy is so changeable. Generally, this 
level reflects  the degree of  political stability and therefore  measures the level of  risk. 
3. The "differentials  in effective  yields" variable's relative lack of  significance  was 
surprising, but it may have been due to the effect  of  regulations and to the hidden forms 
taken by capital movements. A more complete adjustment of  the figures  should improve 
the results considerably. 
4. The variable for  the rate of  return on financial  swap operations had a high 
degree of  significance,  which can be accounted for  by the huge profits  made on such 
operations. Assuming that all swap operations were recorded, it should come as no 
surprise that this variable yielded good results, even when unadjusted figures  were used. 
This is a typical case in which the original model must be adapted to the characteristics 
and individual features  of  a country. 
5. The significance  of  the "monetary imbalance" variable was of  an acceptable 
level, and the balances on current account indicated that capital movements play a 
compensatory role with regard to those balances (also a result of  the obligation to finance 
imports, in that this financing  is necessarily recorded on the balance of  payments). 
iii) Private  capital  movements adjusted  for  flows  in private  holdings  calculated  on 
the basis of  an autoregressive  time series analysis 
Using an autoregressive time series analysis in order to reconstruct the series on 
private holdings of  assets that are liquid on international financial  markets made it 
possible to adjust the official  figures  in a more comprehensive manner than that 
described in the preceding section.28 The improved specification  based on these figures 
for  the period from  1968 (second quarter) to 1977 (fourth  quarter) was performed  using 
the following  equation: 
ARCA3 = - 110.66 + 161.53 ARRENT + 0.124 ARRT - 0.039 ARDM* -
(-2.25) (5.87) (4.53) (-1.49) 
- 1637.2 ARS + 78.14 ARREST + 635.46 D x + 506.07 D 2 
(-4.65) (1.18) (-7.90) (4.77) 
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R*2 = 0.89 D.W = 2.43 
Where: 
ARCA3 = Non-compensatory capital movements adjusted for  flows  of 
private holdings (estimated using an autoregressive time series 
analysis) and for  the "errors and omissions" entry. 
ARDM* = Monetary imbalance adjusted for  the balance on current account. 
ARDI and ARD2 = Dummy variables used to correct for  two observations in which 
the flows  could definitely  not be accounted for  by any type of 
plausible (political or economic) explanation. 
The results of  this evaluation were highly satisfactory  and conformed  completely to 
the model, thereby clearing up some of  the doubts raised in the preceding section. The 
main conclusions are: 
1. The coefficient  of  the variable representing differentials  in effective  yields 
showed a high degree of  significance  (5.87), which was considerably higher than the 
results obtained on the basis of  official  figures  for  capital movements that had been 
adjusted for  errors and omissions. The fact  that the coefficient  increased in significance 
after  adjusting the official  figures  in order to take unrecorded capital movements into 
account confirms  the importance of  the structures of  the rates of  return on different  assets 
as a factor  in the generation of  capital movements and bears witness to the ineffectiveness 
of  controls on capital movements as a means of  counteracting the effects  of  economic 
incentives or disincentives. Controls only change the forms  taken by capital movements, 
which are nonetheless carried out through such means as over-invoicing, under-
invoicing, advancing and delaying current transactions, etc. The improvement in the 
coefficients'  significance  also attests to the adequacy of  the estimates of  unrecorded flows 
(the basis on which the official  figures  were adjusted) which were based on the available 
information  concerning private holdings of  internationally liquid assets. 
2. The significance  of  the "differentials  in effective  yields" variable was increased 
not only by adjusting the figures  on capital movements, but also because of  the 
improvement of  the specification  of  the estimative function.  This made it possible to 
distinguish between flows  brought on by special measures (swap operations, regulations 
affecting  import financing,  etc.) and subsequent flows  (usually outflows)  brought on by 
differences  in the rates of  return on domestic versus external assets (in the simple direct 
regression between the "adjusted capital movements" variable and the variable 
representing differentials  in effective  yields, the coefficient  was considerably less 
significant  than in the regression in question). 
3. The variable representing risk (level of  reserves) maintained a high level of 
significance  (4.53), but its importance diminished slightly when the figures  on capital 
movements were adjusted and the specification  of  the function  was improved. The use of 
this variable, which was lagged by one period, did not have too great an effect  on the 
regression results; it merely reduced the reserves variable's significance  slightly, while 
slightly increasing that of  the variables measuring the impact of  effective  yields and swap 
operations. The multicolinearity test was also improved slightly. 
4. The "monetary imbalance" variable retained its relative importance in 
accounting for  capital movements, but it was much less important than the effect  of  the 
distortions caused by other economic policy measures. At no time did this variable have 
the explanatory capacity which it has in connection with open economies that are free  of 
restrictions. 
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5. The effect  of  the swap policy described in the preceding section can be even 
more clearly identified  by adjusting the figures  to take unrecorded movements into 
account; when this was done, this variable's significance  increased (-4.65). In conjunction 
with the increase in the explanatory capacity of  the variable representing effective  yields, 
this fact  furnished  strong evidence of  the swap policy's ineffectiveness,  inasmuch as the 
inflows  generated by the subsidies almost immediately give rise to outflows  of  capital 
through non-institutional channels; the first  effect  was picked up by the ARS variable, and 
the second was reflected  by the ARRENT variable. 
6. The coefficient  of  the variable representing the extent of  restrictions in the 
economy, despite the fact  that it was not significant  at a level of  5%, consistently 
displayed one sign (positive), which demonstrated conclusively that these measures are 
counterproductive. Moreover, although this variable's coefficient  dropped considerably 
as the specification  of  the function  improved (which was to be expected, since the harmful 
effects  of  the restrictions were picked up by other variables), it at no time changed its sign 
(if  it were to do so, this would indicate that the measure had achieved at least some of  its 
objectives, even though it would still be counterproductive in an overall sense). The 
quantification  of  the measure's overall cumulative effect  was improved by using a simple 
regression between the independent variable and the "restrictions" variable, which gave a 
coefficient  of  379.90 with an extremely high level of  significance  (as shown by a "t" 
coefficient  of  3 65). This ratio reflected  the total effect  of  the use of  restrictions and was a 
clear indication that its effect  is negative. 
7. The "current account" variable did not yield significant  results when treated as 
an independent variable in the empirical evaluation based on adjusted data. Extreme care 
should be used in evaluating this result, however, because its drop in significance  occurred 
when dummy variables were incorporated to eliminate the two atypical observations. It is 
possible that a new, more detailed version of  the balance-of-payments  figures  would 
make it possible to find  an economic explanation for  these atypical observations, in which 
case a renewed attempt to treat this variable as an independent variable would be called 
for.  However, when the evaluation was conducted on the basis of  unadjusted figures,  this 
variable was significant  despite the use of  the above-mentioned dummy variables. 
8. Attempts to identify  elements of  seasonality in capital flows  did not reveal any 
significant  pattern. 
Finally, the same calculations described above were repeated while deflating  those 
variables which might include an element of  distortion as a consequence of  international 
inflation.  Generally speaking, the results did not change greatly as regards the different 
variables' degrees of  significance,  although the level of  the coefficients  did, of  course, 
change. 
iv) Non-compensatory  capital  movements adjusted  for  linearly  estimated 
unrecorded  flows 
The uncertainty associated with the figures  for  unrecorded capital flows  obtained 
from  the available information  on private holdings of  internationally liquid assets, which 
were estimated on the basis of  an autoregressivè time series analysis, made it advisable to 
conduct the same evaluation described in the preceding section, but this time on the basis 
of  figures  on capital movements adjusted for  unrecorded flows  which had been estimated 
using some alternative method. This section sets forth  the main conclusions of  this 
second evaluation, which was based on figures  adjusted for  estimated unrecorded flows 
arrived at by using linear extrapolations of  "unreported residuals" to estimate the 
unknown data. The best specification  of  capital movements, based on these figures,  was 
attained using the following  equation: 
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ARCA4  = - 51.07 + 195.98 ARRENT  + 0.118 ARRT  - 0.0326 ARDM* -
(-0.66) (4.95) (2.52) (-1.57) 
- 2424.91 ARS + 34.64 ARREST  + 0.025 ARCC4 
(-2.77) . (0.31) (0.19) 
R*2 = 0.70 D.W = 2.05 
Where: 
ARCA4  = Non-compensatory capital movements adjusted to incorporate the "errors 
and omissions" entry and unrecorded flows  ascertained by estimating 
private holdings of  internationally liquid assets on the basis of  linear 
extrapolations. 
ARCC4 = Balances on current account symmetrically adjusted with the above 
variable. 
This estimate covered the period from  1970 (first  quarter) to 1976 (third quarter) 
and did not involve any adjustment for  atypical observations since none occurred during 
the period under analysis. 
There is little to add in this connection, since this result corroborated all the 
conclusions presented in the preceding section. 
c) The  case of  Brazil:  Main  conclusions 
The empirical evaluation of  Brazil's experience with international capital 
movements was, during the first  stages of  this study, conducted on the basis of  annual 
data. The results of  this assessment were generally satisfactory  with respect to 
coefficients  of  determination (nearly 97%), but they cannot be regarded as totally 
satisfactory  as regards either the prediction error (high, but not higher than for 
Argentina) or the applicability of  the model on which this study is based. 
One of  the difficulties  involved in the specification  of  the model stemmed from  the 
lack of  data for  the quantification  of  some of  the basic variables, Specifically,  it proved 
impossible to obtain complete imformation  on interest rates, the demand for  money and 
regulations governing financial  swaps. These variables should seemingly play a 
fundamental  role in the model's specification  in the case of  Brazil which, like Argentina, 
has used controls and regulations a great deal. 
The best specifications  for  the different  definitions  of  capital movements can be 
summarized as follows: 
The main conclusions to be drawn from  these results are the following: 
1. The model yielded satisfactory  results for  all the alternative definitions  of  capital 
movements; however, adjusting the original balance-of-payments  figures  to take 
unrecorded movements into account did not improve the results substantially. The fact 
that the adjustments were made solely on the basis of  private holdings in United States 
markets might account for  this lack of  improvement. Nonetheless, this factor  could not be 
overly significant  in an evaluation based on annual observations covering the period 
1958-1973, during which time the United States capital market was by far  the most 
important such market. 
2. Almost all the explanatory variables included in this summary exhibited the 
expected signs and a level of  significance  that was consistent with the results for 
Argentina, with the exception of  the variable representing the rate of  return on different 
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Table 2 
BRAZIL:  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C A P I T A L M O V E M E N T S , 1958-1973 
(Annual  observations) 
Constant Rate of return 
Level of  Current 
restric-  Reserves account 
tions + flow 
GDP R2 «r 
Total capital + errors and 
omissions — flows 
Private capital - flow 
Private capital + errors 















-540.95 -114.61 233.53 










assets; not only was this variable of  little significance,  but it even yielded the opposite 
sign. It is very unlikely that this result reflects  the actual behaviour of  Brazil's economic 
agents, and the explanation for  this anomaly must therefore  be the incomplete 
specification  of  the model and, probably, the dearth of  information  on interest rates. This 
conclusion seems to be borne out by the researchers' experience with the empirical 
evaluation of  Argentina, whose initial results also ran counter to what had been expected 
as regards the "differentials  in effective  yields" variable; however, as the specification  of 
the model progressed, this proved to be the main explanatory variable. Briefly,  the reason 
for  this is that, without a good estimate of  the demand for  money, it is impossible to arrive 
at a correct definition  of  the "monetary imbalance" variable, and the effects  of  this 
variable's behaviour are therefore  distributed among the other variables. 
It is also known that Brazil used a swap policy similar to that used in Argentina, but 
this factor  could not be included in the empirical evaluation, as was done in the case of 
Argentina, because the relevant information  could not be obtained. The inclusion of  this 
variable should have a decisive impact on the coefficient  of  the "rate of  return" variable 
because it clearly separates the inflows  generated by the implicit subsidy in the swap 
policy from  the capital outflows  occasioned by the low rate of  return on domestic assets. 
3. As was also true in the case of  Argentina, the "restrictions" variable showed an 
incorrect sign in the case of  Brazil; this bears witness to the ineffectiveness  of  such 
controls in regulating capital outflows  and to their indirect negative effects. 
4. The major explanatory variable in this evaluation was the level of  reserves. The 
results were not changed by using this variable with a one- or two-period lag. 
5. The results tended to be worse when the "errors and omissions" account was 
incorporated into the concept of  non-compensatory capital flows.  This was a little 
surprising, and may have been due to the incomplete specification  of  the model. 
6. The evaluations relating to private capital movements also yielded good results 
with respect to coefficients  of  determination and the standard error of  estimate. 
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned problems persisted. 
7. In the specific  case of  Brazil, a new variable (the GDP) was incorporated in an 
attempt to reflect  the rate of  return on direct investments. The results showed the correct 
sign, but the "t" coefficient  was not significant  at a level of  5%. However, adjusting the 
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current account to,exclude direct investments substantially improved the results by 
increasing their significance. 
8. The lack of  a good function  for  the demand for  money prevented the 
quantification  of  the monetary imbalance variable, and it was therefore  not included in 
the empirical evaluation. 
In short, although the results generally yielded high coefficients  of  determination, 
they cannot be regarded as entirely satisfactory  for  the purposes of  this study. It is clear 
that this portion of  the study requires a more thorough treatment, which was not possible 
at this stage due to difficulties  in obtaining the basic data. However, the experience 
acquired in evaluating the Argentine situation provides grounds for  a great deal of 
optimism with respect to the possibility of  achieving a better specification  of  the model in 
the case of  Brazil once the variables reflecting  the importance of  "rates of  return", 
"monetary imbalances" and "swaps" have been correctly quantified.  A high priority 
should be assigned to their quantification  in any future  revision of  this study. 
d) The  case of  Chile:  Main  conclusions 
As in the case of  Brazil, the evaluation of  Chile was conducted on the basis of  annual 
data on private capital. In this case as well, difficulties  were encountered in obtaining basic 
information  that was absolutely necessary in order to take into consideration the peculiar 
features  of  an economy such as Chile's, in which restrictions and regulations have been 
used a great deal. 
Unlike the case of  Argentina and, to some extent, that of  Brazil, the results cannot 
be considered as satisfactory;  this conclusion is based on the factors  discussed below. 
Although the results of  the regressions based on unadjusted annual data exhibited 
high coefficients  of  determination (0.90), the signs of  some coefficients  and the level of 
significance  of  others do not appear to be reasonable in light of  economic theory in 
general and the model used in this study in particular. The following  ratio provides an 
example of  these factors: 
CHCA1 = 356.52 - 41.364 CHRENT + 839.84 CHREST - 0.222 CHRT + 
(1.82) (-9.41) (3.23) (0.81) 
+ 0.3842 CHCC 
(1.50) 
R*2 = 0.90 D.W = 1.92 
In this ratio, the "differences  in effective  yields" variable (CHRENT) is highly 
significant,  but has the opposite sign from  what would be expected; the "reserves" 
variable (CHRT) does not have a significant  coefficient;  the "current account" variable 
(CHCC) also has the opposite sign from  was obtained for  the other countries, which 
would indicate that capital movements are magnifying  current account imbalances. 
The only variable for  which the results were consistent with the model was the 
"restrictions" variable, which yielded a highly significant  coefficient  running counter to 
these restrictions' objectives, thereby demonstrating their negative effects. 
Clearly, the above results could only be due to a poor specification  of  the model, 
which was in turn due to difficulties  in obtaining information.  It would seem impossible 
for  economic agents (which, in other studies, have been shown to act on a highly rational 
economic basis) to act so irrationally when external financial  assets are included among 
the investments options. 
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This conclusion was reinforeced  when the evaluation was conducted on the basis of 
figures  adjusted for  private holdings of  internationally liquid assets in United States 
markets and for  the "errors and omissions" entry. These adjustments reduced the model's 
explanatory capacity considerably (R2 = 0.375), but also corrected the coefficients  in the 
expected direction, although the correction was not enough to overturn the conclusions 
set forth  in the preceding paragraph. The best specification  was given by the following 
equation: 
CHCA5 = - 45.537 - 1.4726 CHRENT + 237.57 CHREST + 0.2544 CHRT -
(-0.30) (-0.50) (1.17) (1.18) 
- 0.3709 CHCC 
(1.87) 
R*2 = 0.375 D.W = 2.59 
In this case, the variable representing the rate of  return continued to have the 
opposite sign from  what would be expected, but its coefficient  was not significant;  the 
variable representing risk (reserves) yielded an improved "t" coefficient,  but was still not 
significant. 
These results, albeit unsatisfactory,  show that an adequate specification  of 
behavioural relationships is possible once the figures  have been completely adjusted, i.e., 
once the deposits made by private individuals in other markets have been taken into 
account and, above all, once variables have been included which adequately reflect 
monetary imbalances, special arrangements with respect to capital movements and 
differentials  in effective  yields. This work should also be given a high priority if  a revised 
version of  this study is prepared at some future  date. 
IV 
Summary and conclusions 
The objective of  this study is to carry out both a theoretical and an empirical evaluation of 
international capital movements from  and towards Latin America in order to identify  the 
economic policy variables which influence  such movements. A final  aim is to draw 
conclusions with respect to economic policy that would enable the countries of  the region 
to improve the way in which they handle external-sector variables. 
In this respect, this study is part of  a group of  studies carried out under the same 
project, which is jointly sponsored by UNDP and ECLAC, in order to evaluate current 
account trends and external debt problems in the region. 
This analysis concentrates on evaluating non-compensatory capital movements 
because they fluctuate  the most and are the movements which are most frequently  beyond 
the direct control of  economic authorities. Despite the fact  that non-compensatory 
movements account for  the largest volume of  capital movements involving the region, 
little is known about them and the studies which have been conducted on this subject 
focus  primarily on institutional aspects. 
The model used for  the theoretical and empirical assessments contained in this 
study is the product of  recent theoretical advances made in this field  on the basis of  the 
models for  portfolio  selection under risk conditions and what is called the "monetary 
approach to the balance of  payments". These simple models, however, are not sufficient 
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in themselves to reflect  the complex economic experiences of  the countries of  the region, 
and it was therefore  necessary to modify  them in order to incorporate variables that take 
the individual features  of  the different  countries into consideration. 
One of  the most serious problems encountered in conducting the empirical 
evaluation contained in this study was that the official  data concerning capital movements 
do not adequately reflect  such flows  in many countries. This is because economic agents' 
response to exchange systems which regulate and attempt to prevent capital inflows  and 
outflows  is to seek alternative forms  and channels to serve their purposes, and they 
generally succeed in doing so. Unrecorded capital flows  can be of  such a magnitude that 
they entirely change the official  figures  and, in such cases, an empirical evaluation based 
on such figures  becomes pointless. 
Unrecorded capital movements often  take the form  of  fictitious  operations under 
headings included in the current account. The widespread practice of  under-invoicing 
exports and over-invoicing imports also suggests that official  current account figures  are 
not a reliable basis for  empirical evaluations of  capital movements or the current account. 
One way of  estimating unrecorded capital movements is to evaluate private 
holdings of  internationally liquid assets, inasmuch as their variations, when exchange 
restrictions are in effect,  can be regarded as a reflection  of  such unrecorded movements. 
Complete information  is not available on private-sector holdings of  internationally 
liquid assets but, fortunately,  the information  available on non-residents' deposits in the 
various international financial  markets is increasing day by day. Based on existing 
statistics, it was possible to estimate the data that were not available and to construct 
series on unrecorded flows.  These estimates, along with a description of  the statistical 
procedures used to arrive at them, are included in appendix A. 
The improvements in the empirical results which were achieved by adjusting the 
official  figures  according to these estimates of  unrecorded flows  tend to confirm  the 
validity of  the methods used to reconstruct these series and provide reason to believe that 
they reflect  the magnitude and direction of  unrecorded capital movements with some 
degree of  reliability. 
The results obtained in connection with Guatemala and Argentina were highly 
satisfactory  and demonstrate the model's overall explanatory validity; however, the 
results and especially the coefficients  obtained from  the various regressions should be 
used with extreme care because the accuracy of  the data is uncertain. In addition, it should 
be stressed that, in their present form,  the results cannot be used for  purposes of 
prediction because of  the high standard error of  estimate. 
In any event, the results were sufficiently  significant  to lead to some general 
conclusions with respect to economic policy which are essential to a proper management 
of  the external sector. These conclusions are set forth  below: 
a) It is essential for  exchange and capital markets to function  well if  the external 
sector is to be managed efficiently  and if  capital movements are to be guided in the desired 
direction. 
b) Monetary and credit policy is an extremely important element in the 
management of  the external sector. The creation of  more domestic credit than what is 
called for  by the incremental demand for  money will affect  capital movements and the 
current account is such a way as to have a negative impact on the balance of  payments. 
Nonetheless, such a monetary imbalance will usually tend to be channelled more rapidly 
through capital markets (through the purchase of  foreign  exchange and the interest rate 
of  the country in question) than through the current account. In countries with open 
economies and fixed  exchange rates, this variable was the most significant  factor  in 
accounting for  capital movements. 
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c) The elasticity of  capital flows'  response to changes in the differentials  between 
the effective  yields of  domestic and external assets seems to be very great, and significant 
results can therefore  be obtained with only small modifications  in this variable. Likewise, 
any regulation that tends to lower the rates of  return on domestic assets will tend to have a 
strong impact on the external sector. A brief  examination of  the financial  policies of  the 
countries in the region suggests that these policies, together with monetary imbalances, 
are perhaps the main causes of  the external-sector problems faced  by the countries of  the 
region during the period in question. 
However, the fact  that this variable is very elastic does not mean that the problems 
of  the external sector can be easily resolved by subsidizing capital inflows,  particularly if 
such subsidies are accompanied by inconsistent monetary policies and controls on capital 
movements, along with the parallel markets to which they give rise. An important lesson 
may be learned from  Argentina's experience with the use of  such subsidies. These 
subsidies did indeed attract external capital but, since they were applied at a time of 
excessive liquidity when enormous profits  were to be made on unrecorded capital 
operations, the overall net effects  of  this measure were negative. The authorities 
therefore  did not obtain foreign  exchange, but still had to bear the net financial  losses 
resulting from  those subsidies. 
d) In those cases where the authorities wish to control capital movements, either 
to encourage their inflow  or to prevent their outflow,  such control should preferably  not 
be direct, but should rather be accomplished through the use of  incentives and 
disincentives (such as interest rates or high returns on capital) or global economic policy 
tools (such as credit and exchange policies). Since money is a commodity which is difficult 
to control, direct controls tend to produce results that are diametrically opposed to their 
objectives. Although direct controls may act as a deterrent to some extent (due to the 
illegal nature of  unrecorded movements), their use leads to the immediate formation  of 
marginal markets which provide incentives for  obtaining "cheap" foreign  exchange at 
the official  price, thus giving rise to a greater outflow  of  capital than the controls were 
intended to prevent; the results of  the empirical evaluation are conclusive in this respect. 
Furthermore, the use of  restrictions hardens the attitudes taken on capital markets 
towards the country in which they are applied. 
e) Finally, international reserves, current account balances and the external debt 
must be maintained at adequate levels if  the external sector is to be well managed. In this 
respect, it is important to consider the methods used to analyse a country's external sector 
by the entities which make up international capital markets, particularly as regards their 
repercussions on capital flows.  The international banking system clearly takes a 
favourable  view of  the extension of  credit to countries in a sound reserves and current 
account position and even exerts pressure to this end. Under such circumstances, 
however, what is the use of  receiving capital inflows  that would not represent a transfer 
of  real resources but would only tend to increase an already high level of  reserves? In a 
case such as this, the country in question would wind up paying interest (the difference 
between the cost of  the loan and the return on the investment of  reserves) merely in order 
to create money within the domestic economy. 
In this context, a wise policy for  administering reserves and borrowing which 
would be in line with the other aspects of  sound external-sector management that were 
mentioned above would be designed to attract an inflow  of  capital in order to finance  a 
moderate imbalance on current account as well as a moderate (but, in so far  as possible, 
steady) increase in international reserves. This policy should be enough to achieve more 
rapid economic growth —with the aid of  external savings— and to maintain the external 
sector in a solid position. 
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A satisfactory  level of  reserves would also make it possible to deal with the cyclical 
fluctuations  which occur in the current accounts of  the countries of  the region and to 
prevent them from  giving rise to speculative capital movements. Lastly, a high level of 
reserves is beneficial  when the marginal rate of  return on capital in the country is higher 
than international interest rates; if  it is lower, then a high level of  reserves may eventually 
have negative effects. 
These conclusions follow  not only from  the theoretical analysis, but also from  the 
results of  the empirical evaluations of  the capital flows  of  various countries in the region, 
particularly Guatemala and Argentina. The same general conclusions emerge again and 
again in the evaluations of  each country, despite the differences  among their recent 
economic experiences. This fact  may be regarded as verifying  these conclusions' validity 
in spite of  changing circumstances and the use of  different  economic systems. This study 
should be considered as only one step in the enormous task of  evaluating capital 
movements; it should be expanded upon in order to include other experiences and other 
economies, while efforts  should also be continued to achieve a better specification  for  the 
countries covered here, especially Brazil and Chile. 
NOTES 
1 Although there is a tendency to associate the intensification  of  international capital movements with 
the widespread use of  exchange systems based on floating  exchange rates, the intensification  of  capital 
movements actually preceded the use of  floating  rates; it would be more correct to associate this 
intensification  with the internationalization of  capital markets, the extremely rapid expansion of 
Eurocurrency markets and the proliferation  of  offshore  markets. 
2 Harry Markowitz, Portfolio  Selection:  Efficient  diversification  of  investments,).  Wiley and Sons, 
New York, 1959. 
'For a summary of  the "rediscovery" of  the monetary approach to the balance of  payments, see 
R. Rhomberg and A.R. Heller, "Introductory Survey" in The  Monetary  Approach to the Balance of 
Payments, IMF, Washington, 1977. 
4Cfr.  Rolf  Mantel, Un  modelo  para la administración  de  las reservas internacionales,  Jornadas de 
Economía Monetaria y Sector Externo, Banco Central de la República Argentina, September 1978 
(mimeograph). 
'Grubel, H.G: "Internationally diversified  portfolios:  welfare  gains and capital flows".  American 
Economic Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 5, Part 1, December 1968. 
6Branson, William H.: Financial  Capital  Flows  in the U.S.  Balance of  Payments, North-Holland 
Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1968. 
Lihon, O.: Les mouvements de  capitaux a long terme entre la France  et l'extérieur,  a paper presented at 
the Sixth Colloquium on Applied Econometrics, Rome, February 1979. 
Lybeck, J.A.: A simultaneous model  of  capital  flows,  exchange rates, interest  rates and  prices of  trade 
goods:  Theoretical  considerations  and  estimations by alternative  methods,  Godeborgs Universitat, Sweden, a 
paper presented at the Sixth Colloquium on Applied Econometrics, Rome, February 1979. 
7 See the results for  Guatemala in the pertinent section. 
8 Although a detailed analysis showed that these countries' economic policies often  had features  in 
common, they also frequently  have striking differences.  Nevertheless, their effects  on capital movements and 
on the extent of  the restriction of  financial  and exchange markets are remarkably similar. 
'Within the context of  this study, consideration was also given to the possibility of  analysing the 
experiences of  countries such as Mexico (because of  its proximity to a large capital market and because of  the 
characteristics of  its economy), Venezuela (because of  the dual nature of  its economy) and Colombia (because 
it represents an intermediate point between Guatemala and Argentina as regards the use of  restrictions and 
controls). The difficulties  encountered in obtaining information,  as well as the intensive effort  required to 
specify  the model for  Argentina on a quarterly basis, made it necessary to leave them aside at this stage in the 
research work, despite the fact  that their analysis is essential in order to gain a more complete picture of  the 
behaviour of  capital movements under different  institutional conditions. 
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10 Even under a free  exchange system, there may be substantial differences  between real and recorded 
capital movements. For example, this might occur when, due to flows  in the statistical information  system, 
the accumulation of  foreign  exchange by exporters is recorded as a lower level of  exports rather than being 
shown as export earnings and a subsequent capital outflow. 
11 Three alternative quarterly series have been reconstructed for  Argentina in this study using methods 
that range from  simple linear extrapolations to autoregressive time series analyses based on relatively 
complex statistical methods. The methods used to construct the series are described in some detail in the 
section entitled "Quantification  of  the main variables" and in much greater detail in appendix A. 
12 Although this assumption is compatible with the assumption of  a small country, it is not essential and 
the model is not altered if  the specification  is based on the behaviour of  external economic agents. 
15 An investor with capital "C0" may choose to invest his capital in domestic assets at a rate of  "i" or to 
invest it in external assets at a rate of  "i" while purchasing foreign  exchange at a rate of  "eg" and then to sell 
all his foreign  exchange at the end of  the period at a rate of  "eP". The differential  in the yield would therefore 
be: 
C0 (1 + i) _ Cp (1 + i«) [Cf  / £ ] 
(1 + 7r) (1 + Tr) 
Where: rr = rate of  inflation  during the period. 
14 The main difficulty  involved in carrying out this evaluation is the measurement of  the intensity of  the 
restrictions in use in each country, which is not easily quantified.  The method used in this study is discussed in 
the section on the quantification  of  variables. 
15 The concept of  a positive result is confined  to the achievement of  the measure's objective and is by no 
means intended to describe the measure's effects  on the overall allocation of  resources or the well-being of  the 
community in general. 
16 It should be borne in mind that the existence of  restrictions usually leads to the emergence of  parallel 
markets; the exchange rates on these markets, which are higher than the official  rates, are an important factor 
in measuring the variable corresponding to differentials  in effective  yields. This suggests that there is a close 
association between these two independent variables, with the profits  in foreign  currency increasing as 
exchange controls become stricter, thus creating incentives for  capital outflows.  The measure therefore  has 
the opposite effect  from  what was sought. 
"In other words, as imports rise (adversely affecting  the current account), the flow  of  capital will also 
increase. 
"Although past experience demonstrates that developing countries are net importers of  recorded 
capital, unrecorded capital flight  from  these countries is sometimes greater than net inflows,  which might 
invalidate the general argument. In addition, there have been cases where countries have completed their 
development process without resorting to the use of  external capital. In any event, there is no question about 
the fact  that the use of  external capital is a common practice which may increase in the future  and facilitate  the 
accumulation of  capital required for  the development process. 
19On the subject of  private holdings of  internationally liquid assets, see Carlos Massad, Liquidez 
internacional  total,  evaluación económica y consecuencias de  políticas,  IMF, August 1972; Ricardo H. Arriazu, 
"Conferencia  en la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos", October 1974; Ricardo H. Arriazu, "La reforma 
dei sistema monetario internacional desde la perspectiva de los países en desarrollo", Revista Argentina  de 
Finanzas,  June 1977. 
20In a few  years' time, these improvements in the available information  will make it possible to conduct 
much more precise studies than at present. 
2 1 When this study was nearing completion, the IMF circulated an internal document by V. Galbis 
containing a complete series on regulated interest rates in the countries of  the region. 
2 2 When interest rates are negative in real terms, the alternative to purchasing external assets is not 
financial  investment but rather the accumulation of  goods. The rest of  the information  needed to construct 
this variable (inflation  rate, exchange rates on the official  and parallel markets, international interest rates) is 
readily available. 
2 3 Although annual evaluations for  Argentina were carried out, the results were not as good as those 
obtained from  the quarterly regressions, and it was therefore  decided to report directly upon the results of  the 
quarterly estimates. 
2 4 Obtaining adequate functions  for  the demand for  money in respect of  all the countries —the basis for 
the definition  of  the "monetary imbalance" variable— and reconstructing the series on flows  for  the same 
countries based on autoregressive time series analyses would require more time than was available for  this 
study. 
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2 5 The annual figures  were adjusted only for  the flows  of  holdings of  United States dollars because it was 
impossible to reconstrua statistics going back 20 years with so little reliable data. In any event, the United 
States market far  overshadowed all the other markets during most of  the period in question. 
2 6 The demand function  which served as a basis for  the quantification  of  the "monetary imbalance" 
variable corresponds to the following  equation: 
—d= - 347.85 + 0.234 y + 917.09 ' ~ + 0.821(M) t-l " 14.42 t 
P 1 + ir P 
(-3.69) (2.17) (3.82) (2.44) (-1.89) 
R2* = 0.99 E.T.E. = 0.047 
Where: 
Y = National income; i = Average interest rate; rr = Rate of  inflation. 
(M.)t— j = Holdings during the preceding period, representing the speed with which real holdings are 
P adjusted to conform  to desired holding, 
t = trend. 
2 7 Although it is outside the scope of  this study, it should be noted that, contrary to what is generally 
believed, the regulation of  interest rates has a heavy impact even in countries such as Guatemala; the variable 
reflecting  its effects  on the function  of  the demand for  money is highly significant  and has the highest partial 
correlation coefficient  of  all the variables in this function. 
2 8 The variables used to arrive at these new estimates (as well as the previous ones) are listed in 
appendix B. 
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Appendix A 
Methodology for  reconstructing quarterly series on 
private holdings of  internationally liquid 
assets based on incomplete data 
The empirical evaluation of  the various hypotheses that have been advanced regarding 
the causes of  international capital movements has been hampered by the lack of  official 
figures  on such movements. 
As noted at various points in the main body of  this text, when economic authorities 
are faced  with balance-of-payments  difficulties,  they often  resort to the use of  exchange 
restrictions as a means of  preventing or hindering outflows  of  capital and the 
accumulation of  external assets by residents (payments difficulties  are often  not the only 
incentive for  such accumulation; a major cause can be the unprofitability  of  investments 
in domestic assets due to inappropriate regulations). Under such circumstances, 
economic agents use loopholes in control systems to meet their needs for  external assets; 
inasmuch as the loopholes to be found  in the various components of  the current account 
are relatively simple and therefore  the most frequently  used, these capital movements are 
not recorded as such but instead figure  as current transactions. 
The only way to obtain an approximate idea of  the size of  these unrecorded flows  is 
by inference  from  the variations they produce in private holdings of  internationally liquid 
assets. Unfortunately,  not all such holdings can be detected because some assets, such as 
cash and foreign  currency holdings, are difficult  to record, while other more easily 
identifiable  assets, such as deposits in banks and other financial  institutions, have only 
recently been subject to systematic recording procedures. 
Although the available information  is incomplete, it is worthwhile to try to 
systematize it in order to correct the official  figures  on capital flows.  Not doing so would 
be tantamount to asserting that the level of  such unrecorded flows  is equivalent to zero, 
which is clearly not the case, and the element of  error introduced into the evaluation 
would in any case be greater than the error involved in making corrections based on the 
incomplete data available. 
The only relatively complete information  available thus far  on public and private 
economic agents' holdings of  internationally liquid assets in external markets is provided 
in the bulletin published by the Bank for  International Settlements in Basel which, since 
the fourth  quarter of  1975, has been providing quite detailed information  on deposits by 
non-residents in banks and other financial  institutions in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the other seven countries forming  the Eurocurrency market and the offshore 
markets (the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Panama, Bermuda, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
etc.). These data are published quarterly and are classified  according to the nationality of 
depositors. 
Prior to that date, complete information  is available only on deposits by non-
residents in banks and other financial  institutions in the United States; this information 
covers a sufficiently  long period to permit its empirical evaluation. The above 
information  is published each month in the bulletin put out by the Federal Reserve. 
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With respect to the Euromarket, detailed quarterly information  broken down by 
country is available on the deposits made by non-residents in banks of  the United 
Kingdom beginning in the fourth  quarter of  1972; annual data on such deposits has been 
available since 1971. Besides the detailed information  mentioned above, the only other 
data on the rest of  the European markets and on offshore  markets correspond to overall 
patterns and classifies  depositors by major geographical regions in a way which does not 
permit their nationalities to be identified.  This information  is available in an exhaustive 
study prepared by the Bank for  International Settlements in Basel which was published in 
early 1975; it includes quarterly descriptive series on the behaviour of  each one of  these 
markets going back to 1964. 
Although it is unfortunate  that complete information  on non-residents' holdings of 
external assets does not exist, the information  which is available is particularly useful  for 
the following  reasons: i) until the mid-1960s, the United States financial  market was the 
main recipient of  non-residents' funds;  even in 1968, it accounted for  over 40% of  total 
deposits by non-residents; ii) the above is especially true with respect to deposits by Latin 
American residents, who showed a decided preference  for  that market (in 1968, deposits 
by Latin American residents represented 70% of  all deposits by non-residents in the 
United States); iii) of  all the rapidly growing Eurocurrency markets, the United 
Kingdom's was the main such market until the late 1960s; iv) the development of 
offshore  markets has been the latest stage in the internationalization of  financial  markets 
and only very recently have they begun to receive deposits from  Latin American residents. 
For all these reasons, the available information  can be said to represent the 
majority of  identifiable  (unrecorded) capital flows;  in order to complete the necessary 
information,  the only thing that need be done is therefore  to reconstruct the rest of  the 
information  using statistical procedures based on the available data. Three methodologies 
for  reconstructing homogeneous quarterly series on private holdings of  internally liquid 
assets which were applied in the case of  Argentina are described in this appendix. Table 1 
shows all the available data for  Argentina; the blank spaces represent the data that must 
be estimated on the basis of  the available information. 
1. The  unreported  linear  residuals  method 
This relatively simple procedure is based on assumptions which are partially arbitrary but 
which have been derived from  information  on market performance;  essentially, three 
stages were involved in supplying the missing data in the series on deposits made by 
Argentines in United Kingdom and other international markets, excluding that of  the 
United States. These stages are discussed below: 
a) Deposits  in United  Kingdom  banks 
To fill  in the missing data on deposits made by Argentines in United Kingdom 
banks, the first  step was to interpolate the missing data between the first  quarter of  1972 
and the third quarter of  1973 based on the available data for  late 1971,1972 and 1973. The 
simplest method is a linear interpolation using the following  equation: 
Yt = Y1 + — (Y2 - Y l ) X 
4 
Where X = 0, 1, 2, 3. 
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Table 1 
ARGENTINA: TOTAL HOLDINGS IN UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM 
AND OFFSHORE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Period Market 
Year Quarter United  States United  Kingdom Other markets 












1971 I 549 
II All 
III 453 
IV 461 221 
1972 1 532 
II All 
III 539 
IV 660 289 
1973 I 726 
II 751 
III 913 
IV 962 397 
1974 I 1 030 378 
II 1 397 399 
III 1 133 410 
IV 922 423 
1975 I 853 416 
II 1 024 391 
III 1 017 366 
IV 1 183 378 920 
1976 I 1 210 377 947 
II 1 443 373 963 
III 1 485 410 861 
IV 1 582 529 1 586 
1977 I 1 932 437 1 349 
II 1 749 423 1 907 
III 2 237 587 2 433 
IV 1 508 800 2 710 
Source: Bulletins issued by the Bank for  International Settlements (Basel). 
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To fill  in the data prior to the fourth  quarter of  1971, the simplest method is to 
extrapolate the missing data by calculating a linear trend for  the data in question. The 
calculacions for  the period from  the first  quarter of  1970 to the third quarter of  1971 was 
based on the following  computer trend: 
Yt = 229-168 + 17.29336 T Rc = 0.95 E.T.E = 4 % 
This estimate was biased by the small number of  observations on which the 
calculation of  the trend was based and by the fact  that some of  these observations were 
themselves the result of  a linear estimate. However, the results obtained with this 
procedure appeared to be reasonable in the light of  experience. This procedure also 
ensured that favourable  results obtained from  the empirical evaluation (the ultimate 
objective of  the entire exercise) would not be due to defects  in the statistical method used. 
b) Deposits  in other financial  markets 
Reconstructing the series on deposits by Argentines in the remaining financial 
markets was a more difficult  undertaking. At this initial stage in the research, a simple 
procedure was used based on the "percentage of  unreported residuals". Firstly, the 
percentage of  total deposits by Argentines outside the country channelled to these 
markets was estimated for  the period in which information  was available; secondly, based 
on the information  available for  Latin America as a whole, the same ratio was estimated 
for  the first  quarter of  1970 and the missing data were then interpolated using a linear 
procedure; thirdly, the figures  for  total deposits in all external markets were estimated 
using the following  expression: 
2 t + a. Total BIS = Total BIS 
After  cancelling out the common factor,  the result was: 
Total BIS = J L L 
1 — a 
where "a" = "unreported linear residual percentage", previously estimated linearly, and 
J t = the sum of  deposits in United States and United Kingdom markets. 
Lastly, the results were compared with the available information  for  Latin America 
in order to determine whether they were reasonable or not. 
Table 2 shows the results of  these estimates and a calculation of  private holdings 
which was arrived at by deducting private holdings of  external assets from  total deposits 
by non-residents. 
2. Non-linear  autoregressive  methods 
This procedure is similar to the one described above, except that autoregressive methods 
were used to perform  the extrapolations rather than linear methods. Since the results 
obtained using this procedure tended to produce larger errors than did the method 
discussed previously, these results were not used in the evaluation of  capital movements. 
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Table 2 
ESTIMATES OF PRIVATE  HOLDINGS OF ASSETS BY RESIDENTS IN 
ARGENTINA,  THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
BASED ON A LINEAR METHOD 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Year Quar-ter 
United  United 
States"  Kingdomb 








Total , ... Prtvate 
holdings 
of  external  , , 
.of  external 
assets of  t 
. . t assets' 
Argentina 
1970 I 450 108.11* 558.11* 0.1657* 668.96 302 367 
II 535 125.41* 660.4* 0.1741* 799.54 400 400 
in 533 142.70* 675.7* 0.1824* 826.44 399 427 
IV 539 160.0* 699.9* 0.1907* 864.82 343 522 
1971 i 535 177.29* 712.29* 0.199* 889-25 427 643 
ii 460 194.58* 654.58* 0.2073* 825.76 159 667 
ra 433 212.0 * 645.0* 0.2156* 822.29 126 696 
IV 443 227 670.0 0.2240* 863.40 70 793 
1972 i 543 242.5* 785.5* 0.2323 1 023.19 169 854 
i 461 258.0* 719.0* 0.241 947.30 59 888 
in 524 273.5* 797.5* 0.2489 1 061.78 83 979 
IV 640 289 929 0.2572 1 250.67 294 957 
1973 i 695 316* 1 011* 0.^556* 1 376.63 411 966 
n 736 343* 1 079* 0.2739 1 486.02 585 901 
m 990 370* 1 270* 0-2822 1 769-30 996 773 
IV 926 397 1 323 0.2905 1 86469 1 068 797 
1974 i 1 013 373 1 391 0.2988 1 983.74 1 215 769 
n 1 380 399 1 779 0.3072* 2 567.84 1 594 974 
ra 1 107 410 1 517 0.2155* 2 216.22 1 241 975 
IV 887 422.91 1 309.91 0.3238* 1 937.20 1 028 909 
1975 i 823 416 1 239 0.3321* 1 855.10 621 1 234 
n 990 391 1 381 0.3404* 2 093-69 408 1 686 
in 986 365 1 351 0.3488* 2 074.63 177 1 898 
IV 1 151 370 1 521 0.379 2 451 247 2 204 
1976 i 1 173 377 1 550 0.388 2 534 202 2 332 
u 1 398 373 1 771 0.3628 2 779-4 539 2 240 
ra 1 442 420 1 862 0.3240 2 756 669 2 087 
IV 1 540 529.3 2 069-3 0.440 3 697.3 1 354 2 343 
Source: Column 1 : Federal Reserve and IMF; column 2: Bank of  England; column 5: Bank for  International Settlements; 
column 6: Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic 
'Data for  the end of  the period Argentine deposits in the United States. 
*Data for  the end of  the period, in United States dollars. Argentine foreign-currency  deposits in United Kingdom banks. 
'Unreported linear residual percentage: The diference,  expressed as a percentage, between the statistics on external assets 
of  Argentina provided by the Bank for  International Settlements (BIS) and the International Monetaiy Fund 
'During the period from  the fouth  quarter of  1975 to the fourth  quarter of  1976, die figures  represent Argentine deposits, 
in the main currencies, in European, Japanese, Canadian and United States banks. 
"Gross foreign  assets of  the monetary authorities. Data for  the end of  the period. 
'The difference  between BIS linear and column 6. 
'Estimated values. 
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3. The  autoregressive  time series analysis  method 
This procedure, which is commonly used in preparing estimates of  unavailable data, is 
based on the identification  of  variables whose behaviour is closely correlated to the 
variable for  which information  is lacking; the object is to estimate the behaviour of  the 
latter based on the available information  concerning the former. 
In this study, the deposits outside the country made by Argentines were estimated 
on the basis of  the global figures  for  total and Latin American deposits; since the 
information  on these major headings was also incomplete, preparing these estimates 
involved collecting the available information  and classifying  it in the manner indicated 
below: 














Offshore  markets 
Euromarket UK 
8-UK 
In this way, the unavailable information  was reconstructed based on the headings 
for  which complete figures  were available for  the entire period. The series at the 
worldwide level for  those markets where the information  did not cover the entire period 
(offshore  markets) were completed first  on the basis of  the total figures  for  other markets 
showing similar patterns; the procedure was subsequently used in connection with the 
information  for  Latin America and was then applied to the missing data in the series on 
Argentina. If  the available data on Latin America had been complete, it would have not 
been necessary to reconstruct so many series. 
The data were extrapolated by using the method of  generalized least squares and by 
applying autoregressive procedures.1 
Each of  the series used to prepare these estimates are discussed below. 
a) Total  external  liabilities  of  the different  markets 
Virtually all the necessary information  on this item was available, except with 
respect to offshore  markets such as those of  the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Panama, 
Bermuda, Singapore, Hong Kong, etc., for  which the figures  were available only from  the 
fourth  quarter of  1970 onwards. The figures  for  the period prior to that were extrapolated 
from  the available data on total external liabilities in the Canadian and Japanese markets 
using the following  equation and the methodology discussed previously.2 
Offshore  marekts - World - - 13.3390 + 2.49346 in Canada 
error = .1019 
P = .4392 
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The information  on Canada was used to calculate the data for  offshore  markets 
because that was the series most closely related to the behaviour of  those markets during 
the period for  which information  was available.5 
b) External  liabilities  of  the different  markets  in respect of  Latin  American residents 
The lack of  one single definition  for  the various series corresponding to the heading 
of  "Latin America" made it necessary to adopt such a definition  and to adjust all the series 
to conform  to it. Due to considerations relating to the availability of  information  from 
specific  sources, the definition  that was selected was that used in the bulletin published by 
the Bank of  England; according to this definition,  the term "Latin America" covers the 
following  countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
Within this subgroup, complete information  is available on deposits in United 
States and European markets, but not on those in Canadian, Japanese and offshore 
markets; the partial information  which does exist on these latter markets is derived from 
the information  made available by the Bank for  International Settlements. This series 
was therefore  estimated residually, i.e., by subtracting the available information  on the 
previous headings for  the period from  the fourth  quarter of  1975 to the fourth  quarter of 
1977 from  the figures  of  the Bank for  International Settlements. 
The rest of  the observations were made complete by extrapolating the data based 
on the following  expression: 
Canada + Japan + Offshore  markets = 867.53585 + 0.04236 US (World) 
(1.83) (10.97) 
E.T.E. = 8.40% 
P = .5632 
US (World) represents the series indicating the total liabilities of  United States 
markets in respect of  non-residents. 
c) External  liabilities  of  the different  markets  in respect of  Argentine  residents 
As noted previously, the only information  available under this heading (which was 
the object of  the entire exercise) was the data shown in table 1 of  this appendix. 
The following  procedure was used to complete the series on external liabilities of 
United Kingdom banks in respect of  Argentine residents (in foreign  currencies): 
Quarterly data from  the first  quarter of  1972 to the third quarter of  1973 were 
linearly interpolated based on the following  equation: 
Y t = Yi + - I <Y2 - YD X 
4 
where X = 0, 1, 2, 3. 
The information  for  the period between the first  quarter of  1968 and the third 
quarter of  1971 was extrapolated on the basis of  the following  equation: 
nl 8-UK(Argentina) = 0.4530 nl UK (World) + 0.25708 ni (8-UK) (LA) - 1.49551 
(6.96) (2.63) (1.99) 
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E.T.E. = 7.25 
P = 0.24 
where nl = natural logarithm 
UK(Argentina) = Liabilities of  United Kingdom banks in respect of  Argentine 
residents. 
UK (World) = Total liabilities, in foreign  currencies, of  United Kingdom banks 
in respect of  non-residents. 
8-UK (L.America) = Liabilities of  banks in the Eurocurrency market (excluding the 
United Kingdom), in foreign  currencies, in respect of  the 
nationals of  other Latin American countries. 
In this series, UK (World) was selected to represent the overall behaviour of  the 
European foreign  exchange market in London, while 8-UK (Latin America) was selected 
to represent the behaviour of  the Latin American countries in diversifying  their deposits 
among other financial  centres of  the Eurocurrency market. The analysis using the 
generalized least squares method made it possible to select, on the basis of  the available 
data, the above-mentioned relationship between the series to be completed and the series 
for  which information  was available. The regression coefficients  were highly significant 
and the standard error of  estimate was not too great. 
Information  on the rest of  the Euromarket and on Canada, Japan and offshore 
markets is only available from  the fourth  quarter of  1975 onwards; this information  was 
obtained on the basis of  the data of  the Bank for  International Settlements from  the 
residual of  the information  available for  the United States and United Kingdom markets. 
The figures  that were lacking were extrapolated using the autoregressive time series 
analysis method and the following  equation: 
nl [(8—UK) + Japan + Canada + Offshore  markets ] 
(Argentina) = 2.95014 nl UK (World) + 0.76581 nl (Canada + Japan + 
(3.71) (1.93) 
+ "O.S.") (LAmerica) - 34.34613 
(5.02) 
E.T.E. = 0.117 
P = 0.0524 
In this equation the best ratios were obtained by combining the overall behaviour of 
United Kingdom markets (scale factor)  and the behaviour of  Latin American depositors 
in Canadian, Japanese and offshore  markets.4 The fact  that this combination of  variables 
yielded the best results should be interpreted as indicating that the various depositors in 
the world and particularly in Latin America behave similarly in selecting their investment 
portfolios  and in their responses to changes in expected rates of  return and/or risk. 
This procedure permitted a quite complete reconstruction of  the information  that 
was lacking on the behaviour of  the various capital markets and of  depositors throughout 
the world as well as those of  Latin America and, particularly, of  Argentina. 
The final  results of  these calculations are shown in tables 3, 4 and 5. 
However, since private holdings of  internationally liquid assets was the actual 
object of  interest for  the purposes of  this study (which focused  on correcting the official 
figures  on capital movements and the current account), the available information  on 
public foreign  exchange holdings (which can be found  in such publications as the 
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Table 3 
LIABILITIES OF THE MAIN FINANCIAL MARKETS  IN 
RESPECT OF NON-RESIDENTS 










1968 I 35 929 16 970 20 800 7 840 81 539 
II 36 517 19 450 21 440 8 072 85 479 
III 37 899 20 510 22 630 8 356 89 395 
IV 37 053 21 810 25 530 9 056 93 449 
1969 I 38 576 24 430 26 120 10 164 99 290 
II 42 519 30 200 30 940 10 701 114 360 
III 47 625 32 620 33 280 11 354 124 879 
IV 47 915 32 660 38 570 12 409 131 554 
1970 I 49 524 33 550 38 970 12 978 135 022 
II 49 806 37 180 41 710 14 755 143 451 
III 50 720 37 660 44 550 15 168 148 098 
IV 51 315 40 870 53 150 16 883 162 218 
1971 I 51 822 41 460 55 220 18 316 164 818 
II 54 432 44 070 57 700 19 821 174 023 
III 54 739 46 720 59 490 19 551 180 500 
IV 62 215 52 540 70 010 22 846 207 611 
1972 I 67 820 54 950 72 090 24 688 219 548 
II 68 684 56 420 76 330 26 335 227 769 
III 70 850 61 380 79 680 28 623 240 533 
IV 74 811 65 880 91 020 30 093 261 804 
1973 I 82 237 74 460 98 720 32 935 288 352 
II 82 828 80 440 104 020 35 754 303 042 
III 83 734 88 430 111 750 43 613 327 527 
IV 85 091 96 810 126 850 50 011 358 762 
1974 I 88 596 109 320 132 510 59 916 390 342 
II 96 567 115 070 139 260 66 880 417 786 
III 103 341 113 990 126 500 68 310 412 141 
IV 111 305 111 500 149 510 70 023 442 338 
1975 I 111 669 116 300 151 470 73 513 452 952 
II 110 941 118 900 156 290 78 926 465 057 
III 111 471 123 000 153 100 83 301 470 872 
IV 114 148 128 200 169 400 86 003 497 751 
1976 I 116 911 131 200 168 600 94 675 511 386 
II 121.732 135 200 169 000 101 918 527 850 
III 127 564 137 900 179 700 106 353 551 517 
IV 137 388 148 600 205 000 112 374 603 362 
1977 I 137 308 150 700 201 500 116 526 606 034 
II 147 355 155 800 215 900 119 053 638 108 
III 158 861 161 200 226 100 122 430 668 591 
IV 176 602 171 400 269 200 126 553 743 755 
Source: The bulletin of the United States Federal Reserve, the bulletin of the Bank of England, reports from the Bank for 
International Settlements and original compilarions. 
"Liabilities in pounds sterling and other currencies of United Kingdom banks in respect of non-residents. 
Liabilities in national and foreign currencies of the banks of eight European countries, not including the United Kingdom, 
in respect of non-residents. 
' Liabilities in United States dollars of foreign branches of United States banks in offshore  areas plus liabilities in national 
and foreign currencies of Canadian and Japanese banks in respect of non-residents. 
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Table 4 
LIABILITIES OF THE MAIN FINANCIAL MARKETS  IN RESPECT 
OF LATIN AMERICAN  RESIDENTS 










1968 I 4 376 512 678 654 6 220 
II 4 492 521 799 679 6 491 
III 4 551 586 804 734 6 680 
IV 4 914 607 853 702 7 076 
1969 I 4 738 713 1 004 767 7 225 
II 4 410 864 1 266 934 7 474 
III 4 148 1 069 1 361 1 150 7 728 
IV 4 408 1 102 1 628 1 162 8 300 
1970 I 4 848 1 138 1 752 1 230 8 968 
II 4 929 1 196 1 984 1 242 9 351 
III 4 415 1 213 2 237 1 281 9 146 
IV 4 294 1 253 2 857 1 306 9 710 
1971 I 4 017 1 350 2 920 1 328 9 615 
II 4 013 1 529 3 011 1 438 10 051 
III 3 900 1 594 2 696 1 451 9 641 
IV 4 159 1 695 3 115 1 767 10 736 
1972 I 4 019 1 928 2 942 2 006 10 895 
II 4 437 2 214 2 946 2 040 11 637 
III 4 377 2 562 3 418 2 138 12 495 
IV 5 200 3 269 4 471 2 294 15 234 
1973 I 5 235 3 734 4 866 2 630 16 315 
II 5 500 4 087 5 663 2 617 17 867 
III 5 540 3 930 6 180 2 722 18 372 
IV 6 842 4 110 4 880 2 661 18 493 
1974 I 7 651 4 468 4 662 3 020 19 801 
II 9 024 4 185 5 545 3 582 22 336 
III 8 934 3 551 4 719 3 424 20 628 
IV 9 861 4 154 4 856 3 555 22 466 
1975 I 7 651 4 468 4 662 3 020 19 801 
II 9 024 4 185 5 545 3 582 22 336 
III 11 393 4 495 3 705 4 213 23 806 
IV 11 395 5 048 4 552 4 301 25 296 
1976 I 11 147 4 645 3 855 3 821 23 468 
II 12 007 4 559 4 041 4 579 24 490 
III 12 720 4 991 4 109 3 815 25 635 
IV 13 401 6 251 4 449 5 362 30 963 
1977 I 14 423 6 521 5 579 4 351 30 874 
II 13 804 7 080 5 820 5 772 32 566 
III 14 835 7 132 5 368 5 552 32 887 
IV 14 505 7 649 6 351 6 836 35 341 
Source: The bulletin of the United States Federal Reserve, the bulletin of the Bank of England, reports from the Bank for 
International Settlements and original compilations. 
"Liabilities in pounds sterling and other currencies of United Kingdom banks in respect of non-residents. 
b Liabilities in national and foreign currencies of the banks of eight European countries, not including the United Kingdom, 
in respect of non-residents. 
'Liabilities in United States dollars of foreign branches of United States banks in offshore  areas plus liabilities in national 
and foreign currencies of Canadian and Japanese banks in respect of non-residents. 
152 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L C A P I T A L MOVEMENTS 
Table 5 
L I A B I L I T I E S O F T H E M A I N F I N A N C I A L M A R K E T S  I N R E S P E C T 
O F A R G E N T I N E R E S I D E N T S 
(Data  for  the end  of  the quarter  in millions of  dollars) 
Year Quarter United  States United  Kingdom" Other markets Total 
1968 I 719 4 9 - 8 1 8 
II 7 1 9 110 - 8 2 9 
III 7 3 6 113 - 8 4 9 
IV 768 117 - 8 8 5 
1969 I 7 8 5 129 2 9 1 6 
II 715 151 4 8 7 0 
III 5 8 1 159 6 7 4 6 
IV 4 8 9 167 6 6 6 2 
1970 I 4 8 6 172 6 6 6 4 
II 575 186 9 7 7 0 
III 568 193 9 7 7 0 
I V 563 213 12 7 8 8 
1971 I 549 215 13 111 
II 477 222 16 715 
III 4 5 3 219 19 6 9 1 
I V 4 6 1 227 31 7 1 9 
1972 I 532 243 4 0 815 
II 477 2 5 8 4 3 7 7 8 
III 539 2 7 4 57 8 7 0 
IV 6 6 0 289 75 1 0 2 4 
1973 I 7 2 6 316 119 1 161 
II 751 343 149 1 2 4 3 
III 9 1 3 370 203 1 4 8 6 
I V 962 397 2 6 1 1 6 2 0 
1974 I 1 0 3 0 378 4 1 1 1 8 1 9 
II 1 397 399 545 2 3 4 1 
III 1 133 4 1 0 512 2 0 5 5 
I V 922 4 2 3 4 9 3 1 8 3 8 
1975 I 8 5 3 4 1 6 5 8 0 1 8 4 9 
II 1 0 2 4 391 6 6 3 2 0 7 8 
III 1 017 366 7 4 8 2 131 
I V 1 183 378 9 2 0 2 4 8 1 
1976 I 1 2 1 0 377 9 4 7 2 5 3 4 
II 1 4 4 3 373 9 6 3 2 7 7 9 
III 1 4 8 5 4 1 0 8 6 1 2 7 5 6 
I V 1 582 5 2 9 1 586 3 6 9 7 
1977 I 1 932 4 3 7 1 349 3 7 1 8 
II 1 7 4 9 4 2 3 1 907 4 0 7 9 
III 2 237 587 2 4 3 3 5 2 5 7 
IV 1 508 8 0 0 2 710 5 0 1 8 
Source: The bulletin of the United States Federal Reserve, the bulletin of the Bank of England, reports from the Bank for 
International Settlements and original compilations. 
"Total liabilities of United Kingdom banks in respect of Argentine residents in pounds and other currencies. 
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Table 6 
ARGENTINA:  PRIVATE  HOLDINGS OF INTERNATIONALLY  LIQUID ASSETS 
(Data  for  the end of  the quarter in millions of  dollars) 







Flows  of 
private 
holdings 
1968 I 818 557 261 _ 
II 829 549 280 19 
III 849 532 317 37 
IV 885 554 331 14 
1969 I 916 603 313 -18 
II 870 494 376 63 
III 746 443 303 -73 
IV 662 285 111 74 
1970 I 664 302 362 -15 
II 770 400 370 8 
III 770 399 371 1 
IV 788 343 445 74 
1971 I 111 247 530 85 
II 715 159 556 26 
III 691 126 505 19 
IV 719 70 649 34 
1972 I 815 169 646 -3 
II 778 59 •719 73 
III 870 83 787 68 
IV 1 024 294 730 -57 
1973 I 1 161 411 750 20 
II 1 243 585 658 -92 
III 1 486 980 506 -152 
IV 1 620 1 068 552 46 
1974 I 1 819 1 206 613 61 
II 2 391 1 584 807 144 
III 2 055 1 241 814 57 
IV 1 898 1 028 870 -4 
1975 I 1 849 621 1 228 418 
II 2 098 408 1 690 442 
III 2 131 177 1 954 284 
IV 2 481 247 2 234 280 
1976 I 2 534 202 2 332 98 
II 2 779 539 2 240 -92 
III 2 756 669 2 087 -153 
IV 3 697 1 354 2 343 256 
1977 I 3 718 1 455 2 263 -80 
II 4 079 1 769 2 310 47 
III 5 257 2 463 2 794 484 
IV 5 018 3 064 1 954 -840 
Source: Original compilations based on the data appearing in preceding tables. 
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International Monetary Fund's International  financial  Statistics)'  still had to be 
subtracted from  the figures  on total  holdings (i.e., the sum total of  holdings in the various 
markets). This yielded the figures  corresponding to Argentines' private holdings of 
internationally liquid assets, and the periodic changes (or flows)  in such holdings that 
were needed to correct the official  figures  on capital movements could then be obtained by 
using the method of  first  differences  (see table 6). 
4. Modifying  the series on capital  movements based 
on flows  of  private  holding 
Prior to modifying  the series of  capital movements in order to take unrecorded 
movements into account, the channels through which such flows  occur first  had to be 
evaluated. If  no exchange restrictions are in use, then capital will obviously be able to 
move in and out of  economy freely  and capital movements will usually be recorded as such 
in official  balance-of-payments  statistics; in such instances, the official  figures  require no 
adjustment whatsoever. 
The situation is different  when exchange restrictions are being applied. In this case, 
it is assumed that capital is free  to enter the economy, but outflows  are usually limited. 
Under such circumstances, it is advisable to record all capital inflows  (unless there is a 
desire to avoid recording them for  reasons not strictly related to matters of  exchange, such 
as for  tax purposes) in order to have the right to withdraw the capital latter, without 
difficulty,  at the official  exchange rate.5 
Unauthorized capital outflows  are the movements which are concealed, and the 
current account is usually used for  this purpose. Official  figures  should therefore  be 
corrected only when the figures  on private holdings show positive flows;  no corrections 
need be made when they show negative flows  because most of  them will already have 
been included in the official  figures. 
Based on these assumptions, a second series on unrecorded capital flows  was 
obtained for  Argentina which was used to correct the official  figures  on capital 
movements and the current account; these corrected figures  were then used to evaluate 
the explanatory model for  capital movements, on a quarterly basis, for  Argentina. 
There seems to be no doubt that autoregressive time series analysis is the most 
appropriate procedure for  making the necessary adjustments, and the empirical results 
appear to confirm  this. In this study, however, autoregressive time series analysis was 
used only in the case of  Argentina due to the great difficulty  involved in performing  these 
calculations for  other countries; the application of  this method to other countries will 
have to await a revised version of  this study. 
Notes to Appendix A 
'For a more detailed explanation of  the methodology that was used, see Un  ejemplo de estimación 
retrospectiva  en el caso autorregresivo  by A. de Mattanó and M. Orozco, Department of  Statistical Analysis 
and Co-ordination, Bureau of  Economic Research and Statistics, Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
This study demonstrates, inter alia, that it is more efficient  to use the method of  generalized least squares than 
that of  ordinary least squares to estimate such parameters. 
2 This methodology worked quite well for  the period in question (the first  quarter to the fourth  quarter 
of  1977) but the methodology would have to be changed if  there were more observations to be extrapolated 
due to the insignificance  of  foreigners'  deposits in many international markets prior to 1968. This applies to 
all the extrapolations performed  in the study. 
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3 In all cases, the regression which would minimize the autocorrelation coefficient  was chosen. 
4 Although a very large number of  observations were extrapolated, it should be emphasized that until 
1971 the European market attracted a very small volume of  deposits from  Argentina, especially if  the United 
Kingdom is not included; the volume of  Argentine deposits in the Canadian, Japanese and offshore  markets 
during the same period was also very small. 
5 It might be argued that unrecorded capital inflows  also take place because, in the presence of  controls 
on capital movements, it is common for  people to bring funds  in and then sell them on the parallel markets. 
However, the counterpart of  such sales is the purchase of  these funds  by individuals, which also goes 
unrecorded, and their effects  on flow  figures  are therefore  cancelled out. The only case in which this would not 
occur is when the economic agent bringing in unrecorded capital is a non-resident; then, as regards private 
flows,  only the capital outflow  would be recorded in the statistics while the corresponding inflow  would not be 
registered. This last case would include unrecorded sales by foreign  tourists. 
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Appendix B 
Basic statistical material 
Table 1 
BRAZIL AND CHILE: PRIVATE HOLDINGS OF DEPOSITS 
IN UNITED STATES BANKS 
(Data  for  the end  of  the period  in millions of  dollars) 
Period Brazil Chile 
1957 80 52 
1958 96 61 
1959 107 59 
1960 129 48 
1961 132 52 
1962 89 85 
1963 83 98 
1964 89 109 
1965 88 125 
1966 133 140 
1967 113 165 
1968 114 172 
1969 95 144 
1970 96 157 
1971 76 122 
1972 90 117 
1973 103 116 
1974 162 127 
Source: Bulletins of the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Central Bank of Brazil and Central Bank of Chile. 
Table 2 
GUATEMALA: PRIVATE CAPITAL + NET ERRORS AND OMISSIONS 
(Annual  observations in millions of  dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
-11.60 -4.10 9.90 13.60 13.60 7.40 21.70 13.20 7.80 5.70 8.30 41.20 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
21.90 3.20 39.70 36.20 23.70 18.40 51.70 54.00 49.60 81.20 117.10 174.40 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
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Table 3 
G U A T E M A L A :  N O N - C O M P E N S A T O R Y  C A P I T A L + N E T ERRORS  A N D OMISSIONS 
(Annual  observations in millions of  dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
-11.60 -4.10 9.90 22.00 21.40 12.30 22.80 16.60 3-80 1.10 19.20 40.90 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
25.80 1.90 57.00 44.70 27.80 30.60 59.20 55.60 62.50 89.90 138.80 191.60 
Source: Original compilations. 
Table 4 
G U A T E M A L A :  RESERVES  A T T H E E N D O F T H E P E R I O D 
(Annual  observations in millions of  dollars) 
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 
47.30 38.00 38.60 41.20 44.40 42.50 40.00 55.60 71.20 75.20 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
49.20 44.10 54.10 54.80 45.80 56.70 59.50 67.80 60.70 65.10 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
65.50 74.10 78.30 93.50 134.90 212.00 202.40 303.90 511.00 690.40 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 5 
G U A T E M A L A :  M O N E T A R Y  I M B A L A N C E I N D O L L A R S 
(Annual  observations) 
1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
-20.6575 -40.0246 -28.2801 -7.8224 -20.2391 -2.3672 -31.5841 -11.1204 -13.1175 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
-25.5538 -40.1784 -78.1002 -87.9552 -90.9747 -142.6872 -169.2701 -230.0599 -362.1138 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
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Table 6 
G U A T E M A L A :  FLOW OF M O N E T A R Y  I M B A L A N C E + C U R R E N T 
A C C O U N T — OTHER + FOREIGN L O A N S 
(Annual  observations) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
-24.9671 1.0445 10.6578 -37.3167 -15.2281 -59.1169 10.3638 -67.7972 -60.0362 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
-31.2247 -44.9217 -71.7550 -22.1195 -53.2125 -137.2829 -164.4898 -177.1539 
Source: Original compilations based on IMF data. 
Table 7 
G U A T E M A L A :  REAL RATE OF RETURN 
(Annual  observations) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 
0.0511 0.0355 0.0411 0.0467 0.0416 0.0306 0.0259 0.0224 0.0088 0.0154 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
0.0061 -0.0267 -0.0148 -0.0168 -0.0751 -0.2171 •0.2126 -0.1838 -0.1167 
Source: Original compilations based on data from  International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 8 
G U A T E M A L A :  C U R R E N T A C C O U N T 
(Annual  observations in millions of  dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
11.60 1.50 5.00 -7.80 -18.40 -38.20 -28.60 -11.00 -7.90 -15.70 -17.30 -37.90 
1965 '  1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
-34.60 -12.20 -62.00 -50.70 -19.00 -7.90 -49.20 -11.50 7.80 -103.10 -65.70 -7.60 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
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Table 9 
G U A T E M A L A :  C U R R E N T A C C O U N T 
(Annual  observations in millions of  dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960  1961 1962 1963 1964 
11.60 1.10 -5.50 -24.70 -39.30 -50.00 -40.20 -25.60 -24.20 -23.00 -20.80 -45.70 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
-42.10 -21.60 -71.30 -61.40 -32.40 -25.40 -74.50 -41.50 -34.70 -158.50 -143.50 -211.00 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 10 
A R G E N T I N A :  N O N - C O M P E N S A T O R Y  C A P I T A L + ERRORS  A N D OMISSIONS 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
Quarters 
I 11 111 IV 
1968 -12.80 12.90 101.80 105.90 
1969 80.00 -45.80 67.70 13.10 
1970 128.60 103.60 69.10 117.50 
1971 38.40 4.00 35.40 -249.50 
1972 -102.90 -22.30 9.30 54.10 
1973 -54.20 -93.00 58.50 99.20 
1974 -28.60 230.60 -109.80 -124.70 
1975 104.20 59.00 38.20 -11.30 
1976 -110.40 -6.00 -143.80 -265.20 
1977 1.20 -58.10 371.00 878.00 
Source: Original compilations. 
Table 11 
A R G E N T I N A :  N O N - C O M P E N S A T O R Y  C A P I T A L + ERRORS  — FLOW 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
Year 
Quarters 
I 11 III IV 
1968 -12.80 12.90 101.80 105.90 
1969 80.00 -45.80 67.70 -60.90 
1970 128.60 95.60 68.10 43.50 
1971 -46.60 -22.00 26.40 -333.50 
1972 -102.90 -95.30 -58.70 54.10 
1973 -74.20 -93.00 58.50 53.20 
1974 -89.60 86.60 -166.80 -124.70 
1975 -313.80 -383.00 -245.80 -291.30 
1976 -208.40 -6.00 -143.80 -521.20 
1977 1.20 -105.10 371.00 878.00 
Source: Original compilations. 
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Table 12 
A R G E N T I N A :  C O R R E C T E D FLOWS 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
Quarters 
/ II III IV 
1968 0 0 0 0 
1969 0 0 0 74 
1970 0 8 1 74 
1971 85 26 9 84 
1972 0 73 68 0 
1973 20 0 0 46 
1974 61 144 57 0 
1975 418 442 284 280 
1976 98 0 0 256 
1977 0 47 0 0 
Source: Original compilations. 
Table 13 
A R G E N T I N A :  RESERVES  A T THE E N D OF THE PERIOD 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
Quarters 
/ II III IV 
1967 256.00 670.00 700.00 727.00 
1968 689.00 726.00 728.00 760.00 
1969 815.00 722.00 681.00 538.00 
1970 609.00 707.00 706.00 673.00 
1971 610.00 522.00 459.00 290.00 
1972 278.00 242.00 255.00 465.00 
1973 645.00 817.00 1 229.00 1 318.00 
1974 1 461.00 1 844.00 1 519.00 1 315.00 
1975 919.00 584.00 342.00 452.00 
1976 421.00 772.00 930.00 1 608.00 
1977 1 705.00 2 014.00 2 700.00 3 331.00 
Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic. 
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Table 14 
ARGENTINA: REAL RATE OF RETURN 
(Quarterly  observations) 
/ II III IV 
1968 0.0242 0.0230 0.0234 0.0230 
1969 0.0216 0.0208 0.0186 0.0189 
1970 0.0206 -0.0285 -0.0973 -0.0394 
1971 -0.0443 -0.1466 -0.3707 -0.8128 
1972 -0.6362 -0.5215 -0.4168 -0.3781 
1973 -0.1896 -0.2244 -0.1120 -0.1194 
1974 -0.2431 -0.6180 -1.0407 -1.1248 
1975 -1.2859 -2.4680 -1.9109 -1.9073 
1976 -2.2094 -0.8510 -0.2453 -0.0415 
1977 -0.0547 0.0177 0.0421 0.0450 
Source: Original compilations based on data supplied by the Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
Table 15 
ARGENTINA: MONETARY IMBALANCE IN DOLLARS 
(Quarterly  observations) 
I 11 111 IV 
1968 3 792.3942 -109-6558 -99.3100 -149.7315 
1969 -23.8278 -240.2735 -357.5613 -404.2548 
1970 -79.3279 -312.7360 -260.4290 -477.0092 
1971 -575.4385 -326.9193 -399.6609 2.3153 
1972 328.2555 -1.1890 -1.0520 123-1548 
1973 438.5833 -190.7795 409.6082 1 230.5736 
1974 1 804.2895 1 545.0078 1 059.9279 1 045.6801 
1975 2 145.9542 1 537.7566 -261.3445 1 930.7713 
1976 3 176.2455 -126.9632 1 040.4505 227.0678 
1977 359.4196 293-3403 -413.3440 -174.4582 
Source: Original compilations based on data supplied by the Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
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Table 16 
ARGENTINA: FLOW OF MONETARY IMBALANCE 
(Quarterly  observations) 
I U III IV 
1969 125.9037 -216.4457 -117.2878 -46.6935 
1970 324.9269 -233.4081 52.3070 -216.5801 
1971 -98.4294 248.5192 -72.7416 401.9762 
1972 325.9402 -329.4445 0.1370 124.2068 
1973 315.4285 -629.3628 600.3876 820.9654 
1974 573.7159 -259.2817 -485.0798 -14.2478 
1975 1 100.2740 -608.1975 -1 799.1011 2 192.1158 
1976 1 245.4742 -3 303.2087 1 167.4137 -813.3827 
1977 132.3518 -66.0793 -706.6843 238.8858 
Source: Original compilations based on data supplied by the Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
Table 17 
ARGENTINA: RATE OF RETURN ON SWAP OPERATIONS 
(Quarterly  observations) 
Quarters 
Year  ± 
J II III IV 
1968 -0.0050 -0.0073 -0.0099 -0.0148 
1969 -0.0135 -0.0121 -0.0095 -0.0049 
1970 -0.0110 -0.0116 -0.0135 -0.0100 
1971 -0.0084 -0.0010 0.0078 0.0132 
1972 -0.0047 -0.0055 -0.0057 -0.0045 
1973 -0.0025 0.0005 0.0039 0.0045 
1974 0.0056 0.0068 0.0031 -0.0038 
1975 -0.0075 -0.0225 -0.0399 -0.0697 
1976 -0.1073 -0.0635 0.0081 0.0127 
1977 0.1331 0.1903 0.0 0.0 
Source: Original compilations based on data supplied by the Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
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Table 18 
ARGENTINA: RESTRICTIONS 
fQuarterly  observations) 
Year 
I II III IV 
1968 0.80 0.90 0.90 0.90 
1969 0.90 0.90 0.80 0.80 
1970 0.90 0.80 0.70 0.50 
1971 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.50 
1972 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.30 
1973 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 
1974 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
1975 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.20 
1976 0.10 0.30 0.40 0.60 
1977 0.70 0.80 0.90 0.90 
Source: Original compilations based on data from the Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions  of the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Table 19 
ARGENTINA: CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
Year 
/ II III IV 
1968 10.00 65.00 -61.80 -61.80 
1969 38.30 1.80 -118.50 -147.90 
1970 -26.70 56.00 -33.80 -154.00 
1971 -124.00 -56.60 -151.50 -56.50 
1972 -77.30 -51.60 -61.10 -32.90 
1973 202.20 194.00 316.00 8.40 
1974 223.30 170.90 -85.40 -181.60 
1975 -508.40 -366.50 -198.70 -211.00 
1976 32.70 261.20 154.60 201.60 
1977 347.80 583.50 321.00 64.60 
Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic. 
164 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
Year 
Table 20 
A R G E N T I N A :  C U R R E N T A C C O U N T + CORRECTED FLOW 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
Quarters 
I 11 III IV 
1968 10.00 65.00 -61.80 -61.80 
1969 38.30 1.80 -118.50 -73.90 
1970 -26.70 64.00 -32.80 -80.00 
1971 -39.00 -30.60 -142.50 27.50 
1972 -77.30 21.40 6.90 -32.90 
1973 222.20 194.00 316.00 54.40 
1974 284.30 314.90 -28.40 -181.60 
1975 -90.40 75.50 85.30 69.00 
1976 130.70 261.20 154.60 457.60 
1977 347.80 630.50 321.00 64.60 
Source: Original compilations. 
Table 21 
A R G E N T I N A :  N O N - C O M P E N S A T O R Y  C A P I T A L + ERRORS  A N D OMISSIONS 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  SDRs) 
Year 
Quarters 
I II HI IV 
1970 128.6000 103.6000 69.1000 117.5000 
1971 38.4000 4.0000 35.4000 -249.5000 
1972 -102.9000 -22.3000 9.3000 54.1000 
1973 -54.2000 -93.0000 58.5000 99.2000 
1974 -28.6000 230.6000 -109.8000 -124.7000 
1975 104.2000 59.0000 38.2000 -11.3000 
1976 -110.4000 -6.0000 -143.8000 -265.2000 
Source: Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
Table 22 
A R G E N T I N A :  N O N - C O M P E N S A T O R Y  C A P I T A L , ERRORS  A N D OMISSIONS — FLOW 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
Year 
Quarters 
I II III IV 
1970 70.6000 42.1000 22.5000 
1971 -82.6000 -20.0000 6.4000 -346.5000 
1972 -163.9000 -56.3000 -81.7000 76.1000 
1973 -63.2000 -28.0000 186.5000 75.2000 
1974 -0.6000 25.6000 -110.8000 -58.7000 
1975 -220.8000 -393.0000 -173.8000 -317.3000 
1976 -238.4000 86.0000 9.2000 -521.2000 
Source: Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
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Table 23 
ARGENTINA: CURRENT ACCOUNT + FLOW 
(Quarterly  observations in millions of  dollars) 
I II III IV 
1970 89.0000 -6.8000 -59.0000 
1971 -3.0000 -32.6000 -122.5000 40.5000 
1972 -16.3000 -17.6000 29.9000 -54.9000 
1973 211.2000 129.0000 188.0000 32.4000 
1974 195.3000 375.9000 -84.4000 -247.6000 
1975 -183.4000 85.5000 13.3000 95.0000 
1976 160.7000 169.2000 1.6000 457.6000 
Source: Central Bank of  the Argentine Republic. 
Table 24 
BRAZIL: NON-COMPENSATORY CAPITAL 
(Annual  observations in millions of  SDRs) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
273.00 226.00 195.00 288.00 297.00 187.00 206.00 127.00 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
362.00 199.00 674.00 1 054.00 1 181.00 1 982.00 3 331.00 2 890.00 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 25 
BRAZIL: NON-COMPENSATORY CAPITAL + ERRORS AND OMISSIONS 
(Annual  observations) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
98.00 274.00 209.00 337.00 159.00 111.00 -11.00 96.00 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
337.00 338.00 673.00 1 034.00 1 219.00 1 976.00 3 734.00 3 095.00 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
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Table 26 
BRAZIL: NON-COMPENSATORY CAPITAL + ERRORS — FLOW 
(Annual  observations in SDRs) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
77.0000 263.0000 183.0000 334.0000 202.0000 199.0000 -17.0000 97.0000 
1966 ¡967 ¡968 1969. ¡970 1971 7972 1973 
282.0000 358.0000 672.0000 1 053.0000 1 218.0000 1 996.0000 3 721.0000 3 084.0000 
Source: Original compilations based on data from Internat  tonal  Financial  Statistics  and the bulletin of the Federal 
Reserve. 
Table 27 
BRAZIL: OFFICIAL RESERVES 
(Annual  averages in millions of  SDRs) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
465.0000 367.0000 345.0000 470.0000 285.0000 219.0000 246.0000 484.0000 
/  966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
425.0000 193.0000 257.0000 656.0000 1 187.0000 1 608.0000 3 853.0000 5 319.0000 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 28 
BRAZIL: RATE OF RETURN ON THE DOLLAR 
(Annual  observations) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
-0.8087 -0.6620 -0.2719 -0.6117 -0.7646 -0.6375 -0.5761 -0.2614 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 ¡973 
0.0910 0.0032 0.0366 -0.2125 -0.0767 -0.1502 -0.1048 -0.0116 
Source: Original compilations based on data from the bulletin of the Central Bank of Brazil. 
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Table 29 
BRAZIL: RESTRICTIONS 
(Annual  observations) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
0.3000 0.2000 0.2000 0.3000 0.2000 0.1000 0.1000 0.4000 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
0.6000 0.8000 0.8000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 
Source: Original compilations based on data from  the Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,  of  the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Table 30 
BRAZIL: CURRENT ACCOUNT 
(Annual  observations in millions of  SDRs) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
-276.00 -347.00 -534.00 -277.00 -484.00 -204.00 50.00 248.00 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
-65.00 -303.00 -543.00 -353.00 -644.00 -1 409.00 -1 466.00 -1 485.00 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 31 
BRAZIL: CURRENT ACCOUNT + FLOW 
fAnnual  observations in SDRs) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
-260.0000 -336.0000 -521.0000 -274.0000 -527.0000 -210.0000 56.0000 247.0000 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
-24.0000 -323.0000 -542.0000 -372.0000 -643.0000 -1 389-0000 -1 477.0000 -1 534.0000 
Source: Original compilations based on data from  International  Financial  Statistics. 
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Table 32 
CHILE: NON-COMPENSATORY CAPITAL 
(Annual  observations  in millions  of  SDRs) 
2958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
40.60 80.60 73.60 206.60 178.00 110.00 120.00 78.00 
1966 1967 1968 1969- 1970 1971 1972 1973 
149.00 82.00 347.00 340.00 240.00 -6.00 226.00 1 281.00 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 33 
CHILE: RESERVES 
(Annual  averages in millions  of  SDRs) 
mi 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
60.0000 74.0000 68.0000 55.0000 86.0000 80.0000 51.0000 63.0000 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
128.0000 111.0000 74.0000 79-0000 77.0000 89.0000 138.0000 172.0000 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
126.0000 208.0000 344.0000 389.0000 204.0000 137.0000 149.0000 83.0000 
Source: International  financial  Statistics. 
Table 34 
CHILE: RATE OF RETURN 
(Annual  observations) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
-0.7130 -0.2664 0.0992 0.0566 -0.5980 -1.4206 -1.1159 -0.8320 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
-0.6412 -0.6901 -0.6732 -0.6336 -1.1322 -3.1775 -15.7159 -38.5640 
Source: Original compilations based on data from  the Central Bank of  Chile. 
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Table 35 
CHILE: RESTRICTIONS 
(Annual  observations) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
0.2000 0.5000 0.6000 0.5000 0.7000 0.8000 0.7000 0.7000 0.6000 0.5000 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
0.5000 0.6000 0.7000 0.8000 0.8000 0.7000 0.5000 0.3000 0.2000 0.1000 
Source: Original compilations based on data from  the Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions,  of  the International 
Monetary Fund. 
Table 36 
CHILE: C U R R E N T A C C O U N T 
(Annual  observations in millions of  SDRs) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
-92.9 -32.1 -164.6 -295.1 -222.0 -204.0 -135.0 -42.0 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
-103.0 -97.0 -177.0 47.0 -69.0 -236.0 -472.0 -337.9 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
Table 37 
CHILE: C U R R E N T A C C O U N T + FLOW 
(Annual  observations in millions of  SDRs) 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
-83.9000 -34.1000 -153.6000 -291.1000 -189.0000 -191.0000 -124.0000 -26.0000 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
-88.0000 -72.0000 -170.0000 75.0000 -56.0000 -201.0000 -467.0000 -336.9000 
Source: International  Financial  Statistics. 
1 7 0 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
Bibliography 
Arriazu, Ricardo H., Elección  de  un sistema cambiario  en inflación,  ventajas y desventajas 
de  la indizaciôn,  Banco Central del Uruguay, August 1976. 
Arriazu, Ricardo H., El  sistema monetario  internacional-,  an address delivered at the 
United States Federal Reserve, 1974. 
Arriazu, Ricardo H., "Evaluación reciente en los mecanismos de transmisión internacio-
nal de las perturbaciones económicas", in América  Latina en la Economía 
Mundial,  Comercio,  Empleo  y Distribución  del  Ingreso,  Torcuato di Telia 
Institute, Cuaderno N f i  101, Jornadas series, February 1979. 
Arriazu, Ricardo H., "La reforma  del sistema monetario internacional desde las perspec-
tivas de los países en desarrollo", Revista  Argentina  de  Finanzas,  published by 
the Instituto Argentino de Relaciones Internacionales, June 1977. 
Banco Central do Brasil, Boletín  (various issues), Brasilia, Brazil. 
Banco Central de Chile, Boletín  Mensual  (various issues), Santiago, Chile. 
Banco Central de la República Argentina, Boletín  Estadístico  (various issues), Buenos 
Aires, Argentina. 
Bank for  International Settlements, Annual Report  (various issues), Basel, Switzerland. 
Bank of  England, Quarterly  Bulletin  (various issues), London, England. 
Branson, William H., Financial  Capital  Flows  in the U.S.  Balance of  Payments,  North-
Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1968. 
Frenkel, Jacob A. and Harry G. Johnson, "The Monetary Approach to the Balance of 
Payments. Essential Concepts and Historical Origins", in J.A. Frenkel and H.G. 
Johnson (eds.), The  Monetary  Approach to the Balance of  Payments,  Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1976. 
Grubel, H., "Internationally Diversified  Portfolios:  welfare  gains and capital flows", 
American Economic Review, Vol. LVIII, No. 5, part one, December 1968, 
pp. 1299-1314. 
International Monetary Fund, Annual Report-Exchange  Restrictions  (various years), 
published in Washington, D.C. 
International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics  (various issues), 
published in Washington, D.C. 
Johnson, Harry G., "The Monetary Approach to the Balance of  Payments Theory", in 
J.A. Frenkel and H.G.Johnson (eds.), The  Monetary  Approach to the Balance of 
Payments,  Allen and Unwin, London, 1976. 
171 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND EXTERNAL FINANCING 
Lihon, O., Les mouvements de  capitaux  a long  terme entre la France  et l'extérieur, 
Banque de France; a paper presented at the Sixth Colloquium on Applied 
Econometrics in Rome, February 1979. 
Lybeck, J.A., A simultaneous  model  of  capital  flows,  exchange rates,  interest  rates,  and 
prices of  trade  goods:  Theoretical  considerations  and estimations  by alternative 
methods,  Godesborgs Universitat, Switzerland; a paper presented at the Sixth 
Colloquium on Applied Econometrics in Rome, February 1979. 
Mantel, Rolf,  Un  modelo  para la administración  de  reservas internacionales,  Centro de 
Estudios Monetarios y Bancarios, Banco Central de la República Argentina, 
Estudios  Técnicos,  series, No. 33, June 1978. 
Markowitz, H., Portfolio  Selection:  efficient  diversification  of  investments,  Wiley, 
New York, 1959-
Massad, Carlos, Liquidez  internacional  total,  evaluación  económica y consecuencias de 
política,  International Monetary Fund, internal document, August 1972. 
Mattanó, Mónica A. de, and M. Orozco, Un  ejemplo  de  estimación  retrospectiva  en el 
caso autorregresivo,  Departamento de Análisis y Coordinación Estadística, 
Gerencia de Investigaciones y Estadísticas Económicas, Banco Central de la 
República Argentina, Buenos Aires, December 1978. 
Mundell, Robert A., International  Economics, MacMillan, New York, 1968. 
Rhomberg, R., and A.R. Heller, "Introductory Survey", in The  Monetary  Approach to 
the Balance of  Payments,  International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 
1977. 
United States Federal Reserve, Bulletin  (various issues). 
Uriarte, J.A., Aspectos empíricos  del  enfoque  monetario  del  balance de  pagos en la 
Argentina,  Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Bancarios, Banco Central de la 
República Argentina, Third Symposium on Monetary and International 
Economics, September 1979. 
172 
Latin America and the international monetary 
system: some comments and suggestions 
Carlos  Massad 
This document is a revised version of  the statement delivered by the author at the request of  the Independent 
Commission on International Development Issues (Brandt Commission) on 5 May 1979 in Annecy, France. 
The document was published in CEPAL  Review No. 10, April 1980. 
LATIN AMERICA N T E R N A T I O N A L MONETARY SYSTEM 
I 
The functioning  of  the system 
In this paper, I intend to emphasize aspects of  the present system of  international 
economic relations in the monetary and financial  area that create difficulties  for  an 
adequate insertion of  Latin America in the world economy. I do not propose to make a 
comprehensive study of  all transfers  of  resources between developed and developing 
countries. 
My comments will be arranged under three main headings: the workings of  the 
present international monetary system; the effect  of  the present system on Latin 
American countries and less developed countries in general, and changes in the system 
that could help to minimize the present difficulties. 
Generalized floating  of  currencies became unavoidable as the Bretton Woods 
system proved incapable of  providing enough adjustment incentives for  reserve currency 
countries, essentially the United States and the countries with surpluses. In fact,  IMF 
"discipline" could only apply to non-reserve currency deficit  countries. Reserve currency 
deficit  countries could finance  their deficits  with their own currency, while countries with 
surpluses did not need to request IMF assistance. 
The lack of  international incentives to adjust created a situation where convertibil-
ity in terms of  gold could not be maintained, and the Bretton Woods system collapsed. As 
a matter of  fact,  the lack of  adjustment incentives, together with some domestic banking 
regulations, gave rise to an explosive growth of  private financial  markets as financial 
intermediation between surplus and deficit  countries became more and more in demand. 
Between 1973 and 1978 the net size of  the Eurocurrencies market grew at a rate of  about 
19% per year. 
Those changes are not only important quality-wise, however: they also represent a 
complete qualitative transformation  of  the system. 
1. The  role  of  the monetary authorities  and of  the private  sector 
The first  important qualitative change is that which took place in the market intervention 
role and reserve holdings of  the monetary authorities versus those of  the private sector. In 
a fixed  exchange rate system, the authorities have to maintain exchange rates through 
intervention in the market, for  which purpose they must hold foreign  exchange, gold and 
SDR reserves. In a floating  system such a role is transferred  totally or partially to the 
private sector, and it is the latter which has an incentive to accumulate "reserves" in order 
to "intervene" in foreign  exchange markets. 
This fact  implies a higher sensitivity, or elasticity, of  the composition of  reserves to 
economic incentives. Usually, central banks are less sensitive to changes in expectations 
than private holders of  foreign  exchange. The latter tend to adjust the composition of 
their holdings rapidly when relative interest rates or exchange rates are expected to vary. 
Hence, the more important the role of  private holders in foreign  exchange markets, the 
faster  will be the reaction to changes in expectations. The expectation of  devaluation of  a 
reserve currency —or a currency important in international trade— brings about an 
immediate change in the composition of  assets and liabilities of  the private sector and this 
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helps to produce the expected devaluation. In a sense, it could be said that under the 
present system, since central banks cannot resist the pressure of  private speculators, 
generalized expectations will never be wrong. 
Another consequence of  the increased importance of  the private sector in 
intervention is a relative reduction in the demand for  SDRs. In fact,  SDRs cannot be held 
by the private sector, but in so far,  as the relative importance of  private "reserve" currency 
holdings increases, the demand for  SDRs will decrease relative to that for  currencies. All 
this has important implications for  the system as a whole (the implications for  LDCs will 
be developed later). 
a) Exchange rate changes tend to "overshoot the mark", so that the magnitudes of 
such changes tend to be relatively large. It has been observed that prices tend to react 
faster  than quantities to exchange rate changes in industrial countries. Thus, when a 
particular currency suffers  a devaluation, the export prices of  the devaluing country tend 
to fall  and import prices to rise soon after  devaluation, but export and import volumes 
react more slowly, so that, for  a time, a devaluation increases the imbalance it was 
supposed to correct. Private holders of  the currency will see their devaluation 
expectations reinforced,  and the exchange rate will reflect  such strengthened 
expectations with further  devaluation. Then, after  some time the effect  of  devaluation 
will show itself  in the balance of  payments, in the form  of  a relative reduction of  imports 
as compared to exports, and the opposite process will be generated. As this process is 
better understood and the pattern of  events repeats itself,  the private sector may "learn" 
to speculate better and the destabilizing effect  of  expectations formed  in the way 
described above should tend to dissappear. The length of  the learning period is, however, 
unknown. 
b) The degree of  stringency of  monetary policy becomes more difficult  to evaluate. 
Let us take, for  example, a German-based company that holds US dollars in its assets. If 
such a company expects a reduction in the value of  the dollar relative to the German mark, 
it will try to sell its dollars for  marks, while if  the Bundesbank wants to give at least partial 
support to the dollar to avoid an excessive strengthening of  the mark, it will buy the 
dollars in exchange for  marks. The figures  in Germany will show an increase in the 
money supply, whereas all that has happened is a change in the composition of  assets of 
the German-based company. There is no reason for  this action to change the desired 
spending pattern of  the company, so that the increase in the money supply in Germany 
will have no direct inflationary  effect.  Of  course, the real world is not this simple, but I 
hope that this example serves to illustrate the essence of  my argument. 
c) Exchange rates become more volatile through changes in transactions on capital 
account (capital flows).  If  private capital and money markets are well developed, with 
reserves diversified  in terms of  currencies, changes in expectations will affect  the market 
rapidly and fully:  desired changes in the composition of  assets and liabilities of  economic 
agents will be reflected  in market actions which will result in changes in exchange rates. 
The money markets for  developed countries' currencies are sufficiently  deep to allow the 
operation of  a futures  market where interested parties can buy "coverage" for  exchange 
risks. With or without coverage, however, changes in domestic interest rates or other 
factors  affecting  the desired composition of  assets and liabilities will tend to produce 
sizable capital movements, unless interest rate policy is closely associated with expected 
exchange rates. Such association is very difficult  to achieve in practice, so exchange rates 
must be expected to vary sharply in short periods of  time. 
Furthermore, changes produced through the capital account may tend to reinforce 
those in the current account. An unfavourable  current account will produce devaluation 
expectations. At the same time, the expected cost of  borrowing abroad or the expected 
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benefit  of  external investment will increase (due to the expected devaluation), producing 
as a consequence an imbalance in the capital account with the same sign as that in the 
current account. Since, as pointed out above, the adjustments in the current account come 
about only slowly, one must expect relatively sharp movements in exchange rates on this 
account, or at least a movement in a particular direction for  some time and then a reversal, 
in a cycle which will take two or three years to develop fully. 
d) Sharp changes in exchange rates help to stimulate protectionist tendencies in 
world trade. As some currencies appreciate, the issuing countries will face  some loss of 
competitiveness, while deficit  countries, whose currencies depreciate, tend to yield more 
easily to protectionist lobbyists on balance-of-payments  grounds. Thus, global resistance 
to protectionism is substantially weakened, and if  at the same time, for  this and other 
reasons, the world economy is expanding slowly, the stage is set for  the proliferation  of 
direct controls, regulations and increased tariffs  on trade. 
2. The  international  transmission  of  economic disturbances 
With fixed  exchange rates, it was expected that inflation  rates in the world would tend 
towards equality, since it was argued that any discrepancy would bring about imbalances 
in foreign  payments that would force  adjustment. As exchange rates were not completely 
fixed,  however, some discrepancy in inflation  rates was allowed for,  over and above that 
coming from  different  rates of  change in productivity. Between 1960 and 1970 the 
average yearly rate of  inflation  for  9 industrial countries1 was 3-5%, with a standard 
deviation of  1.5 and a coefficient  of  variability of  0.43- Floating, it was argued, would allow 
for  more freedom  in domestic monetary policy, since variation in exchange rates would 
insulate countries from  external shocks. On these grounds, rates of  inflation  should have 
diverged after  1973 more than they did before,  and particularly before  1970. 
However, empirical evidence does not lend support to this expectation. For the 
same 9 countries considered, yearly inflation  between 1974 and 1977 averaged 11.3%, 
with a standard deviation of  4.8 and a coefficient  of  variability of  0.42: i.e., practically 
identical to that prevailing in the 1960s, while for  the period 1970-1973 —a transitional 
period— the average rate of  inflation  was 6.5%, with a standard deviation of  1.7 and a 
coefficient  of  variability of  0.26. It therefore  looks as though floating  rates have not 
helped very much to insulate countries from  external disturbances. An alternative 
hypothesis, which I have put forward  elsewhere, could be formulated  to explain this 
behaviour. For our purposes, it is sufficient  to point out that floating  has not insulated 
countries from  external shocks. Floating is no substitute for  responsible domestic 
policies. 
3. Creation  of  international  liquidity 
The present system has considerably obscured the concept of  international liquidity itself. 
When the authorities accumulated most of  their external reserves the concept was clear-
cut. But as soon as the private sector assumed, partly or wholly, the responsibility for 
intervening in the market, the concept of  international liquidity became vague and ill-
defined.  Should it be only official  reserves which were considered? Or should one take 
account of  private holdings in some way? These questions are not academic, for  the 
difference  between official  holdings and "total" holdings of  foreign  exchange —and gold 
and SDRs— is enormous (the second is at least twice the first). 
In a floating  system, it is legitimate to consider private holdings of  foreign 
exchange as "international liquidity", since there should be a demand in the private sector 
for  such holdings, and if  the demand is not satisfied,  the private sector will look for  ways 
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to satisfy  it, even creating new liquidity instruments. In a world where the foreign 
exchange operations of  banks in industrial countries and offshore  centres are usually not 
subjected to the same types of  controls as their domestic currency operations, the supply 
of  international liquidity becomes demand-determined. And in so far  as the foreign 
exchange holdings of  the private sector are a good substitute for  domestic (or national) 
money, changes in the supply of  the first  will affect  the demand for  the second. Through 
this process, national central banks lose control over the relevant monetary aggregates. 
This is not because they cannot control the supply of  domestic money in the short run, but 
because the demand for  such money changes, with the result that control or regulation not 
only of  the rate of  growth of  international liquidity, but also of  liquidity in general, 
becomes much less effective.  Of  course, if  the supply of  liquidity in the form  of  foreign 
exchange becomes essentially demand-determined, the relative importance of  SDRs is 
bound to suffer. 
II 
The effects  on Latin American and other 
developing countries 
As the system, or lack of  it, works at present, one must expect relatively sharp and 
recurrent variations in the exchange rates of  the principal currencies. Most Latin 
American countries, as well as other less developed countries (LDCs), peg their own 
currencies to one or another of  the principal currencies, or to a basket of  them. Pegging is 
necessary because most LDCs do not have financial  or money markets deep enough to do 
otherwise, the Central Bank being the only entity capable of  absorbing short-run excess 
supply or demand for  the domestic currency. But pegging means that the domestic 
currency moves together with the currency or currencies to which it is pegged, and the 
fluctuations  of  those currencies are geared to the adjustment needs of  the issuing 
countries, not of  the pegging country. Hence floating  imposes a cost on LDCs in terms of 
destabilizing influences  on their economies. Floating also tends to discourage the 
allocation of  additional resources to the production of  tradeable goods, since an 
uncertainty element is introduced in all calculations regarding activities connected with 
foreign  trade. In most cases, the LDCs exporters cannot even buy coverage, because there 
is no futures  market for  their own currencies. 
There are more deep-seated problems than this, however. Thus, if  floating  does not 
insulate countries from  external shocks, it does not solve the adjustment problem in the 
short or medium run either, and may even complicate it. As everyone knows, if  there is a 
group of  countries running a protracted surplus on current account, there must be another 
group running a deficit,  and floating  will not correct the situation. Floating could perhaps 
equilibrate the balance of  payments as a whole, in the long run, but it might never produce 
equilibrium in the balance-of-payments  current account. As we have already seen, the 
short-run effect  of  floating  on the current account of  the balance of  payments and on the 
balance of  payments as a whole may actually be destabilizing. 
As a matter of  fact,  equilibrium on the current account is not an ideal situation. 
Non-oil-exporting developing countries are net capital importers, so that the desired 
position of  their current account is one of  deficit,  to be financed  with a surplus on the 
capital account. In the case of  Latin America, the average deficit  on the current account of 
the non-oil-exporting countries for  the period 1974-1978 is five  times larger than for  the 
period 1966-1970. The capital surplus should be high enough to cover the deficit  on the 
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Table 1 
E X T E R N A L F I N A N C I N G OF L A T I N A M E R I C A N 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G C O U N T R I E S 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
1966-
1970 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978" 
Deficit  on current account' -2.0 -13.1 -16.1 -11.5 -8.0 -9.5 
Increase in reserves0 0.4 -0.7 2.2 4.9 3.9 8.5 
Use of  external financing  (uses) 2.4 12.4 13.9 16.4 11.9 18.0 
Net external financing  (sources) 2.5 12.6 14.4 16.2 10.5 16.0 
Direct investment 0.7 1.6 2.3 2.2 (2.3) 
Donations 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 3-0 
Net loans'' 1.7 10.9 12.0 13.8 (8.0) 13.0 
Loans from  official  sources 0.9 1.9 1.9 (2.0) (2.2) 3.0 
Multilateral 0.4 0.9 0.8 (0.9) (1.0) 
Bilateral 0.5 1.1 1.0 (1.1) (1.2) 
Borrowing from  private sources 0.8 9.0 10.1 11.8 (5-8) 10.0 
Supplier credits 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.6 (0.6) 1.5 
Commercial banks 0.3 8.2 8.2 7.5 4.7 5.5 
Bonds - 0.1 0.2 0.5 (1-0) 2.0 
Other and unallocated 0.1 0.6 0.6 2.2 -0.5 1.0 
Source: International Monetary Fund, balance of  Payments  Yearbook;  Bank for International Settlements: supplements 
for July and December 1978 and Yearbook; CEPAL estimates. 
"All figures for 1978 are provisional. 
'Excluding official  donations. 
'Positive figure indicates an increase in reserves. 
d Includes long, medium and short-term non-compensatory and compensatory loans. 
current account and the necessary increase in reserve holdings. But a surplus on the 
capital account is only a more respectable way to refer  to a net increase in foreign  debt, 
since unrequited transfers  are negligible and direct foreign  investment is not on the 
increase and is concentrated in a few  countries. At all events, new net indebtedness 
accounts for  at least 80% of  the surplus on the capital account of  the non-oil-exporting 
Latin American countries. 
Despite the levels already reached by such debt (over US$ 100 billion for  the non-
oil-exporting countries of  Latin America by the end of  1978) it must go on increasing for 
many years if  the development process is to continue and if  world resources are to be more 
efficiently  allocated. The additional short-run instability in the balance of  payments 
which is a byproduct of  floating,  however, does not facilitate  official  decisions in industrial 
countries about long-term development finance,  while private financial  markets expand 
rapidly. Thus, the terms of  the new financing  are substantially worse than those of  the 
past, both in terms of  interest rates and of  amortizations schedules. "Debt burden" 
becomes a problem for  further  borrowing, a problem which is more a consequence of  the 
present system than of  "misbehaviour", even though the latter is not always absent. 
Moreover, as debt terms deteriorate, borrowing countries need to increase their reserve 
holdings, both in order to present a better "image" and in order to be ready to offset 
possible outflows.  So, as the terms deteriorate, the necessary rate of  accumulation of 
reserves tends to grow, and so does the necessary net borrowing per year. 
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An obvious way out of  this problem for  LDCs would be to expand exports. If  exports 
grew at a rapid rate, both the "debt burden" and the current account deficit  could be 
reduced. However, as pointed out above, in the present circumstances the developed 
countries tend to yield more easily to protecionist pressures, so that this way out does not 
seem to be feasible.  In fact,  a recent article in IMF  Survey  reaches the conclusions that 
protectionism has increased significantly  in the recent past, and the trend does not show 
signs of  abating.2 Regrettably, this trend has emerged precisely when a good number of 
LDCs, at least in Latin America, are following  an outward-oriented strategy. 
This strategy, to be successful,  requires two prerequisites: foreign  markets and 
foreign  finance.  The former  are being increasedly protected from  outside competition. 
The latter is available, but on terms that are compatible only with a rapid growth of  LDC 
exports. 
Ill 
What can be done to solve, or at least alleviate, 
the present difficulties  in the monetary 
and financial  system? 
At least some of  the roots of  the difficulties  pointed out above can be traced to problems of 
the adjustment process and of  liquidity creation. If  the adjustment process worked 
smoothly, and international liquidity grew at a reasonably stable rate, excessive 
fluctuating  of  exchange rates would be flattened  out and there would be less of  a 
weakening of  the will to resist protectionist measures. 
One could argue that the adjustment process is working smoothly when the choice 
between fixed  or floating  exchange rates becomes irrelevant. In other words, if  the 
domestic policies of  the main industrial countries were strictly co-ordinated, there would 
be no need to vary their exchange rates vis-a-vis  each other in the short run, and there 
would therefore  be no need for  floating.  I hope it is obvious by now how great an interest 
LDCs have in more stable exchange rates and a smoother adjustment process. 
But of  course close co-ordination of  domestic policies is an ideal which is very 
difficult  to reach. Different  countries have different  institutions, different  interest groups 
and different  social and political forces.  For example, some countries can export their 
unemployed and so can accept more restrictive enconomic policies than others. 
Table 2 
ESTIMATED OVERALL INDEBTEDNESS OF LATIN AMERICAN 
NON-OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
Years Officially-guaranteed.  debt 
Non-guaranteed 
debt  to banks 
Overall  in-
debtedness" 
1974 31.51 19.76 51.72 
1975 38.05 24.50 63.48 
1976 48.74 30.65 81.28 
1977 59.00 32.00 91.00 
1978a 68.00 37.00 106.00 
° Includes debt to IMF. 
'Figures for 1978 are provisional. 
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However difficult  it is, I believe one should continue trying to' secure closer co-
ordination of  economic policies among industrial countries. Naturally, such co-ordination 
should take global needs into account, so as to facilitate  the necessary current account 
deficit  of  the LDCs and its adequate financing.  In this way, a smoother process of  real 
resource transfers  would be achieved. In order to ensure the consideration of  global needs, 
LDCs should be represented in some way in discussions on policy co-ordination among 
industrial countries. 
Reports that take a global look at the world economy play an important role here. 
For example, the excellent IMF periodic reports on the world economic outlook should be 
given wider circulation. The Interim Committee of  the Board of  Governors of  the Fund 
should perhaps devote at least one full  meeting a year to evaluating and discussing the 
world economic situation. But policy co-ordination touches some very sensitive points in 
many countries, and for  this reason it requires some degree of  regular involvement of 
governments at the highest political level. 
At the same time, however, improving the adjustment process is in the interests of 
all countries, developing and developed alike. 
All the effort  expended in attaining the goal of  policy co-ordination is well spent. 
However, one cannot expect such efforts  to be fully  effective  alone, so some action should 
be taken in especially difficult  areas even before  co-ordination is improved. 
a) Asset settlement of  international obligations should be established, in order to 
create an incentive for  reserve currency countries to adjust. 
If  asset settlement were the norm, countries could not settle their international 
obligations by simply increasing their liabilities abroad. Hence, if  a reserve currency 
country were in deficit,  it would pay for  it with assets, like any other country. The 
adjustment incentive would appear as those assets were depleted. 
b) An account aimed at the substitution of  SDRs for  reserve currencies should be 
set up in the IMF. Its role would be to minimize pressure on exchange rates due to desired 
changes in foreign  exchange portfolios  of  monetary authorities. The countries issuing the 
currency accumulated in the account would recover it in an agreed period, in exchange for 
SDRs. In fact,  this would be a form  of  short-term debt consolidation for  some industrial 
countries. As these countries recover their currencies from  the account, the SDRs 
accumulated there could be used for  long-term lending to LDCs. One might call this 
operation the "substitution link". 
c) Countries with net reserves higher than, say, 4 months' imports and with 
reserves growing faster  than a given rate per year would pay a tax on their reserves. One 
way to apply this concept, for  example, would be not to allocate SDRs to such countries in 
a future  allocation, the SDRs not allocated to them being assigned to LDCs in proportion 
to their quotas in the IMF. In this way, an incentive for  surplus countries to adjust would 
be established. One might call this the "adjustment link". 
d) A debt refinancing  facility  should be established, perhaps as a joint undertaking 
of  the World Bank and the IMF. This facility  would operate under a system similar to that 
of  the Oil Facility of  the IMF. LDCs would have voluntary access to it on the basis of  a pre-
established set of  indicators, but the amount and conditions of  refinancing  would be 
studied case by case. A refinancing  facility  would be a natural LDC counterpart to a 
substitution account for  reserve currency countries. 
e) A forum  should be established where monetary, trade and development 
matters, which are so closely linked, are regularly jointly discussed, with main tendencies 
being highlighted and policy measures suggested. Such a forum  could assess the global 
contribution of  each industrial country to development, taking into account their 
contribution both through trade and through aid and other financial  flows.  The ideal 
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could be to create some form  of  international economic court that could pass judgement, 
particularly on restrictive trade practices, and establish compensation for  the economic 
damage caused. Countries could then evaluate whether or not it was in their own interests 
to apply protectionist measures and to pay compensation for  them. This concept of 
"compensated protectionism" could be further  evolved as a way to allow countries some 
freedom  in this respect, but with compensatory payments to countries damaged in the 
process. The multipolarity of  the present world lends some realism to this proposal. 
Of  course, most of  these ideas are neither new or realistic. However, the problem of 
development will be with us for  a sufficiently  long time to permit some unrealistic 
approaches at present. I believe that, as time passes, it will be increasingly clear that 
development is not a problem of  developing countries alone, but of  the world as a whole. 
This is my justification  for  considering not only problems of  the Latin American 
countries, or of  all developing countries, but also problems of  the world economy to which 
the latter are so closely linked. 
NOTES 
•Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States. 
2 "Retreat from  liberal trade becomes clearer as more restrictive practices take effect",  IMF  Survey, 
April 9, 1979. 
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Financial openness and the 
adjustment process 
Carlos  Massad 
The purpose of  this study is to explore some aspects of  the role of  capital movements in 
the external and internal balance, with special emphasis on the external debt. 
Section I consists of  an introduction. Section II explores the adjustment mechanism 
both in the case of  an open economy and in that of  an economy which is closed to 
movements of  goods or capital. Section III seeks to evaluate the "debt servicing burden", 
ways of  measuring it, and its evolution in recent years for  Latin America. The last section, 
Section IV, contains the main conclusions. 
This article was presented at the Second International Conference  on Latin America and the World Economy 
of  the Instituto Torcuato di Telia, held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 1980. The Spanish version was 
published in América Latinay la Transformación  Económica Mundial,  Javier Villanueva (compiler), Instituto 
Torcuato Di Telia, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1981. 
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FINANCIAL OPENNESS AND THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS 
I 
introduction 
Capital movements have been a source of  concern at both the national and international 
level for  a considerable time past. The period between the two world wars witnessed 
substantial movements of  capital between countries, and the great world crisis of  the 
1930s, which marked the end of  a relatively long period of  exchange freedom  and 
convertibility, also put an end to capital markets which had become relatively well 
developed in the world. 
The impact of  the great crisis was also reflected  in the organization of  the 
international monetary system which emerged in the mid-1940s. The Articles of 
Agreement of  the IMF adopted at Bretton Woods involved a commitment to unrestricted 
freedom  of  current payments while keeping open the possibility of  direct controls on 
capital movements. 
At this point, however, the lack of  well-developed capital markets and of  free 
convertibility, together with the existence of  exchange controls of  various types, left  open 
in practice barely more than the possibility of  movements of  capital from  official  sources 
to likewise official  users. 
Only with the reappearance of  the convertibility of  the main European currencies 
as from  the 1950s did a private capital market of  some importance begin to emerge. 
From that time on, it began to be possible and interesting to transnationalize the 
major national banks of  the main countries, thus facilitating  the growth of  transfers  of 
financial  resources both between countries and between currencies. Using the facilities 
provided by an increasingly efficient  and interconnected international banking system, it 
became possible to transfer  large amounts of  resources from  one country to another or 
from  one currency to another almost instantly. Once a real or imaginary difference  of 
yield on short-term loans between two countries or two currencies was perceived the 
funds  could flow  in massively in order to take advantage of  that difference  free  of  risk. 
Thus, a recipient country of  such recources which sought to back up its own currency had 
to accumulate enormous amounts of  foreign  currency in return for  its national currency, 
with a corresponding increase in the domestic money supply. If  the country supplying the 
funds,  for  its part, wanted to defend  its currency it could only do so through contraction of 
its domestic money supply and heavy loss of  reserves. Thus, the existing institutional 
machinery facilitated  the appearance of  monetary imbalances in the form  of  big 
movements of  short-term capital which made it impossible to maintain the established 
international monetay system. 
The private short- and long-term capital markets had already achieved some 
substantial importance by the mid-1960s, and their growth from  then on took place at a 
dizzy rate (see table 1). This growth opened an additional door for  the financing  of  the 
balance of  payments and of  development: private short- and medium-term capital in the 
form  of  indebtedness. Before  the existence of  this market, the only fairly  substantial 
source of  private external financing  was direct foreign  investment. Thus, developing 
countries which sought external financing  had two possibilities open to them: official 
sources and direct foreign  investment. Both these sources represented long-term 
commitments, but in the case of  official  loans these commitments were at interest rates 
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below those prevailing in the market. With the opening up and expansion of  private 
sources of  financing  in the form  of  loans, however, loan terms tended to become shorter 
while the interest rates on the debt tended to rise. Indeed, later on the latter rates began to 
float  in connection with some specific  market rate, thus incorporating to some extent the 
future  inflation  expected in the centres providing the capital. 
These institutional developments gave the developing countries new options for 
tackling their external payments imbalances. When there was only the possibility of 
official  financing  —the maximum amount of  which could be predicted quite accurately— 
any balance-of-payments  imbalance greater than the amount of  such financing  had to be 
faced  with the countries' own reserves or through the application of  measures which 
could ensure a relatively rapid adjustment of  the balance-of-payments  current account. 
These measures generally included a sharp alteration in the exchange rate and the 
restriction of  domestic demand in order to reduce the extent to which the alteration in 
exchange parity was passed on to domestic prices and to bring about a smaller level of 
absorption of  tradeable goods by the national economy. Both these effects  tended in the 
appropriate direction, but these measures involved a sometimes intolerable effect  of  the 
level of  employment, so that there was a strong temptation to apply restrictions on 
imports and give subsidies to exports, whether directly or disguised in the form  of 
multiple exchange rate systems, surcharges and tax exemptions, subsidized or directly 
restricted systems of  credit, etc. 
The short-term capital movements were reflected  mainly in the accumulation or 
disaccumulation of  foreign  exchange by the national private sector, and so all the 
movements were limited by the availability of  such foreign  exchange reserves in national 
private hands and by the financing  capacity of  the national private sector. 
Table 1 
EVOLUTION OF THE EXTERNAL ASSETS OF DEPOSIT BANKS OF 
THE MAIN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, U.S.A., JAPAN 
AND OFFSHORE CENTRES 
Billions of  dollars  at end 
of  each year 













































Source: International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  1979 and July 1980. 
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In recent years, the size of  the financial  markets and the possibility opened up for 
the foreign  private sector to accumulate and disaccumulate securities expressed in foreign 
currencies have made it possible for  short-term capital movements to reach very high 
levels. Thus, a further  option has been opened up: that of  "financing"  current account 
imbalances (or desired increases in official  reserves) much more easily than in the past. 
II 
The adjustment mechanism and financing 
In view of  the current ease with which it is possible to move capital it is worth reviewing 
the process whereby the economy of  a small country adjusts to domestic monetary 
imbalances. This analysis is centered rather on movements of  short- and medium-term 
capital than on those of  long-term capital. In any case, the rapidly decreasing importance 
of  official  financing  has meant that within the overall external indebtedness of  a country, 
long-term capital has been losing relative importance.1 
Let us assume that the authorities of  a country expand domestic credit more than is 
required for  keeping up the availability of  money. An excess money supply then appears 
in this economy, and as a result of  this there is an excess of  demand both for  goods and for 
securities, including securities expressed in foreign  currency. If  the economy in question 
were totally closed to the exterior and it were expected that the excess supply of  money 
would only be temporary, this would be reflected  in a reduction in domestic interest rates 
and an increase in domestic spending, with these two effects  tending to produce 
inflationary  pressures and/or an increase in real income. The economy would adjust 
through the raising of  domestic prices and/or of  real income and the temporary decline in 
interest rates would disappear, so that they would return to their normal levels once the 
increase in prices or income had caused the excess money supply to disappear in real 
terms. 
In contrast, if  the economy were completely open to the exterior both as regards 
transactions of  goods and movements of  capital, the adjustment process would be 
different.  The excess money supply would have as its counterpart an excess demand for 
securities and goods. If  the nominal exchange rate were fixed,  the excess demand for 
securities would tend to bring about a transfer  of  capital to securities expressed in foreign 
currency, that is to say, the so-called "flight  of  capital". Any excess demand for  goods, for 
its part, would exert pressure in the direction of  an increase in imports and a reduction in 
exports, thus generating a deficit  on the current account of  the balance of  payments. 
Both these effects  —that on the market for  goods and services and that on the 
securities market— act in the same direction and help to generate a global balance-of-
payments deficit.  The counterpart of  this deficit  is a reduction in the level of  official 
foreign  reserves and a reduction in the money supply which would cause the nominal 
excess money supply to disappear without there necessarily being changes in domestic 
prices. 
These two examples —that of  complete isolation and that of  complete openness— 
are extreme cases, buy they help to understand the more complex and frequent  cases of 
partial openness and of  total openness for  either capital or goods, but not for  both at the 
same time. 
Out of  the wide range of  possible permutations between different  degrees of 
openness of  capital movements and of  merchandise trade, we may select two which make 
it possible to bring out more clearly some empirical cases: total openness in merchandise 
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trade, with total absence of  non-compensatory capital movements, and total openness of 
capital movements in an economy which is closed to transactions of  goods. 
1. Openness to merchandise  trade 
Let us consider the first  of  these cases. Starting from  an equilibrium situation, with a fixed 
exchange rate, expansion of  domestic credit above that which could be absorbed by the 
demand for  money would mean excess money supply and this would exert pressure in the 
direction of  an increase in the domestic demand for  goods and services and a decrease in 
domestic interest rates (assuming that the excess money supply was expected to be only 
temporary). The drop in interest rates would not have the effect  of  causing greater 
demand for  external financial  assets, since it is assumed that capital movements are non-
existent, but it would contribute to an increase in domestic demand, both for 
internationally tradeable goods and for  non-tradeables. If  all goods and services were 
tradeable, then the greater domestic demand would have the effect  of  promoting an 
increase in imports and a decrease in exports. The whole effect  of  the excess money 
supply would be reflected  in a current account deficit  on the balance of  payments. 
In contrast, if  not all goods were tradeable there would be excess demand in the 
market for  non-tradeable goods and an increase in their relative price. This would give 
rise to inflationary  pressures that would be temporary provided that there was no further 
increase in the excess money supply. This excess supply is absorbed in two ways: through 
the deficit  on external payments, which tends to reduce the nominal money supply, and 
through the increase in the prices of  non-tradeable goods and services, which tends to 
reduce the money supply in real terms. This may not give an equilibrium situation in the 
long-term. 
Since there is no possibility of  transforming  domestic financial  assets into external 
assets, the domestic interest rate would remain under its equilibrium level until the deficit 
on current account made it possible to absorb the excess money supply through the loss of 
official  reserves. For their part, the drop in domestic interest rates and the increase in 
demand would tend to increase the level of  employment, at least temporarily. 
Now let us consider the opposite case, in which there is excess demand for  money. 
In this case, the result will be an increase in the domestic interest rate and a surplus on the 
balance-of-payments  current account, with a return to equilibrium once the surplus has 
generated sufficient  additional money (through an increase in the official  reserves) in 
order to achieve a balance between the supply of  money and the demand for  it; until this 
happens, the domestic employment level may deteriorate. In an economy like this, the 
level of  domestic prices is determined by the exterior, and domestic inflation  will tend to 
be equal to external inflation  when appropriately measured (to be appropriate, the form 
of  measurement must take into account the specific  composition of  the "shopping basket" 
of  the country in question). In contrast, domestic interest rates will be determined at least 
in the short-term, by the monetary policy, so that they may differ  substantially from  the 
interest rates prevailing on external m rkets.2 
In a case like that analysed above, it is therefore  to be expected that domestic price 
levels will be closely related to international levels, whereas the same may not apply to 
interest rates. 
2. Openness to capital  movements 
Let us now consider the second case selected: an economy which is closed to movements of 
goods but is completely open to movements of  capital. Let us assume once again that we 
start from  a state of  equilibrium and that excess money supply is generated through the 
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expansion of  domestic credit. As in the previous case, this excess supply will exert 
pressure in the direction of  a decline in domestic interest rates and an increase in the 
demand for  goods. The downward trend in interest rates will generate a change in the 
composition of  financial  assets in favour  of  those expressed in foreign  currency, since 
domestic interest rates will tend to be lower than external rates. The possibility of 
acquiring external assets will mean, however, that this reduction in the rates will be 
practically nil if  capital can move easily. The less this ease of  movement (or the greater 
the cost), the greater will be the temporary difference  produced between the two types of 
interest rates. 
On the other hand, the increase in the demand for  goods will not be reflected  in an 
increase in imports and a reduction in exports, since this economy is closed to 
international movements of  goods. Consequently, the entire impact of  the increase in the 
demand for  goods will be reflected,  under conditions of  full  employment, in an increase in 
domestic price levels. In this case, therefore,  we will see that the nominal domestic 
interest rates are closely linked with international rates, whereas domestic price levels 
may diverge considerable —at least for  a certain length of  time— from  external levels. 
In these two cases, no account has been taken of  the time that the adjustment 
process will last and the possible exchange variations, the aim being to highlight what in 
my opinion are the fundamental  elements in the analysis of  the process of  adjustment to 
domestic monetary imbalances. It should be clear from  the foregoing  consideration that 
in real economies it is not possible to divorce the analysis of  the balance-of-payments 
current account from  that of  the capital account. Both are linked with each other, and the 
greater the possibility that movements of  capital can take place, the closer this linkage is. 
In reality, under this approach the global quantitative result of  the balance of  payments is 
determined by the size of  the domestic monetary imbalance, whereas the composition of 
this overall result depends on the way this imbalance is reflected  in the markets for  goods 
and securities.3 
3- The  speed of  adjustment 
It may be expected that the speed of  adjustment of  the capital account will be greater than 
that of  the current account. Movements of  capital represent changes in the composition 
of  the portfolios  of  financial  assets and liabilities, and these can be carried out without 
delay. In order to make changes in imports and exports, however, time is required in order 
to determine which are to be varied and from  which markets, and in certain cases the 
necessary investments will have to be made also. Under the present institutional 
circumstances, capital can be moved almost instantly, but not goods. 
Preliminary studies carried out in ECLAC confirm  this view. Using a model based 
on the monetary approach to the balance of  payments, Valeriano García tried out an 
estimate of  the time needed for  adjustment on the balance-of-payments  current account 
and capital account in the period 1960-1976 in nine Latin American countries. Garcia 
drew a distinction between imbalance in the existing stock and in the flows  and estimated 
the coefficients  of  adjustment for  the capital account and for  the balance of  payments as a 
whole. In both cases, he found  that the coefficient  is greater in the case of  the capital 
account, both for  imbalance in the flows  and for  imbalance in the existing stock.4 
At this point it is worth pausing for  a moment to consider the relative ease with 
which movements of  capital can take place under different  degrees of  control. The 
European experience in recent years, reflected  in reports of  both OECD and the IMF, 
seems to show that the existing institutional means make attempts at control completely 
futile.  In a recent study covering a group of  Latin American countries, Ricardo Arriazu 
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reaches the same conclusion and goes even further:  he says that when control over 
movements of  capital tends to increase, the movements become even greater and are in 
the opposite direction to that desired. The empirical evidence seems to show clearly that 
the order of  cause and effect  is indeed as shown here and not the reverse.5 
Short-term capital movements do not always play a balancing role. Once a flow 
towards a country has been initiated, this may create expectations of  revaluation of  the 
currency of  the recipient country, thus making the flow  of  capital even more attractive 
and consequently increasing it. Alternatively, an outflow  of  capital can raise expectations 
of  devaluation, thus accentuating the incentive for  such an outflow.  This is why, in the 
present institutional circumstances, it is of  the utmost importance that the economic 
policy of  each country should aim at a suitable combination of  interest rates and exchange 
rate variations which will not tend to facilitate  unbalancing movements of  capital. 
Ill 
The external debt 
The facilities  available for  "financing"  a balance-of-payments  imbalance involve in 
themselves a risk for  the future.  It may rightly be argued that, in a world open to 
movements of  capital, these movements will not tend to take place only in one direction. 
On the contrary, it is perfectly  possible and even highly probable that while a country is 
receiving capital from  the exterior, at the same time it will be sending capital abroad in a 
process which is connected not only with the yield on that capital but also with the 
average risk of  the portfolio  of  such investments.6 This means that, at the same time that 
foreign  investors are interested in making investments in the country in question, the 
investors of  that country itself  can also have an incentive to invest abroad. When we speak 
of  investments, these do not include only what is traditionally considered as direct 
investment, but also investments of  a financial  nature, including loans. 
It is this latter component which has reached high levels in recent years. At the end 
of  1979, the external debt of  the non-oil-exporting Latin American countries came to 
almost US$ 140 billion, and it is estimated that by the end of  1980 it will amount to US$ 
160 billion. 
1. The  external  debt  and the evaluation  of  creditworthiness 
External lenders do not see the phenomenon of  the debt as a kind of  international 
diversification  of  their portfolio,  and they do not take into account the fact  that they are 
not only lending but also receiving instead the size of  a country's debt is evaluated without 
recognizing that the country is in turn "lending" to the exterior. 
According to figures  prepared by the Bank for  International Settlements in Basle, at 
the end of  1979 the banks in the principal industrialized countries and the branches of 
United States banks in overseas financial  centres registered total assets in Latin American 
countries of  US$ 122.7 billion and liabilities of  US$ 52.4 billion.7 In other words, the Latin 
American countries in question, which do not include the Caribbean area, had received 
US$ 122.7 billion in loans, but had in turn "lent" (deposited) US$ 52.4 billion to the banks 
in question. 
When the external debt is analysed, however, this fact  is not taken into 
consideration, even though the opening up of  the capital market to the exterior 
necessarily tends to increase both the level of  indebtedness of  the country in question and 
the level of  its investments abroad. For this reason, the so-called "creditworthiness" 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICAN NON-OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES: OUTSTANDING 
GLOBAL DEBT AT END OF EACH YEAR" 
(Billions  of  dollars  and  percentages) 
Percentage 
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 1979b  ™crease 
between 
1974-1979 
Nominal values by groups of  countries' 
Group I (debt: over 10 billion) 31.6 40.7 54.7 63.0 76.6 92.0 191 
Group II (debt: between 1 and 10 billion) 16.7 18.8 21.1 23.9 28.7 38.0 128 
Group III (debt: less than 1 billion) 3-9 5.4 7.0 8.2 10.5 13.0 238 
Total 52.2 64.9 82.8 95.1 115.8 143.0 174 
Real values 
Adjusted by import prices 
Group I 22.5 27.1 34.6 38.2 44.1 46.4 106 
Group II 12.7 12.6 13.8 14.2 16.1 18.0 42 
Group III 2.9 3.6 4.4 4.8 5.8 6.3 117 
Total 38.1 43.3 52.8 57.2 66.0 70.7 86 
Adjusted by terms of  trade 
Group I 34.1 44.7 58.0 65.3 81.0 98.9 190 
Group II 16.9 24.6 26.2 30.2 37.7 49.6 193 
Group III 4.1 5.5 7.3 7.8 10.7 14.1 244 
Total 55.1 74.8 91.5 103.3 129.4 162.6 195 
Price indexes (1973 = 1 0 0 / 
Exports Group I 129.0 136.7 149.5 159.3 164.6 184.6 
Group II 130.7 114.2 123.6 133.3 136.0 162.3 
Group III 132.3 151.2 153.5 181.9 179.4 192.6 
Imports Group I 140.2 150.2 158.5 165.2 174.0 198.3 
Group II 132.2 149.5 153.0 168.4 178.3 211.8 
Group III 136.9 153.4 160.1 172.1 182.0 208.4 
Source: International Monetary Fund, "Balance of  Payments Yearbook"; World Bank, "World Debt Tables", 1979; Bank 
for  International Settlements (BIS), Annual Report, June 1980; ECLAC estimates. 
"Refers  to the debt actually disbursed and includes estimates of  the private debt not guaranteed by the State. 
Estimates based on preliminary figures. 
'Classification  refers  to the year 1974. Group I includes Brazil and Mexico, Group 11 Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru, 
and Group III the remaining Latin American non-oil-exporting countries. 
For the purpose of  better comparability, the base of  the indexes was changed to 1973= 100 and they refer  to the unit values 
of  exports and imports of  goods and services. 
becomes a restriction on external indebtedness and, as noted above, a substantial external 
risk. If  for  some reason the external view of  a country's creditworthiness deteriorates, the 
flow  of  external financing  may be abruptly cut off,  making necessary an exaggerated 
adjustment in the current account and/or capital account of  the balance of  payments and 
calling for  restrictive domestic policies which can sharply increase unemployment in the 
short term. This risk makes necessary extremely careful  handling of  domestic policy, on 
which it also imposes certain restrictions. 
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As external idebtedness cannot be unlimited, for  the reasons already noted, the 
demand for  direct foreign  investment as a form  of  future  financing  will tend to increase 
even though, from  a strictly economic point of  view, external indebtedness and direct 
foreign  investment are very close substitutes of  one another. 
The process of  evaluation of  the creditworthiness of  countries has been carried out 
with growing sophistication by the external creditor institutions. Even so, this process is 
still based on just a few  indicators which do not enable the future  payments capacity of  a 
country to be accurately determined. When we recall that in the long run countries always 
pay their debts (except in the event of  a true worldwide disaster) and that also all goods 
are tradeable in the long term, then the current state of  the balance of  payments, which is 
the most frequently  used indicator, is not necessarily a good index.8 
2. The  burden  of  debt  servicing 
On the other hand, it should also be clearly understood that certain arguments used by 
some debtor countries to minimize the importance of  their debt are fallacies.  Thus, for 
example, it is asserted that international inflation  reduces the real value of  the debt as 
measured in terms of  the domestic resources needed to pay it. There are two argements 
which run counter to this assertion. One is that the rates of  interest charged on an ever-
increasing proportion of  the debt are floating  and include at least in part, as has recently 
been shown in the financial  markets, the inflationary  expectations of  the creditor 
countries. Secondly, the cost of  servicing a country's debt does not depend on the 
international rate of  inflation  but on the way the prices of  that country's imports and 
exports behave or, more generally, the way its social exchange rate behaves.9 
Thus, an increase in the external prices of  imported products makes it more costly, 
in terms of  the resources committed, to generate a unit of  foreign  exhange to service the 
debt. The increase in the prices of  imported products means that it is necessary to devote a 
country's present or future  domestic resources to financing  the real level of  imports, with 
the result that the marginal cost of  obtaining one more unit of  foreign  exhange increases. 
On the other hand, an increase in the external price of  exports has the opposite effect. 
Such an increase means that it is necessary to use fewer  real domestic resources to pay for 
a given volume of  imports, so that the marginal cost of  generating one more unit of 
foreign  exchange is reduced. These variations in prices will be reflected  in the social value 
of  foreign  exchange. Failing this, a more appropriate means of  measurement than those 
normally used may be obtained by deflating  the figures  of  the external debt by an index of 
the external prices of  exports and multiplying those figures  by an index of  the external 
prices of  imports. This is equivalent to dividing the nominal value of  the debt by a terms-
of-trade  index. 
As we can see from  table 2, whereas the increase in the nominal debt for  the Latin 
American non-oil-exporting countries between 1974 and 1979 comes to 174%, this 
figure  is halved if  the debt is deflated  by an index of  the price of  imports. In contrast, if  we 
use as a deflator  a terms-of-trade  index, the figure  increases to 195%. Likewise, we see 
from  the table that the growth rate of  the debt adjusted in this manner is very similar both 
for  those countries which in 1974 had an external debt of  over US$ 10 billion and those 
whose debt was between US$ 1 and US$  10 billion. 
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IV 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, it may be maintained that the current financial  institutionality tends to 
facilitate  capital movements between countries; the control of  such movements has now 
become very difficult,  and consequently economic policy must be perfected  with the aim 
of  preventing capital movements from  destabilizing the economies. Furthermore, in a 
world which is open to capital movements, these will tend to take place between countries 
not only as a function  of  considerations of  profitability,  but also as a function  of  the 
average risk of  a given portfolio  of  investments. Thus, capital will flow  between two 
countries in both directions, even when the level of  profitability  is identical in both, as 
long as the variations in that profitability  are not identical. Although it is true that the 
Latin American countries have been net recipients of  capital, it is also true that these 
countries "invest" abroad. Consequently, their external creditworthiness must take into 
account both the debt which they have and the loans which they themselves have made to 
the exterior. It can also be expected that these tendencies will continue for  some time, 
since the national investment portfolios  are far  from  having reached equilibrium. As 
their external creditworthiness acts as a restriction on their capacity for  indebtedness, 
however, countries must continue to look carefully  at their balance-of-payments  current 
account results, in order to prevent an adverse creditworthiness rating from  jeopardizing 
their access to capital markets. 
NOTES 
1 Direct investments may be considered to correspond to long-term capital in terms of  profitability  and 
risk, although the short-term conditions may determine the actual moment at which the investments are 
begun. 
2 The comparison between the two types of  interest rates must take into account the expected variations 
in the exchange rates. 
'See Carlos Massad: "El enfoque  de absorción y el enfoque  monetario de la balanza de pagos: 
¿Resultados contradictorios?", in Estudios  de  Economía  No. 15, Department of  Economics, University of 
Chile, Santiago, 1980. 
4See Valeriano García: "Ajuste de la balanza de pagos, política de crédito y control de la deuda externa", 
in Política  monetaria y ajuste de  la balanza de  pagos: tres estudios,  Cuadernos de la CEPAL series, No. 29, 
United Nations, Santiago, 1979. 
5 See R.H. Arriazu: "Movimientos internacionales de capitales", Cuadernos de la CEPAL series, No. 32, 
United Nations, Santiago, Chile, 1979 (UNDP/ECLA Joint Project). 
6See C. Massad: "Cartera de inversiones de los países productores de petróleo; su diversificación  hacia 
América Latina", Revista Estudios  de  Economía,  No. 12, Department of  Economics of  the University of 
Chile, Santiago, Chile, 1979. 
7 See Bank for  International Settlements, International  Banking  Developments - first  quarter  1980, 
Basle, 29 July 1980, table 7. 
8 See A. Saieh: "Un análisis sobre la posibilidad de evaluar la solvencia crediticia de los países en 
desarrollo", Monetaria,  No. 3, CEMLA, 1979. 
9See C. Massad and R. Zahler: "Inflación  mundial y deuda externa: el caso del deflactor  impropio", in 
Dos estudios  sobre el endeudamiento  externo, Cuadernos de la CEPAL series, No. 19, Santiago, 1978. 
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MONETARY AND REAL EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL OPENING UP 
I 
Introduction 
Several countries in the Southern Cone of  Latin America have in recent years experienced 
fairly  similar economic and social circumstances, involving political and institutional 
breaks with the past of  varying degrees of  abruptness, partly as a result of  a very complex 
economic situation marked by inadequate economic growth, a high rate of  inflation, 
balance-of-payments  difficulties,  extensive price controls, the existence of  large black 
markets and a drop in output. 
In each case the new authorities attributed this situation to the development 
strategy based on industrialization through import substitution, and to the effect  of  the 
numerous "distortions" which affected  the price system. 
In these circumstances, in the light of  this interpretation and in the context of  a new 
political order, economic policies seeking "normalization" were introduced with the aim 
of  laying the foundations  of  a different  style of  development, guided by a strategy very 
different  from  that followed  over the past thirty years. 
The new strategy emphasizes opening up to the exterior, the free  functioning  of 
markets and the stimulation of  private initiative; it assigns a "subsidiary" role to the State, 
and places emphasis on reducing the government deficit  and public expenditure, 
controlling the means of  payment, and ensuring price stability. 
The principal features  of  the short-term economic policy have been an endeavour 
to reduce the existing macroeconomic imbalances and the allocation of  priority —in view 
of  the initial situation— to control inflation  and improvement of  the balance of 
payments, as well as external creditworthiness. 
The above describes more or less what happened in Argentina, starting in March 
1976, in Chile, starting in September 1973 and in Uruguay, starting in September 1974. 
However, there were also some substantial differences,  arising partly from  the 
initial situation from  which the experiments evolved, and from  certain structural 
characteristics specific  to each of  these countries. Particular mention may be made in this 
respect of  political and institutional features;  those related to the type of  export market; 
the degree to which productive activity was in private or State hands; the speed and 
completeness with which the economies were opened up to external forces  (as regards 
both real and financial  aspects); the predominance of  certain economic policy objectives 
over others (for  example, full  employment versus price stability); and the approach used 
and degree of  independence and consistency achieved by the technical teams in handling 
economic affairs. 
To a degree, this study falls  within a context established by two relatively new 
global phenomena, one in the international economic field  and the other in the 
application of  economic policies by some developing countries. 
On the one hand there is the growth in international liquidity and the increasing 
importance of  the international private banks in the recent period, as a result of  which 
private financial  credits have been growing in importance in comparison with official 
external financing,  and are beginning to replace direct foreign  investment as the main 
mechanism whereby capital is exchanged between the industrialized countries and the 
countries at an intermediate stage of  development. The emergence of  these new 
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characteristics on the international financial  scene makes it necessary to highlight, in 
relation to the past, the specifically  economic determinants of  supply and demand for 
external financial  resources. 
From the viewpoint of  the development strategy and economic policy applied by 
various Latin American countries, especially in the Southern Cone, there is a definite 
tendency towards external economic opening up. As far  as the opening up of  trade is 
concerned, this has attracted a good deal of  attention in professional  and academic circles. 
However, there is a lack of  studies on the external financial  opening up proper, and also 
on its implications for  the efficiency  of  monetary and credit policies and its repercussions 
on the evolution of  domestic prices, the external debt, employment, investment and 
redistribution of  wealth arising from  differences  in timing or in speed between 
commercial opening up and financial  opening up. 
In view of  the fact  that these events are very recent, that information  is relatively 
scarce and that a comparative analysis of  the three cases goes beyond the planned scope of 
the present study, and also because of  the author's greater knowledge of  the Chilean case, 
Chile has been selected as the subject of  this study. 
II 
The initial situation 
Between 1971 and 1973 an attempt was made to modify  profoundly  the distribution of 
income and wealth in the country. In the long term this implied an alteration of  the 
structure of  production, of  the mode of  operation of  the economy and, more broadly, of 
the type of  relations predominating in Chilean society up to that time. As far  as economic 
aspects were concerned, this involved an intensification  of  the process of  agrarian reform 
and the establishment of  an area of  social ownership in the spheres of  production, finance 
and marketing. 
The economic programme drawn up at that time did not pay due attention to the 
management of  financial  variables, but concentrated on an attemp to control the concrete 
aspects of  the process of  production and distribution. Because of  this, the short-term 
macroeconomic policy produced such results, at least in some respects, that towards the 
end of  1973 Chile was facing  an economic situation characterized by numerous severe 
imbalances, both in the fiscal  and monetary sectors and in the balance of  payments. 
The creation of  the area of  social ownership and the prices policy applied in it, 
together with the increasing gap between government expenditure and tax revenues, led 
to a marked increase in the fiscal  deficit.  While in the decade 1960-1969 the deficit 
represented on average 14.6% of  expenditure in the sector and 3-3% of  gross domestic 
product expenditure, the corresponding values in the period 1970-1973 were 35.5% and 
12.5 %. In 1973, the fiscal  deficit  was equivalent to 55.1 % of  fiscal  expenditure and 23.6% 
of  gross domestic product expenditure (see table 1). In real terms the fiscal  deficit  in 1973 
was seven times as large as in the decade 1960-1969, while fiscal  expenditure as a 
proportion of  gross domestic product expenditure stood at double its recent historical 
share. 
Developments in the monetary sector also showed signs of  severe imbalances. 
Whereas in 1960-1969 the average growth rate of  private money (M t) was 37% a year, 
this figure  rose fivefold  in 1970-1973 and in 1973 growth in M, was 419%. There is no 
doubt that, in the face  of  this growth rate in the means of  payment, "monetary" causes 
were important in explaining the inflationary  process which the country was 
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Table 1 
CHILE: F I S C A L D E F I C I T : 1960-1978 
(Percentages) 




1973 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Fiscal expenditure 14.6 35.5 55.1 32.6 11.6 10.0 8.1 4.2 
Gross domestic 
product expenditure 3.3 12.5 23.6 10.3 3.1 2.7 2.3 1.2 
Source: Ministry  of  Finance,  Budget Department,  Exposición sobre el estado de la hacienda pública, Santiago, Chile, 
January 1979. 
Table 2 
CHILE: M O N E Y A N D PRICES: 1966-1973 
(Percentage  change)" 
Inflationb  Currency  issuec Money1 
1966-1970 26 48 41 
1971 41 133 113 
1972 205 174 152 
1973 599 462 363 
Source: Central Bank, Boletín mensual, various issues, and "Series Monetarias", July 1979. University of  Chile, 
Department of  Economics, "Indice de Precios al Consumidor", 1970-1976. 
"December to December. 
'Consumer Price Index: 1966-1970 —National Statistical Institute (INE), 1971-1973— University of  Chile, Department 
of  Economics. 
"Adjusted issue (figures  of  the Central Bank of  Chile).* 
''Private sector money (figures  of  the Central Bank of  Chile). 
•This is the recorded issue by the private and banking sector, adjusted for  various non-monetary items in the Central Bank 
Balance. See University of  Chile, Department of  Economics, Estadísticas  monetarias de Chile  1940-1975,  Publication 
No. 70, Santiago, June 1979, pp. 37-42. 
experiencing; inflation  reached levels unprecedent in the economic history of  Chile. In 
the period 1970-1973, annual average growth in the Consumer Price Index was 117%,' 
and it reached a rate equivalent to 355 % in September 1973, revealing a very serious state 
of  affairs  not only because of  the very high rates of  inflation,  but also because inflation  did 
not appear to be under control. In the period 1960-1969, in contrast, the average annual 
rate of  inflation  was 25% (see table 2). 
The country's external position, the level of  international reserves and capacity to 
secure external loans had also sharply worsened.2 As can be seen from  table 3, both the 
trade balance and the current account balance deteriorated in 1970-1973 compared with 
the average for  the 1960s. By the end of  1973 the level of  net international reserves was 
negative to the extent of  US$ 231 million, compared with a positive balance of  US$ 409 
million in December 1970. 
Of  course, the situation described above was at least partly due to, and was 
aggravated by, the mode of  operation of  the foreign  exchange, financial  and monetary 
markets, and even the market for  real goods and services. 
The functioning  of  the foreign  exchange market was characterized by the existence 
of  multiple undervalued exchange rates, prior import deposits, para-tariff  restrictions, 
import bans and other quantitative limitations. 
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The financial  sector, for  its part, operated with interest rates held at excessively low 
levels, high and differential  reserve ratios, qualitative and selective control of  bank credit, 
and so on. Moreover, the Central Bank offered  no resistance to the demands of  the 
government sector and State-owned enterprises, and thus helped to accentuate inflation-
ary pressures. 
To this should be added the profusion  of  price controls in the market for  real goods 
and services, with the resulting effects  on the allocation of  resources and the general 
efficiency  of  the economic system, and on the emergence of  parallel (black) markets. 
Although the unemployment rate stood below its historical levels (to a large extent 
because of  the rise in employment in the public sector and the area of  public ownership), 
the share of  gross domestic fixed  capital investment in the gross domestic product 
expenditure in the period 1971-1973 was 20% lower than in the 1960s. Furthermore, 
after  a growth of  7.7% in gross domestic product expenditure in 1971, it fell  to 0.1% in 
1972 and 3.6% in 1973-
In view of  the circumstances described above, the new authorities set themselves 
the short-term aim of  re-establishing macroeconomic equilibrium, particularly in the 
financial  field. 
Table 3 




1973 1973 1974 1975 
1976 1977 1978 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Exports of  goods 74 1 056 1 304 2 146 1 554 2 109 2 177 2 480 
Imports of  goods 686 1 170 1 447 2 016 1 708 1 655 2 244 2 917 
Trade balance" 18 -114 -143 130 -154 454 -67 -437 
Current account balance -135 -236 -288 -211 -491 148 -399 -730 
Balance of  non-compensatory 
capital 148 203 242 228 299 235 346 1 351 
Balance of  payments 25 -132 -112 -45 -275 455 -7 671 
Net international reserves 
(average for  the period on the 
basis of  end-of-year  figures) -15 42 -231 -277 -551 -96 -103 515 
(Percentage  of  gross domestic  product  expenditure) 
Exports of  goods 18.2 17.4 19.2 25.6 19.5 24.3 21.8 21.7 
Exports of  goods (excluding 
copper) and services 7.8 6.5 5.5 8.0 11.5 13.4 15.0 16.2 
Imports of  goods 17.7 19.3 21.4 24.0 21.4 19.1 22.4 25.5 
Trade balance" 0.5 -1.9 -2.1 1.6 -1.9 5.2 -0.7 -3.8 
Current account balance -3.5 -3.9 -4.2 -2.5 -6.2 1.7 -4.0 -6.4 
Balance of  non-compensatory 
capital 3.8 3.3 3.6 2.7 3.7 2.7 3.6 11.8 
Balance of  payments 0.6 -2.2 -1.7 -0.5 -3.4 5.2 -0.1 5.9 
Net international reserves 
(average for  the period on the 
basis of  end-of-year  figures) -0.4 0.7 -3.4 -3.3 -6.9 -1.1 -1.0 4.5 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile, boletín  mensual,  December 1976 and May 1979. Ministry of  Finance, Budget Department, 
Exposición  sobre el  estado  de  la hacienda  pública,  January 1979. 
" Defined  as exports of  goods less imports of  goods. 
200 
MONETARY AND REAL EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL OPENING UP 
As a longer-term strategy, the new régime has endeavoured to build up an economy 
based on the use of  the free  price system as a mechanism for  resource allocation,3 the 
progressive reduction of  the State's role in the economy and the attribution of  a "subsid-
iary" role to the State, which must act in such a way as to cause the least possible distortion 
in the operation of  the markets. 
Repeated stress has been laid on the need to control inflation  and to open up the 
economy to the exterior. Measures to combat inflation  have principally been justified  on 
the grounds of  their impact on the transparency and stability of  the price system, and 
accordingly on the allocation of  resources. The need to open up the economy has been 
explained in terms of  the size of  the international market and the effect  of  such a step on 
the competitiveness and efficiency  of  the Chilean economy. 
Consequently, the policies which most merit analysis here —though they were not 
necessarily applied at the same time, despite the fact  that their introduction became fairly 
systematic4 from  the beginning of  1975 onwards— were the following: 
a) Efforts  to control the inflation  process by reducing the growth rate of  the means 
of  payment and currency issue; 
b) Reduction in the size of  the State apparatus, government expenditure and the 
fiscal  deficit,  and transfer  by the State to the private sector of  all those activities 
(including, of  course, productive activities) which the authorities felt  that the private 
sector could carry out efficiently; 
c) Opening up the country to the exterior, especially as regards trade in goods and 
non-financial  services, by simplifying  and reducing rules applying to external trade, 
progressively lowering and standardizing tariffs  and, where possible, eliminating all 
allocation criterion other than the price of  foreign  exchange; 
d) Unification  and forward  planning of  the nominal exchange rate on the basis of 
two criteria: the differential  between the Chilean and the United States inflation  rates, 
and the evolution of  the international reserves of  the monetary system; 
e) Liberalization and development of  the domestic financial  sector, with the 
criteria of  profitability  of  assets and liabilities of  the financial  system, and competition 
between its institutions and intermediaries, becoming the guides for  decision-making and 
action by economic agents. Interest rates would be allowed to move freely,  and legal 
reserve requirements would be reduced and standardized in accordance with general 
economic policy; 
f)  A partial opening up to movements of  international capital, principally con-
trolled through the establishment of  minimum repayment periods and restrictions on the 
capacity of  the national banking system to borrow and to issue guarantees. 
Ill 
The counter-inflation  strategy within the 
macroeconomic policy 
The counter-inflation  strategy was principally based on the effort  to control the rate of 
growth of  the monetary base and money (defined  as M^. This approach was based on the 
view of  new economic authorities that the magnitude of  the Chilean inflationary  process 
by the end of  1973 stemmed from  monetary causes which could fundamentally  be 
attributed to the deficit  incurred by the public sector and the enterprises in the area of 
social ownership. 
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This prompted a sharp restriction of  credit from  the monetary system to the 
government sector, which in 1975-1978 became responsible (as regards its budgetary 
situation in current terms) for  a "disissue" of  currency, absorbing in that period 15% of 
the total issue of  the Central Bank (see table 4). 
This is consistent with the official  medium-term and long-term views on the size 
and self-financing  of  the State sector and the need for  a sharp reduction in the fiscal  sector 
deficit  (see table 1). In these circumstances, the public sector cut back its deficit  by 
reducing expenditure,5 increasing tax revenues,6 raising the tariffs  of  public enterprises 
and services and, though to a lesser extent, seeking to finance  deficits  by borrowing 
domestically from  the private sector. 
Another important source of  finance  for  the State was the sale of  some of  its assets; 
by December 1978 the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción had obtained the 
equivalent of  US$ 585 million in this way. Naturally, this source of  income tends to 
vanish when the process of  selling State assets has been completed. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that despite the appreciable effort  of  the public 
sector to accommodate itself  to the requirements of  the new economic policy, growth in 
the monetary base up to the end of  1977 remained extraordinarily high for  what was 
termed a "monetarist" stabilization strategy. Only in 1977 did annual growth in the 
monetary base fall  below the levels recorded in 1971-1973, and even then it remained 
excessively high, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the periods prior to 1970 
(see table 5). 
Moreover, in spite of  the efforts  of  the monetary authorities to control the means of 
payment, it took about five  years7 to reduce inflation  to levels close to, though higher 
than, historical levels.8 
Table 4 
CHILE: VARIATIONS IN ADJUSTED CURRENCY ISSUE, 1974-1978 






















operations" Domestic credit 
Absolute values 
(millions  of  pesos) 
-41 -14 
2 336 997 
9 536 3 285 
7 453 7 025 
16 747 4 223 
Percentage  breakdown 


















Source: Central Bank of  Chile, Series  monetarias,  July 1979; University of  Chile, Department of  Economics, Estadísticas 
monetarias  de  Chile,  1940-1975. 
"Including operations with the private sector and with the Treasury. 
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Table 5 
CHILE: MONEY AND PRICES, 1966-1978 
Percentage  change 
(December  to December) 
Velocity  of 
circulation" 
(number  of 








































































Source: Central Bank of Chile, Series  Monetarias,  op.cit.;  Exposición  sobre el  estado  de  la hacienda  pública,  op.cit.;  INE and 
Department of Economics, University of Chile. 
" Defined as the gross domestic product expenditure divided by M,. These figures cprrespond to observed values, which are 
not necessarily the equilibrium values. 
Source: Department of Economics, University of Chile. For the remainder of the period, the source is INE. 
In  terms of  the analytical  framework  in which the economic policy  operated,  this 
would seem to be due principally to the relative lack of  sound instruments for  monetary 
control,9 above all because of  the embryonic nature of  the long-term capital market, which 
prevented proper open-market operations. This was aggravated by the evolution of  the 
velocity of  circulation of  money,10 basically as a result of  the creation of  very good 
substitutes for  money and the persistence, for  a considerable period of  time, of  high 
inflationary  expectations.11 
Since the difficulty  in controlling currency issue lay principally in the exceptional inflow 
of  foreign  currency, which accounted for  80% of  the cumulative change in the money base 
between 1975 and 1978, it would appear essential to analyse more thoroughly the 
repercussions of  this change on a group of  variables of  key importance for  the operation, 
balance and vigour of  the economy. 
In the first  place, it is worth recalling the well known fact  that, if  the exchange rate 
is fixed  (in the sense that the Central Bank undertakes to buy and sell foreign  exchange at 
a given, though not necessarily constant, price), then as an economy is opened up to 
external forces  (either through the current account, the capital account, or both), 
domestic issue and money become increasingly endogenous12 vis-a-vis  the functioning  of 
the economy. In this way the efforts  of  the authorities to control the nominal supply of 
money tend to be fruitless,  and their field  of  action is limited to domestic credit. 
1. The  counter-inflation  policy  and opening 
up to the exterior 
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As is well known, the Chilean production sector was subjected in a rapid and 
escalating manner to external competition, as a result of  the progressive reductions in 
tariffs  (see table 6) 1 3 and the introduction of  a single real exchange rate which, despite 
these reductions, did not rise appreciably (see table 7). 
Although protection for  some sectors which were previously subject to negative 
effective  protection was increased, the average tariff  was lowered and standardized, and 
quantitative restrictions of  all kinds were minimized almost to the point of  elimination. 
As a consequence of  this opening up to foreign  trade, attempts to control money 
supply tend, though not immediately, to be cancelled out by movements in the current 
account14 or the capital account of  the balance of  payments. In other words, changes in the 
level of  international reserves result from  imbalances in the monetary sector. 
The evolution of  the capital account of  the balance of  payments, and in particular 
that of  net inflows  of  foreign  loans to the domestic private sector, especially since the end 
of  1977, have played a preponderant role in this regard. 
Although the external financial  liberalization took place more slowly than the 
liberalization of  the real sector of  the economy, it came to form  the main mechanism 
through which liquidity in the economy was increased. Part IV below contains a more 
thorough discussion of  the special stimulus given to private borrowing abroad. Here we 
shall briefly  analyse the important role played by such borrowing in slowing the decline in 
the growth of  currency issue and thus causing the main burden of  the stabilization 
programme to fall  with excessive force  on the public sector. 
In order to understand the role played by international movements of  capital, it is 
necessary to remember that during the first  half  of  1975, determination of  the interest 
Table 6 
CHILE: NOMINAL TARIFFS, 1973-1979 
(Percentage  of  CIF  values) 
Date of  adjustment Average tariff 
Maximum 
tariff 
1973: at 31 December 94 Over 500 
1974: 1 March 90 200 
27 March 80 160 
5 June 67 140 
1975: 16 January 52 120 
13 August 44 90 
1976: 9 February 38 70 
7 June 33 60 
22 December 27 60 
1977: 8 January 24 50 
30 April 22 50 
2 9 August 20 35 
December 16 25 
1978: March 15 20 
June 14 20 
December 12 15 
1979: June 10 10 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"There are a small number of exceptions to the maximum tariffs,  the most important of which relates to motorcars. 
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Table 7 
CHILE: EVOLUTION OF THE EXCHANGE RATE AND PRICES 
Indexes  (Average  for  1974 = 100) 
Period 
, , , , . , Index  of  whole-Index  of  the nomtnal , , sale pnces of exchange rate , domestic  products 
(1)  (2) 
Index  of  whole-
sale prices in the 
United  States 
(3) 
Index  of  the real 
exchange rates" 
[(1)(2)}  (3) 
(4) 
1974 (average) 100 100 100 100 
First quarter 52 46 92 104 
Second quarter 77 73 96 101 
Third quarter 108 115 103 97 
Fourth quarter 167 169 106 105 
1975 (average) 595 590 108 109 
First quarter 280 261 106 114 
Second quarter 490 452 107 116 
Third quarter 700 697 109 109 
Fourth quarter 907 946 111 106 
1976 (average) 1 580 1 920 114 94 
First quarter 1 212 1 224 112 111 
Second quarter 1 517 1 720 113 100 
Third quarter 1 640 2 266 115 83 
Fourth quarter 1 950 2 474 116 91 
1977 (average) 2 607 3 514 121 90 
First quarter 2 230 2 900 118 91 
Second quarter 2 353 3 392 121 84 
Third quarter 2 695 3 744 121 87 
Fourth quarter 3 128 4 020 122 95 
1978 (average) 3 828 5 097 130 98 
First quarter 3 520 4 352 126 102 
Second quarter 3 778 4 868 130 101 
Third quarter 3 953 5 358 131 97 
Fourth quarter 4060 5 810 134 94 
Source: Central Bank of Chile; National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
"This column probably underestimates the actual real exchange rate, if one takes into account the diversification of Chilean 
foreign trade and the devaluation of the dollar against other industrial countries' currencies. No calculations of the 
effective  exchange rate are published in Chile. 
rate in the domestic financial  system was left  to market forces.  At the same time, steps 
were taken to ensure a sharp reduction in the previous control —both quantitative and 
qualitative— on bank credit, by stimulating competition within the financial  system.15 
However, because of  the desire to control growth of  the means of  payment, high reserve 
ratios on deposits were maintained for  a substantial period, and this helped to create a 
marked difference  between interest rates for  borrowers and for  lenders. 
As may be seen from  table 8, from  the second quarter of  1975 onwards extremely 
high real interest rates for  borrowers existed side by side with rates to depositors which, 
while positive (especially from  the second half  of  1976 onwards), were much lower than 
the lending rates. The principal explanation for  this, as already noted, lies partly in the 
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high reserve ratios and also in the cost of  operations by intermediaries and the profits 
obtained by the financial  system during the period under consideration.16 
Table 9 provides data on actual domestic interest rates17 expressed in (nominal) 
dollars, in other words the pertinent rates which are comparable with international 
interest rates. Here it can be seen that, with the exception of  1975, when the rate of 
devaluation of  the peso was almost identical to the nominal bank interest rate to 
borrowers, real rates in the remainder of  the period were extraordinarily high. 
The differential  between the interest rates prevailing in Chile and those in the 
main international financial  centres (which on various occasions have recorded negative 
rates in real dollars), together with the excess supply of  international liquidity in the 
industrialized countries, the improvement in the international reserve position of  the 
Chilean monetary system and Chile's creditworthiness, go a long way towards explaining 
the inflow  of  foreign  exchange to the country during this period.18 
Mention must also be made of  the stimulus given to demand for  external liabilities 
on the part of  residents, because of  the types of  controls affecting  international capital 
movements, which, for  persons who had access to external finance,  led to substantial 
monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic profits  (see Part IV).19 
As may be seen from  table 10, in the four  years between 1975 and 1978 net flows  of 
private capital made up 74% of  exchange operations and 58% of  the cumulative issue 
during that period. 
It should be noted that, while the inflow  of  external credit, through its influence  on 
the domestic capital market, helps to reduce the interest rate, this requires that there 
Table 8 
CHILE: REAL 30-DAY BANK INTEREST RATES ON PESO DEPOSITS" 
(Percentages) 
19 75 1976 1977 1978 
Charg- Paid Mar- Charg- Paid Mar- Charg- Paid Mar- Charg- Paid Mar-
ed gin ed gin ed gin ed gin 
January -3.8 -4.0 0.2 3.7 -0.4 4.1 6.2 1.9 4.3 5.4 4.2 1.2 
February -5.9 -5.5 -0.4 3.9 0.1 3.8 5.4 1.0 4.4 3.6 2.2 1.4 
March -9.6 -8.0 -1.6 1.0 -3.2 4.2 3.8 0.1 3.7 1.5 0.1 1.4 
April -9.3 -6.8 -2.5 2.6 -1.3 3.9 3.9 0.9 3.0 1.8 0.7 1.1 
May 2.6 -1.3 3.9 4.8 2.3 2.5 3.8 1.4 2.4 3.6 2.4 1.2 
June 1.0 -3.3 4.3 1.6 -0.6 2.2 3.5 1.4 2.1 2.8 1.3 1.5 
July 10.9 5.4 5.5 2.7 -0.9 3.6 2.4 0.6 1.8 1.9 0.7 1.2 
August 9.4 3.7 5.7 6.0 2.6 3.4 2.8 1.0 1.8 1.8 1.0 0.8 
September 8.7 0.3 8.4 3.7 0.3 3.4 2.4 1.0 1.4 2.1 1.3 0.8 
October 3.3 -0.4 3.7 4.8 1.3 3.5 2.6 1.3 1.3 3.6 2.7 0.9 
November 3.5 -0.2 3.7 8.4 4.6 3.8 5.2 3.8 1.4 4.0 2.9 1.1 
December 6.9 2.7 4.2 7.7 3.8 3.9 4.2 1.3 4.0 3.1 0.9 
Annual" 15.9 -17.8 64.2 10.8 57.2 18.7 42.6 25.0 
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
"Defined as ij^ = ——, where ij^ j is the nominal monthly bank rate and£ is the monthly inflation rate as indicated by 
1 "f p 
the change in the Consumer Price Index. 
Annual real rate, calculated by compounding the real monthly rate over the year. 
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Table 9 
CHILE: 30-DAY B A N K I N T E R E S T RATES O N US DOLLAR DEPOSITS" 
(Percentages) 










ed gin ed gin ed gin ed gin 
January -6.88 -7.16 0.28 2.88 -1.16 6.61 2.28 4.33 4.42 3.19 1.23 
February -7.03 -6.35 • -0.68 4.19 0.27 3.92 5.21 0.83 4.38 3.28 1.36 
March -11.60 -10.07 -1.53 7.58 3.26 4.32 14.54 10.48 4.06 1.82 0.43 1.39 
April -13.67 -11.31 -2.36 7.32 3.21 4.11 6.53 3.47 3.06 1.86 0.82 1.04 
May 4.06 0.12 3.94 5.48 2.91 2.57 3.89 1.40 2.49 3.40 2.26 1.14 
June 6.86 2.27 4.59 5.84 3.53 2.31 2.46 0.36 2.10 3.09 1.63 1.46 
July 3.97 -1.18 5.15 18.17 13.96 4.21 2.70 0.85 1.85 2.91 1.71 1.20 
August 9.47 3.86 5.61 6.19 2.68 3.51 1.41 -0.28 1.69 3.27 2.39 0.88 
September 11.39 2.76 8.63 5.21 1.73 3.48 -2.29 -3.62 1.33 4.06 3.27 0.79 
October 1.96 -1.68 3.64 5.61 2.12 3.49 3.23 1.97 1.26 4.67 3.76 0.91 
November 2.37 -1.29 3.66 5.80 2.13 3.67 3.52 2.20 1.32 4.53 3.49 1.04 
December 3.26 -0.80 4.06 7.22 3.33 3.89 -0.11 -1.33 1.22 4.74 3.85 0.89 
Annual* 0.39 -27.90 118.53 44.36 58.38 19.57 51.10 32.73 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile. 
« 'N - t 
Defined  as ij) = where i j j is the nominal monthly bank rate and t is the monthly percentage change in the 
1 + t 
nominal exchange rate. 
b Annual rate, expressed in US dollars, calculated by compounding the monthly rate (expressed in US dollars) over the year. 
Table 10 
CHILE: N E T FLOW O F P R I V A T E E X T E R N A L C A P I T A L A N D 
C U R R E N C Y ISSUE 
Annual flows 
f  millions of  dollars) 
Currency Exchange Net  inflouof 
Percentage Percentage 
issue operations private capital 
(1) 12) 13) (3)  : (2) (3)  : (1) 
1975 639 476 236 50 37 
1976 844 731 254 35 30 
1977 665 346 267 77 40 
1978 523 529 783 148 150 
1975-1978 2 671 2 082 1 540 74 58 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile, Boletín  mensual and Series  monetarias. 
"Gross inflows  less amortization and interest payments. 
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should be no simultaneous attempt to reduce the rate of  increase in the means of  payment. 
If  mechanisms are applied to reduce the build-up of  domestic credit, a situation arises 
where a substantial part of  the effort  made by the public sector is nullified  by growth in 
money arising from  the balance-of-payments  situation. 
It should be mentioned that repayment of  the official  external debt helped to create 
this situation, since an "active" net inflow  of  foreign  exchange was needed to make the 
payments, even though it is not possible to discount the use of  international reserves, at 
least in part, for  that purpose.20 Nevertheless, the foreign  exchange required did not have 
to be generated by the private sector. The Chilean public sector might also have helped to 
refinance  the debt by means of  new foreign  borrowing, although this was not the option 
followed,  so that the foreign  exchange needed to service the external debt had to be 
obtained through the trade balance or the private capital account. 
To the above should be added the objective of  increasing the country's international 
reserves (which, however, probably grew faster  than was desired); this necessarily 
imposed a very active role on exchange operations within the scheme of  monetary 
emissions, leading to delays in reducing the growth of  the means of  payment. 
2. The  counter-inflation  policy  and 
demand  for  money 
One of  the aspects of  the economic policy which attracts most attention is the excessively 
passive attitude of  the economic authorities both to managing demand for  money and to 
influencing  the community's inflationary  expectations.21 It is well known that the 
liquidity ratio is determined by the public in general, but the cost of  keeping money can 
nevertheless be affected  by the behaviour of  the Central Bank. In this regard, the moment 
chosen to free  interest rates,22 which, in view of  the prevailing circumstances, could be 
counted on to rise to extraordinarily high levels, does not appear to have been in keeping 
with the counter-inflation  policy, both because of  its implications for  the velocity of 
circulation (see table 5) of  already existing money25 and because of  the impact on demand 
for  international finance. 
There can be no doubt that the freeing  of  the interest rate, in an intensely 
inflationary  context, together with a relatively slow devaluation, stimulated the economic 
agents to keep their financial  assets (in the form  of  quasi-money) in pesos and their 
liabilities in dollars.24 Naturally, these two phenomena were inconsistent with a counter-
inflation  strategy which involved an attempt  to reduce the rate of  growth in (nominal) 
money, especially as no decisive action was taken on the determinants of  the (real) 
demand for  money. 
Accordingly, the timing of  the sales of  State assets and the freeing  of  the interest 
rate does not appear very appropriate in the light of  the effort  made as regards fiscal 
discipline, which, inter  alia,  contributed to a sharp drop in investment and an 
extraordinarily large increase in unemployment. 
One interesting aspect was only tackled in part; this was the effort  to increase 
demand for  money by reducing the reserve requirement on bank deposits and/or by the 
payment by the Central Bank of  adequate interest on the legal reserves maintained by the 
banking system.25 
As is well known, the reserve requirement on deposits is equivalent, from  the 
viewpoint of  the banks, to a tax on the use of  a "factor  of  production". Reducing the 
reserve requirement amounts to lowering the tax rate, while paying interest on the 
reserve, in the final  analysis, reduces the magnitude of  this tax. 
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Accordingly, by increasing the capacity for  making loans or, alternatively, making it 
more profitable  for  banks to seek deposits, it may be hoped that measures such as those 
indicated will further  stimulate competition among banks for  deposits, which tend to 
become more attractive assets for  individuals and enterprises, thus increasing the 
quantity of  them sought.26 Of  course, this increase should be compared with the rise in 
currency issue and the probable increase in the value of  the bank multiplier arising both 
from  the reduction in the reserve requirement and from  an expected decline in the 
currency/deposit ratio. 
Another point which merits emphasis in connection with a counter-inflation  policy 
based on an effort  to reduce the growth rate of  the nominal money supply is the need to 
pay attention to the evolution of  the flow  demand for  money. The more traditional type of 
monetary analysis takes account only of  money as a stock, and it is in this sense that both 
the supply of  money and demand for  it are usually studied. A more relevant concept for 
evaluating the short-term implications of  monetary imbalances, however, refers  to the 
flow  of  supply and demand for  money, and the latter corresponds to demand for  money 
over a given period of  time. 
Either as a consequence of  imbalances between the real stock of  money sought and 
the existing stock, or of  economic growth, of  expectations of  a reduction in the cost of 
holding money, of  the probable lower yield from  assets used as substitutes for  money, of 
demand for  nominal money to replenish the real stock sought, or of  a combination of 
these factors,  a given demand will exist for  nominal money flow. 
If  the monetary authority does not meet it, there will be an excess supply of  goods 
and a fall  in the rate of  economic activity, though even so inflationary  pressures will not 
abate for  some time. This would be a possible "monetary" explanation of  the 
phenomenon of  "stagflation".  According to some authors, the mechanism described 
above could have provided a fundamental  explanation for  the Chilean situation in 1975. 
Because of  the magnitude of  the tax represented by inflation28  at that time, and 
because the monetary authority insisted on controlling the growth of  M,, there was an 
excess demand for  nominal money flow.  This imbalance was reflected  in excess supply in 
the goods market, so that the macroeconomic adjustment occurred fundamentally  in the 
form  of  a profound  economic recession, thus reducing demand for  real monetary 
balances.29 
The above points to the need to ensure that a counter-inflation  programme which 
is aimed at moderating growth in M, should also take into account the evolution of 
demand for  money, especially when the real liquidity of  the economy is excessively low.30 
This latter aspect is of  great importance since, at least in the Chilean case, there is some 
evidence that when the cost of  holding money becomes excessively high, real demand for 
money stock becomes very inelastic vis-a-vis  the inflation  rate,31 whereas this does not, of 
course, happen with the flow  demand for  money. 
3. Counter-inflation  policy,  the exchange rate 
and the rate of  interest 
As is well known, in a small, open economy with a non-floating  exchange rate there is 
very close relationship between exchange, monetary and credit policies. The Chilean case 
fits  this description in many respects. 
A matter continuously under discussion is what the "equilibrium" exchange rate 
should be, and what exchange rate policy would be most appropriate. If  it is accepted that 
the monetary authority should fix  the exchange rate instead of  letting it float,  what 
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criterion should guide forward  planning of  the exchange rate? A great deal has been 
written on this matter, and it will undoubtedly continue to be a subject of  debate between 
economists for  a long time to come. A recent meeting jointly organized by ECLAC and the 
Central Bank of  Uruguay contributed some interesting ideas (of  great importance for  the 
countries of  Latin America) to this old discussion.52 The paragraphs below contain a few 
additional reflections  prompted by Chilean experience in the last five  years. 
It would seem that forward  planning of  the exchange rate in Chile was guided by at 
least two criteria: differences  between international and domestic inflation  rates, and the 
level of  the country's international reserves.35 Furthermore, it was sometimes used to 
help guide expectations of  inflation  and, through its influence  on exports and imports, to 
secure a desired deficit  on the current account of  the balance of  payments. 
This was undoubtedly a case of  an attempt to use an instrument to reach various 
objectives which are not necessarily compatible. In particular, it was not clear whether the 
exchange rate was a mechanism to be used to control the commercial opening up, or 
whether its evolution had to be planned in the light of  the evolution of  the exchange 
market. For example, during periods of  very slow devaluation, and even revaluation, the 
inflow  of  short-term capital rose, apparently stimulated by expectations concerning the 
ratio between the future  rate of  devaluation and the evolution of  the domestic interest 
rate. In this way, if  the exchange rate is used merely as an instrument of  monetary control, 
without combining it with proper planning as regards the relative yields of  the different 
liabilities in the financial  system, this may, at least for  a time, produce effects  very 
different  from  those expected.34 This latter factor  is of  particular importance because of 
the close relationship between exchange rate management and interest rate 
management. 
When the exchange rate is indexed, while the interest rate is free  and rises to the 
very high levels it reached in the Chilean case, there is no doubt that this provides an 
enormous stimulus for  the inflow  of  financial  capital. Indeed, attempts to regulate or 
control this inflow  will be fruitless  if  the interest rate differential  between the domestic 
economy and outside, after  discounting expectations of  a devaluation (which may include 
exchange rate risk in parallel markets) is sufficiently  attractive. 
This, it would appear, was what happened in the Chilean economy. If  total 
international  reserves are taken as a guide in determining the exchange rate, a situation 
arises where, as a consequence of  the initially restrictive monetary policy, the domestic 
interest rate rises; as a result, the inflow  of  external capital is stimulated and the exchange 
rate is depressed (in relative terms).35 
This means that the current account deficit  and the consequent external borrowing 
are greater than they would have been if  the evolution of  the exchange rate had been 
planned using another criterion, with more rapid devaluations. 
In this way the country is placed in a situation where the economic recovery can be 
slowed down by the continuing restrictions on government expenditure (which ceases to 
be the "cause" of  inflation,  but whose inactivity is an important factor  in the slowness of 
the recovery), together with lower net external demand than would have existed if  a 
different  combination of  monetary, fiscal  and exchange policies had been applied. 
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the real exchange rate in Chile, despite the 
lowering of  tariffs  and the worsening of  the terms of  trade which occurred in the period 
1975-1978,36 was on average 2.3% below  its average value in 1974.37 In addition, it was 
very unstable as regards its role in allocating resources for  export activities and import 
substitution, as the currency had been devalued in 1975 and 1978 and revalued in 1976 and 
1977.38 This would indicate that the reduction in tariffs  was one of  the factors  accounting 
for  the marked growth in the country's exports and imports in the recent period, 
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principally through the reduction in the cost of  imported raw materials, inputs and capital 
goods.39 
The sharp deterioration in the current account balance in 1977 and 1978, and the 
preliminary projections for  1979, indicate that a more rapid devaluation would be 
desirable,40 to generate foreign  exchange by means of  a smaller current account deficit.  In 
this way greater protection would be granted to the domestic market and, subject to 
success in modifying  expectations of  devaluation, the inflow  of  international capital 
would be moderated, while there would be still greater stimulation of  non-traditional 
exports, whose real growth rate, in relation  to the tariff  reductions,  must tend to decline 
because of  the fact  that, once the planned level and structure of  tariffs  has been reached, 
the additional  stimuli to activities which make intensive use of  imported goods cease. 
In addition, the rate of  external borrowing, which in 1978 and 1979 grew much 
faster  than the average for  the period, would be reduced. Tn this regard it has recently 
been asserted that, in the case of  the Chilean economy, foreign  borrowing is not of  great 
importance, since most of  the loans are contracted by the private sector, thus ensuring the 
profitability  of  externally financed  projects. In this way, it is argued, servicing of  the 
external debt would be ensured automatically through the efficiency  associated with the 
uses to which it would be put. 
However, it would appear necessary to point out that the above argument is 
excessively simplistic. Because of  the considerable recent build-up of  external debt, the 
exchange rate has been held down, making its long-term adjustment more difficult. 
However, the real cost of  servicing the external debt in the future  requires not only the 
generation of  domestic saving, but also its conversion into foreign  exchange. Accordingly, 
if  important changes occur in the terms of  trade, in international liquidity or in domestic 
economic or institutional circumstances, so that the country does not enjoy the present 
abundance of  foreign  exchange, it might be necessary to modify  the parity, with 
corresponding implications for  the real value of  the external debt expressed in terms of 
domestic resources, and for  the social efficiency  of  the externally financed  projects. 
As already noted, prior commitments as regards payment of  the official  external 
debt imposed strong pressures on the monetary sector. However, it is not clear what 
procedure for  the generation of  foreign  exchange would be most appropriate —a surplus 
on the non-compensatory capital account or a smaller deficit  on the current account. 
Perhaps during the period of  highest inflation  stimulation of  the exchange rate might 
have offered  some disadvantages. 
Nevertheless, a rate of  devaluation persistently lower than the differential  between 
domestic and international nominal interest rates stimulates the flow  of  international 
capital to the country, and when this inflow  does not finance  a current account deficit,  but 
is principally used to build up international reserves, it does not contribute to raising total 
saving. In fact,  for  a given level of  growth of  the quantity of  money, external credit 
actually competes with domestic credit; in contrast, if  the inflow  of  international capital 
takes the form  of  a larger current account deficit,  external saving is increased. 
The combination of  devaluation (revaluation) and domestic interest rates are not 
independent of  the inflow  of  foreign  exchange and the creation of  base money. Nor are 
they independent of  the degree of  substitution and/or complementarity between 
domestic and foreign  saving. It would seem from  Chilean experience that the exchange 
rate is not an appropriate instrument to control the monetary base, especially when it is 
used in isolation.41 Insistence on forward  planning of  the exchange rate using this 
criterion has important effects  on other economic policy objectives, particularly foreign 
borrowing, complementarity between domestic and external saving, and the allocation of 
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resources between domestic and tradable goods, all of  which must be properly evaluated 
in terms of  the objective of  stabilizing the level of  prices. 
IV 
Opening up to the exterior in the financial  field42 
One aspect of  Chilean economic policy which is out of  keeping with the general approach 
which has guided the economic programme in the last five  years relates to the opening up 
of  the Chilean economy to international financial  capital. It is interesting to note that 
recent developments in Argentina and Uruguay have been much more liberal in this 
regard, but at the same time rather more cautious and "gradualist" as regards the 
commercial opening up. 
Despite the common impression that Chile borrowed a great deal between 1975 
and 1978,43 the empirical evidence indicates that this view should be carefully  evaluated. 
In nominal  terms, between the end of  1974 and the end of  1978 the country contracted 
loans totalling US$ 2 137 million, increasing its gross reserves by US$ 1 062 million, 
giving nominal net borrowing of  US$ 1 075 million. This is equivalent to cumulative 
growth of  25.4% over the net debit balance at the end of  1974, in other words, an annual 
average rate of  nominal net borrowing of  below 6% (see table 11). However, it should be 
mentioned that the net borrowing figures  underestimate the "actual" nominal debt to 
some extent, since it is necessary to maintain a high level of  reserves in order to retain 
access to external financing. 
"Real" net borrowing is usually estimated by deflating  the nominal value of  the 
external debt by an index of  the unit value of  the country's imports. During the four  years 
1975-1978, if  this procedure is used, Chile's real gross external debt fell  at an average rate 
of  0.4%, and the real net debt fell  at an annual average rate of  3-9% (see table 12). 
However, as has been asserted in a recent study,44 the methodology set out above 
suffers  from  serious limitations, and it seems more appropriate, in measuring the 
effective  debt burden, to deflate  it by an index of  the terms of  trade. This calculation, in the 
Table 11 
CHILE: EXTERNAL DEBT: 1973-1978 
(Millions  of  dollars) 




Net  debt 
(1)  - (2) 
1973 4 048 401 3 647 
1974 4 774 535 4 239 
1975 5 263 All 4 836 
1976 5 195 816 4 379 
1977 5 434 871 4 563 
1978 6911 1 597 5 314 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile, Deuda externa de  Chile  1978. 
Note: The external debt figures  refer  to sums actually disbursed outstanding at the end of  each year. They include 
traditional debt and other external liabilities comprising the International Monetary Fund, suppliers' credits and 
financial  credits to the private sector, as well as short-term lines of  credit to commercial banks, the Banco del Estado 
and the Centra] Bank. 
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Table 12 
CHILE: EXTERNAL DEBT, 1975-1978 
(Percentage  change) 
Year Gross debt Net  debt 
A B C A B C 
1975 10.2 -8.3 82.4 14.1 -5.1 88.7 
1976 -1.3 -3.2 -8.0 -9.4 -11.2 -15.6 
1977 4.6 -5.7 16.4 4.2 -6.1 16.0 
1978 27.2 17.8 34.0 16.5 7.8 22.7 
1975-1978" 9.7 -0.4 27.2 5.8 -3.9 22.7 
Source: Table 11; CEPAL: Economic Survey of  Latin  America, 1978. 
Note: A = Growth rate of  the nominal external debt. 
B = Growth rate of  the nominal external debt deflated  by the index of  import prices. 
C = Growth rate of  the nominal external debt deflated  by the terms-of-trade  index. 
"Average annual growth rate during the period. 
Chilean case, leads to the conclusion that the average annual growth rates of  the gross and 
net debt during the period 1975-1978 reached 27.2% and 22.7% respectively. In other 
words, real growth in the external debt thus defined,  in the last four  years, was three times 
the growth of  the nominal external debt. 
Furthermore, provisional figures  indicate that in 1979, as in 1978, external borrow-
ing showed a sharply increasing trend. 
Despite the above, it would have seemed reasonable to expect a much greater 
inflow  of  external credits in view of  the very high domestic interest rates, the low interest 
rates on international markets, the abundance of  international liquidity and the evolution 
of  the exchange rate in Chile.45 
In order to understand the smaller relative inflow  of  financial  capital to the Chilean 
economy from  an economic viewpoint, three main aspects should be borne in mind. 
Firstly, it is necessary to point out that in the first  years of  application of  the new 
economic policy, the attitude of  the international financial  community to Chile was very 
cautious, so that until well into 1977 there were probably substantial limitations on 
external borrowing on the supply side. 
A second consideration is that, while the public sector increased its debt very slowly, 
the same did not happen with the private sector. As can be seen from  table 15 below, in 
the four  years under review the public sector increased its external debt by 17 %, while the 
rise in the private sector debt was 228%. This has important implications in the field  of 
redistribution, as will be indicated below. 
A third factor  which helps to explain the phenomenon is the set of  obstacles and 
restrictions imposed by the monetary authorities on such external capital as might be 
appropriated by the domestic financial  system.46 
The most important limitations on the inflow  of  external credits47 include those 
relating to minimum periods for  repatriation, and those which restrict bank borrowing in 
foreign  currency in terms of  the sums involved (which are tied to the banks' capital and 
reserves), the speed with which they can be increased (because of  restrictions on the flow 
of  borrowing), and the capacity to grant guarantees.48 
There are also two further  aspects of  this subject which merit thorough analysis: 
one relating to the monetary approach to the balance of  payments, and the other to the 
implications for  resource allocation and wealth distribution of  the type of  restrictions 
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imposed on external borrowing. However, the lack of  sufficient  disaggregated, up-to-date 
information  makes it necessary to conduct the discussion in broad terms, in the form  of 
questions, merely laying down a few  general recommendations which, in our view, may be 
inferred  from  the Chilen experience. 
1. Financial  opening up to the exterior  and the monetary 
approach to the balance of  payments 
As already indicated, the economic strategy relating to external financing  does not fall 
squarely within the general lines of  economic policy. 
It would appear that the economic authorities considered, at least until the middle 
of  1979, that the so-called monetary approach to the balance of  payments has greater 
validity in the long than in the short term. If  dynamic aspects of  movements in the 
balance-of-payments  accounts, patterns of  adjustment in variables, etc., are ignored, the 
process of  opening up to the international capital market and complete integration into it 
(together with the liberalization of  the domestic capital market, including reforms  of 
reserve requirements, and so on) would, according to the monetary theory of  the balance 
of  payments, generate a large inflow  of  external credit and a very rapid tendency for  the 
domestic interest rate and international rates (adjusted for  a certain risk) to become equal. 
This would furnish  a substantial stimulus to investment especially in construction (one of 
the most depressed economic sectors in the last five  years), and promote a rise in 
economic activity. 
The principal drawbacks of  such a measure are connected with the adjustment 
process, and particularly its possible repercussions on inflation  (depending on the degree 
of  commercial opening up and the exchange rate policy adopted, through monetization of 
the accumulation of  reserves), the external borrowing position and the probable drop in 
the rate of  devaluation, with the consequent adverse effects  on economic activity and 
employment (particularly in the sectors producing tradable goods).49 
The main argument cited by the economic authorities against a complete 
liberalization of  the external financial  market refers  to the potential impact of  a massive 
inflow  of  external capital on the money supply, and consequently on the stabilization 
effort.50  In fact,  it is necessary to assess the elasticity of  demand for  finance  vis-a vis the 
interest rate, identify  the monetary repercussions of  the measure (including the larger 
deficit  on the current account of  the balance of  payments) and compare them with the 
expected evolution of  demand for  money. 
There are very few  empirical studies in Chile concerning the behaviour of  the 
market for  loanable funds.  However, recent experience suggests that a very substantial 
capital inflow  would be required in order to lower the interest rate.51 If  this occurred, it 
would generate an excess supply of  money flows,  with equilibrium being achieved in three 
basic ways. 
The first  way is adjustment through an increase in output  and/or  prices, principally 
of  goods which are not internationally tradable, with the resulting repercussions on 
economic activity and/or the general level of  prices. 
The second adjustment variable would act through the domestic financial  market, 
by means of  a rise in demand  for  money (appropriately defined)  arising from  the possible 
reduction in the cost of  holding liquid balances, and from  the rise in the volume of 
transactions. 
Finally, the third means of  adjustment is a change in the current account balance of 
the balance of  payments. Naturally, the more open the economy to the exterior, and the 
greater the trade links with international markets for  real goods and services, the more 
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important this variable is. Consequently, it is very likely that a more rapid opening up to 
external finance  would only temporarily generate greater inflationary  pressures and a 
certain improvement in output of  non-tradable goods and services. The main result 
would be a larger trade gap, with a consequent rise in external indebtedness and a fall  in 
levels of  activity and employment in the sector producing internationally tradable goods. 
However, this last conclusion is closely linked to the exchange rate policy adopted 
during the external financial  liberalization. If  the movement of  the exchange rate is 
guided by the evolution of  the current account and the external debt, with the currency 
being devalued more rapidly or more slowly as the current account deficit  or the level of 
external debt increases or declines, there will be a rise in the level of  prices, increasing 
nominal demand for  money. The build-up of  international reserves, accompanied in this 
case by the attempt to reduce the growth rate of  money, means that external financing 
replaces domestic credit, without necessarily helping to generate a greater volume of 
domestic saving. If,  on the other hand, the exchange rate policy is guided by the balance-
of-payments  position, a growing accumulation of  international reserves would lead to a 
slower devaluation (or a revaluation), with an increase in the current account deficit  and 
the external debt. In this way, external financing  constitutes foreign  savings, which, 
assuming  a certain level of  domestic savings, helps to ensure that the expenditure of  the 
economy exceeds the level of  the product.52 
It should be noted that increasing external borrowing leads to a "negative" 
external- ity because of  the criteria used by creditors in evaluating risks and solvency, so 
that the social marginal cost (for  the country) of  external borrowing is greater than the 
private marginal cost. This is an argument in favour  of  imposing a tax on the raising of 
external finance,  even when there is complete external financial  openness. 
On the basis of  the interest rate differential,  the exchange rate policy followed  and 
recognition of  the delayed action of  economic policy, it seems clear that more rapid 
external financial  opening up would, in the Chilean case, have led to greater net external 
borrowing, a fall  in the level of  activity in the sector producing tradable goods and a rise in 
domestic liquidity (or a combination of  the three effects),  thus justifying  the authorities' 
concern to control the degree of  external financial  openness.53 
However it cannot be denied that more thorough-going domestic financial 
liberalization and a stronger devaluation of  the peso would have substantially reduced the 
influence  of  private capital from  abroad, probably stimulating domestic saving and 
lessening the impact of  exchange operations —through the capital account of  the balance 
of  payments— on currency issue and the counter-inflation  strategy. 
Since a decision was taken to move faster  towards openness in the trade field  than 
in the financial  field,54  it would seem to be of  interest to study this phenomenon, and 
particularly the way in which external finance  was restricted, and its implications for  the 
Chilean economy. These points are analysed below. 
2. Some "real"  consequences of  the control  of 
external  finance 
One of  the most interesting subjects of  analysis in the Chilean economic experience is the 
way in which the external financial  opening up was controlled. This is because normally 
in order to ensure consistency with the remaining measures adopted, it would have 
seemed natural to expect a total opening up to international capital markets, or 
alternatively, from  considerations of  short-term macroeconomic equilibrium,55 the 
rationing of  external credit by price, which was the mechanism governing most of  the 
remaining economic decisions. 
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However, the procedure adopted56 involved establishing de  facto  quantitative 
restrictions on external borrowing,57 especially in the case of  the domestic financial 
system, which enjoys greatest ease of  access to the international capital market. As 
already noted, the capital and reserves of  the financial  enterprises limited both their 
external borrowing and their capacity to issue guarantees, and there was in addition a 
general limitation on all economic agents as regards the periods of  time for  which 
external funds  could be borrowed. 
The above becomes even more important if  it is remembered that, in addition to 
imposing this type of  limitation on external borrowing, the interest rate in the capital 
market was freed,  trade was rapidly opened up, the major part of  the process of  selling off 
State enterprises to the private sector took place, and strict discipline was imposed on the 
State sector and on public enterprises. 
These measures led to a sharp rise to extraordinarily high levels in the real rate of 
interest to borrowers in the financial  system,58 and to a very profound  change in the level 
and structure of  aggregate demand and consumption and in the relative prices of  goods 
and factors.  The consequences of  this situation are to some extent reflected  in the 
investment and unemployment situation in Chile during the period (see table 13). 
Excessive demand for  finance  also arose, partly because of  the sale of  State-owned 
enterprises, and was aggravated by demand generated on the domestic capital market by 
public enterprises, which found  that contributions from  the government, and credits 
from  the Central Bank, were restricted. 
Accordingly, two important consequences arising from  the phenomenon under 
discussion are those relating to the evolution of  investment and to the allocation of 
resources. 
There is no doubt that the high rates of  interest on loans provide an explanation, 
even though a partial one, of  the depressed level of  private investment in the period; to 
this should be added the drop in public sector investment.59 In addition, the enterprises 
which had access to external credit were characterized by their large size and their use of 
relatively capital-intensive technology, so that there was no guarantee that their 
Table 13 
CHILE: UNEMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT 
(Percentages) 
Period 
Unemployment  rate in 
Greater  Santiago" 
Rate of  investment1 
1960-1970 6.0 15.3 
1971 5.5 14.1 
1972 3.8 11.9 
1973 4.6 12.0 
1974 9.6 13.0 
1975 16.2 10.7 
1976 16.8 9.6 
1977 13.2 10.7 
1978 14.3 11.3 
Source: University of  Chile, Department of  Economics: Comentarios  sobre la situación  económica, 1978, 1979; and 
Ocupación y desocupación  en el  Gran Santiago,  various issues. 
"Simple average of  the rates for  March, June, September and December. 
'Gross domestic fixed  capital investments as a proportion of  gross domestic product expenditure. 
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investment would necessarily generate high levels of  employment or be the most efficient 
from  a social viewpoint. 
In this regard it is interesting to observe how in these years, despite some 
liberalization of  the domestic financial  market, some of  the features  of  the way the 
financial  system was traditionally managed persisted. Thus, the dual nature of  the 
industrial structure and the distribution of  income has tended to be retained, so that a 
handful  of  companies receive substantial amounts of  credit on preferential  terms which 
they invest in over-capitalized enterprises that are only partially used. In this way this 
sector generates large incomes, while most of  the smaller, fairly  labour-intensive 
enterprises subsist with extraordinarily high financial  costs. 
It may also be held that, as in the past, such a restricted financial  system grants clear 
advantages to those enterprises which have direct or indirect access to preferential  credit 
(in this case credit from  abroad), and to those which can make use of  their undistributed 
profits,  either from  within the enterprise or from  other enterprises belonging to the 
same economic group. In Chile, a substantial group of  enterprises combine all these 
advantages, and are accordingly improving their competitive position, though this does 
not necessarily correspond to an increase in their productive efficiency. 
It may be deduced from  the above paragraphs that the mechanisms used to control 
the flow  of  external loans to Chile did not promote an adequate level of  investment, nor 
the efficient  allocation of  it, but instead probably made possible a substantial change in 
the distribution and concentration of  wealth. 
Because of  the form  of  the attempts made to regulate the flow  of  external 
borrowing, conditions were created which enabled enterprises with access to internation-
al credit to obtain substantial profits.  In other words, because of  the way in which the 
"import quota" of  financial  capital was distributed, a profit  was generated from  the 
difference  between the international and the domestic price of  such capital.60 
There is even evidence that some enterprises engaged in import activities 
fundamentally  because of  the attraction of  the external credit associated with importing. 
It has also been alleged that the deficit  on the current account of  the balance of  payments 
is over-estimated because of  the incentive for  under-invoicing exports and over-invoicing 
imports, with the difference  entered in the form  of  external credit. 
Preliminary, very conservative estimates indicate that the transfer  obtained in this 
way by private enterprises enjoying access to external credit during the period 1976-1978 
totalled at least US$ 540 million, rising to over US$ 650 million by mid-197961 (see 
table 14). 
In addition to the above, it should be mentioned that while the private sector was 
securing its financing  to an increasing extent from  abroad, the public sector was doing so 
at a much slower rate. Between the end of  1974 and the end of  1978, private debt increased 
by US$ 1 449 million, to more than 30% of  the country's total stock of  debt, compared 
with less than 14% at the end of  1974. The public sector , on the other hand, which 
increased its accumulated debt by US$ 688 million, dropped its share from  87% at the end 
of  1974 to slightly under 70% at the end of  1978. 
An examination of  debt servicing shows that the net flow  of  external resources to 
the public sector in the four  years under consideration was negative  (-  US$  468 million), 
while the flow  to the private sector was US$ 948 million. If,  instead of  external debt, 
balance-of-payments  figures  are used, the situation is even more favourable  to the private 
sector. Moreover, the proportion of  borrowing by the public sector during the period 
1975-1978 under article 14 of  Decree-law 471 (the main provision under which external 
credits entered the country) was less than 8%, while more than 90% represented 
borrowing by the private sector. 
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Table 14 
CHILE: F I N A N C I A L PROFITS OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISES ENJOYING 
ACCESS TO EXTERNAL CREDIT 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Year 
Interest  rate 
(annual  percentage  in dollars) 
LIBOR  Chile 
Differ-
ential* 
Alternative  (I) 










Alternative  (3) 
Stock  of 
external  debtd 
Private 
sector Profit 
1976 6.12 118.53 1.0629 227 121 319 170 641 681 
1977 6.42 58.38 0.4554 287 169 381 207 772 351 
1978 935 51.10 0.3240 750 251 932 326 980 318 
1979 (first 
half) 11.21 42.10 0.1968 500 113 (466) 133 1 569 155 
654 836 1 505 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile, Boletín  mensual,  May 1979; Deuda externa de  Chile,  June 1979-
"Calculated as the difference  between the interest rate on bank loans in Chile, expressed in dollars, and double the LIBOR 
rate. 
'Alternative (1) was calculated on the following  assumptions: a) the only sums entered are credits disbursed to the private 
sector under article 14; b) they remain in the country for  two years; and c) the amount available per year is equal to half  the 
annual flow.  This calculation is undervalued both by reason of  the coverage of  article 14 (article 15, which corresponds to 
credit for  the private sector, was not included), and by reason of  the period spent in Chile, since these credits remain in the 
country for  more than two years; and because no account is taken of  the stock of  debt under article 14 existing at the end of 
1975. 
'Alternative (2) is based on balance-of-payments  data and refers  to the movements (net of  amortization payments) of 
non-compensatory capital for  private use. In this case the assumptions of  alternative (1) were repeated for  long-term and 
medium-term capital movements, while only one year of  stay in Chile was assumed for  50% of  the total short-term 
credits. For 1979 a movement equal to that of  1978, for  all debt periods, was estimated. 
''Alternative (3) is based on the assumption that the total stock owned by the private sector to foreign  sources at the end of 
the previous year remains in the market for  only one year. Neither traditional private debt nor short-term debt is 
included. 
Table 15 
CHILE: EXTERNAL DEBT" BY SECTORS, 1973-1978 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Public debt  Private debt  _ , 
Total 
Millions 
of  dollars 
Percentages 
Millions 
of  dollars Percentages 
debt 
December 1973 3 260.2 80.6 787.8 19.5 4 048 
December 1974 4 138.2 86.7 635.8 13.4 4 774 
December 1975 4 444.6 84.5 818.4 15.6 5 263 
December 1976 4 163.8 80.2 1 031.2 19.9 5 195 
December 1977 4 067.4 74.9 1 366.6 25.2 5 434 
December 1978 4 826.0 69.8 2 085.0 30.2 6 911 
Source: Institucionalidad  económica e integración  financiera  con e •1 exterior,  op.cit. 
"The external debt figures  refer  to sums actually disbursed outstanding at the end of  each year. They include traditional 
debt and other external liabilities comprising the International Monetary Fund, suppliers' credits and financial  credits to 
the private sector, as well as short-term lines of  credit to commercial banks, the Banco del Estado and the Central Bank. 
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Table 16 
CHILE: GROSS AND NET FLOW OF EXTERNAL 
CREDIT" BY SECTORS 
(Millions  of  dollars  at current  prices) 
1975 1976 
_ Debt x r _ Debt XT Gross Net  Gross Net 







Net  Gross Debt 
flnm  flrnj) flow 
Net 
flow  . flow vtce 
Public 
sector 768 778 -10 545 868 -323 580 1 042 -462 1 529 1 202 327 
Private 
sector 110 54 56 238 224 14 526 199 327 824 273 551 
Total 878 832 46 783 1 092 -309 1 106 1 241 -135 2 353 1 475 878 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile. 
"The external debt figures  refer  to sums actually disbursed outstanding at the end of  each year. They include traditional 
debt and other external liabilities comprising the International Monetary Fund, suppliers' credits and financial  credits to 
the private sector, as well as short-term lines of  credit to commercial banks, the Banco del Estado and the Central Bank. 
It is clear from  the above not only that there was probably inefficient  allocation 
with tendencies towards concentration within the domestic private sector, but also that 
the public sector, including naturally public sector enterprises, found  itself  in financial 
conditions which were very disadvantageous compared with those private enterprises 
which enjoyed access to external credit on the above-mentioned conditions.62 
Criteria of  efficiency  and equity dictate that, if  it is wished to ration external credit, 
this should be done through a tax (supplemented as appropriate by other mechanisms) to 
be collected by the government.63 Although it is true that the domestic and international 
capital market is far  from  perfect,  such a measure would drastically reduce the serious 
drawbacks associated with certain apects of  the way in which the quantitative restrictions 
on the import of  capital were applied.64 
V 
Summary and final  comments 
This paper began with a short outline of  the macroeconomic situation with which 
economic policy in Chile since the end of  1973 has had to deal. 
There followed  an analysis of  the foundations  of  the stabilization strategy which 
was based on an attempt to reduce the growth rate of  nominal money, as traditionally 
defined. 
It was felt  that this policy tended to be inconsistent with the progressive opening 
up of  the Chilean economy to the exterior, because of  the increasingly endogenous nature 
of  the money supply. Difficulties  in controlling base money were exacerbated by the 
extremely rapid (though partial) liberalization of  the domestic capital market, especially 
in the context of  an extraordinary level of  international liquidity. 
As a result, the stabilization programme appears to have been conceived within the 
frame  of  reference  of  a closed economy, since as the country's economic relations become 
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internationalized, the restrictions on domestic credit, and particularly credit to the public 
sector, were modified  to a greater or lesser extent because of  the inflow  of  foreign 
exchange. This inflow  was also stimulated by the evolution of  the domestic interest rate 
and the exchange rate policy followed  in 1975-1978. 
Consequently, it is considered that an excessive burden fell  on the Chilean public 
sector, with the consequent adverse effects  on the level of  investment, employment and 
social expenditure. 
Limiting the analysis to a non-floating  exchange rate, it was argued that exchange 
rate policy should not be used as an instrument for  controlling the money supply 
(although it is in fact  an important direct determinant of  the evolution of  domestic prices 
in an open economy), and it was pointed out that an attempt was made to use and plan an 
instrument —the exchange rate— on the basis of  considerations which were not 
necessarily mutually consistent, such as the level of  international reserves, external debt, 
expectations of  inflation  and the differential  between domestic and international 
inflation  rates. It is, furthermore,  clear that the application of  a succession of  different 
exchange rate policy objectives and/or guidelines can lead to excessive instability in the 
real exchange rate. 
The advantages and drawbacks of  using the evolution of  the current account, or that 
of  the balance of  payments, as the most appropriate criterion for  exchange rate policy 
were examined, and it was concluded that, if  the aim is that external financing  should be 
channelled so as to ensure the greatest external savings, it seems more desirable that the 
exchange rate should follow  the level of  international reserves. If,  on the other hand, it is 
not wished to increase external borrowing, and if  appropriate credit measures designed to 
reduce the inflow  of  foreign  exchange through the capital account are not adopted, 
external financing  will principally be a substitute for  domestic credit. 
It was therefore  concluded that the timing of  the external opening up, the domestic 
financial  liberalization and the sale of  enterprises to the private sector was inappropriate 
in view of  the effort  made by the public sector within the framework  of  the monetary 
policy. A more gradual opening up of  trade, and measures aimed at directly or indirectly 
(through credit policy) holding back the flow  of  capital from  and to the private sector, 
might have permitted a form  of  monetary planning which placed fewer  restrictions on 
government activity and that of  public enterprises. 
As regards demand for  money, emphasis was laid on the excessively passive role 
adopted by the economic authorities, the consequences of  which were aggravated by the 
circumstances prevailing when the development of  the capital market was promoted. All 
this helped to delay the reduction of  inflation,  and helps to explain a substantial part of 
the process of  "stagflation"  suffered  by thé Chilean economy during part of  the period 
under consideration. 
Acccordingly, it was suggested that during stabilization processes based on 
restrictive monetary policies, more emphasis should be placed on the effort  to control 
inflationary  expectations and/or on the behaviour and evolution of  money substitutes. 
This was followed  by an analysis of  the implications of  a process of  opening up to 
the exterior which occurred at a rate and with characteristics which were different  in the 
real sector from  those in the financial  sector of  the economy. 
An attempt was made to demonstrate the close relationship between exchange, 
monetary and fiscal  and credit policies in a process of  this type. In particular, stress was 
laid on the need to pay greater attention to the composition of  the balance of  payments, in 
addition to its level; and mention was made of  the dual role of  the exchange rate, both as 
regards the trade balance and through the effects  of  expectations concerning its future 
evolution on international capital movements. 
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An analysis was then made of  the justification  —based on counter-inflationary 
arguments and considerations relating to external borrowing— given for  the decision to 
carry out the external financial  opening up in a relatively slow manner. It was indicated 
that, while such arguments are not without validity, they would carry greater weight if  the 
commercial opening up had also been carried out more gradually; at all events, the 
magnitude of  the inflow  of  external capital, and the way in which it was restricted, are 
highly disputable. 
A faster  planned devaluation, together with a form  of  domestic credit management 
designed to reduce the spread between interest rates to borrowers and to lenders, and an 
effort  to quantify  and take appropriate action on the demand for  nominal money flow, 
might have led to a monetary situation such that without generating inflationary  pres-
sures, public sector expenditure and investment would have been spared such drastic 
reductions. 
The mechanisms used to control the flow  of  capital do not appear to have been 
those best suited to promoting greater investment or employment or the optimum 
allocation of  resources. 
An estimate was made of  the total tansfers  obtained by the domestic private sector 
which had access to external credit, and stress was laid on their important redis tribu tive 
consequences, both within the private sector and vis-a-vis  the public sector. 
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the macroeconomic policy applied was not 
neutral with regard to the sectors and groups which had to bear not only the cost arising 
from  the stabilization policy, but also the redistributive effects  associated with the 
particular form  in which the external financial  opening up occurred. 
It seems clear that, on the basis of  criteria of  efficiency  and equity, a government tax 
equivalent to a tariff  on the import of  external credit is a more appropriate mechanism 
for  controlling external financial  opening up than the introduction of  quantitative 
restrictions. Such restrictions might become more important if  it is felt  that the supply of 
international liquidity available to a country is very eratic or unstable. Indeed, this latter 
consideration, together with the speed of  adjustment of  capital movements compared 
with that of  goods, suggests that the external financial  opening up offers  greater 
difficulties  for  the management of  macroeconomic policy than the commercial opening 
up. 
Finally, if  it is decided to reform  the external sector of  the economy, the commercial 
and the financial  opening up must be analysed, assessed and implemented in a co-
ordinated manner. 
NOTES 
1 Calculated on the basis of  the Price Index prepared by the Department of  Economics of  the University 
of  Chile. 
2 It would seem necessary to make a distinction between the actual and potential difficulty  of  obtaining 
external loans and the ability to disburse them. In fact,  as the figures  indicate, external financing  was used 
fairly  easily. 
5 The most notable exceptions have been the labour and foreign  exchange markets, where prices have 
been determined by mechanisms other than the free  play of  the market. Furthermore, the prices of  a small 
number of  goods have been controlled, though apparently at levels very close to those prevailing in the 
market. 
4 It is not intended to assert that the economic policy has been applied in a manner displaying external 
and internal coherence and consistency. Nevertheless, despite various changes in emphasis and of  priorities 
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both as regards objectives and the means used (for  example, inflation  and external equilibrium, exchange rate 
policy, and so on), a basic long-term philosophy has predominated and has generally set the framework  for 
the design of  economic policy. 
'This was accompanied by changes in the breakdown of  the expenditure. 
Principally through the introduction¡pf  a value added tax and strict measures agaínsf  tax evasion. 
7This happened,at the end of  1978, though-in 1979 ligation "revived. 
'Nevertheless^ it should be remembered that international inflation  in the last five  years has been 
nju„çh greater than that of  the 1960s, so that in that regard the greater control recently observed over the pace 
of  Chilean inflation  is significant. 
9 A phenomenon which occurs more clearly the more open the economy is to external forces. 
10This refers  to money as defined  traditionally (M,), the growth rate of  which was, for  most of  the 
period under consideration, regarded as an indicator and guide of  monetary policy. 
11 Furthermore, the fact  that the economy had been "indexed", as well as other elements associated with 
cost pressures, helped to prevent the inflation  rate from  falling  more rapidly. 
12 In the sense that they cannot be controlled by the monetary authority and that in contrast, demand for 
the means of  payment (which depends on the behaviour of  individuals, enterprises and banks both at home 
and abroad) "creates its own supply", basically through movements in the current and capital accounts of  the 
balance of  payments. 
"The lower tariff  protection was partially offset  by a rise in transport costs during the period. 
14 However, it should be mentioned that, according to the authorities, the commercial opening up had a 
twofold  justification.  As far  as long-term development strategy was concerned, it would force  domestic 
producers to face  up to international competition, while in relation to the counter-inflation  policy, although it 
would restrict the instruments for  monetary control over domestic credit, it would, for  a given exchange 
policy, impose a ceiling on the domestic prices of  internationally tradable goods and services. 
15 This paper does not analyse the situation within the financial  sector as regards the greater or lesser 
competitiveness, rules of  the game, or equality of  opportunity as between institutions and intermediaries, 
both domestic and foreign.  In this regard see F. Berger, "La protección efectiva  negativa a la industria 
monetaria y la política financiera  externa de Chile", Cuadernos  de  Economía,  No. 42 (August 1977), pp. 197-
234. 
16 Another variable which would explain the high spread between rates to borrowers and rates to 
lenders would seem to be inflation,  as a result of  the fact  that, as depositors received a positive real rate, part of 
the inflation  tax would be paid by borrowers, by paying high interest rates on loans. See R. McKinnon, "La 
intermediación financiera  y el control monetario en Chile", Cuadernos  de  Economía,  No. 43 (December 
1977), pp. 31-32. 
17 As in table 8, these rates correspond to observed values (as distinct from  expected values) of  nominal 
interest rates, of  the change in the level of  prices and of  the evolution in the nominal exchange rate. 
1 8 This assertion relates to the monetary impact of  the inflow  of  external financial  capital obtained by 
the domestic private sector. 
1 9 This should not be interpreted to mean that the supply of  external credit is perfectly  horizontal, at the 
same level, for  all potential users of  such finance,  but rather that the imperfections  which characterize this 
market were exacerbated by inadequate State controls. 
2 0 Naturally, the monetary "impact" of  payments on the foreign  debt is not unconnected with the way in 
which the public sector generates the required resources. In particular, cases where the fiscal  deficit  is reduced 
should be distinguished from  cases of  government borrowing from  the Central Bank. 
2 1 The exceptions —perhaps somewhat belated— appear to have been two revaluations of  the peso 
(July 1976 and March 1977), the establishment of  a daily depreciation schedule for  the peso starting in 
February 1978, and the endeavour to "guide" interest rates in the capital market, which was of  very brief 
duration. 
2 2 This coincided with a time of  extremely high inflation,  severe restrictions on public expenditure, and 
the sale to the private sector of  an appreciable number of  enterprises with large State shareholdings. 
2 3 This is due to the fact  that the type of  financial  assets which were becoming most profitable,  and 
which were not previously available to economic agents, did not include those that comprise money as 
traditionally defined,  although this definition  was used as a guide and indicator of  the expansionary or 
restrictive nature of  monetary policy. 
2 4 It should also be mentioned that the domestic financial  system was liberalized only partially, and this, 
according to some analysts, was a principal cause of  the high spread between interest rates to borrowers and 
to lenders. See McKinnon, op.cit., pp. 22-57, and "Represión financiera  y el problema de la liberalización 
dentro de los países menos desarrollados", Cuadernos  de  Economía,  No. 47 (April 1979), pp. 3-22. 
2 5 In practice, this latter mechanism operated by reducing the reserve requirement for  the following 
month by an amount equivalent to the interest payable on the reserve maintained during the previous month. 
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Thus the "payment" of  interest did not cause increases in currency issue, as its effect  was manifested  in the 
behaviour of  the bank multiplier. 
26It should be noted that, from  the viewpoint of  the financial  institutions, the payment of  interest at 
market rates on legal reserves is equivalent to a induction in the reserves, so that the large spread between 
interest rates to borrowers and to lender would tc.id tu diminish. If  this spread is defined  as «*> and ic 
expressed, like the other variables, per uiiit of  deposit, then m — i* - ¡p - g c t-e,,i<, - e,i„ where i„ = rate of 
interest to borrowers; e, - !<•gal reserve requirement; e„ — actual reserve ratio; i, = rate of  interest applicable 
to the legal reserve; c = administration and intermediation costs; ip = interest rate to lenders; g = profit. 
Changes in i, and e,, of  such a magnitude as to modify  the spread m by a given amount do not necessarily have 
the same impact on the value of  the bank multiplier or, consequently, on money. 
2 7 See L. Sjastaad and H. Cortés, "El enfoque  monetario de la balanza de pagos y las tasas de interés real 
en Chile", in University of  Chile, Department of  Economics, Faculty of  Economic and Management Sciences, 
Santiago, Estudios  de  Economía,  No. 11, first  half  of  1978, p. 13-
28See R. Zahler and E. Budinich, "Financiamiento gubernamental, emisión e impuesto inflación", 
Estudios  de  Economía,  No. 8 (second half  of  1976), p. 138. 
2 9 The attempt to regulate one or other of  the determinants of  demand for  money meant a delay in 
domestic financial  liberalization. As far  as the official  economic strategy was concerned, the financial  reform 
was apparently of  such priority that it was decided to sacrifice  the performance  of  other markets and 
economic sectors in order not to hold up the evolution and development of  the capital market. 
5 0 In the Chilean case, real demand for  money stock dropped sharply until mid-1976, from  which date 
the liquidity coefficient  began to rise. For the implementation of  monetary policy in the short-term it is very 
important to be able to determine the evolution of  demand for  money stock (real) and demand for  money 
flows  (nominal), since at different  moments in time stock and flow  disequilibria of  different  intensities may 
coexist, or there may be equilibrium with respect to stock and disequilibria with respect to flows,  and vice 
versa. 
5 1 When the rate of  inflation  (actual and expected) is very high, economic agents tend to replace real 
monetary balances within their portfolios  of  assets by other financial  and physical assets which offer  a higher 
yield than money. Nevertheless, until money is replaced by other goods as a means of  exchange for  carrying 
out transactions, there is a "minimum" level of  real money which, because of  its liquidity, is essential for 
effecting  payments in the economy. Thus, over and above a certain (high) rate of  inflation,  real demand for 
money stock becomes very inelastic. However, since nominal demand for  money flow  depends directly on the 
rate of  inflation,  among other things, it becomes necessary in a counter-inflation  programme to reconcile the 
evolution of  supply and demand for  money flows,  by taking the appropriate policy measures. See in this 
regard footnote  30 and Zahler and Budinich, op.cit.,  p. 142. 
52 Seminario  sobre política  cambiaria,  Central Bank of  Uruguay and CEPAL, Montevideo, August 1978. 
"See A. Bardon, "Algunas experiencias de la política cambiaria en Chile (1973-1978)", in Seminario 
sobre política  cambiaria,  op.cit.,and McKinnon, op.cit. 
3 4 For more details see C. Massad, "La paradoja de septiembre", Estudios  de  Economía,  No. 5 (first  half 
of  1975), pp. 51-56. 
3 5 If  the capital account is freed  more rapidly, this latter effect  will be mangnified. 
5 6 In the period 1975-1978, the average level of  the terms-of-trade  index was 77, compared with 85 in 
1960-1964, 119 in 1965-1969 and 121 in 1970-1974. 
3 7 See table 7. Of  course, the problem of  properly defining  what is the "equilibrium" real exchange rate 
remains. 
3 8 Nevertheless, it would seem to have been perceived as fairly  stable compared with the evolution of 
the exchange rate between 1971 and 1973. 
3 9 Naturally, the sharp devaluation in 1974 and 1975, the initial drop in domestic aggregate demand and 
the unused export capacity existing at the end of  1973 played a fundamental  role in the rise in exports, and 
especially of  non-traditional exports. 
4 0 Naturally, in view of  the openness of  the economy, a measure of  this nature would have an 
inflationary  impact derived from  the increase in the Chilean peso prices of  internationally tradable goods and 
services. 
4 1 However, the more open the economy is to external influences,  the greater the importance acquired 
by the evolution of  the exchange rate as a direct  determinant of  domestic inflation  (not through its influence 
on the monetary base), together with international inflation  and the characteristics of  markets for  goods and 
services which are not internationally tradable. 
4 2 The analysis which follows  refers  to financial  credit rather than to direct external investment, 
because of  the separate determinants of  each, the low level of  direct investment compared with loans 
(between 1975 and 1978 external investment accounted for  20% of  the net flow  of  non-compensatory capital, 
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since private loans accounted for  more than 100% of  that flow),  and the closer relationship between private 
loans and the financial  aspects of  macroeconomic policy. 
•"This may have been due to the fact  that during this period external borrowing was in fact  strongly 
stimulated  by the relatively slow devaluation and the objective of  sharply increasing the country's 
international reserve position and permitting a substantial rise in interest rates to borrowers. 
"See Carlos Massad and Roberto Zahler, "Inflación  mundial y deuda externa: El caso del deflactor 
impropio", in Dos estudios  sobre endeudamiento  externo, Cuadernos de la CEPAL No. 19, Santiago, Chile 
(English version entitled "World inflation  and foreign  debt: the case of  the improper deflator",  CEPAL 
internal document No. 79-4-978). 
4 , I t should be remembered that the domestic interest rate in dollars was 60% a year on average 
between 1975 and 1978. 
"•'See note 15 and D. Tapia, "Apertura al mercado financiero  internacional", in Institucionalidad 
económica e integración  financiera  con el exterior  (Santiago, Chile, Instituto de Estudios Bancarios Guillermo 
Subercaseaux, 1979), pp. 107-130. 
""There were substantial modifications  and simplifications  in this regard during 1979. 
4 8 These limitations are those imposed on demand for  loans. It must not be forgotten  that, even with 
total openness, there are also important imperfections,  such as market fragmentation,  differential 
guarantees, imperfect  information,  risk evaluations and quantitative rationing by banks in addition to 
rationing by price, positive-slope supply of  external credit, and so on. 
""Obviously, there are other arguments in favour  of  not allowing a complete opening up to external 
capital, such as the political arguments which recognize the implications of  a situation where a substantial 
proportion of  domestic capital is in foreign  hands, as well as others related to the imperfections  of  the capital 
markets, information  costs, market fragmentation  and, above all as regards direct investment, arguments 
related to the mode of  operation of  the transnational corporations. 
5 0 See Tapia, op. cit. 
5 1 This assertion refers  to the implications which an inflow  of  credit would have for  external debt, 
rather than to high interest-elasticity of  demand for  external finance.  The domestic interest rate depends not 
only on external finance,  but also on domestic saving. Domestic saving dropped sharply during the period 
under consideration. The short-term domestic interest rate expressed in dollars in the middle of  1979 was still 
very high, despite a substantial inflow  of  capital. In 1975-1978 the inflow  of  private capital (net of 
amortization and interest payments) was equivalent to 4% of  gross domestic product expenditure, rising to 
7% in 1978. 
5 2 Obviously, domestic saving is not independent of  external saving: the relationship between them 
should be specified  in each particular case. 
5 5 It should also be pointed out that any fall  in the domestic interest rate would have produced a stimulus 
(though probably a small one) to investment, and accordingly to economic growth and employment. 
5 4 In our view, while it was necessary to regulate the flow  of  external capital to the country (a 
phenomenon which would have occurred more easily with a more gradual commercial opening up), the 
mechanisms used were far  from  being the most effective  and equitable ones. 
5 5 It is important to note that in very few  other areas of  the economy was as much concern shown for  the 
short-term and the adjustment process. 
5 6 In June 1979, the restrictions on the contracting of  external loans by banks and finance  companies 
were modified. 
5 7 It is reasonable to argue that, because of  the specific  characteristics of  flows  of  international financial 
capital, their volatility, creditors' attitudes and risk assessment, and so on, it is necessary to establish some 
form  of  quantitative regulation of  the inflow  of  external credit. However, there are different  ways of  ensuring 
this regulation, with different  effects  in terms of  efficiency  and redistribution. 
5 8 The rate to lenders, though it has increasingly been positive, has not been very high because of  the 
wide spread between the rates to lenders and to borrowers. 
"Public sector investment, which in 1974 represented 12% of  gross domestic product expenditure, 
made up only 6.4% in 1977. 
6 0 It should nevertheless be stressed that, independently of  the degree of  external financial  openness, 
many imperfections  remain in the domestic and international capital markets. 
6 1 At the end of  1978, the sales value of  the State-owned enterprises sold to the private sector during the 
period stood at US$ 585 million. 
6 2 It may be held that the private sector borrowed abroad as a way of  financing  payment of  the tax 
represented by inflation,  which, was very high during this period. However, this tax fell  principally on those 
economic agents for  whom it was most difficult  to replace cash or sight deposits by other assets, and on 
borrowers in the domestic market for  short-term capital. It is clear that these categories do not include the 
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major private enterprises with access to international finance,  to which they resorted precisely in order to 
"evade" the inflation  tax. 
6 3 The measures adopted by the Central Bank in the second quarter of  1979, designed to establish 
obligatory reserve ratios for  the inflow  of  certain types of  external credit, are similar to this tax. However, by 
that time the principal redistributive effect  had already been consolidated. 
6 4 Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier in the text, if  the supply of  external credit becomes very unstable, 
it may be necessary to resort to some form  of  direct control regulated by the economic authorities. 
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ALTERNATIVE OPENING UP STRATEGIES: A SIMULATION MODEL 
I 
Introduction and objectives 
The topic of  the degree of  economic opening up to the exterior, which has always been 
present in the region, began to assume growing importance in Latin America from  the 
mid-1960s onwards. 
The reasons for  this are to be found  at various levels. On the one hand, there is the 
"demonstration effect"  of  the economic growth achieved by some countries of  South-East 
Asia, where the high growth rate of  their exports has played a very important role. 
From another angle, various countries of  the region have experienced relative loss 
of  dynamism in their import-substitution-based industrialization processes and have 
designed new strategies for  the external sector, generally associated with the promotion 
of  exports and the more rigorous exposure of  domestic economic activity to international 
competition. 
More recently, and to some extent related with the foregoing,  a number of  Latin 
American countries have adopted new economic growth strategies tending to emphasize 
the importance of  the market as a mechanism for  the allocation of  resources and, in this 
context, have called for  greater alignment of  domestic prices with international prices, 
which has meant the decisive opening up of  their economies to foreign  trade. 
Moreover, the profound  changes which have taken place in the world monetary 
system and the recent evolution of  the international capital markets have meant a 
qualitative and quantitative change of  great importance in the amount and cost of  the 
financial  capital available for  the developing countries. When we add to this the attempts 
made by many of  these countries to reform  the functioning  of  their domestic financial 
markets and make them more flexible,  with the consequent credit and interest rate 
policies that this involves, we see that the situation is one of  sustained integration of  the 
domestic capital markets with the international ones. Likewise, the changes which have 
taken place in recent years in the world economy, with the persistence of  inflationary 
pressures and tendencies towards recession, have led some countries (specially the highly 
industrialized ones) to adopt more protectionist strategies. These phenomena have given 
new topicality to the discussion regarding the degree of  economic vulnerability of  the 
small countries, depending on their particular form  of  insertion into the world economy. 
The above elements are being adduced, inter  alia,  in favour  or against a greater 
degree of  economic openness to the exterior in most of  the countries of  the region. 
Perhaps one of  the most fundamental  problems encountered in this respect in the design 
and application of  macroeconomic policy is the relative lack of  background information 
—whether theoretical or in the form  of  national or regional experience— which would 
enable a clear picture to be obtained of  the characteristics and consequences of  the process 
of  greater or lesser economic openness to the exterior. The literature which exists in this 
respect is very scanty, and in general it clearly lags behind the latest developments. 
It was against this general background that ECLAC, and now also ILPES, has carried 
out activities on this topic through empirical studies of  national cases and theoretical and 
analytical research into the question of  economic opening up to the exterior. 
The present study falls  within the second of  these areas and represents an attempt 
to make a systematic study of  the process of  economic opening up to the exterior, 
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concentrating its efforts  on understanding the evolution, during the process of 
adjustment associated with a particular external sector economic strategy of  some 
important macroeconomic variables such as the level of  economic activity, the balance of 
payments, external indebtedness, prices, interest rates, etc. 
In this work, ECLAC has benefited  from  the collaboration of  the International 
Monetary Fund, with which a joint study is being carried out on the design of  a 
macroeconomic analytical and computational model which simulates1 the dynamic 
behaviour of  the macroeconomic variables mentioned above in the context of  different 
strategies (different  not only as regards magnitude and velocity, but also synchronization) 
of  economic, trade and/or financial  openness. It must be emphasized that various aspects 
presented in this report do not yet reflect  a final  common version of  the model or certain 
specific  adjustments regarding the design of  particular economic policies. 
In the present document, a description and explanation of  the fundamental 
characteristics of  the macroeconomic model is given and an analysis is made of  the result 
of  simulations on: a) abrupt reductions in trade protection, assuming that the economy 
remains closed to international capital movements; b) gradual reduction of  the same 
variable in similar conditions; c) abrupt financial  opening up to the exterior, assuming 
that trade policy is not modified;  d) gradual financial  opening up; and e) combinations of 
simultaneous changes in the trade and financial  fields. 
The greater or lesser degree of  trade openness is measured by the lesser or greater 
degree of  protection against imports of  goods and non-financial  services from  abroad2. 
Greater or lesser financial  openness to the exterior has been associated with lesser or 
greater restriction on the flow  of  external financial  capital into and out of  a given country. 
Through these exercises it is aimed to provide some elements of  judgement with 
regard to the controversy on "gradualism versus shock" in the process of  economic 
openness, the desirability of  a greater or lesser degree of  simultaneity of  changes in trade 
and financial  protection, and the possible benefits  (or costs) of  carrying out opening-up to 
the exteior in an asymmetrical manner, in terms of  the "current account-capital account" 
dichotomy of  the balance of  payments. 
It is also sought to establish the optimum magnitude and sequence of  some 
compensatory policies aimed at minimizing the transitory effects  due to the various 
opening up strategies and to identify  the possible costs (trade-offs)  in terms of  other 
economic objectives associated with such policies. 
The result of  the simulations and of  the compensatory policies has been analysed 
focusing  attention on the time paths of  the macroeconomic variables mentioned earlier, 
since the gaps which exist are more evident in this area than in that of  the final  results of 
particular economic policies. In addition —and this is no less important than the 
foregoing—  the time needed to stabilize particular variables may be quite long, and their 
trajectories may in practice be of  great interest to the policy makers. Finally, the lack of 
any background information  which makes it possible to anticipate the dynamic 
conjuctural behaviour of  the economy may mean that ill-advised economic policy 
measures are taken; even if  the direction and magnitude of  such measures were 
appropriate, however, their effect  is not independent of  the moment (and/or the 
sequence) in which they are carried out. 
The present study does not seek to analyse whether the long-term growth rate is 
higher or lower for  the case of  a more or less open economy, nor does it go into the validity 
of  the argument of  dynamic comparative advantages or even the arguments in favour  of  a 
particular level of  opening up (protection). 
What is specifically  sought is to determine —assuming that it has been decided to 
select a higher degreee of  opening up to the world economy— the characteristics of  the 
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adjustment process which takes place when the economy passes from  án initial situation 
to another terminal situation, both of  them being situations of  equilibrium, as a result of 
changes in the trade and/or financial  protection.3 
In other words, the emphasis is placed on the time path of  some macroeconomic 
variables in the framework  of  certain policy changes: what is of  primary interest is the 
transition between two equilibrium situations. A conscious effort  has been made, 
however, to ensure that the model reproduces theoretically reasonable "long-term" 
conditions in a context of  general equilibrium and thus global and sectoral consistency. 
Thus, the model makes it possible to obtain long-term equilibrium situations and 
also to reproduce deviations with respect to that situation during the "transition".4 
The research has been oriented towards the evaluation of  the adjustment process of 
an economy having certain values of  parameters and variables "typical" of  a Latin 
American country in response to modifications  of  the magnitudes and sequences in time 
of  situations of  trade and/or financial  opening up. As this type of  phenomenon has 
generally been accompanied by other institution and/or economic policy changes, an 
effort  was made to design a model which, although specially formulated  in its present 
version for  analysing the external sector, makes it possible to combine (through the 
inclusion of  the fiscal  and monetary sectors and their explicit linking with the balance of 
payments) changes in the external sector economic strategy with other policies such as 
monetary and/or fiscal  policies, changes in exchange parity, changes in the size and 
financing  of  the public sector, fiscal  reforms,  etc. 
The basic structure of  the model also permits investigation of  the effects  of  changes 
in the terms of  trade or international financial  conditions, and permits analysis of  the 
sensitivity to different  production and/or consumption structures, different  values of 
parameters and elasticities, etc. It is therefore  worth stressing that the type of  analysis 
that can be carried out with this model, or with slightly modified  versions of  it, goes far 




The  production  and supply sector 
Factor endowment (distance from  transformation  curve to origin) 
(1) yt* = y t- i*(l  + ct) 
Actual supply of  importable goods 
(2) 
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Actual supply of  exportable goods 
( 3 ) Xts  = X 2 I" ( 7 . 2 7 3 / 7 2 ) y* ( p x f  -I  % + ( 1  _ X 2 )  X t _ t , 
L yiyiyiipi,)2 + yi2y3(px,)2  + 7 1 * 7 2 ( p n , ) 2  -J 
Desired supply of  non-tradeable goods 
(y2yil73)  y,* (pn,)2  "1 V2 (4) W = T (71 72/73) t  ( ,)  H 
L .. .. v2 1 2.. I 2.. x2 J 
7i7273(£¿,)2  + 7i273 (px,)2  + y\yi (pn,)2 
Growth rate of  transformation  curve 
(5) c, = (h/Y,)ôt 
Rate of  investment 
(6) ], = - z(CA), 
Productivity of  capital 
(7) Ô, = - 7(log y* - log y,-\*) 
Actual supply of  non-tradeable goods 
(8) log N,s  = log N, s* + A3 (log N,d  - log Nt*) 
Real product 
(9) y, = [71 (hs)2  + 72<X,S)2 + 73 (N ( s ) 2 ] 1 / 2 
Nominal income 
( 1 0 ) Y,  = pit  + pxX,s  + p„N,s  + ( E R ) T p F ( h d  - It) 
Resource unemployment 
(11) u, = 00 + 7i5(log^r* - log y,) 
Supply of  importable goods as a proportion of  the national product 
(12) Wit  = (piJt)/[Yt  - ( E R )Tp F ( I , d  - It)] 
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Supply of  exportable goods as a proportion of  the national product 
(13) wx,s = (px,X,s)/[Y,  - (ER)rpF(l,d  ~ /,*)] 
Supply of  non-tradeable goods as a proportion of  the national product 
( 14) V = (pn,N,s)/[Y,  - (ER)TpF(I,d  - //)] 
The  expenditure  sector 
Private expenditure on goods 
(15) EP, = EXP(log  EPRD), - rDtBF, 
Total private expenditure 
(16) log EPRD, = X4{74log[yr  - T,  - T(ER)pF(I,"  - I,s)]  + 75(log M  - log Md)  + 
+ 76(ro,  - ô,)} + (1 - X4)log EPRD,-i 
Total expenditure 
(17) E, = EP, + G, 
Total expenditure on importable goods 
(18) log (pif),  = log E, - log £,-1 + log p¡, — log pi,~\ + (1 /to*)  j -77(logp,,-log^ i_1) + 
+ { W + [(77 + 78 - 79 - l)/2]} (log pXt.  - log px,.0 + {wd  + [(77 -
- 78 + 79 - l)/2]}(log pn, - log />„,_,)} + log(/>A-i 
Total expenditure on exportable goods 
(19) log(pxXd) ,  = log E, - log E,-i + logpx,~~logpx¡-\ + (1 /wxd)  {{w„d  + [(77  + 7 8 - 7 9 -
-l)/2]}(log Pi, - log />,-,_,) - 78(log px, - log />„_,) + {w*  + [(-77 + 
+ 78 + 79 - l)/2]}(log pn, - log pni^)} + log(pxXd),-l 
Total expenditure on non-tradeable goods 
(20) l o g ^ N ' ) , = log E¡ - log Ei-i + log pn,~ log pn,-i + (1 /W„d)\[wxJ  + [(yi-y%  + 79 -
- l )/2]}( logp i t - log/v,) + {wf  +[(-77 + 78 + 7 9 - l)/2]}(log^," 
- log px,-i) - 79(log Pn, - log pn ,-i)| + \og(p„NJ),-l 
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Proportion of  expenditure on importable goods 
( 2 1 ) wit = (P',lt)/Et 
Proportion of  expenditure on exportable goods 
(22) wxt  = (px,X,d)/E, 
Proportion of  expenditure on non-tradeable goods 
(23) Wnt  = (pn,Nt)/E, 
Prices  and inflation 
Absolute level of  prices 
(24) log Pi = wd(log  pit - log pi,.,) + wx(\og  px, - l o g p X í . i )  + w„d(logpn,  - logpn,-X) + 
+ log P,-l 
Prices of  importable goods 
(25) log Pi, = X5[log(ER), + log(l + r) + log pF,]  + (1 - X5)log 
Prices of  exportable goods 
(26) log px, = log(ER),  + log pFl 
Prices of  non-tradeable goods 
(27) log p„, = X6(log N,d  - log N,s*)  + X7(log pit - log piM)  + log pn,-, 
Expected inflation 
(28) ift  = X8(log P, - log P,-1) + (1 - X8)7r,-ie 
Balance of  payments and external  debt 
Imports (in foreign  currency) 
(29) h = pKlt~hs) 
Exports (in foreign  currency) 
(30) X,  = pF(X,s  - X,d) 
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Balance-of-payments  current account (in national currency) 
(31) (CA),  = (ER),(X,  - I,)  - rDtBF, 
Balance-of-payments  capital account (in national currency) 
(32) (DK),  = A.4 (ER),  + fi{yn(rD,  ~ rF,  -Q,) + 7,8[log(ER), - log(£i?),-,]} 
Balance-of-payments  position (in national currency) 
(33) (BP),  = (CA),  + (DK), 
International reserves (in national currency) 
(34) R, = R,-i + (BP), 
External debt (in national currency) 
(35) BF, = BF,.x  + (DK), 
The  monetary sector 
Supply of  money 
(36) M,  = R, + CRP,  + CRG, 
Demand for  money 
(37) log Mf  = ai +7iolog Y,  - 7nir,e  - ynïd, 
Nominal domestic interest rate 
(38) rD, = 7,3(log M,d  - log M,)  +i?z>,-, 
The  fiscal  sector 
Nominal public expenditure 
(39) Gt  = g0 + T  + T(ER)pF(I,d  - I,s) 
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Nominal taxation (non-tariff) 
(40) T=t0  + hY 
Nominal total domestic credit to government 
(41) CRG  = CRG-i  + G-T-  T(ER)pF(l,d  - l , s ) 
Definition  of  exogenous variables 
ER — rate of  exchange (index of  unit of  domestic currency per unit of  foreign 
currency) 
T homogeneous nominal tariff  for  imports of  non-financial  goods and services 
pF = index of  international prices 
a = index of  restriction of  financial  capital movements 
0 
TF = Foreign rate of  interest 
0 
Q = non-exchange rate risk and other elements which increase the relevant external 
rate of  interest for  the country 
CRP = nominal amount of  domestic credit to the private sector 
go = deficit  on the nominal public sector budget 
to = autonomous nominal taxes 
t\ = Proportional rate of  income tax. 
The variables accompanied bye the symbol {") are strictly exogenous, while the rest 
of  the exogenous variables may be interpreted as the mechanism through which policies 
relating to the external, monetary and/or fiscal  sector may be implemented. 
It should be noted, in addition, that there are certain coefficients  related to the 
structure of  technology preferences,  demand for  money, etc., which can easily be modified 
to incorporate changes in one or more of  their determinants. 
Ill 
General aspects 
The model consists of  41 equations, 20 of  which relate to behaviour and the rest to 
definitions  or identities. 
There are three reasons for  this level of  aggregation: on the one hand, as it is sought 
to evaluate the trajectory of  the main macroeconomic variables for  a generic rather than a 
specific  economy, it is necessary to restrict the complexity of  the model and limit it to the 
most general aspects. Secondly, since this is a simulation exercise there are many 
unknown coefficients  and parameters, so that the more the model is expanded the greater 
the degree of  arbitrariety generated in the process of  determining the values of  certain 
parameters, thus making the observed trajectories of  the objective variables less general. 
Finally, the simulation programme used has a limit of  equations which imposes a 
"technological restriction" on the dimensions of  the model. 
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It is assumed that the economy is "small" in the sense that it has to abide by prices 
and interest rates on the world market which cannot be modified  through its own 
economic conduct. 
The model assumes a nominal exchange rate which is fixed  in the sense that it is 
determined by the economic authorities (and can be used as a policy instrument) rather 
than by the market forces. 
It is also assumed that, prior to the application of  the policies of  openness reforms 
have been carried out in the domestic financial  sector «yifh  a view to the liberalization of 
the financial  market, on which specifically  the rate,of  interest is freely  determined.5 
In this stage of  the research, a dynamic analysis of  the model has been made in the 
sense of  studying the time path of  the variables between two equilibrium situations 
(initial and final)  expressed in terms of  levels,  or, looked at in another way, on the 
assumption that the values of  their derivatives with respect to time are zero.6 
What was stated in the preceding paragraph means that, in initial and terminal 
equilibrium situations the (real and nominal) income remains stable (although not 
necessarily at the same level), so that net saving is assumed to be nil and the goods in this 
economy are "used" in such a way as not to alter the level of  the potential product (net 
investment is nil). Now, policies of  openness are usually accompanied to a greater or 
lesser extent by current account deficits,  which, as it is well known, constitute external 
saving. If  it is desired to assume that there is no net saving or investment at any moment 
in time, it is necessary to impose the condition that every time that there is external 
saving which is not nil the domestic saving (which is not explicitly modelled, because the 
analysis of  the process of  accumulation is not the main interest of  this study) must be of 
equal amount but of  contrary sign: in other words, it must be assumed that changes in 
external saving are totally offset  by changes in domestic saving. 
There can be no doubt that assuming the foregoing  involves rather an extreme 
situation. However, most of  the empirical studies indicate the presence of  such offsetting, 
although not perfect,  in the sense that part of  the external saving finances  consumption 
and part of  it finances  investment expenditure.7 
If  we consider policies of  financial  opening up which involve the inflow  of  external 
capital as a consequence of  the incentive due to the difference  between domestic and 
foreign  interest rates, and if  domestic spending is sensitive to the rate of  interest, it can be 
demonstrated that unless some interaction between the inflow  of  capital, the deficit  on 
current account and changes in the level of  the potential product is included, the external 
indebtedness situation sooner or later becomes untenable and the economy ceases to be 
viable. 
The foregoing  suggests that it is necessary to incorporate in the model some 
mechanism to take account of  changes in the potential product as a function  of  the volume 
of  external saving and the degree of  substitution that this has with domestic saving. This 
also means making a distinction between the (real) rate of  interest of  the financial  assets 
and another variable which reflects  to some extent the productivity of  capital, this 
difference  being the cause of  the change in national spending which can give rise to 
modifications  in the potential product of  the economy. 
The model therefore  incorporates variations in production capacity which are 
associated with external saving: these variations can only take place during the process of 
transition, since in the terminal situation external saving is nil and consequently the 
potential product (possibly different  from  the initial one)8 is constant. 
It is evident that this is an ad  hoc way of  (temporarily) endogenising the value of 
the potential product of  the economy. However, in addition to the trivial solution9 (which 
in many cases involves results which are not economically viable) of  assuming perfect 
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substitution between domestic saving and external saving, there are theoretically two 
other alternatives: one consists of  assuming that domestic spending is inelastic with 
respect to the rate of  interest, and the other is to assume that the flow  of  external capital 
is an inverse function  of  the level of  external indebtedness of  the country. 
The first  alternative (equivalent to a vertical IS curve in the traditional macroeco-
nomic framework)  has the serious theoretical drawback that the real rate of  interest of  the 
economy can be modified  by money supply policies without there having been any change 
in the real economy (technology, preferences  and tastes) or in other (relative) prices. The 
second possibility, which it is planned to develop in future  stages of  the project, has the 
attraction of  its "realism", but it nevertheless requires fairly  specific  assumptions in order 
to ensure a new equilibrium situation before  the payments of  interest on the external debt 
make it necessary to generate exports incompatible with the productive capacity of  the 
economy and/or imports of  such a low level that they eventually become negative. 
Consequently, the present report uses a preliminary, and of  course incomplete, 
solution to this topic. Nevertheless, it is closer to the real behaviour of  the economies than 
much of  the literature on open economies. This literature generally ignores the existence 
of  the external debt, assumes a tendency to equalization of  domestic interest rates with 
those abroad, without specifying  in a consistent manner the monetary and real  mecha-
nisms through which such a situation would be achieved, or, finally,  simply does not take 
into account the interaction between financial  and real assets (accumulation of  physical 
capital) through variables (such as the productivity of  capital and/or the rate of  prefe-
rence in time) related with the rate of  interest. 
It is important to note that, with the exception of  what was stated in preceding 
paragraphs, it is assumed that the potential product of  the economy, identified  by the 
"transformation  curve", is determined exogenously, that is to say, it is independent of  the 
endogenous evolution of  the variables of  the model.10 
It must be emphasized that the model assumes initial conditions of  equilibrium. A 
preliminary analysis suggests that the time path of  the main macroeconomic variables is a 
function  not only of  the characteristics of  the changes in the exogenous policies, but also 
of  the initial values of  the endogenous variables. Therefore,  in order to "isolate" the effect 
of  the policy changes, we have worked with initial equilibrium conditions (in the sense 
that, in the absence of  exogenous changes, the observed values of  the endogenous 
variables tend to be maintained through time). It is hoped to be able to analyse more 
"real" cases, with initial disequilibrium situations, in future  stages of  the research and to 
evaluate their impact, comparing and explaining the alternative trajectories for  identical 
policy changes, precisely on the basis of  different  magnitudes of  the possible initial 
disequilibria. 
In the present version of  the model, no analysis is made of  the factor  market or 
changes in the distribution of  property and wealth, which are so important in some 
experiences of  economic opening up. This is undoubtedly an important limitation, since, 
among other elements, it fails  to consider an important mechanism of  adjustment of  the 
economy which can be of  very fundamental  importance with different  changes of  policies 
or exogenous shocks: namely, the evolution of  factor  prices (especially real wages) and 
the rate of  labour unemployment. 
This is one of  the areas where study and future  development of  the model are very 
necessary. It cannot be denied that it presents difficulties,  since the analysis of  the factor 
market in a general equilibrium model calls for  the differentiated  specification  of 
production functions  by sectors and/or goods and compatibilization of  the development 
of  the capital market with consistency in the determination of  the national product, not 
only on the supply an expenditure side, but also in its factoral  disaggregation; it should 
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also be borne in mind that in making the behaviour of  the factor  market an explicit 
function,  the potential product becomes an endogenous variable. Finally, it is the factor 
market, and above all the labour market, that institutional conditions, wage or salary 
policies, etc., usually play a very fundamental  role, thus making it a rather complicated 
matter to try to determine in a general  manner, and within the limitations imposed by a 
numerical experimentation exercise with a simulation model, the factors  deciding wages 
and the volume of  employment.11 
With regard to the foregoing,  it should be noted that in the model a distinction is 
made between the potential product, associated with points on the transformation  curve, 
and the effective  product, which is determined endogenously. Thus, their defference 
represents the gap between them and measures resource unemployment and, although 
with limitations and only in an indirect manner, labour unemployment.12 
In line with recent analyses of  the theory of  international trade, the model considers 
three kinds of  goods (or sectors of  activity): importable goods, exportable goods (together 
these represent internationally tradeable goods), and goods which are not tradeable with 
the exterior. As we know, these categories are based on the greater or lesser ease of 
substitution between domestic and foreign  goods in production and/or consumption 
(reflected  basically through price differentials,  including transport costs, tariffs  and other 
adjustments and/or trade distortions). 
This classification,  which is very useful  for  the study being carried out here, directed 
as it is towards analysis of  the external sector, does not incorporate a distinction between 
consumption goods and investment goods. It should be recalled that in the model there is 
no explicit identification  of  the "use" of  these goods and, with the sole exception of 
balance-of-payments  current account disequilibria (which implies use for  accumulation 
different  from  use for  replacement investment), no distinction is made between con-
sumption goods and investment goods. This omission constitutes a limitation, since one 
of  the most frequently  discussed topics in processes of  opening up is that of  their impact 
on the rate of  accumulation.13 
Finally, it should be noted that the model has three important general equilibrium 
characteristics.14 Firstly, the quantities of  each good produced are limited by the transfor-
mation curve and, in long-term equilibrium conditions, the vector of  the quantities 
produced satisfies  the equation of  the transformation  curve; the positon and shape of  the 
latter are determined by the resource endowment and the technology of  the economy. 
Secondly, the demand equations satisfy  the three general theoretical conditions of 
homogeneity, symmetry of  the substitution effects,  and additivity. The last general 
characteristic of  the model is its budgetary restriction, both for  the Government and for 
the economy as a whole; the differences  between imports and exports are associated with 
the imbalances in the market of  non-tradeable goods and, following  the balance-of-
payments absorption approach, with the difference  between expenditure and income. 
The role of  budgetary restriction is that of  making it possible to link the interactions 
between the balance of  payments (including the capital account) and the fiscal  and 
monetary sectors, and between these and domestic expenditure and income. These links 
are modelled explicitly, and, together with the two elements referred  to earlier in this 
same paragraph, guarantee the global and sectoral coherence and consistency of  the 
model. 
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IV 
Structure and functional  relations 
The basic structure of  the model which will be used in the simulation exercises can 
conveniently be classified,  for  the purpose of  explanation, in six interrelated sections. 
1. The  production  and supply sector 
a) Desired  supply 
The system of  equations representing the aggregate supply desired in each period 
of  time for  the three types of  goods, importable (Is*),  exportable (Xs*)  and non-tradeable 
(Ns*)  is deduced from  the process of  maximization of  the value of  the national product 
(Y*  = pils* + pxXs*  + p„Ns*),  subject to the technological restriction represented by a 
transformation  curve, the available resource endowment (y*),  and the prices of  the three 
goods (pi,  px, pn) parametrically determined.15 
The technology is characterized by a quadratic transformation  function  which 
describes the technical possibilities of  transformation  of  one good with another (that is to 
say, the ease or difficulty  with which resources intended for  the production of  a particular 
type of  good can be used to produce another good). 
Formally, the problem of  the producer is: 
to maximize: p'z 
subject to: z'Az = y*2 
Where p is the price vector (p„  px, p„) affecting  producers z is the quantity vector (Is*, 
Xs*,  Ns*)  and A is a positive definite  symmetrical matrix of  parameters,16 y* is a positive 
scalar which determines the distance of  the transformation  curve with respect to origin 
and represents the total endowment with available resources. 
It can be demostrated that the solution to this maximization problem is given by: 
z = b>* / (p'Qpfà'&p 
Where $ = A"1. 
Thus, the desired supply of  importable, exportable and non-tradeable goods 
depends exclusively on the relative prices of  the three goods, the technical conditions of 
transformation  of  one good by another, and the endowment of  resources. 
The system of  equation z, is homogeneous of  degree zero in nominal prices, the 
crossed slopes of  quantities with respet to prices are symmetrical, and the weighted sum 
of  the price elasticities, across the equations, is zero.17 
The expressions for  Is*,  Xs*  and Ns*,  appear in the square brackets of  equations 
(2), (3) and (4) of  the model. 
With regard toy*,  as already noted in previous pages, we originally tried to define  it 
as an exogenous variable. Unless we assume perfect  substitution between external saving 
and domestic saving, however, it is necessary to incorporate the effects  deriving from  the 
deficits  and surpluses on the balance-of-payments  current account in the process of  saving 
and investment, and, hence, in its impact on y*. 
To this end, we have attempted a simple preliminary specification,  identifying  the 
available resources with the real national product. In this way, using a Domar type 
equation, the growth rate is equal to the product of  the rate of  investment multiplied by 
the marginal productivity of  investment. 
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(l) y,* = y«-i*(i + c,) 
(5) e, = (I,/Y,)ôt 
The investment is assumed to depend on the differential  beween the productivity 
of  capital and the rate of  interest (see the section on expenditure) and is determined as a 
function  of  the balance-of-payments  current account deficit,  assuming that z% of  the 
external saving is invested and (100 - z) % is substituted (in the algebraical sense) for 
domestic saving (equation 6). Equation 7 indicates that as the stock of  capital 
(approximately indicated by y*) grows, its productivity falls. 
b) Actual  supplies 
The model assumes that there are no demand restrictions on the tradeable goods 
market: that is to say, at the relevant prices, which, as we shall see, are determined 
basically by international prices, the demand for  exportable surpluses and the world 
supply of  importable goods are infinitely  elastic (and of  instantaneous velocity). 
On the production side, it is assumed that if  the economy experiences a change in 
relative prices, in technology or in resource endowment, the modification  in the structure 
of  supply of  tradeable goods is not instantaneous; a gradual adjustment mechanism has 
been incorporated, so that the effective  change in the supply of  tradeable goods is a 
function  of  the difference  between the desired supply and the actual supply of  the 
preceding period: 
Af  = A,(f*  - W ) 
0 < A, < 1 
AXS  = k2(Xs*  - X,V) 
0 < A2 < 1 
In other words, it is assumed that there is some inertia in the production structure, 
so that it takes time to transfer  resources to and from  these sectors. The magnitude of  the 
delay depends on the value in the case of  the supply of  importable goods kl  and on ki  in 
the case of  exportable goods. 
Consequently, the actual supply of  tradeable goods (see equations (2) and (3) is a 
weighted average) of  the present desired supply and the effective  Supply of  the preceding 
period. 
The actual supply on the non-internationally-tradeable goods market is determined 
in a different  manner, since unlike the case of  tradeable goods, excess supply or excess 
demand for  non-tradeable goods may persist for  some time. In other words, at the prices 
prevailing in each period there is no guarantee that the markets will clear, so that it seems 
and extreme case to assume that in spite of  this the actual supply of  non-tradeable goods 
will always be identical with the desired supply. 
This is why this market has been modelled on the assumption that prices and 
quantities adjust from  one period to another. In particular, if  at the prevailing price there 
is excess supply (demand) with respect to the desired supply, the effective  supply of  non-
tradeable goods, Ns,  will be smaller (larger) than the desired supply (see equation 8).18 
If  A3 — 0, this means that Ns  = Ns*  and the quantities actually offered  on the market 
coincide with the desired supply. If  A3 = 1, the adjustment takes place along the demand 
curve for  non-tradeable goods.19 
241 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM A N D EXTERNAL FINANCING 
Once the values of  F,  XS  and N s are known, we can obtain the actual "real product", 
y, given by equation 9- Likewise, the nominal product is also determined through equation 
1 0 . 2 0 
The unemployment of  resources ut, with respect to normal underutilization 
(assumed tobe 5%), which is expressed in equation 11,depends directly on the difference 
between y* - y¡. 
Finally, it may be noted that in equilibrium conditions, that is to say, once sufficient 
time has passed to enable the process of  adjustment of  the economy to take place, the 
actual supply equals the desired supply, so thaty, = y*.11 
2. The  expenditure  sector 
Nominal expenditure has two components, that corresponding to the private sector and 
that corresponding to the public expenditure. 
Private expenditure, in turn, can also be conveniently classified  in two categories: 
spending on goods and non-financial  services (see equation 15) and spending on the 
payment of  interest in respect of  indebtedness of  this sector with the exterior (TDBF). 
The desired total nominal expenditure of  the private sector has been specified  as a 
positive function  of  the disposable nominal income and the nominal excess supply of 
money, and as a negative function  of  the difference  between the rate of  interest and the 
marginal productivity of  capital, 5 (see the term in square brackets in equation 16).22 
This expenditure equation is deduced from  the fact  that the residents of  the country 
have a certain level of  disposable nominal income, determined by the value of  the goods 
produced, less taxes. This income represents the relevant budgetary restriction and, if 
there is equilibrium in the monetary sector and the return on physical capital and 
financial  assets is equal to the rate of  preference  in time, the disposable income is totally 
consumed.25 
The term (Aí - M d )  represents the traditional "hoarding" effect  in the expenditure 
equations and is related with the so-called "wealth effect".  If  there is an excess supply 
(demand) of  money, then, ceteris  paribus, equation 16 indicates that the expenditure will 
be greater than (less than) income. 
The term (ro — S) is introduced as a variable explaining the aggregate expenditure 
on consumption and/or investment and also, as noted in the previous chapter, in order to 
determine from  the "real" side the equilibrium interest rate; without this term, this 
interest rate would be undetermined and could assume any value which equilibrates the 
monetary sector. 
Assuming that the effective  expenditure is gradually adjusted to the desired 
expenditure, we obtain equation 16, where A4 represents the velocity of  adjustment 
(0 < A4 < 1). 
The nominal private expenditure on goods is obtained by deducting from  total 
expenditure the payments of  interest on foreign  debt.24 The total expenditure on goods is 
obtained by adding public expenditure, G, to private expenditure (see equation 17). 
Once the total nominal expenditure on goods has been determined, its distribution 
between importable, exportable and non-tradeable goods is deduced through a process of 
maximization subject to the budgetary restriction represented precisely by total nominal 
expenditure. For this purpose, it is convenient to use the argument of  separability, which 
basically consists of  assuming that there is a unidirectional causal relationship from  total 
expenditure towards its components. 
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Consequently, the problem consists of: 
maximizing: f(qt°) 
subject to the fact  that píqtD  — Et 
where p is the price vector (pi,  px, p„) affecting  domestic residents in their expenditure 
decisions, q is the vector for  the quantities demanded (l,D,  Xt°,  N,°); Et corresponds to 
the nominal expenditure on goods (E¡  = p¡I,D+pxX,D+p„N,D)\  and/represents a generic 
utility function. 
The solution of  this problem permits us to obtain equations 18, 19 and 20, which, 
assuming that the expenditure elasticity of  demand for  all goods is equal to unity, 
correspond to the nominal expenditure on importable, exportable and non-tradeable 
goods (in logarithmic terms) respectively.25 
On the basis of  these equations it can be demostrated that the demand functions  are 
homogeneous of  degree zero on prices, the matrix (òq  ¡bp') is symmetrical, and the 
property of  additivity is complied with. 
The proportion of  expenditure on each type of  good within total expenditure has 
been expressed by the variables w¡, wx , wn (equations 21, 22 and 23), which are 
determined endogenously from  period to period. 
It is interesting to note that the difference  between the nominal expenditure, E, and 
the nominal income Y¡,  corresponds exactly to the deficit  on the balance-of-payments 
current account only if  the market of  non-tradeables is in equilibrium. During the 
transition between two equilibrium states, however, situations may be observed where 
there simultaneously exists a current account deficit  and an excess of  supply of  non-
tradeable goods, so that the economy is below its potential output. 
It may be noted, finally,  that if  there is a current account deficit  and expenditure is 
greater than income, equation 16 alone does not enable us to determine the composition 
of  the excess demand for  goods, and it is necessary to have recourse to the value of 
coefficient  z of  equation 6 in order to determine the proportions in which the economy is 
consuming and/or investing above its productive capacity. 
3. Prices  and inflation 
The general price level has been expressed on the basis of  the expenditure deflator,  as a 
Divisia index in which the percentage change in the level of  prices is a weighted average 
of  the percentage changes in the prices of  importable, exportable and non-tradeable 
goods, the weighting elements being the proportions of  expenditure on each type of  good 
within total expenditure (see equation 24).26 
In equilibrium conditions, the domestic price of  importable goods has been defined 
as the product of  the price of  foreign  goods (pF)27 multiplied by the exchange rate (ER) 
adjusted by the level of  tariff  protection.28 
As the response of  domestic prices to variations in PF,  ER or r is not generally 
instantaneous, a gradual adjustment has been assumed (equation 25).29 
The price of  exportable goods is made equal to the price abroad multiplied by the 
exchange rate (equation 26).30 
The price of  non-tradeable goods is determined as a function  of  the imbalances of 
supply and/or demand in their own market, and their rate of  change responds 
"autonomously" to the variation of  prices of  importable goods (equation 27).31 
The value of  coefficient  X6 is a crucial factor  with regard to the velocity with which 
the price of  non-tradeable goods arrives at its equilibrium state. A very small value of  Xé 
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means that in the face  of  given changes there will be big delays in returning to an 
equilibrium state, so that, depending on the value of  À3, the economy will be for  a longer 
or shorter time at a greater or smaller distance from  its potential level of  optimum 
resource use. 
Finally, for  the expected inflation  we have used a traditional model of  adaptative 
expectations, along the lines of  Cagan,32 namely: 
Atr,e = \8(Alog p, - irt-\) 
where TTÍ  — the expected rate of  inflation  in period t. On the basis of  this expression we 
have deduced equation (28). 
4. The  balance of  payments and external  indebtedness 
Imports (I¡), valued in foreign  currency, are defined  as the product of  the international 
price, pF,  multiplied by the difference  between the domestic supply and demand of 
importable goods (equation 29). 
Similarly, exports (X,)  correspond to the excess domestic supply of  exportable 
goods, valued at international prices (equation 30). 
The balance-of-payments  current account (CA),  expressed in national currency, is 
equal to the trade balance (X,  ~I,),  less the flow  of  payments corresponding to interest on 
foreign  debt (equation 31). 
The behaviour of  the balance-of-payments  capital account is derived from  the 
assumption that, in addition to certain autonomous flows,  international credits enter or 
leave the country as a function  of  the difference  beween domestic and foreign  interest 
rates (rD,~rF,), adjusted by the expectations of  devaluation of  the national currency 
(Aelog(£R)i) and by other factors  related with risk, differences  in reserve requirements, 
etc., which are incorporated in the term Q,. 
In the absence of  any controls on capital movements, the flow  of  the latter (DK)¡, 
expressed in national currency, would be represented by the following  equation:33 
(DK):  = Á4(ER),  + 717(rD,  ~ rF,  ~ Q,) + yi8[log(ER), - log(ER),-i] 
The value 717 reflects  the velocity at which, in the absence of  controls on capital 
movements, such flows  move into and out of  the country under consideration. 
To the extent that there are controls on capital movements, the "effective"  value of 
717 will we smaller. Thus, through the policy variable /?, which as we see in equation 32, 
multiplies the determinant factors  of  the induced flows  of  external capital, an attempt is 
made to incorporate the degree of  financial  restriction vis-a-vis  the exterior. A value of 
/}=0 means that the economy is totally closed to international capital movements, 
whereas j8=l indicates total financial  openness. 
Equation 33 of  the balance-of-payments  position (BP),,  equivalent to the variation 
in net international reserves, is defined  as the algebraical sum of  the current account and 
capital account balances. 
The stock of  international reserves, Rt, which equals the stock at the end of  the 
previous period, plus the balance-of-payments  position, is defined  in equation 34. 
It is worth noting the form  in which external indebtedness has been incorporated 
in the model. It is assumed that the initiative regarding AK  can only come from  the 
exterior, since the model does not include in any way the holding of  external financial 
assets by domestic residents. In addition, it is assumed that only the domestic private 
sector has issued bonds in the past, so that there is an initial stock of  bonds in the 
244 
ALTERNATIVE OPENING UP STRATEGIES: A SIMULATION MODEL 
possession of  that sector which are traded only among themselves or with the exterior. 
The flow  of  bonds issued by the private sector is assumed to be nil,34 so that if  BF,  is the 
stock of  domestic bonds in the possession of  foreigners,  that is to say, the gross external 
debt of  the country (see equation 35), we have: 
BF,  = 1 A KRI 
fco 
It has been assumed, for  simplicity's sake, that the initial amount of  external 
indebtedness is nil.35 
Finally, because of  the way in which the external debt has been incorporated in the 
model, it is worth noting that the flow  of  payments of  interest to which this indebtedness 
gives rise corresponds to the product of  BF,  multiplied by the domestic rate (ro,), since it is 
precisely the bigger expected return from  domestic financial  assets which explains the 
capital movements induced towards the country. 
5. The  monetary sector 
The nominal amount of  money (Ali) is defined  (in a broad sense) in equation 36 as the 
sum of  domestic credit (broken down into credit to the private sector, CRP,  and credit to 
the public sector, CRG,  plus the value in national currency of  the net international 
reserves. 
In the demand for  money, M,D, expressed in nominal terms in equation 37, the 
model assumes a type of  behaviour which has been extensively worked out in the 
literature, the argument for  it being the nominal income (as a "proxy" for  the budgetary 
restriction), the expected rate of  inflation  (reflecting  the alternative cost in terms of 
goods) and the nominal rate of  interest (which indicates the presence of  non-monetary 
financial  assets as substitute for  money).36 
The rate of  interest changes as a function  of  the excess supply and/or demand for 
money (equation 38).37 
The model makes explicit the direct link between the external sector and the 
monetary sector through the effect  of  the variations in the international reserves on the 
money supply. This mechanism, as is well known, is the central element in the monetary 
approach to the balance of  payments and expresses the fact  that the money supply, when 
the exchange rate is determined by the economic authority, is not controllable and in the 
ultimate analysis is determined (through the purchase and sale of  foreign  currency to the 
Central Bank) by the demand for  money.38 
Equation 36 also indicates a very close linkage between the financing  of  fiscal  policy 
and the monetary sector. 
6. The  fiscal  sector 
The model incorporates the public sector in a very simple form,  although for  studies 
centered on this sector this must be suitably disaggregated and specified. 
Public expenditure in nominal terms,(j;, is defined  as the sum of  non-tariff  taxation 
(T,), tariff  collection, and the public sector deficit,  g0, which constitutes one of  the 
variables of  fiscal  policy (see equation 39). 
Non-tariff  taxation is assumed to depend on income tax, at a proportional rate, t\, 
and on other taxes, t0 (equation 40). These two coefficients,  t0 and t\, also form  part of  the 
fiscal  policy instruments. 
245 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND EXTERNAL FINANCING 
Finally, it is assumed that all public sector deficits  are financed  by the issue of  money 
by the Central Bank, through credit to the Government (CRG),  or alternatively, that all 
surpluses are reflected  in absorption of  the money by the monetary authority with 
consequent reduction of  the amount of  high powered money (see equation 41). 
The linkage between fiscal  policy and monetary policy is immediate, and is due to 
the fact  that no other forms  of  financing  public expenditure have been modelled (such as, 
for  example, domestic indebtedness with the private sector and/or external 
indebtedness). 
Nor has any direct linkage been modelled between public expenditure and private 
expenditure, so that any change in G, financed  through taxation, is exactly offset  in the 
present version of  the model by changes in private expenditure of  equal magnitude but of 
opposite sign. 
V 
Functioning of  the global model 
In this section an endeavour will be made to give an idea of  the global functioning  of  the 
model, describing how the different  sectors are related with each other and explaining the 
mechanisms of  adjustment to some changes in the macroeconomic conditions. This will 
make it possible to analyse more readily and precisely in the next chapter some of  the 
simulation exercises. 
If  an excess nominal supply of  money39 arises, for  example, this is manifested  in 
pressure on the market for  goods (equation 16) and on the financial  sector (equation 38). 
In the first  case, it should be noted that part of  the greater expenditure goes to the 
market for  tradeable goods, generating a deficit  on the balance-of-payments  current 
account,40 and thus causing a reduction in the supply of  money, which tends to restore 
equilibrium. 
When expenditure increases, this also produces an excess demand for  non-
tradeable goods, which is reflected  partly in a rise in the prices in the market for  such 
goods (equation 27) and partly in an increase in the effective  supply of  non-tradeable 
goods (equation 8). Both effects  increase the nominal demand for  money, thus helping to 
reduce the disequilibrium of  the monetary sector. 
Finally, initial excess supply of  money will also affect  the financial  sector, its impact 
being directly proportional to the value of  713 (equation 38). The tendency to a drop in the 
interest rate will help the monetary sector to return to equilibrium through the increase 
in the amount of  money demanded.41 
It should be noted that, if  outside prices do not change, the rise in the price of  non-
tradeable goods is only transitory because of  the properties of  the structures of  production 
and expenditure and the unit values of  the sectoral elasticities of  supply and demand with 
respect toy* and E¡, respectively. The effect  of  a rise in pn is to transfer  resources from  the 
production of  exportable and importable goods to that of  non-tradeable goods and to 
divert demand towards tradeable goods, all of  which explains the deficit  on the balance of 
payments trade account, the reduction in the excess supply of  money, and the tendency of 
the prices of  non-tradeable goods to return to their initial equilibrium level.42 
In other words, once the period of  transition is over, whose duration, intensity, 
specific  time path and lags displayed by the various variables naturally depend on the 
particular values of  the parameters and coefficients  of  the model, the situation returns to 
one of  equilibrium. This is achieved basically through the following  adjustment 
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mechanisms: loss of  international reserves and increase in external indebtedness, higher 
level of  economic activity,43 transitory rise in price levels and temporary drop in interest 
rates.44 
The first  of  these mechanisms, the balance-of-payments  deficit  with consequent 
reduction of  the nominal supply of  money, plays a fundamental  role in this model, since 
leaving aside the possible process of  accumulation, prices tend to return to their initial 
level,45 as does the rate of  interest, which is reasonable enough since there have been no 
"real" changes in the economy. 
Consequently, we observe that if  the economy is open (or even protected) with 
respect to the trade in goods and non-financial  services, the model reproduces as its 
equilibrium condition the situation whereby "the demand for  money creates its own 
supply", in other words, the nominal supply of  money is endogenous and its evolution is 
explained ultimately by the factors  determining demand (through the variations in the 
nominal products, its interest rates, and in expected inflation).  In this example there have 
not been any major changes in the variables which explain the demand for  means of 
payment, so that the bulk of  the adjustment takes place through a negative balance-of-
payments situation (assuming that domestic credit does not change from  the level which 
it had when the excess supply of  money was generated). In this way, the economy gets rid 
of  the surplus money, bringing the supply of  means of  payment in line with the nominal 
amounts demanded. 
Another case which it is interesting to analyse is that of  a devaluation of  the 
exchange rate. This means basically that the prices of  tradeable goods, with a greater or 
lesser lag, rise in proportion to the devaluation (see equation 25 and 26). Moreover, and 
depending on the value of  Á7, the prices of  non-tradeable goods will also rise directly.46 
Unless the value À.7 is unity, the terms of  trade for  tradeable goods initially improve, 
making their production more profitable  and causing demand to move towards non-
tradeable goods. This therefore  tends to generate a surplus on the baíance-of-payments 
trade account and an increase in the supply of  money. 
This is coherent with the initial impact of  the rise in prices on the real supply of 
money, causing an excess of  demand for  money since, even if  Xi were equal to unity and 
there were initially no change in relative prices, an excess nominal demand for  money 
arises which depresses expenditure and tends to raise interest rates. The first  effect  is 
reflected  in a drop in the relative price of  non-tradeable goods and stimulation of  the 
transfer  of  resources to the production of  tradeable goods (and the diversion of  demand to 
non-tradeable goods), with consequent improvement in the balance-of-payments  trade 
account and an increase in the supply of  money. The second effect,  if  J3 is not zero, is to 
stimulate the entry of  capital, thus also helping to close the gap between the demand for 
and supply of  money. 
In short, both the "expenditure" effect  and the change in relative prices help to 
restore the monetary equilibrium. 
Through this example we see that in the model an exchange rate variation alone 
does not cause permanent changes in relative prices.47 However, depending on the initial 
conditions at the moment of  devaluation and the specific  values of  the lag coefficients  (X,) 
and those relating to imbalances in the financial  sector, not only is a (one time) 
improvement in the balance of  payments produced, but also the economy can, naturally, 
be reactivated. Associated with these effects  there will certainly be a rise in the level of 
prices and probably greater external indebtedness. 
The foregoing  paragraphs contain some of  the fundamental  elements for 
understanding the basic functioning  of  the model: the analysis of  the simulations is 
concentrated on the relative impacts of  the different  adjustment mechanisms and on the 
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time paths and the various lags in the variables affected  by policy changes, all of  which 
depend essentially on the specific  values of  the parameters and coefficients  of  the model. 
VI 
Analysis of  some simulations 
This chapter seeks to investigate the specific  characteristics of  the time paths of  the main 
macroeconomic variables vis-a-vis alternative strategies of  economic opening up to the 
exterior.48 
All the simulations start from  an initial situation of  global and sectoral equilibrium, 
assuming that the economy is closed to international capital movementes (ft  = 0) and is 
protected with a uniform  tariff  of  100% (r = 1) on all imports. In addition, initially the 
effective  products is equal to the potential products, the prices of  goods are in equilibrium 
for  a fixed  exchange rate (ER  = 1), the current account, capital account and balance of 
payments as a whole are in balance, and the level of  international reserves and amount of 
money remain constant. It is assumed that the crossed price elasticities of  demand are 
zero and that if  there is a change in the price of  a good the supply of  the other goods moves 
in the opposite direction. 
The analysis is concentrated on the dynamic time paths of  these and other variables 
in response to policy changes. Finally, an analysis is made of  some policies which, when 
combined with those of  opening up, minimize certain undesirable effects  which have 
been noted in the first  simulations. 
1. Commercial  opening up policies 
To begin with, let it be assumed that it has been decided to implement a "shock" 
commercial policy consisting of  reducing the value of  a tariff  to zero over a given period. 
Figures A.l to A.7 show the effects  of  this policy on the endogenous variables of  the 
model. 
The initial impact of  the policy is to abruptly reduce the price of  importable goods49 
(it may be recalled that k¡ = 1). This also affects  the price of  non-tradeable goods, not only 
through the effect  of  ki, but also because of  the change in relative prices, since the initial 
drop in the price of  importable goods leads to a transfer  of  resources towards the 
production of  non-tradeable (and exportable) goods and diverts demand from  the non-
tradeable (and exportable) goods market to the market for  importable goods.50 As a result 
of  this, not only does the level of  the prices fall51  (see figure  A.l), but an excess supply in 
the non-tradeable goods market is also produced (figure  A.2). 
From the monetary point of  view, the drop in the level of  prices generates an excess 
supply of  money which is manifested  in relation to the financial  sector through a strong 
cyclical movement in the interest rate (see figure  A.4). This rate drops in the periods 
following  the reduction in tariffs,52  but subsequently gradually returns to a new 
equilibrium state, although this is below the initial level because of  the drop in the 
productivity of  capital. 
The impact of  the excess supply of  money on expenditure, together with the initial 
changes in relative prices, is reflected  in the current account deficit  of  the balance of 
payments. The loss of  reserves (a process which lasts for  approximately eight periods) 
culminates in a level which is less than half  of  the initial one (see figure  A.5), with 
imports which are more than twice their original value. 
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The current account deficit  of  the balance of  payments, expressed as a proportion of 
the national product, comes to 7.5% for  the first  period and initially remains high but 
subsequently goes down until it practically disappears in the eighth period. It may be 
noted that the excess supply of  money tends to go down gradually in proportion as 
international reserves are lost.53 
As regards the impact of  this policy on the sectoral composition of  the national 
product (figure  A.6), it is to be noted that there is a sharp drop in the importance of  the 
sector producing importable goods (import substitution activities), which goes down 
from  35% to 19% in only two periods. The exportable goods, which are benefited  by the 
drop in the price of  importable goods, react more slowly (it may be recalled that 
À.2 = 0.4 and Xi = 0.8), with their share increasing from  17% to 37%. The behaviour of 
non-tradeable goods is explained by their own and crossed price elasticities of  supply and 
demand.54 
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A. 3. Imports and exports 
A.4. Rate of  interest 
A.5. Current account and international reserves 
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A.6. Structure of  supply (as  a proportion of  the national product) 
A.7. Gap Between actual and potential product (long-term  equilibrium level:  5%) 
Figure B 
EFFECTS OF COMMERCIAL O P E N I N G U P O N THE SHARE OF N O N - T R A D E A B L E 
G O O D S IN THE N A T I O N A L PROJECT 
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Finally, it is to be obvserved that as there is no instantaneous adjustment in the 
sector of  tradeable goods and, more specifically,  as Ai is double X2, the resources no longer 
used in the production of  importable goods rapidly become unemployed, whereas their 
transfer  to other sectors takes some time.55 It is for  this reason that, as we may see from 
figure  A.7, the gap between the potential and real product is initially large and returns 
only very gradually to its initial level.56 
It is interesting to compare the foregoing  case with what could be called a "gradual" 
commercial opening up policy, which has been defined  here as the full  liberalization of 
imports over four  periods. Figures D.l to D.4 display this situation, which is illustrated by 
comparing it with sudden commercial opening up. 
In general, it is observed that the direction of  the changes in the variables is the 
same as in the case of  "shock", but the distribution in time of  these changes is different: 
the process of  return to a new equilibrium position displays a different  distribution in 
time and is "smoother" than in the "shock" case. 
The foregoing  is clearly reflected  in the evolution of  prices (see figure  D.l), and 
something similar also occurs with the time paths of  the structure of  production. 
Resource unemployment57 and the rate of  interest are displaced from  their 
equilibrium values for  approximately the same period of  time as in the case of  abrupt 
commercial opening up, and their extreme points are less pronounced but further  away 
from  their equilibrium values in the rest of  the distribution (see figures  D.2 and D.3). 
Strictly speaking, in order to make a comparative appraisal of  the cost of  resource 
unemployment it would be necessary not only to consider the differences  in the areas 
under the curves of  figure  D.2, but also to bring in the social discount rate as a 
homogenizing element. 
It is interesting to note that the accumulated balance-of-payments  current account 
deficit  (loss of  reserves) does not differ  according to the type or context of  the opening up 
(sudden or gradual reform  greater or lesser speed of  adjustment in the tradeable goods 
sectors, different  situations of  disequilibrium in the non-tradeable goods market) (figure 
E.3). Furthermore, gradual opening up does not tend to distribute the deficit  over a larger 
number of  periods58 compared with the case of  shock opening up: what is observed is that 
initially the deficits  are smaller and subsequently greater than in the abrupt commercial 
opening up (see figure  D.4). 
To sum up, then, with regard to the real product, it is noted that this falls  when 
tariffs  are reduced, and this fall  tends to be greater in proportion as there is greater 
rigidity in the non-tradeable goods market. The main difference  observed between the 
cases of  shock and gradual opening up is not so much in relation to the time during which 
the product remains below that of  "full  employment", but rather that in the former  case 
the unemployment "peak" is greater and the distribution of  the resource gap is more 
asymmetrical than in the gradual case. 
It is also concluded that in both types of  commercial opening up there is an 
immediate deterioration in the balance-of-payments  current account, the accumulated 
deficits  being practically identical in both cases. What varies once again, is the intensity of 
the deficit,  which is greater for  a smaller number of  periods in the case of  abrupt opening 
up, and also the distribution of  these deficits  in time. 
While the production of  importable goods drops, as was to be expected, the 
production of  exportable goods grows because of  the effects  of  substitution in production 
and consumption. In the new equilibrium situation, the share of  the production of 
tradeable goods in the total may be greater or smaller than the original share, depending 
basically on the own and crossed supply and demand elasticities with respect to prices of 
importable and non-tradeable goods. 
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FigureC 
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Figure D 
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E.3. Current account and international reserves 
Current account (A3=l; A¿=0.3) 
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Finally, it may be noted that while the nominal rate of  interest tends to fall  initially, 
the real rate rises substantially while the level of  domestic prices goes down as a result of 
the tariff  reduction. 
2. Financial  opening up policies 
These exercises, which start from  an initial equilibrium position where there is a 100% 
tariff  maintained constant, and flows  of  capital are prohibited, are designed to analyse the 
effects  of  permitting international movements of  capital into and out of  the country. It is 
assumed that the domestic interest rate is initially twice the sum of  the international rate 
and the risk premium (ro = 20%;rp = 5%; Q= 5%). 
A policy of  shock financial  opening up is understood as one which instantaneously 
permits the free  movement of  capital into and out of  the country (/? goes from  a value of 
zero to unity in one period). Figures F.l to F.6 describe the evolution of  the main 
macroeconomic variables for  this latter situation. 
The difference  in interest rates causes a flow  of  capital which increases the supply 
of  money and the external debt. In principle, the excess supply of  money causes a drop in 
the rate of  interest and initially has an expansive effect  on aggregate demand, which is 
reflected  in the current account deficit  and a rise in the price of  non-tradeable goods. 
In order for  the economy to return to a situation of  equilibrium which means, inter 
alia, that DK  = 0, the domestic interest rate must drop to 10%. This phenomenon is 
produced by the interaction of  the excess supply of  money, which affects  the rate of 
interest in the financial  sector, and the impact of  external savings on the accumulation of 
capital, with a consequent fall  in its productivity. 
This process is more or less slow, depending basically on the values of  y n (equation 
32), y n (equation 38) and, above all, z (equation 6); this last parameter reflects  the 
impact of  external saving on investment. 
It may be noted that, for  the values adopted for  the parameterws, even though the 
rate of  interest falls,  it nevertheless remains for  over 40 periods above the long-term 
equilibrium level (figure  F. 1). The larger the values of  717 and 2, the more rapidly ro with 
tend to become equalized with (jf  +0). 
Moreover, as long as such equality does not exist, external indebtedness will be 
accumulated, which means that the economy must generate a growing surplus on the 
trade account of  the balance of  payments in order to cover the interest payments on the 
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foreign  debt (see figure  F.2). In this process there is a slight increase in the share of 
tradeable goods and a drop in non-tradeable goods as a proportion of  the national product 
(see figure  F.3), because of  the need to depress aggregate demand so as to generate the 
resources for  the payment of  interest on the external debt.59 This implies a small drop in 
the price of  non-tradeable goods and in the level of  prices (see figure  F.5). 
In spite of  the surplus on the trade account, a sustained deficit  on the balance-of-
payments current account is to be noted, although it decreases gradually as the economy 
tends towards equilibrium (see figure  F.4). All this is accompanied by an increase in the 
gross international reserves, quite sharp at the beginning because of  the larger inflow  of 
capital, and subsequently going down but nevertheless remaining finally  at a higher level 
than the initial one. This is because the drop in the rate of  interest and the growth of  the 
product give rise to an increase in the demand for  money, which is satisfied  through the 
accumulation of  international reserves. 
It should be noted that although the process o.f  financial  opening up is accompanied 
by a higher level of  international reserves, the gross and net external indebtedness is 
nevertheless growing (see figure  F.6). The real expenditure on goods and non-financial 
services, which tends to grow at the begninning, as a consequence of  the greater external 
indebtedness, goes down with time not only because of  the smaller flow  of  external 
indebtedness, but also because of  the growing interest payments on this debt. 
The counterpart to the greater external indebtedness, associated with the deficit  on 
the balance-of-payments  current accoaunt, is reflected  in a growing real product whose 
time path and final  level depend essentially on the values of  z and y (equations 6 and 7). 
Finally, in contrast with the commercial opening up, the impact of  the resource gap 
is very small (see figure  F.7) and is associated with the values of  71 and 72, that is to say, 
the time it takes for  the investment in these sectors to be actually expressed in greater 
production. 
With regard to gradual financial  opening up, in principle this can be defined  in two 
alternative manners: one consisting of  the complete but not instantaneous liberalization 
of  capital movements (/? goes from  zero to unity over "several" periods), and another in 
which /3 instantaneously assumes a value which is positive but less than unity. This is the 
case which is observed in figures  G.l and G.2. 
The main differences  between gradual and abrupt financial  reform  lie in the 
distribution of  the variables in question, which is "smoother" in the latter case.60 It should 
be noted that external indebtedness, towards the end of  the period, shown in the figures, 
is a good deal less than the corresponding to the "shock" case; however, the process of 
accumulation (assuming the same value of  z) and growth is also smaller. 
An interesting aspect, valid for  both abrupt and gradual financial  opening up, is 
that in so far  as the economy must generate resources to pay for  the servicing of  the 
external debt, this means that if  there are disequilibria in the non-tradeable goods market 
the activity of  this sector will suffer,  thus increasing the size of  the gap between the 
potential and actual product. 
In short, financial  opening up, unlike commercial opening up, does not 
significantly  affect  the level of  domestic prices or resource unemployment.61 Nor is there 
a loss of  gross international reserves. There is, however, a process of  growing external 
indebtedness associated with simultaneous surpluses on the capital account and deficits 
on the current account of  the balance of  payments, whose impact on the (drop in the) 
domestic rate of  interest depends not only on the speed of  response of  the flows  of  capital 
to the interest differential  between the country and the exterior, but also, and in 
particular, on the effect  of  the external indebtedness on the process of  investment and 
economic growth. 
257 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND EXTERNAL FINANCING 
Figure F 
EFFECTS OF SUDDEN FINANCIAL OPENING UP ON VARIABLES INDICATED 
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F.4. Balance of  payments accounts 
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F.7. Gap between actual and potential product (long-term  equilibrium level: 5%) 
Figure G 
EFFECTS OF S U D D E N A N D G R A D U A L  F I N A N C I A L O P E N I N G U P 
O N THE VARIABLES  I N D I C A T E D 
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3. Simultaneity  of  policies of  commercial and financial  opening up 
This section describes the results of  an exercise which simultaneously combines policies 
of  commercial and financial  opening up, both of  a gradual nature62 (see figures  H.l to 
H.7). 
In the first  place, it is noted that because of  the combined effect  of  the two policies, 
which bring about a fall  in the nominal demand for  money (as a consequence of  the drop 
in the level of  prices resulting from  the tariff  deduction) and an increase in the supply of 
money (due to the inflow  of  international capital), the accumulated deficit  on the current 
account (see figure  H.l) and the level of.the  final  product63 are higher, while the rate of 
interest (see figure  H.2) is lower, than in each of  the policies considered separately. 
The final  level63 of  reserves, however, is higher than in the case of  commercial 
opening up (see figure  H.3), since the demand for  money is in this case higher because of 
the larger product and the lower rate of  interest. At all events, it is to be noted that, as in 
the case of  each type of  opening up considered separately, the evolution of  the reserves is 
determined ultimately by the behaviour of  the demand for  money. 
With regard to the external indebtedness (see figure  H.4), it is to be noted that this, 
and hence the accumulated net inflow  of  international capital, is much lower in the case of 
the combined policies than in the case of  financial  opening up considered separately. This 
is because of  the different  evolution of  the rate of  interest in the two simulations, since the 
inflow  of  capital is very sensible to changes in this rate. Thus, in the case of  financial 
opening up the excess supply of  money goes down gradually from  an initial level of  barely 
1%, whereas in the case of  the combined policies this variable shows a cyclical behaviour 
in which, in the first  periods, the excess supply of  money grows sharply as a result of  the 
drop in the demand for  money, reaching a peak of  over 7%. For this reason, the nominal 
rate of  interest drops sharply at the begining (five  periods), and even when it begins to 
grow again it does not manage to exceed relatively low levels, always remaining below the 
time path followed  in the case of  financial  opening up alone (see figure  H.2). When the 
policies are combined, this leads to an inflow  of  capital (and consequent external 
indebtedness) far  below the case of  financial  opening up alone. 
As regards the structure of  the trade account of  the balance of  payments, here we 
note that both imports and exports grow (due to the change in relative prices caused by 
the commercial policy), but the former  grow less than the latter, because of  the need to 
generate a surplus in order to pay for  the servicing of  the external debt (see figure  H.5). 
Since this debt is smaller than in the case of  financial  opening up alone (where imports 
drop by almost 50% and exports rise by 20%), in this case exports grow by 160% and 
imports increase by 128%.64 
Finally, the structure of  production (like the resource gap) behaves in a very similar 
/ay to the case of  commercial opening up, which is to be explained by the small impact of 
financial  opening up on relative prices. The level of  prices is finally  slightly below (2%) 
the level reached with commercial opening up alone, because of  the drop in the price of 
non-tradeable goods which is necessary in order to generate the surplus on the balance-of-
payments trade account65 (see figures  H.6 and H.7). 
To sum up, it may be deduced that the simultaneous application of  the two types of 
opening up policies is not the same as the "sum" of  each of  them considered separately. 
Although the production structure and the resource unemployment, together with prices, 
tend broadly to reproduce the situation observed in the case of  commercial opening up, 
the financial  and external sector variables behave in a different  manner from  that 
resulting from  the "combination" of  the two policies considered separately. This is 
reflected  mainly as a lower level of  external indebtedness, a smaller surplus of  the 
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Figure H 
EFFECTS OF SIMULTANEOUS POLICIES OF COMMERCIAL A N D F I N A N C I A L 
O P E N I N G U P (BOTH G R A D U A L )  O N VARIABLES  I N D I C A T E D 
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H.7. Price level 
balance-of-payments  trade account (but with larger imports than in the initial situation) 
and a different  time path of  the rate of  interest in comparison with financial  opening up 
alone. 
4. Compensatory  policies 
It may be deduced from  analysis of  the simulations associated with the various strategies 
of  opening up that in some cases they may be accompanied by transitory effects  (of 
undefined  duration) which may be considered undesirable by the economic authorities. 
These effects  are connected, in the case of  the balance of  payments, with a deficit  on 
current account, loss of  international reserves and/or greater external indebtedness, 
while in the productive sector the main effect  observed is resource unemployment in the 
case of  commercial opening up.66 
One of  the main possibly undesirable effects  of  a financial  opening up policy is 
external indebtedness. Since, however, this is inherently connected with such opening up 
per se, no attempt will be made to develop compensatory policies with regard to financial 
opening up at this stage of  the research.67 
With regard to commercial opening up policies, these display the two effects 
mentioned above which may be considered undesirable during the transition process: loss 
of  international reserves, associated with the accumulated deficit  on the balance-of-
payments current account, and the gap created beween the potential product and the 
effective  product. 
There are various aggregate demand policies (exchange rate, fiscal  and/or 
monetary) which could, in principle, be tried out with the aim of  minimizing such effects. 
In the present case, a type of  monetary policy will be developed which can be used with the 
aim of  reducing the external sector gap. 
In order to reduce the current account deficit,  which is equivalent in this case to 
reducing the loss of  international reserves, it would be necessary to implement a 
restrictive monetary policy consisting of  reducing domestic credit so as not to generate 
the excess supply of  money described in the first  section of  this chapter. 
Figure 1.1 describes the magnitude and sequence in time of  the domestic credit 
policy derived from  the attempt to secure permanent equilibrium in the monetary sector. 
Figure 1.2 shows how the loss of  reserves is substantially reduced, in a policy of  gradual 
commercial opening up, when the compensatory monetary policy is applied. 
264 
ALTERNATIVE OPENING UP STRATEGIES: A SIMULATION MODEL 
Figure I 
C O M P E N S A T O R Y  M O N E T A R Y  P O L I C Y FOR T H E B A L A N C E O F P A Y M E N T S 
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1.2. International reserves 
It is deduce that a strong contraction of  domestic credit (in this case, that which is 
directed to the private sector) would be necessary, this being more pronounced in the first 
periods arid subsequently less marked. The reserves drop very gently, above all compared 
with the opening up without compensatory policy, and the reason why they do not remain 
totally unchanged is that simply guaranteeing equilibrium of  the monetary sector is not 
sufficient  for  this. In addition, as the adjustment in the exportable goods market is slower 
than in the importable goods market, the change in relative prices has an asymmetrical 
effect  (in spite of  the fact  that there is no excess demand) on the two markets, necessarily 
generating a transitory though small deficit  in the balance of  payments in the first 
periods. 
Finally, the elimination of  the excess supply of  money increases the excess supply of 
non-tradeable goods, so that, depending mainly on the values of  Â.6 and X3, a gap would be 
generated between the potential production and the larger effective  production.68 
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In contrast, there is no similar effect  on the side of  the tradeable goods, since the 
drop in aggregate demand caused by the restrictive credit policy affects  exports and 
imports, but not the production of  tradeable goods, the latter being a function  of  prices 
but not of  domestic demand. 
VII 
Summary and conclusions 
It may be deduced from  this study that the effects  of  commercial opening up are very 
different  from  those of  financial  opening up. The former  are manifested  specially in 
changes in resource allocation and in the structure of  production, in a heavy impact on 
prices (relative and absolute), and in relatively large drops in aggregate production, with 
the interest rate displaying a cyclic type of  behaviour. The impact of  financial  opening up, 
in contrast, is seen particularly clearly in the areas of  greater external indebtedness and 
bigger current account deficits  and in the drop in the rate of  interest, while the effects  on 
the structure of  production, prices and the resource gap are very small, although the 
resource gap does acquire greater importance with the passage of  time when the economy 
has to generate growing trade account surpluses to service the foreign  debt. 
A second interesting result is the difference  in the effects  caused by gradual and 
shock opening up strategies during the period of  transition from  an initial equilibrium 
situation to another terminal equilibrium situation. In general, the balance-of-payments 
current account deficits  and the transitory drops in product and prices (or in the rate of 
inflation,  if  this is initially positive) are more pronounced at the beginning in cases of 
shock commercial opening up, but subsequently converge more rapidly, in comparison 
with the effects  of  gradual opening up. Moreover, as already noted, the combination of  the 
two policies (trade and financial  opening up is not the simple "sum" of  each of  them 
considered separately), it may naturally be deduced that the economic authorities cannot 
remain indifferent  in the face  of  the different  sequences and magnitudes of  the alternative 
opening up strategies. 
Another result which is worthy of  special note concerns the importance of  the 
mathematical sign and magnitude of  the correlation which exists between domestic 
saving and external saving. The value of  this parameter, and its consequent implications 
for  economic policy measures which tend to affect  it, are seen to be crucial in the 
determination of  the time needed for  the economy to return to a (probably different) 
equilibrium path. Apart from  what is described in the present study, this phenomenon 
can be appreciated if  we think, for  example, of  the way in which the economy will reach 
and adjust to a rise in world interest rates and/or if  it is decided to open up the economy to 
a greater extent financially.  This situation is very closely related with the capacity of  the 
economy to sustain given levels of  external indebtedness for  long periods. In particular, 
the linking of  external savings (balance-of-payments  current account deficit)  with 
national expenditure on investment goods, which increase the productive capacity, 
assumes great importance in the determination of  a new global macroeconomic 
equilibrium time path. 
The foregoing  point is also one of  the fundamental  elements, in addition to the 
variables traditionally taken into account (expectations of  devaluation, risk appraisals, 
etc.), for  explaining a phenomenon which has been observed empirically in several cases 
of  opening up, namely, the long delay in adjustment of  the domestic rate of  interest to the 
international rate. 
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Specifically,  the research indicates that even when there is rapid financial  opening 
up it takes a long period of  adjustment to secure general macroeconomic equilibrium and, 
in particular, convergence of  the domestic rate of  interest with the international rate, if 
investment and the rate of  growth of  the output are slow. There are also other parameters 
whose values are very decisive in conditioning the more or less rapid convergence 
between domestic and international rates of  interest, the principle of  these parameters 
being the elasticity of  the flow  of  international capital to the country and the proportion 
of  the monetary disequilibrium manifested  in the domestic financial  market. 
It must be stressed that these results have strong implications, in addition to 
external indebtedness, in such areas as the effects  of  imperfections  in the domestic and 
international capital markets on the processes of  saving and investment, redistribution of 
wealth, etc. 
An element which plays a role of  great importance in determining the time path of 
the various macroeconomic variables is the adjustment mechanisms of  prices and 
quantities in the non-tradeable goods market. It is observed that the slower the 
adjustment of  this market and the more decisive the role of  effective  demand in decisions 
on the supply of  such goods, the costlier the process of  commercial opening up tends to be 
in terms of  production losses. Likewise, the greater or lesser correlation between 
domestic and external inflation  in the face  of  a change in tariff  protection depends 
strongly on the importance of  the production of  non-tradeable goods with total supply 
and on the speed of  adjustment of  prices to imbalances between supply and demand in 
this market. 
Another element which stands out by its importance for  the time path of  the 
macroeconomic variables in a process of  opening up is that associated with the speed of 
response of  the production of  exportable and importable goods to changes in relative 
prices. The greater the mobility of  intersectoral resources and the smaller the differences 
between the lags in the desired and effective  supplies of  exportable and importable goods, 
the smaller will be the transition costs deriving from  the economic opening up. 
Other interesting results which have been noted are summarized below. 
When the economy is opened up to the exterior, the global balnce-of-payments 
position may improve even though the current account deteriorates and the external 
indebtedness grows. The more rapid and complete the financial  opening up is, the more 
clearly this phenomenon is to be noted. 
The real product temporarily falls  when tariffs  are reduced. The duration of  the 
resource unemployment is independent of  the rapidity of  commercial opening up, but the 
resource gap is greater in the case of  "shock" commercial opening up, although in certain 
periods its magnitude is less than that corresponding to gradual commercial opening up. 
The result is also very sensitive to the relative speed of  adjustment of  quantity and 
prices in the non-tradeable goods market. 
The rate of  inflation  falls  with commercial opening up, while the domestic rate of 
interest moves towards the value of  the international rate when the economy is opened 
up financially.  The two variables do not converge instantaneously towards the 
international levels, and this depends, although only partially, on the speed of  the 
respective process of  opening up. In a general equilibrium context, however, the 
adjustment of  prices tends to be more rapid than that of  rates of  interest. 
Although the production of  importable goods falls  with commercial opening up as 
the domestic price goes down, the production of  exportable goods rises. The proportion 
of  non-tradeable goods in the terminal situation, compared with the initial situation, 
depends on the elasticities of  substitution of  production and expenditure. 
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In view of  the characteristics of  the model, the nominal interest rate always tends to 
go down when the economy is opened up to the exterior, but the real rate may rise 
substantially above its initial value for  some time. This case is frequently  observed in 
abrupt commercial opening up strategies and is explained by the (relatively) sharp drop 
in the domestic rate of  inflation,  which is due precisely to the reduction in the price of 
importable goods. 
Compensatory policies can be designed which tend to reduce some of  the 
undesirable transitory effects  of  the process of  opening up. The model makes it possible 
to indicate the magnitudes and sequences of  some of  these policies and to evaluate the 
trade-offs  implicit in their application. 
Finally, it is expected that the development of  this model, since it has been 
completed and refined,  will make it possible to facilitate  the analysis of  real cases, 
orienting the work towards the estimation of  parameters, lags, and coefficients  of 
adjustment, and helping to evaluate economic policy options in relation to the costs 
generated in the transitional period. 
Appendix 
Values of  the parameters used in the simulations 
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NOTES 
•For the moment, it has been decided to work with a "typical" economy of  the region, and not with 
particular national cases. For this reason, the model is quite general, with the aim of  covering the essential 
features  of  a considerable number of  countries and not seeking to incorporated institutional or other 
characteristics which would naturally have to be taken into account if  it were desired to apply the model to 
more specific  situations. Consequently, at the present stage the model has not been estimated econometrically 
but has been used to simulate the behaviour of  this "typical" economy. 
2 It is recognized that the degree of  trade openness can be measured in different  ways. Thus, for 
example, the existence of  "water in the tariff  may or may not be taken into account. The type of 
measurement adopted depends on the purpose of  each study, and in the present case it is sufficient  to use the 
nominal protection for  this purpose. 
3 While the exercise is centered on the analysis of  the opening up of  the economy, the model also makes 
it possible to study the time path of  the various macroeconomic variables when there is an increase in the 
degree of  protection with regard to merchandise trade, international capital movements, or both these 
factors. 
4 It should be borne in mind that the exact dimension of  the time unit has not been defined  in the model. 
We will speak of  "periods" without this meaning that they are equivalent to years or months or any other 
habitual measurement of  time used in the real world. 
'This assumption is of  fundamental  importance and, to a certain extent, a limiting factor,  in the 
analysis of  the process of  opening up. Ways of  modelling the financial  sector in a more complete and complex 
way are being studied, in order to permit a situation in which a distinction can be drawn between the credit 
market and the money market, or, alternatively, distinctions can be drawn between active and passive interest 
rates and between domestic reserve requirements different  from  the international ones. 
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6 At all events, it must be stressed that the model is designed to permit a dynamic analysis of  the 
evolution of  the variables in relation to long-term dynamic equilibrium situations. 
'See, for  example, Fry, W. (1980), Grinds, E. and Bhagwati, J. (1976), Mikesell, R. and Zinser, J. 
(1973), Griffin,  K.B. and Enos, J.L. (1973) and Weisskopf,  T. (1972). 
8 It should be borne in mind that this way of  modelling the relation beween changes in the potential 
product and in external saving derives from  the need of  the model for  consistency. There is no intention of 
comparing final  levels of  the potential product associated with different  strategies of  opening up of  the 
economy to the exterior. It may be recalled once again that the main purpose of  the exercise is to analyse the 
process of  transition in the context of  these strategies, and not the characteristics of  the long-term situation. 
'This does not mean that there is no theoretical and practical interest in analysing this situation, since 
one of  the most frequently  discussed aspects of  policies of  opening up is precisely whether they really do bring 
an increase in productive capacity or whether, in contrast, they merely bring about an increase in consump-
tion expenditure of  such magnitude that it even raises doubts about the capacity of  the national economic 
system to maintain such a situation in the future. 
1 0 In particular, the model does not explicitly take into account sectoral production functions. 
"Another area which calls for  study and which can be of  decisive importance in the process of 
redistribution of  wealth associated with some forms  of  opening up to the exterior is that related with the 
functioning  of  the domestic capital market and the greater or lesser ease of  access to international credit by 
different  domestic economic agents. See Zahler, R. (1980). 
1 2 The productivity of  labour in different  sectors is usually heterogeneous, so that changes in the levels 
and structure of  production caused, for  example, by a particular policy of  economic opening up may be 
asymmetrical with regard to their impact on employment. 
"This discussion usually incorporates considerations which are not easy to handle in a model like that 
used in this study. These include the uneven initial structure of  the protection given to consumption and 
investment goods, possible initial situations of  disequilibrium with regard to stocks of  consumption goods 
(usually associated with excesses of  demand for  consumption goods), the impact of  opening up on the 
demand for  domestic credit and, in more general terms on the evolution of  the capital market, etc. 
1 4 See Clements, K. (1980a). Some of  the basic blocks in the model were designed on the basis of  this 
study. 
1 5 The first  part of  the determination of  the desired sectoral supplies is based directly on the analysis of 
Clements, K. (1980a). 
16In the model, a diagonal matrix is used for  simplicity's sake: A = diag[7i, yi, 73]. 
17 The weights depend on the proportion of  each of  the goods in the product w¡, Wx and W (equations 
12, 13 and 14), which are variable and are determined in the model endogenously from  period to period. 
I8This equation permits Ns  to exceed Ns*,  so that it implicitly assumes the prior existence of 
inventories. Likewise, if  A3 — 0 when there is excess supply of  non-tradeable goods, inventories would be 
accumulated. The model does not analyse the determining factors  for  inventories or the optimum desired 
levels of  them. 
1 9 Note that A3 = 0 implies total dissociation between aggregate supply and demand. With this 
assumption, any aggregate demand policy would fail  to have any impact on real aggregate supply, even in the 
short term. Therefore,  assuming that A3X) is the only mechanism which makes it possible to link real 
aggregate supply directly with aggregate demand in this model. 
2 0 Strictly speaking, both terms correspond rather to the sale of  final  goods and services, unless A3 = 0. 
In the text we refer  to these as the real product (y)  and the nominal product (Y). The first  of  these, y, is 
compared withy* in order to evaluate the degree of  slackness or overheat of  the economy with respect to the 
potential use of  resources. In Y  the tariff  collection revenue is added because this corresponds to income 
generated in the production process, although it is not received by the producers but by the Government. 
2 1 Naturally, if  Ai = A2 = 1, and A3 = 0, this process takes place instantaneously. 
2 2 This last variable, S, can also be identified  as the rate of  time preference,  so that if,  for  example, the 
rate of  interest is less than 6, present consumption is stimulated in relation to future  consumption, and 
private sector spending increases. 
2 5 It is implicitly assumed, although not so modelled, that this case corresponds to a situation in which 
the desired wealth equals the actual wealth, so that the entire (disposable) flow  of  income is consumed (74 = 1 
in equation 16). 
2 4 The model assumes that only the private sector can become indebted with the exterior. See the 
section on the balance of  payments and external indebtedness in this same chapter. 
2 5 Note that, unlike the case of  supply, where we worked with an explicit production function,  the 
demand equations are expressed in terms of  rates of  change, and not levels. The derivation of  the equation for 
sectoral expenditure is based on the work by Clements, K. (1980b) for  multisectoral supply. 
2 6 Note that the weights are variable. 
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2 7 In this study it has been assumed that the foreign  price of  exportable and importable goods is the 
same, this does not introduce any loss of  generality, since if  it were desired to study, for  example, the impact of 
a variation in the terms of  trade, all that would be necessary would be to differentiate  prx from  pr¡. 
2 8The model takes no account of  transport costs and assumes that all kinds of  imperfections, 
restrictions or distortions which imply a gap between (pr(ER))  and p¡, are expressed in the value of  r, which 
is a variable representing the homogeneous tariff.  In this study, the value of  this variable reflects  the degree of 
trade openness to the exterior. 
29The simulation exercises described in the following  chapter use the value As = 1. 
50Elements can be incorporated which introduce a gap between the two terms of  equation 26 (for 
example, an export subsidy) as well as gradual adjustment mechanisms, etc. 
" This latter term can represent such factors  as elements of  expectation, expected costs of  replacement, 
etc., and in addition to its effects  during the transition it helps to accelerate the adjustment of  the prices of 
non-tradeable goods when changes take place in the prices abroad, the exchange rate, and/or T. 
52See Cagan, P. (1956). 
5 5 It has been assumed that the expectation of  variation of  the exchange rate are equal to the effective 
(actual variation of  this rate). In addition, it is assumed that <?/ = eis constant; naturally, a more specific  study 
of  the determining factors  of  the flows  of  external credit could incorporate more complex functional  relations 
for  A'log(ER)i  (for  example, as a function  of  past inflation,  or of  the differences  between inflation  in the 
country and abroad) and for  Q, (for  example, as a function  of  the balance-of-payments  current account deficit, 
the external debt, etc.). 
5 4 For the present, we have not taken into consideration the issue of  government bonds, because of  the 
complexity involved in the possible "net wealth effecs"  (it is assumed in the present version that there are no 
net redistributive effects  from  changes in the composition of  holdings of  funds  and/or money by the private 
sector), the difficulty  in adopting a clear rule with regard to financing  of  the public sector deficit,  and the 
problem involved in a particular form  of  segmentation implicit in the bonds market in this case. 
5 5 In the present version of  the model it is assumed that the international reserves do not generate a 
flow  of  interest, and we have worked only with the gross external debt. Some results, however, are presented 
in terms of  the net external debt. 
56It should be noted that in open economies the holding of  foreign  exchange and/or other financial 
assets expressed in foreign  currency acquires greater importance in the portfolio  of  assets of  enterprises and 
persons, so that variables such as tf  and A'fog(ER)  must play a role of  growing importance as determining 
factors  of  the demand for  money. At present, it is assumed in the model that domestic residents do not 
maintain wealth in this form. 
5 7 In a similar manner to the market for  non-tradeable goods, we could include an element designed to 
reflect  the direct effect  of,  in this case, the exterior rate of  interest (adjusted for  risk and for  expectation of 
devaluation) on the domestic interest rate, which would accelerate the adjustment of  the monetary sector to 
changes in /}, rr, Q and A'log(ER). 
i8"Pure" monetary policy is exercised, in this case, through control of  domestic credit to the private 
sector. 
59This may be due, inter  alia,  to an expansive domestic credit policy, a drop in the level of  prices 
(because of  a reduction of  tariff  levels, for  example), a decline in the demand for  money (through the creation 
or development, for  example, of  financial  assets which are money substitutes), etc. 
4 0 If  there is no perfect  substitution between domestic and external saving, an increase in production 
takes place, accompanied by a drop in interest rates (as a consequence of  the grater accumulation and its effect 
on the productivity of  capital), both of  which help to increase the demand for  money and thus restore the 
equilibrium of  the monetary sector. 
4 1 When the interest rate falls,  this once again causes greater expenditure, this time because of  the effect 
of  76 (equation 16); if  there is accumulation of  capital, then Ò falls  generating a set of  "second order" 
consequences, all of  which goes to show the analytical complexity (and hence the need for  numerical 
experimentation) involved in trying to apprehend all the direct and indirect effects  of  various policy measures 
or changes in certain variables. 
4 2 Note that if  ¡3 ^ 0, the initial drop in the interest rate leads, through the outflow  of  international 
capital and the consequent reduction of  base money to another effect  tending to restore the monetary sector to 
equilibrium. 
•"Unless A3 and 2 are zero. 
4 4 This latter effect  will be permanent if  z is positive. 
4,5 If  the economy were totally closed to international trade and finance,  the relative  prices would 
eventually be the same, but the absolute level of  prices would have increased in proportion to the excess 
supply of  money. 
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46Other effects  which could be analysed are connected with the initial increase in tariff  taxation and the 
possible impact on capital movements (equation 32). 
4 7 It should be noted that usually those who use the monetary approach to the balance of  payments (or 
the exchange rate) maintain that, in inflationary  conditions, the rate of  change of  domestic prices equals 
international inflation  plus the rate of  devaluation. Although this latter factor  tends to be valid in certain 
conditions and above all in the long term, it does not always guarantee that the levels  of  prices (adjusted by the 
exchange rate) become equal. In order for  this to occur it might be necessary, for  example, that in the initial 
moment, when the exchange rate policy was implemented, there should have been equilibrium between the 
country and the exterior as regards absolute price levels. Consequently, the fact  that the rates of  domestic 
inflation  tend to become equal to international rates, for  a fixed  exchange rate, does not guarantee that there 
will be equilibrium in the external sector accounts. 
4 8 As noted early, the model can be used to simulate other types of  policies and/or changes in exogenous 
variables. In the present case, the analysis is concentrated on foreign  sector policies of  opening up. 
4 9 In this exercise, as the tariff  is reduced to zero there is also a drop in tax collection and, in the absence 
of  an active fiscal  policy there is a drop in government expenditure (as a proportion of  the national product) 
from  20% to 12%. If  it is desired to maintain the initial percentage, it would be necessary to increase to and/or 
t\, or, alternatively, finance  the deficit,  g0, through the issue of  currency and the continual loss of  reserves. 
Naturally, if  the reduction in the tariff  is not total (0 < r < 1), the public sector may endup with greater, equal 
or less tariff  income, depending on the magnitude of  the reduction and the elasticities in the importable goods 
sector. 
5 0 These effects  naturally indicate the tendency to an increase in imports and exports. Because of  the 
values of  \ i and Á2, however, this process is not symmetrical (see figure  A.3). 
5 1 In an initial scenario with positive inflation,  there would be a temporary drop in the growth rate of 
prices. This would also obviously depend on the existence or absence of  other economic policy measures, such 
as devaluation. 
5 2 It should be borne in mind that the real rate of  interest rises at the beginning because of  the initial 
reduction in the rate of  inflation.  This is valid in all commercial opening up exercises. 
5 5 In the new equilibrium the nominal supply of  money adjusts to the smaller demand for  money 
resulting from  the drop in the price level, precisely throuth the loss of  reserves. 
5 4 For simplicity's sake, the model uses unitary sum price elasticities for  demand, so that the proportion 
of  spending on each type of  good with respect to total spending remains constant. If  the demand elasticity of 
non-tradeable goods with respect to the price of  importable goods were -0.5, for  example, instead of  zero 
(that is to say, if  importable and non-tradeable goods were complementary in demand), the non-tradeable 
goods sector would actually benefit  from  the reduction in tariffs  and its share in the product would grow (see 
figure  B). 
5 5 it should be recalled that we are working with A3 = 0. If  its value were positive, then as there is 
initially an excess supply of  non-tradeable goods, the magnitude of  the unemployment of  resources would be 
greater. 
56lf  Xi = X; = 1, for  A3 = 0, we observed that the commercial opening up basically causes the same 
effects  as regards the magnitudes and time paths as those referred  to here, except, naturally as regards the 
resource gap, which is zero, since it is assumed that there is instantaneous speed of  adjustment in the transfer 
of  resources between sectors (see figures  C. 1 and C.3). 
5 7 If  there is rigidity in the non-tradeable goods market (X.6 small and/or X3 positive), the highest rate of 
resource unemployment is greater than in the cases where this market adjusts rapidly (see figures  E. 1 and 
E.2). 
5 8 Naturally, this is valid for  gradual opening up covering "a few"  periods, since if  the tariff  reduction is 
prolonged, in relation to the case of  figure  D.4, over more than 12 periods, then by definition  the current 
account deficit  for  the gradual opening up which would be very small per unit of  time, would last longer than 
that associated with abrupt trade opening up. 
5 9 As may be seen in figure  F.4, the net flow  of  capital to the country goes down with time as a 
consequence of  the reduction in the interest differential  between the country and the exterior. 
6 0 The value of  the rate of  interest in period 40 (which is not one of  equilibrium is smaller in the "shock" 
financial  opening up than in the commercial opening up precisely because of  the greater flow  of  external 
credit, the greater investment and the drop in the productivity of  capital in comparison with the gradual case. 
6 1 This latter situation is more probable in proportion to the slowness of  the adjustment of  prices and 
quantities on the non-tradeable goods market. 
6 2 Results are also available for  simulation which combine the other alternatives of  abrupt and gradual 
reforms.  In the next stage of  the research an attempt will be made also to carry out simulations of  different 
sequences of  the two policies. 
6 5 This refers  to period 40, which is not necessarily one of  equilibrium. 
272 
ALTERNATIVE OPENING UP STRATEGIES: A SIMULATION MODEL 
6 4 It may be recalled that in the case of  commercial opening up, both exports and imports increase by a 
similar amount (140%), thus maintaining trade (and current) accounts of  the balance of  payments in 
equilibrium. 
"This effect  would increase with time if,  Aí went down and/or A3 were positive. 
6 6 Other areas which could be analysed concern the evolution of  prices and the rate of  interest. 
6 7 If  it is desired to minimize the current account deficit  associated with financial  opening up, this must 
be achieved through some mechanism which tends tp equilibrate the monetary sector, and this involves the 
growing accumulation of  international reserves and gross external indebtedness. Assuming that the interna-
tional reserves do not receive any kind of  pecuniary return, the interest payments would make necessary an 
increasing surplus on the balance-of-payments  trade account, associated with increasingly marked reduction 
of  expenditure and excess supply in the non-tradeable goods market. 
6 8 In the simulations which appear in figures  1.1 and 1.2 it has been assumed that \3 = 0, which, by 
definition,  minimizes the impact of  the restrictive monetary policy on resource unemployment. 
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TRADE AND FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION 
I 
Introduction 
The move towards the elimination of  restrictions and artificial  impediments to foreign 
trade and capital flows,  or what has come to be termed "liberalization" or "opening up" of 
economies, by some developing countries in the mid to late 1970s created a great deal of 
interest on the part of  academics and policymakers alike. The Southern Cone countries 
—Argentina, Chile and Uruguay— where the liberalization strategy was pursued most 
aggressively, and one might say with considerable fanfare,  were being touted as the 
success stories of  the last decade in both the international financial  press and banking 
circles.1 Developing countries were being continually apprised of  the benefits  of 
"outward-looking" policies and encouraged to emulate the examples offered  by the 
experiences of  the Southern Cone countries. By now, however, the earlier enthusiasm has 
dissipated quite sharply as these very same countries have found  themselves in serious 
economic difficulties,  precipitating the adoption of  strong stabilization programmes, and 
even a reversal of  direction in the liberalization policies. The sharp declines in growth 
rates in all three countries, and the increases in current account deficits  to levels that were 
no longer sustainable, exerted considerable pressures on the authorities to retreat from 
their earlier-announced policies. As these difficulties  persist, the resolve of  even the 
national authorities most committed to an open economy model is being severely tested. 
Needless to say, not many developing countries are being persuaded that the benefits  of 
liberalization clearly outweigh the costs in the present set of  circumstances. It seems that 
the euphoria that accompanied the initially successful  attempts at liberalization have 
come to be replaced by serious misgivings, and perhaps even a degree of  pessimism, about 
opening up. 
What went wrong in such a short space of  time is a question that is being repeatedly 
raised by a number of  interested parties, both within and outside the countries that 
undertook the trade and financial  reforms.  Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify  four 
main lines of  thought on this issue. First, there is the view that the liberalization policies 
were themselves misconceived and were not really relevant for  developing countries even 
at the theoretical level. For various reasons, given the institutional and structural 
characteristics of  developing countries, it is argued that opening-up is destined to fail,  and 
therefore  it is of  no great surprise to find  the countries that pursued such policies in their 
present straits. A second view, which is related to the first,  while not condemning 
liberalization policies per se, holds that it was the implementation of  these policies that 
was at fault.  In other words, the proponents of  this view, while tending to accept the neo-
classical premise that opening up has long-run advantages, are nevertheless critical of 
how the policies were in fact  executed. Third, it is possible that the countries were the 
victims of  exogenous, specifically  external, shocks that coincided with their attempts to 
liberalize, and it was the deteriorating international environment that bears some part of 
the responsibility for  the problems that these countries encountered. It is generally 
recognized that liberalization is fraught  with difficulties  even under the most ideal 
circumstances, and the task for  the policymaker is made doubly demanding when the 
country is faced  with external shocks while it is in the process of  liberalizing. Finally, 
there is the argument developed by Edwards (1982), Pastore (1982), Sjastaad (1983), and 
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Dornbusch ( 1984), among others, that lays the principal blame on what are referred  to as 
"domestic policy inconsistencies". In essence their position is that fiscal,  wage, credit, and 
exchange rate policies were not sufficiently  co-ordinated, and furthermore  towards the 
end, proved to be in basic conflit  with the overall strategy of  opening up. 
The true picture most likely combines elements of  the arguments listed above to 
some degree, and it would be difficult  to pick only one as being the predominant cause of 
the "failure"  of  the liberalization experiments. For example, there is little dispute, even 
by the most ardent proponents of  liberalization, that opening up does involve costs in the 
short and medium-term. Whether these outweigh the potential benefits  is a matter that 
has not yet been examined in detail, and it is also a very difficult  issue having strong 
welfare  overtones.2 In addition, it has to be noted that a number of  developing countries, 
principally in South-East Asia, have been relatively successful  in pursuing outward-
oriented policies (although of  a selective nature and with active government support) for 
many years now. The experience of  these countries does provide a counter-example 
against any broad indictment of  liberalization policies. How the policies ought to be 
implemented, namely whether they should be undertaken gradually or suddenly, and 
whether they should be simultaneously or sequentially applied to the trade and capital 
accounts, is also a difficult  question. The short-run outcome for  the economy is not 
independent of  the way in which barriers to trade and capital flows  are removed,3 and 
while different  strategies may yield similar results in the long run, during the transition 
the behaviour of  the main macroeconomic variables can be quite different  and the choice 
between strategies would naturally have to depend on the government's objective 
function. 
From a less normative perspective, developing countries involved in the process of 
liberalization benefited  at the beginning from  quite favourable  external economic 
conditions, namely bouyant export markets, improving terms of  trade, and very low 
(even negative) foreign  real interest rates and abundant capital inflows.  However, in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s these same countries were facing  a worsening of  the 
international economic climate, including declining terms of  trade, falling  growth rates in 
industrial countries, sharp changes in the availability of  foreign  financing  that were 
accompanied by a dramatic increase in real interest rates on external borrowing, and 
finally,  the growth of  protectionist pressures in their principal export markets. While 
these external changes affected  most developing countries in some degree, the countries 
that were opening up found  that their liberalization policies had perhaps made them 
relatively more vulnerable to shocks emanating from  abroad than other developing 
countries that continued to maintain restrictions on trade and capital flows.  Furthermore, 
serious domestic policy inconsistencies arose in a number of  countries that were 
liberalizing, possibly because, to quote Sjastaad (1983), of  the absence of  any "master 
plan" of  reforms.  The level of  fiscal  deficits  and the rapid growht in private expenditures 
financed  by foreign  borrowing turned out to be incompatible with the desired expansion 
in aggregate demand in certain cases; institutional wage indexation schemes continued to 
be the rule; domestic financial  and other structural reforms  together with stabilization 
programmes led to excessively high real interest rates which had a negative impact both 
on investment and the cost structure of  production; and, with the benefit  of  hindsight, it is 
now clear that exchange rate policies adopted often  led to steady real overvaluation of  the 
respective currencies.4 
In a previous paper (Khan and Zahler (1983)) we analysed the macroeconomic 
effects  of  opening up and dealt with the issues of  the timing and sequencing of  reforms  in 
some detail. However, as the focus  of  that paper was exclusively on the subject of 
liberalization, the analysis was conducted with two critical assumptions. First, we 
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assumed that the international environment was unchanged, and second, that for  the 
most part there was no change in domestic fiscal  and monetary policies, and the nominal 
exchange rate was fixed.  While these two assumptions were obviously necessary in order 
to isolate the direct effects  of  liberalization, they are of  course unrealistic from  a historical 
perspective. The main purpose of  the present paper is to relax these assumptions and to 
conduct some further  simulation experiments with the model that was developed in our 
previous paper, comparing the outcomes with and without external and internal shocks. 
This type of  exercise allows us to ascertain whether such shocks could indeed significantly 
alter the paths taken by the main macroeconomic variables following  the opening up of 
the foreign  sector. It should be noted that, we purposely exclude from  discussion the 
broader question of  whether liberalization is in some sense beneficial  or not, and which 
particular type of  liberalization strategy is "optimal" for  developing countries. Issues of 
this nature, although very important, are outside the scope of  the essentially quantitative 
approach adopted here. It should further  be stressed that while the types of  shocks we 
study have in fact  occurred in the 1970s, the exercise is still basically hypothetical and we 
do not pretend to reproduce the experience of  any specific  country. 
The remainder of  the paper covers the following:  in section II we discuss the 
changes in the international picture and how it affected  developing countries as a group, 
and also some of  the domestic policies implemented by developing countries that 
embarked in the liberalization direction. Section III presents the basic framework  of 
analysis, including a brief  description of  the model we utilized. The results from  the 
various simulations are presented in section IV. The concluding section brings together 
the main results and attempts to provide a judgement on the significance  of  the role 
played by external and internal factors  in the liberalization experiments, and whether 
these factors  were sufficiently  important to unravel the whole opening-up process itself. 
II 
The international scenario and 
domestic policies 
The late 1970s and early 1980s have been characterized as a period of  considerable strain 
for  non-oil developing countries as the international environment became increasingly 
inimical to their growth and current account prospects. Recent papers by Khan and 
Knight (1983) and Massad and Zahler (1984) have identified  three external factors  as 
being mainly responsible for  the serious current account difficulties  of  this group of 
countries, namely the deterioration in the terms of  trade, the slowdown in economic 
activity in the industrial world, and towards the end of  the decade, the sharp rise in real 
interest rates in international capital markets.5 At the same time, domestic 
developments, as evidenced by rising fiscal  deficits  and consequent inflationary  pressures, 
or by increased private expenditures financed  by excessive foreign  borrowing,6 combined 
with rigid exchange rate policies, compounded the external payments difficulties  that 
resulted from  the deterioration in the international economic climate. 
In so far  as the external factors  are concerned, the terms of  trade of  the oil-
importing developing countries deteriorated at an average rate of  2% per annum during 
the period 1973-1983 (table l).7 After  falling  sharply in 1974-1975 in the wake of  the 
fourfold  jump in the world price of  energy products in 1973-1974, the terms of  trade 
improved somewhat in the following  two years as primary commodity prices in the world 
markets registered substantial increases. From 1978 to 1982, there was a steady 
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worsening of  the terms of  trade as commodity prices continued to fall  at the same time 
that these countries were again faced  with another significant  increase in the price of 
imported oil during 1979-1980. Exacerbating the problem further  was the decline in the 
growth rates in industrial countries.8 After  increasing at about 3% during 1973-1977, the 
average growth rate in the industrial world declined in the following  six-year period to 
around 2 % per annum. During 1980-1983 real GNP of  the industrial countries grew only 
at an average rate of  a little over 1 % per year (table 1). The increase in petroleum prices, 
the decline in primary product prices, and the fall  in growth rates in industrial countries, 
combined to worsen the terms of  trade of  oil-importing developing countries at an annual 
average rate of  over 3% during 1978-1983; by contrast, the terms of  trade had been 
relatively constant on average during the earlier period 1973-1977. 
The other major external factor  affecting  the payments positions of  oil-importing 
developing countries during the late 1970s was the increased level of  service payments on 
foreign  debt. In the years prior to 1977 debt service had not posed a serious problem for 
many oil-importing developing countries because conditions in the international credit 
markets were generally favourable  and, even though the foreign  real interest rate rose in 
1975," for  the period 1973-1977 the average was still strongly negative, i.e., -7.19? 
(table I). From 1978, however, the picture changed quite dramatically as developing 
countries began to acquire increasing amounts of  external debt at floating  rates while 
interest rates in the international capital markets were climbing to post-war highs and 
export prices were beginning to weaken.10 Foreign real interest rates rose sharply and 
became positive —averaging about 9.5% per year during 1978-1983— and in fact  in the 
last three years (1981-1983) had reached the astronomical average level of  over 17%. 
This turnaround of  more than 16 percentage points between the periods 1973-1977 and 
1978-1983 forced  a number of  oil-importing countries to undertake strong adjustment 
efforts  once the limits on their recourse to financing  had been reached.11 
While these external events were obviously beyond the control of  the developing 
countries, inappropriate domestic policies also contributed in no small measure to the 
Table 1 
NET OIL-IMPORTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SELECTED 
MACRECONOMIC VARIABLES, 1973-1983 
(  Percentages) 
1973 1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Terms of trade 
Foreign real 
interest rates" 
Growth of real GDP 
Inflation'' 
Current accounts' 
4.0 -8.7 -7.5 5.6 6.8 -4.5 -2.1 -7.1 -4.8 -2.9 1.8 
-16.2 -17.3 6.4 -0.6 -7.7 3.4 -3.2 1.7 19.9 20.3 11.6 
4.1 5.5 3.3 5.2 5.7 6.4 4.7 4.7 22 1.6 2.2 
23.8 29.9 30.1 29.7 23.8 21.4 25.9 33.2 32.3 31.1 39.1 
-9.0 -24.5 -27.6 -16.2 -12.7 -15.7 -19.4 -22.0 -22.5 -18.8 -13.4 
Memorandum item 
Real GNP growth of 
industrial countries 6.1 0.5 -0.6 5.0 3-9 4.1 3.5 1.3 1.6 -0.1 2.3 
Source: IMF, World  economic outlook  (1984). 
"Three-month Eurodollar rate adjusted for  percentage changes in export unit values. 
''Consumer prices. 
' As percentage of  exports of  goods and services. 
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overall difficulties  faced  by these countries. Fiscal policies in the non-oil developing 
countries continued to be expansionary as a rule and budget deficits,  expressed as a 
proportion of  GDP, more than doubled —from  about 2% in 1973 to 4.6% in 1983.12 The 
pressure on available resources created by rising government expenditures, as well as the 
rapid increase in liquidity resulting from  the financing  of  these deficits  and of  private 
sector expenditures through the banking system, led to a significant  upsurge in inflation. 
Since exchange rate changes typically tended to lag behind domestic price increases that 
were in excess of  those experienced by trading partners, upward pressure was put on the 
real exchange rate which was allowed to appreciate substantially in a number of 
developing countries during the decade.13 
The combined impact of  the external shocks and inappropriate domestic policies 
on the main macroeconomic variables in the oil-importing developing countries is 
evident from  table 1. Taking the year 1978 as a convenient breakpoint, we find  that the 
annual average growth rate fell  from  about 5% in 1973-1977 to an average of  a little over 
3% during 1978-1983. The steady decline in the growth of  real GDP from  1978 is 
particularly noticeable, and in the last two years 1982-1983 real GDP grew by an average 
of  less than 2%. After  averaging about 10% in the period 1968-1972, inflation  rose to an 
annual average rate of  nearly 30% per year during 1973-1983; for  the most recent years 
1980-1983, inflation  was running at an average annual rate of  about 34%. 
Finally, the current account position of  the oil-importing developing countries, 
expressed as a proportion of  exports of  goods and services, deteriorated sharply following 
the first  major oil price increase in 1973-1974, with the deficit  reaching a peak of  nearly 
28% of  exports of  goods and services in 1975. Favourable movements in the world prices 
of  primary commodities led to a marked improvement in the current account balances in 
1976-1977, but from  then on the deficit  rose steadily through 1981. Since the possibilities 
of  increasing exports significantly  were small in view of  the relatively flat  foreign  demand 
situation, the adjustment policies initiated by a number of  countries in late 1981 
consequently put considerable emphasis on reducing aggregate demand, which caused a 
decline in imports and economic activity; the current account picture did improve as a 
result of  these efforts,  and the average ratio of  the current account deficit  to exports of 
goods and services during 1982-1983 was reduced to about 16%. All in all if  one looks at 
the economic situation in 1983 one cannot help but be struck by the deterioration that 
took place on all fronts.  The decade of  the 1970s, except for  the years of  abundant foreign 
financing  and low real foreign  interest rates, contained some of  the worst periods from  an 
economic standpoint for  countries that were perhaps the least equipped to handle them. 
The relative influence  of  external and domestic factors  on the current account 
positions during 1973-1980 was tested empirically by Khan and Knight (1983) for  a 
sample of  32 non-oil developing countries. The results in this study showed that the most 
important determinant of  the current account balances was the terms of  trade, followed 
by foreign  real interest rates, fiscal  deficits,  and real effective  exchange rates, which were 
roughly equal to each other in importance. The growth of  real GNP in industrial countries 
played a relatively minor role, but it can be argued that the effect  of  this variable is already 
captured to some extent in the terms of  trade and foreign  real interest rate variables. 
Given the empirical results obtained by Khan and Knight (1983), it would be fair  to 
hypothesize that the experiences of  countries engaged in opening up their economies 
would have been similar to the other non-oil developing countries. In fact  the economic 
situation of  the Southern Cone countries during the last two to three years has been far 
worse than the average outcomes for  the group reported in table 1. Growth rates in 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay had turned negative by the early 1980s; inflation  in 
Argentina was far  in excess of  the average rate for  net oil-importing countries;14 and, the 
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ratio of  the current account deficits  to exports of  goods and services was markedly higher 
in all three countries. 
It would seem therefore  that there is at least some prima facie  evidence that 
external shocks and domestic policy inconsistencies had a more severe impact on the 
countries that were liberalizing their foreign  sectors. This is the basic question we focus 
on, and by analysing it we should be able to have a somewhat firmer  basis to try and 
explain the failures  of  the liberalization experiments. 
Ill 
Framework of  analysis 
The analysis of  the effects  of  shocks that occur while the foreign  sector is being liberalized 
is conducted within the framework  of  the dynamic general equilibrium model that was 
developed by Khan and Zahler (1983) to examine the transitional macroeconomic effects 
of  changes in barriers to trade and capital flows.  The model has its roots in the general 
equilibrium econometric models developed by Clements (1980), the computational 
general equilibrium models such as the ones designed by Feltenstein (1980) among 
others, as well as the more monetary-oriented models typically specified  to analyse short-
term stabilization policies.15 
A detailed description of  the basic model is given in Khan and Zahler (1983), so 
that here we only present a brief  outline of  some of  its main features.  The model contains 
three composite goods —exportables, importables and non-tradeables— for  which 
supply and demand equations are separately defined.  The supply equations are derived in 
a manner outlined by Clements (1980) in the framework  of  a multiproduct supply model. 
The supply of  each good depends exclusively on the relative prices of  the three goods, the 
technical conditions of  transformation  of  one good into another, and the initial resource 
endowment.16 Total output of  the economy is simply the aggregate of  the outputs of  the 
three goods, and the unemployment of  resources is modelled as a linear function  of  the 
difference  between potential output (equal to the resource endowment) and total output. 
The demand system incorporated in the model represents a fairly  straightforward 
application of  standard demand theory. The private component of  total aggregate 
expenditures is related to disposable income, the excess supply of  money, and the 
domestic interest rate; government expenditures, as is customary, are assumed to be 
exogenous.17 By invoking separability we argue that once total expenditures are 
determined, the distribution between importable, exportable and non-tradeable goods is 
determined by a process of  maximization subject to a budget constraint represented by 
the (given) level of  aggregate expenditures. This yields demand equations for  each good, 
as a proportion of  aggregate expenditures, that depend solely on relative prices, satisfying 
the properties of  symmetry and additivity. 
The domestic price of  exportables (Px) is taken to be equal to the product of  the 
international price of  tradeables (Pf)  and the exchange rate (e), and the domestic price of 
importable goods, allowing for  tariffs,  is defined  as: 
(1) Pi = (1 +r)ePf 
where Pi is the domestic price of  importable goods, r is the tariff,  e is the exchange rate, 
and Pf  is the international price of  tradeable goods. As the prices of  importable and 
exportable goods are esentially given from  abroad,18 disequilibrium in the tradeable goods 
markets results in changes in imports and exports. Imports are defined  as the difference 
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between domestic demand and domestic supply of  importables, and similarly exports are 
equal to the domestic excess supply of  exportables. 
The price of  non-tradeable goods (Pn) is, however, endogenously determined and 
is assumed to respond positively to excess demand for  non-tradeable goods (and 
variations in foreign  prices). The general price index, constructed as a Divisia index of  the 
three composite goods, with the (endogenous) weights corresponding to the expenditure 
shares of  each of  the three goods, is therefore  endogenous as well. Expectations of 
inflation  are also incorporated into the model, although in a fairly  simple fashion  using an 
adaptive-expectations formulation. 
The monetary sector of  the model contains three basic relationships: a money 
demand function,  a money supply identity, and an equation that links changes in the 
domestic interest rate to the excess demand for  money. The demand for  money is 
specified  in the customary way, i.e., relating money holdings to income, inflationary 
expectations, and the domestic interest rate. The supply of  money is made up of  net 
international reserves, credit to the private sector, and credit to the government. It is 
assumed that all fiscal  deficits  are financed  by government borrowing from  the banking 
system, so that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the budget deficit  and 
variations in the money supply brought about by changes in credit to the public sector. For 
the case of  the interest rate, a standard LM mechanism is assumed so that an excess 
demand (supply) for  money leads to an increase (decrease) in the domestic interest rate. 
In the model, monetary disequilibrium affects  aggregate demand both directly through 
the spillover into private expenditures, as well as indirectly through changes in the 
interest rate. 
Capital flows,  aside from  an autonomous component, are assumed to be determined 
by the differential  between domestic and foreign  interest rates, adjusted for  expected 
exchange rate changes and a country risk premium. The presence or degree of  controls on 
capital movements is represented by a parameter )8 which scales the explanatory 
variables in the following  way: 
(2) D K = D K + fi[y(rd  — rf  - e - p ) ] 
where DK is the flow  of  capital (with DK representing the autonomous component), rd 
is the domestic interest rate, rf  the corresponding foreign  interest rate, e is the expected 
change in the exchange rate,19 and p is the risk premium. In this formulation,  by varying /3 
one can control the extent of  capital flows;  for  example, for  j8=0 the economy is 
completely closed and for  /3>0 capital flows  are assumed to respond to variations in the 
explanatory variables. 
To allow for  the possibility of  an upward sloping supply curve of  foreign  credits the 
risk premium is made a function  of  the ratio of  external debt to income: 
(3) Pt = PO + PI ( B f /Y) t 
where pq is a constant, Bf  is the stock of  external debt, and Y is the level of  income. The 
parameter p\ is assumed to be positive so that as the ratio (Bf/Y)  rises the risk premium 
will also increase. This will reduce net capital inflows  to the country even though 
domestic and foreign  interest rates, and the expected exchange rate, remain unchanged.20 
Basically, despite its high level of  aggregation, as compared for  example to the 
computational general equilibrium models, the model is sufficiently  detailed to be able to 
provide meaningful  answers relating to the short-run consequences of  opening up. The 
model explicitly incorporates the linkages between the balance of  payments, fiscal,  and 
monetary sectors, as well as their relationship to expenditures and output. Moreover, 
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considerable attention is paid to the role of  relative prices in the demand and supply 
functions  for  the three composite goods. Finally, since it is formulated  in dynamic form 
the model is able to provide the path of  adjustment of  the main macroeconomic variables 
from  one equilibrium to another.21 The analysis of  the transition path, which is essential 
in devising operational liberalization strategies, clearly requires the introduction of  some 
type of  dynamics into the system. 
The main theoretical characteristics of  this model can be shown through some 
simple experiments relating to trade and financial  liberalization. Consider first  the case 
where a country has a 100% tariff  on imports, which it then reduces to zero. Following 
Dornbusch ( 1974) the relative price effect  of  this measure can be analysed through the aid 
of  figure  1. In this figure,  assuming that income and expenditures are equal, along the HH 
schedule there is no excess demand for  tradeable goods, and by Walras Law, excess 
demand for  non-tradeable goods is zero as well. North-east of  the HH schedule the 
relative price of  non-tradeable goods is too low and there is an excess supply of  tradeable 
goods (trade balance surplus), and an excess demand for  non-tradeable goods. Similarly 
south-west of  HH there would be trade balance deficit  and an excess supply of  non-
tradeable goods. 
Assuming that r=100%, the nominal exchange rate fixed  (and for  simplicity set 
equal to unity), and that the economy is closed to capital movements, the initial 
equilibrium is at point A where the ray OT (the slope of  which measures the domestic 
price of  importables in terms of  the price of  exportables) intersects HH. At A the relative 
prices of  importable and exportable goods in terms of  non-tradeable goods are Pi°/Pn° 
and Px°/Pn°,respectively, and there is equilibrium in both the trade balance and the non-
tradeable goods market. 
If  T  is reduced to zero the domestic price of  importables falls  (to Pi1) and rotates the 
ray to OT'. Assuming that Pn is unchanged, the initial effect  of  the tariff  reduction is 
represented by a movement from  A to B,22 which involves an appreciation of  the real 
exchange rate (defined  as the ratio of  the price of  non-tradeables to the price of 
tradeables). Obviously this is not an equilibrium position since at B there is an excess 
demand for  tradeable goods and an excess supply of  non-tradeable goods, requiring a fall 
in Pn along OT' so as to restore general equilibrium at point C, with Pn^Pn 0 . This 
movement from  B to C has been identified  in the literature as the real exchange rate 
depreciation associated with trade liberalization. Although at point C the trade account is 
in balance with both imports and exports above their respective values in the original 
equilibrium (A), it should be recognized that the initial effect  of  opening up (point B) 
generates a trade balance deficit.  In other words, the depreciation of  the real exchange 
rate associated with the movement from  B to C represents a transitory equilibrating 
movement necessary to close the foreign  exchange gap created by the trade deficit  that 
occurs in the process of  moving from  A to C (through B). 
The changes in relative prices and their effects  on demands and supplies that result 
from  tariff  removal correspond to a sort of  production and expenditure "switching" 
effect.  However, it should be noted that opening up also creates an expenditure 
"augmenting" effect.  Assuming that inflation  is zero initially,23 the fall  in the prices of 
importable and non-tradeable goods causes a reduction in the general price level which in 
turn creates an excess supply of  money and a fall  in the domestic interest rate. This 
stimulates expenditures which reinforce  the trade balance effect,  and in the short run, 
dampen the fall  in the relative price of  non-tradeable goods.24 
The effect  of  trade liberalization on aggregate supply and output can be seen in 
figure  2, which relates the production possibilities between importables and exportables, 
assuming that resources utilized by the non-tradeables sector remain constant.25 At the 
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initial relative price DD the economy would be at point A, producing X^ of  exportables 
and I a of  importables. When the tariff  on imports is reduced to zero the country will face 
the new (domestic) terms of  trade FF and the new equilibrium will be at B. If  adjustment 
were instantaneous we would simply move along the transformation  curve from  A to B, 
and output of  tradeables would be unchanged. However, if  the reduction in the production 
of  importables is faster  than the expansion of  exportables, then the path of  tradeables 
output would be pushed inside the transformation  curve (indicated by the dashed line). In 
such a case, during the transition period as the economy moves from  A to B, it will be 
operating below its productive potential, creating greater resource unemployment and a 
larger output-gap, as compared to the respective long-run equilibrium levels of  these 
variables. 
In summary, as demonstrated in figures  1 and 2, the main theoretical results of  a 
tariff  reduction in the short run are a trade balance deficit  and consequent loss of 
international reserves, an increase in both imports and exports, a lowering of  the price 
level, a fall  (rise) in the nominal (real) interest rate, and assuming the production of 
importables adjusts faster  than the production of  exportables, a temporary decline in 
output and increase in resource unemployment. 
To analyse financial  opening up, as in Khan and Zahler (1983), we start from  an 
initial equilibrium in which the domestic interest rate is above the foreign  rate plus the 
risk premium, and capital movements are completely restricted (j8=0). Financial 
liberalization takes the form  of  increasing the value of  /î, and capital movements then 
take place as long as:26 
r d > r f  + p 
In the traditional IS-LM framework  (figure  3) the initial equilibrium point would be 
A, with real income at y°, the domestic interest rate equal to rd°, and zero foreign  debt 
(Bf=0).27 
With a constant risk premium and foreign  interest rate, the (small) country faces 
an infinitely  elastic supply of  international financial  capital which, when monetized, 
makes the effective  LM curve horizontal.28 The short-run effect  of  financial  opening up is 
therefore  represented by shifting  LM to KK.  At point B expenditure (y®) exceeds income 
(y°) and induces a current account deficit.29  Whether international reserves rise or fall 
depends obviously on the size of  the capital inflows  relative to the current account deficit. 
As a consequence of  the capital inflow  the stock of  foreign  debt would naturally rise. 
In Khan and Zahler (1983) it was assumed that the resource endowment (potential 
output) was fixed,  which implies zero net savings and investment.30 Consequently, as 
output remains constant and foreign  debt increases, the risk premium rises and increases 
the total cost of  financing  faced  by the country.This shifts  KK upwards to K'K 1 ,  reducing 
the difference  between expenditures (yC) and income (y°) and, therefore,  the current 
account deficit.  At the point C the inflow  of  capital is smaller due to the lower interest 
differential,  and the foreign  debt rises at a smaller rate. The process continues until a new 
overall equilibrium is reached at the original values of  income and the domestic interest 
rate (point A), with expenditure equal to income, and current account equilibrium. 
However, now at A there is a larger stock of  foreign  debt and higher risk premium, and a 
lower level of  real expenditures on goods and non-financial  services, as compared tó the 
initial equilibrium. 
The main results of  financial  opening up are that the domestic nominal interest 
rate initially declines and then rises back to its original level. The current account deficit  is 
financed  by increases in foreign  debt rather than by a fall  in international reserves, as was 
the case in the trade liberalization. During the transition period real expenditures on 
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goods and non-financial  services increase, but then would be lower in the final 
equilibrium due to the need to service the now larger stock of  foreign  debt.31 
The model embodying the characteristics described was simulated in the earlier 
paper for  a variety of  opening up strategies, including among others, the gradual and 
sudden removal of  barriers to trade and capital flows,  both simultaneously as well as in 
different  sequences, and was found  to yield generally sensible results. The way in which 
this model is structured it is quite capable of  handling a large variety of  shocks aside from 
those directly related to opening up. The only change we made to the original model was 
to introduce a distinction between the price of  importables and exportables, which had 
previously been assumed to be equal to a single international price level. This change had 
to be made so as to be able to discuss terms of  trade variations, and therefore  the current 
version of  the model contains two separate foreign  prices —one for  importables and the 
other for  exportables. 
Formal models of  any type are clearly not able to analyse all of  the interesting 
questions arising from  foreign  sector reforms,  nor for  that matter can they capture the 
complex nature of  some of  the other structural changes implemented which are less 
amenable to quantification.  However, the advantages of  using a model, such as the one 
here, to determine the effects  of  liberalization, external shocks, and autonomous domestic 
policy changes, over the approaches taken by, for  example, Ffrench-Davis  and Arellano 
(1981), Ffrench-Davis  (1982), Pastore (1982), Edwards (1982), Harberger (1982), 
Hanson and de Melo (1983), Sjastaad (1983), Wogart (1983), Zahler (1983) and Ramos 
(1984), are quite obvious. A number of  things tend to be occurring simultaneously during 
the period of  interest, namely opening up itself,  stabilization efforts,  etc.? and it is really 
only with a model that one can hope to identify  and isolate the effects  of  different  sets of 
factors.  In other words, by using a model one is able to make suitable ceteris  paribus 
assumptions, something which is not really possible in the type of  studies that have 
hitherto addressed the issue. 
The simulation experiments start with the case of  a gradual reduction in trade 
barriers and restrictions on capital movements. This particular case was studied by Khan 
and Zahler (1983) as well, and here it is taken as the "control" or base-line simulation to 
which the other simulations are compared. The specific  foreign  shocks we consider are a 
simultaneous temporary increase in the nominal foreign  interest rate, and a temporary 
deterioration in the terms of  trade. The change in the terms of  trade is taken for  purposes 
of  this particular exercise as a decline in the price of  exportables relative to the price of 
inportables.52 The domestic policy inconsistency scenario analysed here is represented by 
a simulation in which there is a temporaray increase in the fiscal  deficit.33  Furthermore, as 
it is assumed in all the simulations that the nominal exchange rate is fixed,  this implicitly 
yields a second inconsistency that has been stressed in the recent literature. Keeping the 
exchange rate unchanged while opening up in the presence of  certain external shocks or 
an expansionary fiscal  policy will generally lead to a real appreciation,defined  here as an 
increase in the price of  non-tradeables relative to the price of  tradeables, a weakened 
external payments position, and increased vulnerability to speculative attacks on the 
currency. In each of  these simulations that are undertaken we trace the response of  the 
following  macroeconomic variables: the general price level, the domestic interest rate, 
the current account balance, international reserves and foreign  debt, the real exchange 
rate, and real expenditure on goods and non-financial  services. 
These various simulations obviously do not cover all the possible shocks that 
occurred during the 1970s. For example, we do not explicitly consider the effects  of  a 
slowdown in the growth rates in industrial countries. As this effect  was not found  to be 
particularly significant  in the results reported by Khan and Knight (1983) we felt  we 
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could exclude it from  consideration here. Furthermore, we do not attempt to determine 
the effects  of  growing protectionist pressures in industrial countries on the exports of 
developing countries. Neither of  these simulations is particularly difficult  to perform,  but 
they would require some respecification  of  the basic model to incorporate a foreign 
demand function  for  exports. As the model is currently formulated  it utilizes a small 
country assumption and implicitly assumes that foreign  demand for  exports is infinitely 
price elastic. Finally, we do not go into the wage indexation question since the model does 
not include an explicit wage-determination equation, although it is possible, as discussed 
in Khan and Zahler (1983), to handle this indirectly. Nevertheless, we feel  that the 
simulations here provide sufficient  information  to enable one to form  a reasonable 
judgement on the principal effects  that some specific  external shocks and certain policy 
changes are likely to have in the course of  liberalization. 
IV 
Results 
In the initial equilibrium the economy is assumed to have a uniform  tariff  of  100% on 
imports and capital flows  are completely restricted.34 In other words, the economy is not 
completely closed to trade since imports are allowed, although at a domestic price 
substantially higher than the world price, and the country does engage in export activities. 
On the other hand, neither capital inflows  or outflows  are permitted. The balance of 
payments, the current account, and the government budget are all in balance; prices are 
constant; the economy is assumed to be on its aggregate transformation  curve;35 and the 
exchange rate is fixed.  In specific  terms, liberalization involves lowering the tariff  rate 
gradually to zero over four  periods, and simultaneously eliminating restrictions on capital 
flows,  also over four  periods.36 In the control simulation the foreign  interest rate, the 
terms of  trade, and the government budget deficit  are kept unchanged (chart 1). For the 
external shocks scenario the nominal foreign  interest rate is raised to 15% in period 3 and 
is then lowered back to its original level of  5% after  four  periods —chart 1-A. 
Concurrently with this, the terms of  trade are assumed to deteriorate by 5 % per period for 
four  periods, and then progressively improve so that by the seventh period they are at 
their original level (chart 1-B). The domestic shock is represented by the emergence of  a 
fiscal  deficit  (approximately equal to 7-8% of  national income) for  four  periods (chart 1-
C), after  which the budget is once again assumed to be balanced. 
A very important point to note in analysing the simulations reported here is that 
the outcomes for  the variables under consideration are conditional on the numerical 
values of  the parameters of  the underlying model.37 Clearly alternative scenarios could be 
created by changing the parameter values employed. It should also be stressed that the 
values chosen for  the shocks, and the periods over which they extend, are only illustrative 
and not intended to be necessarily realistic. However, even though these specific  shocks 
are arbitrary, they nevertheless should give a reasonable flavour  of  what can be expected 
to happen if  one superimposes shocks of  certain types on the opening-up process. 
1. Control  simulation:  simultaneous  removal  of  restrictions 
on trade  and capital  flows 
The liberalization of  the trade and capital accounts directly lowers the price of 
importables (by the amount of  the reduction in the tariff  rate), and thus initially raises the 
relative prices of  both exportables and non-tradeable goods in terms of  importable goods. 
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The change in the pattern of  demand and production resulting from  the change in 
relative prices tends to exert downward pressure on the price of  non-tradeables as well. 
As a consequence, the general price level falls  quite rapidly in the beginning, and then 
once the effects  of  the tariff  reduction have worked themselves out, stays permanently at 
the new lower level (chart 2-A). 
As expected, the fall  in the overall price level lowers the nominal demand for 
money; furthermore,  since initially the domestic interest rate is assumed to be above the 
corresponding foreign  rate, with the removal of  capital controls there is a large inflow  of 
capital from  abroad which augments domestic liquidity. The resulting excess supply of 
money causes the domestic interest rate to decline (chart 2-B), and both these factors  have 
an expansionary effect  on aggregate demand. The combination of  the change in relative 
prices and the rise in domestic absorption results in a pronounced deficit  in the current 
account (chart 2-C) that persists for  a number of  periods.58 The volume of  trade (imports 
plus exports) however is larger than in the initial equilibrium, which is the desired result 
of  the liberalization policy. Given the parameters of  the model, the capital flows 
generated by the interest rate differential  are not adequate to cover the deficits  in the 
current account, so that the country will continue to lose international reserves until 
monetary equilibrium is re-established (chart 2-D). By the end of  the transition the stock 
of  international reserves falls  to less than one half  of  their original level. In the context of 
our model this result points to an important precondition for  liberalization policies, 
namely that when starting off  the process of  opening up the policymakers should ensure 
that the country has a comfortable  cushion of  reserves. The foreign  debt of  the country 
rises in a somewhat cyclical fashion,  reflecting  closely the path taken by domestic interest 
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rates and the resulting capital inflows.  Until the risk premium rises by enough to close the 
differential  between domestic and foreign  interest rates, the stock of  foreign  debt will 
continue to increase. In this particular simulation equilibrium is reached when the final 
stock of  foreign  debt is about 25% of  national income (chart 2-D). 
Two additional results, which were not stressed in Khan and Zahler (1983), are 
worth mentioning. First, real expenditures on goods and non-financial  services, which 
can be treated as a proxy measuring the welfare  effects  of  liberalization policies, increase 
substantially when the domestic price of  importable goods falls  (chart 2-E).59 This 
tendency is then reversed as interest payments on foreign  debt absorb an increasing 
proportion of  the income of  residents, although, given the model structure and specific 
parameter values, in the long-run equilibrium real expenditures on goods and non-
financial  services are still higher than their pre-reform  level. 
Second, as was analysed in figure  1, during the course of  liberalizing the domestic 
relative price of  importable goods with respect to the other goods decreases, and the 
relative price of  exportables tends to rise. With the assumed parameter values, and the 
initial shares of  the three goods in total output, the real exchange rate, defined  as the ratio 
of  the price of  non-tradeable goods to the price of  tradeables, will appreciate (chart 2-F). 
This real appreciation is a natural consequence of  the removal of  tariffs  on importable 
goods, and the economy has to move to a new equilibrium real exchange rate. Other 
things being equal, this appreciation will result in a loss of  international competitiveness 
and a worsening of  the current account for  a period of  time. Although this movement 
represents an equilibrium change, the authorities could reduce its impact on the curent 
account through appropriate exchange rate policy.40 What is more important, however, is 
the prevention of  a real appreciation beyond the new equilibrium real exchange rate that 
is consistent with the elimination of  restrictions on trade and capital movements.41 
2.D. International reserves and foreign  debt" 
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2. Effects  of  external  and domestic  shocks 
The effects  of  a combination of  external shocks and the emergence of  a budget deficit 
while the foreign  sector is being liberalized are also shown in chart 2. It is quite evident 
from  chart 2-A that the various shocks appear to have little impact on the path of  the 
general price level that results from  only opening up. We would expect the deterioration 
in the terms of  trade to exert additional downward pressure on prices, as the decline 
initiated by the fall  in the domestic price of  importables is amplified  by the reduction in 
export prices. However, at the same time the fiscal  deficit,  by increasing aggregate 
spending, would tend to push up the price of  non-tradeable goods. The values of  the 
parameters of  the underlying model are such that these effects  tend to offset  each other, 
and the net impact on the general price level turns out to be negligible. 
While the domestic interest rate does fall  when the shocks are superimposed, the 
decline is somewhat smaller than in the control simulation (chart 2-B). Since the foreign 
interest is increased there is a net capital outflow  during the first  few  periods and a 
smaller excess supply of  money, despite the fact  that the financing  of  the fiscal  deficit 
expands the nominal money supply.42 
A more striking difference  between the two sets of  simulations can be observed in 
the case of  the current account position (chart 2-C). Even though there is less excess 
liquidity in the economy during the initial periods, the combined effect  of  the 
deterioration in the terms of  trade and the expansionary fiscal  policy causes the current 
account balance to be significantly  worse than it would be in the absence of  such shocks. 
Starting from  an equilibrium position, the current account deficit,  as a proportion of 
nominal income, reaches around 18% by period 6, as compared to less than 7% in the 
same period in the control simulation. Once the shocks have worked themselves out the 
paths of  the current account balance from  the two simulations become quite close. 
Accompanying this larger current account deficit  there is also an initial outflow  of 
capital because of  the increase in the foreign  interest rate, and the decline in the domestic 
interest rate brough about as a result of  the removal of  capital controls. As a consequence, 
international reserves decline much more rapidly in this scenario (chart 2-D); in the final 
equilibrium the stock of  international reserves actually becomes negative. In marked 
contrast to the control simulation, the stock of  foreign  debt falls  for  the first  8 periods or 
so,43 and rises steadily thereafter,  although its level remains permanently smaller than in 
the control simulation (chart 2-D). This would necessarily mean that debt service 
payments would be smaller than in the scenario without shocks, despite the temporary 
increase in the foreign  interest rate. 
From periods 2 to 6 real expenditures on goods and non-financial  services increase 
significantly  more than in the control simulation —chart 2-E. This is primarily due to the 
expansionary effect  of  the budget deficit,  moderated somewhat by the impact of  the terms 
of  trade deterioration on domestic spending. As the terms of  trade and the foreign 
interest rate return to their respective original levels, and the fiscal  deficit  is eliminated, 
real expenditures end up being slightly higher than in the control simulation because of 
the smaller debt service payments. 
The appreciation of  the real exchange rate also turns out to be more pronounced 
when there are external and domestic shocks (chart 2-F). This occurs basically for  two 
reasons: first,  the price of  tradeable goods falls  relatively more, with the decline in import 
prices caused by the tariff  reduction now being accompanied by a fall  in the price of 
exportables. Second, the expansion in aggregate demand caused by the fiscal  deficit 
increases the price of  non-tradeable goods. Eventually, as the foreign  price of  exportables 
returns to its original level and the fiscal  balance is re-established, the real exchange rate 
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2.E. Real private expenditures 
2.F. Real exchange fate 
Periods 
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first  depreciates (relative to the control simulation path) and then move to a slightly 
higher equilibrium level. This long-run result occurs because less resources from  the 
tradeable goods sector, i.e., smaller trade balance surpluses, are required to service the 
now lower stock of  foreign  debt. 
The movements in the real exchange rate clearly highlight the importance of 
adopting an appropriate exchange rate policy during the liberalization process. 
Maintaining a fixed  nominal exchange rate, or for  that matter simply operating a policy 
that does not permit the exchange rate to move in line with the relative price of  tradeables 
to non-tradeables, when there are external shocks or domestic fiscal  imbalances, would 
not appear to be suitable. In particular, budget deficits,  and excessive private expenditures 
financed  by foreign  borrowing, result in an expansion in aggregate demand that is 
basically inconsistent with the reduction in the price of  non-tradeable goods that would 
keep the current account deficit,  and consequent loss of  international reserves, within 
reasonable limits. In such circumstances fixing  the nominal exchange rate would 
exacerbate the situation. This issue of  inconsistency between excess domestic 
expenditures and exchange rate policies has been discussed by a number of  authors 
engaged in analysing the experience of  the Southern Cone countries during the 1970s.44 
In connection with the exchange rate issue an interesting question arises as to what 
would be likely effects  if  the country in fact  did adopt a more flexible  exchange rate policy 
while it engaged in opening up. We analysed this case by repeating the experiment of 
reducing tariffs  and eliminating capital account restrictions, but now instead of 
maintining a fixed  exchange rate we allowed for  a gradual depreciation of  about 50% 
between periods 3 and 6. This policy led to a much smoother evolution of  the real 
exchange rate over time, although, as expected, in the final  equilibrium there was still a 
real appreciation. The decline in the general price level and domestic interest rate was 
markedly smaller, as was the increase in real expenditures, relative to the control (fixed 
exchange rate) simulation. There was also an improvement in the current account 
position even though restrictions on trade and capital flows  were removed, and the stock 
of  international reserves rose initially before  settling down to a value very close to the 
original equilibrium level. Although the policy of  steady depreciation is not totally 
without costs, since there is an increase in the foreign  debt above what was observed in 
the control simulation, and the price level falls  by a smaller amount, nevertheless it can be 
argued that at least some of  the negative aspects of  the transition period following 




The widespread interest generated by countries that embarked in the direction of  opening 
up the economy to allow for  the freer  flow  of  goods and capital across borders still 
continues. There has, however, been a radical shift  in the type of  questions being raised 
about the relative economic performance  of  these economies. Initially the questions 
focused  on the success these countries achieved in some areas on the macroeconomic 
front,  but now in the light of  their current situation, equally relevant questions are being 
asked about the supposed failure  of  outward-oriented policies. The burgeoning literature 
analysing the experience of  the countries in the Southern Cone of  Latin America 
continues to attest to the fact  that there remains considerable puzzlement as to how the 
situation could change so dramatically in the space of  only a few  years. 
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Certainly, there has been no shortage of  reasons presented for  this turn of  events. 
In this paper we focused  on two specific  reasons: first,  the role of  certain external shocks; 
and second, various domestic policy actions that proved in the end to be inconsistent with 
the overall strategy of  opening up. These particular factors  are ones that are relatively 
more amenable to quantitative analysis. It is well-recognized that external events 
contributed to the difficulties  experienced by developing countries, and these events were 
obviously outside the control of  these countries. Nevertheless, it can be argued that 
opening up in order to increase economic efficiency  and improve resource allocation, 
made the countries more vulnerable to foreign  shocks. Furthermore, in some cases the 
inability to control excessive domestic spending, whether public or private, and the 
general inflexibility  of  exchange rate policies, during the liberalization process 
compounded the problems, and can thus be held partly responsible for  the negative 
consequences that later emerged. 
In this paper we specifically  examined the short and medium-run effects  that 
certain types of  external shocks and an expansionary fiscal  policy can have on key 
macroeconomic variables while the economy is being opened up. The simulation 
experiments, conducted using a general equilibrium model, were not intended to be 
completely realistic, in the sense of  either applying to any particular country, or 
reproducing the actual shocks that hit developing countries, but rather should be treated 
as providing essentially hypothetical scenarios. Specifically  it was shown that the removal 
of  barriers to trade and capital flows  produces some costs in the short run. While the rate 
of  inflation  and domestic interest rate tend to approach their respective international 
values, this is accompanied by a rise in the real rate of  interest, a decline in output and 
employment, a worsening of  the current account, a loss of  international reserves, and a 
significant  build-up of  foreign  debt. There is, furthermore,  an appreciation of  the real 
exchange rate to a new equilibrium level. In the context of  this particular exercise, the 
negative effects  of  opening up become magnified  if  one then further  allows for  the 
possibility of  domestic policy inconsistencies and an adverse international climate during 
the liberalization process. 
Whether the liberalization experiments would have been successful  in the absence 
of  external shocks, and if  the right macroeconomic policies had been in place, is 
something we have purposely stayed away from.  What we can say, however, is that the 
possibilities of  success were greatly diminished once the international picture worsened, 
and countries pursued other domestic policies that apparently worked at cross purposes 
with the policy of  liberalization. Based on the results here it is possible that if  external 
shocks are large and persist for  long enough and inconsistent domestic policies are 
maintained, then it is quite likely that the economy would go into a recession if 
compensatory action is not taken. In reality, limits on external borrowing prevented 
developing countries from  financing  their way out of  their difficulties  brought about by 
the various shocks and inappropriate policies, and finally  forced  them to undertake 
painful  adjustment, and even to reverse the overall strategy and reimpose barriers to 
trade and capital flows. 
What then is the policy lesson that can be drawn from  the analysis conducted here? 
The conclusion that comes out quite forcefully  is that opening-up policies have to be 
actively supported by domestic macroeconomic management. This becomes even more 
imperative if  the country is subjected to external shocks while it is in the process of 
liberalizing the foreign  sector. While the individual developing country can do little about 
changes in the international environment and has to take those as given, it would seem 
that a judicious combination of  external financing,  use of  international reserves, and 
domestic adjustment would be called for  at an early stage to offset  or minimize the effects 
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of  any external shocks that occur. Since there are quantitative limits to the amount of 
international reserves and foreign  financing,  it is obvious that eventual adjustment of  the 
basic supply-demand balance in the economy is necessary. Fiscal and monetary restraint 
to control both public and private spending, coupled with a more flexible  exchange rate 
policy, would seem to be the relevant instruments of  adjustment in the circumstances that 
a number of  developing countries found  themselves in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
While there were attempts in this general direction they can perhaps be characterized as 
probably being too little and too late. As a consequence, many developing countries, and 
particularly those engaged in the process of  opening up, found  that they had to eventually 
undergo more painful  adjustment than would have been necessary if  action had been 
taken more promptly. 
NOTES 
'See Harberger (1982). Recent papers by Edwards (1982) and Diaz-Alejandro (1983) contain an 
interesting sampling of  quotations from  the financial  press on this issue. 
2 An interesting recent attempt to analyse these types of  welfare-related  questions is contained in 
Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1983). 
'See McKinnon (1982), Frenkel (1982), Edwards (1983) and Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1983), for 
a discussion of  the issues involved in the sequencing of  reforms. 
4See, for  example, Dornbusch (1984). 
'See also Khan and Knight (1982). Other external factors  would include the growth in protectionist 
pressures in the principal export markets of  developing countries, and the fairly  drastic contraction in capital 
flows  to the non-oil developing countries in 1982 and 1983 that sharply increased the costs of  adjustment of 
debtor countries. It is, however, difficult  to deal with either of  these in a quantitative fashion. 
6See Massad (1983) and Zahler (1983). 
7 This group basically includes all non-oil developing countries except those referred  to as "net oil 
exporters". For a precise classification,  see IMF (1984), Statistical Appendix. 
8 There is some empirical evidence available now on the positive relationship between growth in 
industrial countries and the international prices of  non-oil primary commodities; see Goreux (1980) and 
Goldstein and Khan (1982). 
'The foreign  real interest (rr) is defined  here as the nominal foreign  interest rate (rf)  adjusted for 
percentage changes in the export prices of  oil-importing developing countries (DXP), i.e., 
rrf = (rf - D X P ) / ( 1 + DXP ) 
10The empirical evidence on the relationship between high real international interest rates and prices 
of  primary commodities is discussed by Gotur (1983). 
"See Massad and Zahler (1984). 
12See IMF (1984) page 51. 
15See Khan and Knight (1982), (1983). 
1 4 The rate of  inflation  in Uruguay was close to the average rates experienced by developing countries as 
a group, while that of  Chile was well below. 
1 5 We can include in this group the models of  Blejer (1977), Blejer and Fernández (1980) and Khan and 
Knight (1981). 
1 6 Since the resource endowment is fixed  we do not allow for  any net investment or savings. 
1 7 Private expenditures on goods alone require that interest payments on foreign  debt be subtracted out. 
It should also be noted that we assume that the pattern of  government spending on the three goods is 
identical to that of  the private sector. 
1 8 Assuming that the exchange rate and the tariff  level remain unchanged. 
"The expected change in the exchange rate is assumed throughout to be equal to the actual change. 
2 0 The relevance of  this particular formulation  to the analysis will be made clear below. 
2 1 This is generally not possible in the larger computational general equilibrium models. 
2 2 Following Khan and Zahler (1983) it is assumed here that non-tradeable goods substitute with each 
of  the tradeable goods, but for  simplicity we rule out cross price effects  between importables and exportables. 
This assumption does not change the conclusions reached by Khan and Zahler (1983) in any important way. 
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2 5 Starting with a positive rate of  inflation  would not alter the analysis. 
24See Blejer (1978). 
2 5 In general a change in relative prices would change production of  non-tradeable goods, and the 
transformation  curve between importable and exportable goods would have to shift.  We make this restrictive 
assumption in figure  2 only for  expositional purposes. 
2 6 We assume here that the expected (and actual) nominal exchange rate is constant. 
2 7 Starting with a positive stock of  foreign  debt would not change any of  the basic results. 
2 8 In the Khan and Zahler (1983) model it was assumed that the response of  foreign  capital to interest 
rate differentials  was high, although not instantaneous. The approach adopted here for  the graphical analysis, 
i.e, shifting  the LM curve, yields qualitatively similar results. 
2 9 The current account deficit  is also marginally increased by the increase in the relative price of  non-
tradeable goods that results from  the excess supply of  money created by the inflow  of  capital. 
3 0 This would hold, for  example, if  domestic and foreign  savings were perfect  substitutes. 
3 1 It should be stressed that by assuming that net savings are zero the potential benefits  of  financial 
opening up are in a sense being minimized. For an alternative approach where productive capacity grows 
with foreign  savings, see Zahler (1982). 
3 2 Obviously one could also obtain the same decline in the terms of  trade by increasing the price of 
importables relative to the price of  exportables. The outcomes, however, are not symmetrical so that one has 
to be careful  to note that our results are conditional on how the terms of  trade change is specified. 
3 3 A similar set of  results are obtained if  private sector expenditures are increased through an expansion 
in domestic credit. 
3 4 For the reasons for  choosing an equilibrium position to begin from,  see Khan and Zahler (1983), 
page 245. 
3 5 The model assumes a "normal" rate of  unemployment of  5%. 
3 6 All changes in the exogenous variables are assumed to occur in the third period. 
37For these values see Khan and Zahler (1983), Appendix II. 
3 8 In equilibrium the current account is set equal to 100; values below 100, therefore,  imply a current 
account deficit. 
3 9 Real expenditures, as defined  here, are closely related to the concept of  national income adjusted for 
changes in the terms of  trade. 
4 0 Of  course nominal depreciation of  the currency would entail certain costs, particularly with respect to 
inflation. 
4 1 For a discussion of  the reasons why the real exchange rate may appreciate in the course of  a 
stabilization programme, see Dornbusch (1982), (1984). 
4 2 One would normally expect an increase in the fiscal  deficit  to result in a greater excess supply of 
money, but in this framework  there is a larger increase in the demand for  money (due to the increase in 
nominal income); furthermore,  the additional monetary expansion created by the deficit  leaks out very 
rapidly through the current account. 
4 3 In the model only foreign  residents are allowed to acquire domestic debt, and domestic residents 
(including the government) are restricted from  holding foreign  debt. As such, an increase in foreign  interest 
rates, by reducing the incentive for  foreigners  to invest, leads to a smaller (or even negative) inflow  of  capital 
and a lower stock of  foreign  debt. 
44See, for  example, Edwards (1982), Pastore (1982), Sjastaad (1983), Zahler (1983) and Dornbusch 
(1984). 
4 5 This result confirms  the argument put forward  by Dornbusch (1984) that the exchange rate policies 
in the Southern Cone countries led to steady overvaluation of  their respective currencies, and that this 
outcome could have been avoided through more flexible  exchange rate management. 
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RECENT SOUTHERN CONE LIBERALIZATION : THE CHILEAN CASE 
I 
Introduction 
Since the mid-1970s, the Southern Cone countries of  Latin America have experienced 
profound  political, institutional, and economic reforms.  Their immediate causes can be 
found  in the evolution of  their relatively recent (prereform)  political situation, which saw 
marked polarization of  different  groups and political forces,  social unrest, and a general 
feeling  of  dissatisfaction  with the countries' economic performance. 
These events were followed  by the installation of  military régimes, with the new 
characteristic of  trying to go far  beyond the traditional attempt of  introducing social (and 
particularly, labour) discipline and put the "house in order". In fact,  in Argentina, Chile 
and Uruguay, an attempt was made, at least in the economic sphere, to drastically reform 
the pattern of  economic development, institutions and policies that, according to the new 
authorities, had prevailed since the end of  World War II. 
In Chile, the rupture of  the new economic authorities with the traditional economic 
thought and policies has been almost complete. It is difficult  to find  any other country in 
recent history that has embarked so wholeheartedly on a programme of  extreme 
monetary orthodoxy with free  market-oriented development economic policies. 
It is very important to point out at the beginning that the régime intended to go far 
beyond technocratic and bureaucratic modernization; in fact,  an attempt has been made to 
reshape the foundations  of  the Chilean society, its values, its structures and its 
behavioural patterns, which included as a main component a clearcut economic model. 
Although we will concentrate on the economic analysis, no relevant and comprehensive 
study of  the recent evolution of  Chile's economy can be undertaken without an 
understanding of  the philosophical, ideological, and political framework  that 
characterized the economic reform.1 
In this respect, a great part of  the interest of  the recent Southern Cone 
"experiments", and particularly of  the Chilean one, has concentrated on a combination of 
quite rigid and strict authoritarian régimes (closed polity) in which political freedom  was 
extraordinarily limited, together with an economic vacuum in which, contrary to the 
political sphere, liberalization (mainly in the goods markets, and to a much lesser extent 
in factor  markets) was the name of  the game —open economy.2 Initially most of  the 
economists favouring  these experiments tried to abstract from  ethical, political, social 
and institutional considerations; as time has passed, increasing concern about the long-
run difficulties  of  economic liberalization cum authoritarianism has been expressed 
(Friedman, 1982). 
Besides the academic interest in the Chilean economic experience, its study is also 
important from  a more practical and policy-oriented point of  view. Until recently the 
Chilean case was perceived by some financial,  international and political institutions as a 
"success case" and even as another "economic miracle",5 an example to be imitated by 
other LDCs. Therefore,  the relevance of  its analysis exceeds the interest of  one more case 
study per se. 
This article analyses the main macroeconomic developments of  the recent Chilean 
experience that started with the military coup in September 1973, consciously abstracting 
from  the above-mentioned philosophical, ideological, and political considerations. More 
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specifically,  it analyses the main characteristics of  the Chilean economic model, its general 
orientation and its implementation, trying to highlight important lessons as well as 
unresolved issues, both of  which may improve the understanding and the design of 
economic development policies in Chile as well as in other LDCs. 
One last introductory note: be cautious when trying to evaluate the results of  recent 
Southern Cone economic experiments. On one hand, many different  policies with 
different  objectives, magnitudes, speeds and sequences were implemented, which makes 
it difficult  to evaluate them separately —specially when trying to correlate causes and 
effects  appropriately (Zahler, 1983). It is also difficult  to separate the effects  of  changes in-
the international scenario, the development strategy, or the stabilization effort  and other 
short-run policies on major economic variables. Finally, even though the time-span of 
these experiences has extended for  several years, given the initial conditions they faced 
and the nature and magnitude of  the reforms,  we necessarily have to concentrate more on 
the evolution of  the adjustment and transition paths of  the main macrovariables than on 
the medium and long-term prospects of  the model. Nevertheless, some characteristics of 
the economic policies implemented during the transition period (which has been quite 
long already) have had strong implications for  the long-run results of  these reforms.  In 
fact,  at this date there is strong evidence that in Chile the experiment has failed  to achieve 




The Chilean economic model has its roots in different  grounds. Modern neoclassical 
theory and monetarist-oriented framework  blossomed in some academic centers and in 
the economic policy-making of  certain important countries of  the industrial world in the 
early 1970s. In addition, there was the "demonstration effect"  of  some developing 
countries, especially in East Asia, that had performed  extraordinarily well through more 
outward-oriented policies that opened their economies to the world trade and financial 
flows  (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1979; Eng Fong and Lim, 1981; Keesing, 1979, Krueger 
et al.,  1981; Krueger, 1981).6 More important was the abundant availability of 
international liquidity related to the radical changes associated with the oil shock, 
especially increasing importance of  private banking international flows  in the world 
financial  markets. This not only made it attractive to engage in financial  opening up, but 
created an unknown phenomena for  LDCs, namely that the foreign  exchange constraint 
tended to disappear through the availability of  international financial  capital flows.7 
On the domestic front,  the neoliberal critique toward the development strategies 
and economic policies implemented in the postwar period was far-reaching, 
comprehensive, and had as its logical consequence an alternate and completely different 
developmental approach.8 According to that school, the economic growth rate of  Chile in 
the 30-year period from  1940 to 1970 —which averaged 4% in annual terms— was much 
lower than the country's potential. This, together with the persistence and acceleration in 
the early 1970s of  inflation  and the chronic balance of  payments crisis were, according to 
that view, caused by the size of  government, the nature of  its intervention in the economy, 
and the magnitude of  its deficit,  as well as erroneous economic strategies based upon a 
combination of  Keynesian and import-substitution policies and distortions of  the price 
system through generalized and often  irrational price controls. 
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The economic situation prevailing at the moment of  the military coup was 
charaterized by low growth, accelerating inflation,  multiple and heavy distortions of  the 
price system, shortages and widespread parallel markets, a critical international reserves 
situation, and a rapid loss in creditworthiness. The political scenario showed a high 
degree of  polarization and conflict. 
The coming into power of  a military régime allowed a group of  economists, 
defining  themselves as "non-political", to join the government and pursue the 
implementation of  their particular view of  economic and social policies with very little 
institutional, political, or social restrictions, especially if  compared to Chilean historical 
standards in which Congress, unions, political parties, the press, and so on, played a very 
important role in the actual design and outcome of  economic policies. The "economic 
team"9 not only shared a common belief  in an extreme version of  a market-oriented 
economy but also offered  an economic programme emphasizing a way out of  the foreign 
exchange problem facing  the country in 1974 and 1975, and making no specific  mention 
of  issues such as human rights, democratization, and so on. Having no definite  time-
horizon, and having eliminated the traditional short-run and eminently temporary 
nature of  the economic policy, they concentrated all their efforts  on the design and 
implementation of  what is called the Chilean economic model. 
Ill 
Main theoretical characteristics and framework 
of  the Chilean economic model 
In broad terms, one can distinguish the two basic components of  the model: development 
strategy (with structural transformations),  and stabilization policies. 
On one hand, the core of  development strategy consisted of  price liberalization and 
free  markets, and the effect  of  the resulting structural transformations,  financial  reforms, 
and opening up of  the economy to world trade and capital flows  on income and wealth 
distribution, and on intra- and intersectoral production changes. On the other hand, 
private enterprise was encouraged, minimizing and reorienting the economic role of  the 
State in conformity  to the "subsidiarity principle". These two were the basic instruments 
needed to eliminate government-induced "distortions" and to give appropriate signals to 
entrepreneurs (both national and foreign)  and consumers. These also would help 
stimulate competition and initiative, which would put the country on a higher, stable, and 
well-grounded growth path along the lines of  comparative advantages. Furthermore, the 
idea of  a "non-political" society and bias against State intervention implied that its 
economic action should be "neutral", "non-discretional" and "impersonal", in the double 
sense of  not favouring  any particular group or sector10 and not altering through 
intervention the price system determined by market forces. 
Price stabilization policies played a fundamental  role not only because of  the quasi-
hyperinflation  at the end of  1973, but principally because of  belief  that the undistorted 
price system was the crucial element in resource allocation decisions. Ideally, all price 
changes should reflect  relative price movements and therefore  the goal of  a zero inflation 
rate. With it, the stability and transparency of  the price system constituted a basic 
component of  the stabilization as well as of  (although indirectly) the development 
policy.11 
The new authorities' initial approach to Chilean inflation  was based on the 
assumption that the main cause of  the inflation  was the excessive growth of  the money 
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stock. Therefore,  a restrictive monetary policy was postulated corresponding to a closed-
economy monetarist view of  inflation.  Once the Chilean economy opened up 
commercially and the public sector was balanced, the objective changed from  "zero 
inflation"  to "world inflation"  based on the "law of  one price". Associated with a strict 
monetary approach to the balance of  payments was a fixed  nominal exchange rate. 
Consequently, monetary policy became essentially passive. 
IV 
The initial situation 
Between 1971 and 1973, an attempt was made to modify  profoundly  the political 
foundations  of  Chilean society and to alter drastically the distribution of  power, income 
and wealth in the country. In the long term, this implied an alteration of  the structure of 
production, of  the economy's mode of  operation and more broadly, of  the type of  relations 
predominating in the Chilean society up to that time. Economically speaking, this 
involved an intensification  of  agrarian reform  and the establishment of  an area of  social 
ownership in the sphere of  production, finance  and marketing. 
The creation of  social ownership and the price policy applied to it, together with 
the increasing gap between government expenditures and tax revenues, led to a marked 
increase in the fiscal  deficit.  While the deficit  represented on average 14.6% of  fiscal 
expenditure and 3.3% of  gross domestic product (GDP) between I960 and 1969, the 
corresponding values between 1970 and 1973 were 35.5% and 12.5%. In 1973, the fiscal 
deficit  was equivalent to 55.1 % of  fiscal  expenditures and 23.6% of  GDP; in real terms, it 
was seven times as large as in the period from  I960 to 1969. 
Developments in the monetary sector also showed signs of  severe imbalances. 
Whereas in I960 to 1969 the average growth rate of  private nominal money (M,) was 
37% a year, this figure  rose fivefold  from  1970 to 1973 and in 1973, growth in M¡ was 
419%. Inflation  reached levels unprecedented in the economic history of  Chile. From 
1970 to 1973, the annual average increase in consumer prices (CPI) was above 300% and 
reached around 600% by September 1973, revealing a tendency to accelerate to 
hyperinflation;  during I960 to 1969, the average annual rate of  inflation  was 25% 
The country's external position, the level of  international reserves, and the capacity 
to secure external loans had sharply decreased also. The accumulated current account 
deficit  reached almost one billion dollars from  1971 to 1973. By the end of  1973, net 
international reserves were minus US$ 231 million, while in December 1979 they had 
been positive and over US$ 400 million. 
The situation described above was partly due to and was aggravated by increasing 
government intervention with inconsistent and diverse quantitative restrictions and 
price controls that affected  the functioning  of  the foreign  exchange, financial  and money 
markets, and the market for  real goods and services. 
Multiple undervalued exchange rates, heterogeneous tariffs  and non-tariff  barriers, 
import bans, prior import deposits, and other quantitative limitations on the foreign 
exchange market coexisted with negative real interest rates, high and differential  reserve 
requirement ratios, and quantitative and selective control of  bank credit in the financial 
sector; in addition, the government intervened with a profusion  of  price controls in the 
market for  real goods and services, all of  which resulted in extremely inefficient  resource 
allocation and in the emergence of  generalized shortages, cues, and parallel markets. The 
Central Bank offered  no resistance to the demands of  the government sector and the 
State-owned enterprises, thus helping to accentuate inflationary  pressures. 
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Although the unemployment rate stood below its historical levels (largely because 
of  excess demand, and the rise in employment of  the public sector and in the area of  public 
ownership), the share of  gross domestic fixed  capital investment in GDP in the period 
1971 to 1973 was 20% lower than in the 1960s. Furthermore, after  growing 9-0% in 
1971, GDP fell  by -1.2% in 1972, and by -5-6% in 1973. 
V 
Implementation and results of  the 
new economic policy12 
Although the initial disequilibria demanded high priority be given to short-run 
macroeconomic policies, the authorities tried to deal with both those problems and the 
major structural transformations  of  Chile's economy. It is therefore  difficult  to isolate the 
different  policies. For analytical purposes, however, we will analyse the different  main 
components of  the macroeconomic policies and their principal results. An attempt to 
evaluate them from  a more global perspective is developed in the next two major 
categories to follow. 
Stabilization  policy 
Given the magnitude of  the initial macroeconomic disequilibria, short-run policies — 
even though formulated  as anti-inflationary—  directly contributed to what was perhaps a 
more pressing and unavoidable problem: the balance of  payments and international 
reserves position, as well as the country's precarious creditworthiness.13 
The anti-inflationary  policy had two common factors,  and, until mid-1982, three 
different  approaches. The first  common trait was not to use the traditional administrative 
price-control mechanism as a stabilization instrument. (Cortázar and Marshall (1980) 
correctly point out, however, that the official  estimates of  price increases during 1976 to 
1978 underestimate substantially the "true" inflation  for  that period.) With the 
important exception of  wages and the exchange rate as a means of  controlling production 
costs and inflationary  expectations, almost all other prices have been under no official 
control in the last nine years.14 The other general characteristic of  the stabilization effort 
was the reduction of  fiscal  and public sector deficits  and the attempt to reduce 
government expenditures. 
Inflation  has been tackled in different  ways over time. At first,  the authorities' 
interpretation of  inflation  was that of  a traditional monetarist view for  a closed economy, 
that is, the cause being the high growth rate of  the money supply. The initial 
counterinflation  strategy rested on the effort  to control the growth rate of  the monetary 
base, issued by the Central Bank, and M,. The new economy authorities believed that the 
Chilean inflationary  process stemmed from  monetary causes derived from  the deficit 
incurred by the public sector and enterprises in the area of  social ownership. 
Consequently, the monetary authorities sharply restricted credit to the government 
sector. As a result of  these restrictions, not only did the central government fail  to demand 
resources from  the Central Bank in its domestic currency budget, but it reimbursed the 
monetary authority; from  1975 to 1979, the central government represented -21.5% of 
the accumulated flow  of  base money. Furthermore, there was a systematic reduction in the 
government's share of  the total credit of  the monetary system: internal credit to the 
private sector, as a proportion of  total domestic credit, increased from  less than 8% in 
1973, to 14% in 1974 to 1976, 41% in 1977 to 1979 and more than 75% in 1980 to 1982. 
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This stabilization policy was consistent with the spirit and philosophy of  the new 
economic policy in general, regarding the size and self-financing  of  the State sector and 
the need for  a sharp reduction in the fiscal  sector deficit.  The latter was implemented by 
tightly controlling outlays, increasing tax revenues through a tax reform,15  raising the 
tariffs  of  public enterprises and services and, though to a lesser extent, by borrowing 
domestically from  the private sector. Another important source of  finance  for  the State 
was the sale on some of  its assets, an element that played a crucial role in transforming  the 
Chilean economy at that time: asset concentration by a few  private business 
conglomerates with very important economic consequences. 
Despite the appreciable effort  of  the public sector to accommodate itself  to the 
requirements of  the new economic policy, growth in the monetary base up to the end of 
1977 remained extraordinarily high for  what was termed a "monetarist" stabilization 
strategy. Only at the end of  1977 did annual growth in the monetary base fall  below the 
level recorded in 1971 to 1973, and even then it remained excessively high in comparison 
to the periods prior to 1970. The reasons for  this were the following:  first,  the lack of 
sound instruments of  monetary control, mainly the embryonic nature of  the long-term 
capital market that prevented adequate open market operations; and second, the 
increasing importance of  foreign  currency inflow,  stimulated by extraordinarily interest 
rate differentials  associated with the domestic financial  reform,  and representing nearly 
Table 1 
CHILE: MONEY AND PRICES 





Consumer price Consumer price Income  velocity 
money index" index (times  per year) 
19 66 60.3 38.9 17.0 17.0 12 
1967 21.1 25.1 21.9 21.9 12 
1968 46.0 38.3 27.9 27.9 13 
1969 41.8 35.2 29.3 29.3 13 
1970 70.3 66.2 34.9 36.1 12 
1971 132.7 113.4 22.1 355.4¿ 8 1972 173.7 151.8 163.4 8 
1973 461.6 363.0 508.1 605.9 10 
1974 222.5 231.2 375.9 369.2 20 
1975 312.9 267.2 340.7 343.3 24 
1976 266.3 189.3 174.3 197.9 25 
1977 94.4 113.5 63.5 84.2 20 
1978 56.2 65.0 30.3 37.2 17 
1979 44.9 57.8 38.9 20 
1980 36.8 59.4 31.2 18 
1981 -8.9 8.7 9.5 17 
1982 -26.5 -9.0 20.7 18 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile ( 1979), ( 1983a), ( 1981), ( 1983b); Lüders ( 1982);INE ( 1983); Cortázar and Marshall ( 1980). 
"Official  price index. 
* Calculated by Cortázar and Marshall (1980). 
c Defined  as the gross domestic product expenditure divided by M,. These figures  correspond to observed values, which are 
not necessarily the equilibrium values. 
''Accumulated inflation  rate during 1971-1972. 
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70% of  the accumulated flow  of  high powered money (base money created by the 
country's Central Bank) from  1975 to 1977.16 
In terms of  a reduction in price rises, the results were quite poor: in mid-1976, 
inflation  was above 200% in annual terms (table 1). Besides difficulty  in controlling 
money growth, the high interest rates, the creation of  very good money substitutes, and 
the persistence of  high inflationary  expectations raised the income velocity of  money, 
which was twice its 1965-1970 values and three times its 1971-1973 figures  (Zahler, 1980: 
section 2). Furthermore, during this period importers could exercise an important 
monopoly role, delaying the downward pressure on inflation  that should have come from 
the first  steps of  the tariff  reform.  Given the way in which monetary and restrictive fiscal 
policies were implemented, output was more affected  than prices. In 1975, GDP fell  by 
12.9%, and during 1975-1976 the average unemployment: rate was 16.5%, nearly three 
times as high as in the 1960s. 
The second stage of  the stabilization policy combined the monetarist view of  a 
closed economy with the attempt to affect  inflationary  expectations (and to a lesser 
degree, costs) through preannouncing a diminishing rate of  devaluation of  the peso 
against the dollar. 
This policy did not try to maintain a stable real exchange rate. Instead of  adjusting 
the exchange rate to past inflation,  the opposite was intended: the "tabla" would 
influence  the future  rate of  price increases. In June 1976 and March 1977, two 
revaluations took place followed  by important drops in the inflation  rate: the monthly 
rate was reduced from  10% in mid-1976toless than 4% by mid-1977. By then, the annual 
increases in the cost-of-living  index was less than 100%. At the end of  1978, its growth 
rate had fallen  to between 30% and 40% (Cortázar and Marshall, 1980). These rates were 
slightly higher than the average price increase of  the 1960s, and were an improvement 
relative to the corresponding periods' international inflation  rates. The steady opening 
up of  the Chilean economy, however, was becoming contradictory to the view that the 
supply of  money (as opposed to that of  internal credit) could be controlled by the 
monetary authority (Zahler, 1980: section 2, 1-2). Given the orthodox monetary policy, 
the inflow  of  foreign  money and the increasing importance of  credit to the private sector 
required the public sector to absorb a disproportionate burden of  the effects  of  the 
stabilization policy. 
Since the authorities interpreted the lower inflation  rates as the result of  using the 
exchange rate as a stabilization instrument, with the economy increasingly integrating 
into the world economy and with the government budget in surplus, a shift  in policy 
occurred in mid-1979: while still being monetarist in nature, it changed from  a closed 
economy to a totally open one. The new interpretation was based on the law of  one price 
and was intimately linked to the monetary approach of  the balance of  payments, in which 
the domestic inflation  tends to approach, ceteris  paribus, the foreign  relevant inflation 
plus the rate of  depreciation of  the exchange rate in an open economy. In June 1979, the 
exchange rate was fixed  in nominal terms at the rate of  39 pesos per US dollar. Since the 
government did not anticipate financial  problems, the authorities expected international 
inflation  to provide a ceiling for  domestic price increases. Since then, and until June 1982, 
monetary policy was essentially passive, with base money movements primarily 
reflecting  the monetization of  variations in the international reserves.17 
As a result of  this policy (and of  previous reductions in money growth), inflation 
was lowered in 1980; by the end of  1981, it was close to the international level. During the 
first  two years of  its implementation (until mid-1981), however, it was far  above this 
latter rate, which led to a significant  deterioration of  the real exchange rate. No 
consideration was given to the fact  that at the moment of  implementing such a policy, the 
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domestic inflation  rate may have been higher than that of  the rest of  the world, or that 
because of  lags in the adjustment process, for  some time domestic inflation  may have 
exceeded the international one; as it happened, the country could have had at the end a 
higher price level  than that of  the rest of  the world. 
The law of  one price refers  to equalization of  price levels  between a country and its 
major trading partners. It applies only to inflation  rates  (for  fixed  nominal exchange 
rates) in equilibrium.  In June 1979, that clearly was not the situation for  price levels and 
rates of  change, and the pegging of  the nominal exchange rate created a systematic 
overvaluation of  the peso. That in turn stimulated large current account deficits,  which 
were easily financed  given the extraordinary high supply of  international credit during 
the period. 
When these deficits  emerged during 1980 and especially 1981, the official  position 
was that the private sector had spent "too much", and since the country was practically 
under a dollar standard, the "automatic adjustment" of  the specie-flow  mechanism had to 
work. Theoretically, that mechanism would reduce the money supply, increase interest 
rates, and put downward pressure on domestic real expenditures and non-tradeable goods 
prices in such a way that the Chilean economy would recover its international 
competitiveness. Given the magnitude of  the lag in the real exchange rate (atraso 
cambiario),  expenditure-reducing policies were not enough and expenditure-switching 
policies were required. Since the authorities insisted on pegging the nominal exchange 
rate, the only solution to the balance of  payments problem was an improvement in the 
relative prices of  tradeable goods. This implied that non-tradeable goods prices would 
have to rise by less than foreign  inflation.  In practice, this required non-tradeable prices 
and wages to fall  in absolute  terms,  especially since the dollar itself  had appreciated vis-a-
vis the currencies of  the major Chilean trade partners. 
In fact,  wages (for  institutional reasons) and prices, as well as interest rates and 
asset values, did not prove flexible  enough downwards. Even though inflation  was 
lowered to international levels —reaching 9.5% in annual terms in December 1981 and 
becoming negative during the first  months of  1982— the fall  in the money supply caused 
by the fall  in international reserves, with M, decreasing by 9% in 1982 and high-powered 
money falling  by 27 %, had a major impact in losses of  production and in unemployment. 
GDP fell  14.1 % in 1982, and the open unemployment rate peaked in the third quarter of 
1982 at higher levels than the all-time record of  1975. 
With no measures taken on the exchange rate and monetary and financial  policies 
passive, the change in relative prices was slow. The losses of  production, increasing 
unemployment, accumulating debt, and generalized bankruptcies —due to the recession 
and the extremely high real interest rates, the latter aggravated by the almost nil 
inflation—  were so big, that the stabilization programme finally  collapsed. After  using 
the exchange rate as a price stabilization instrument for  almost three years, a series of 
frequent  and big devaluations started to take place in June 1982. Since then, diverse and 
somewhat contradictory efforts  have been made to isolate money changes from  the 
balance of  payments situation. 
Although inflation  did not follow  devaluation —by December 1982 the free  market 
peso price of  the dollar had increased by more than 100% as compared to its June value, 
with exchange controls and parallel markets becoming of  increasing importance— it has 
reversed the tendency of  the previous two years: CPI increased by 10% in the three 
months after  the first  devaluation, and inflation  in 1982 more than doubled that of  1981. 
Briefly,  even though stabilization policies lowered annual price increases from  over 
600% in 1973 to less than international inflation  during the first  six months of  1982, the 
costs associated with these policies became prohibitive: initially, in terms of  recession and 
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unemployment (Ramos, 1975), and later (1980-1981) through its effect  on the real 
exchange rate and balance of  payments disequilibrium. This finally  led to even higher 
unemployment and production losses than those of  1975-
Economic liberalization  reforms18 
There have been many major economic innovations in the Chilean economic policy, such 
as the privatization of  public enterprises and the social security system, a drastic change in 
the legal and institutional aspects of  labour union organizations, tax reforms,  and the 
reorientation of  the role of  government. For reasons of  space, these and other events are 
dealt with here mainly in relation to the macroeconomic effects  of  what are generally 
considered to be the core of  Southern Cone economic reforms:  those affecting  the foreign 
sector, thus allowing the country to pursue comparative advantages and integrate its 
financial  market to that of  the world's economy; and, related to this latter reform,  the 
domestic financial  liberalization. 
Commercial  opening up 
Following a development strategy based on the gains from  free  trade (associated with the 
"small country" case in economic development literature), and given the above-
mentioned characterization of  the Chilean foreign  trade of  goods and non-financial 
services at the end of  1973, the authorities decided to implement drastic reforms  in this 
field.  There was a simplification  and reduction of  rules applying to external trade, a quick 
dismantling of  all non-tariff  barriers, progressive, rapidly lowering, and standardization 
of  tariffs,  and the elimination of  all allocation criteria other than the tariff  and price of 
foreign  exchange. In October 1976, tariff  reform  as well as a new and liberal treatment of 
direct foreign  investment led the country to abandon the Andean Group —a common 
market to which Chile had belonged since its inception in 1969 and in which it was 
relatively competitive. Although the tariff  programme was revised on more than one 
occasion, the outcome was straightforward,  since in less than five  years almost all Chilean 
imports —with the major exception of  automobiles— were subject to a uniform  tariff  of 
only 10% (see table 2). 
The other crucial component of  a trade reform  is related to the time path of  the real 
exchange rate. This policy was less clear and precise than the tariff  reform,  and had 
different  objectives during the course of  the programme. From October 1973 to June 
1976, after  an initial major devaluation, a crawling peg prevailed which was 
complemented by occasional discrete adjustments! The main objective during that period 
was to unify  the exchange rate for  all transactions, and this was accomplished by the third 
quarter of  1975. In June 1976, the peso was revalued by 10% on arguments of  the 
preceding depreciation of  the peso, the monetary impact of  reserve accumulation, and the 
eventual anti-inflationary  effect  through both cost reduction of  imports and the lowering 
of  inflationary  expectations. In March 1977, another 10% revaluation of  the peso took 
place. As mentioned, from  June 1976 to June 1979, the exchange rate was used mainly as a 
price stabilization instrument. This was reinforced  from  June 1979 to June 1982 with a 
fixed  nominal exchange rate system. Since mid-1982, a maze of  radically different  policies 
has been implemented. 
The real exchange rate changed substantially over the 1975-1982 period (see 
table 3). During the first  years of  the trade reform,  it was relatively high compared to 
1971-1973 levels. This, together with the lower internal cost of  imported raw materials, 
intermediate goods, and other inputs reinforced  by tariff  reductions, created incentives 
for  exportable goods production and importable goods consumption. In fact,  as expected 
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from  the commercial opening up, exports and imports of  goods as a proportion of  the 
GNP increased from  less than 15% in 1961-1970 to more than 22% in 1974-1981.19 
The annual figures  show a very high variability and should be qualified.  Imports 
grew at a much faster  rate than exports: from  1977 to 1981, the average annual volume of 
exports grew by less than 8%, while that of  imports rose by nearly 20% per year (see 
table 4). The reasons for  this seem to lie, first,  in the systematic appreciation of  the real 
exchange rate since mid-1978. Related to this was the overabundant supply of  credit in 
world financial  markets and the domestic monetary and credit policies, which stimulated 
borrowing abroad and brought significant  capital inflows  to the Chilean economy, 
especially since 1979. These have contributed to generate a trade balance deficit  in two 
ways: by increasing expenditures (through the mõnetization of  the inflow  of  reserves), 
and by changing relative prices in favour  of  non-tradeables through not only its influence 
on the atraso cambiario  but also through its impact on increases in home goods prices. 
These increases absorbed the bulk of  the inflationary  pressures from  the excess supply of 
money generated by the capital inflows. 
Before  1979 the use of  the exchange rate as a counterinflation  mechanism was 
initiated, with devaluations smaller than former  price rises and even with some sudden 
revaluations. Nevertheless, only when the public sector budget appeared to be under 
control, and more important, when there was no immediate nor foreseeable  foreign 
exchange constraint due to the extraordinary affluence  of  foreign  financial  capital, did the 
Chilean authorities put all of  their effort  into price stabilization through the pegging of 
the nominal exchange rate. 
Table 2 
CHILE: NOMINAL TARIFF, 1973-1979 
(Percentage  of  CIF  values) 
Year  Date Average tariff  Maximum  tariff 
1973 31 December 94 Over 500 
1974 1 March 90 200 
27 March 80 160 
5 June 67 140 
1975 16 January 52 120 
13 August 44 90 
1976 9 February 38 70 
7 June 33 60 
22 December 27 60 
1977 8 January 24 50 
30 April 22 50 
29 August 20 35 
December 16 25 
1978 March 15 20 
June 14 20 
December 12 15 
1979 June 10 10 
Source: Zahler (1980: 134, tableó). 
"The are a small number of exceptions to the maximum tariffs,  the most important relating to cars. 
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Table 3 
CHILE: E V O L U T I O N O F T H E E X C H A N G E R A T E A N D PRICES I N D E X 
(.Average  for  1974=100) 
Year 
(averages) 
Index  of  the 
nominal  exchange 
rate 
(1) 
Index  of  wholesale 
prices of  domestic 
products 
(2) 
Index  of  wholesale 
prices in the 
United  States 
(3) 
Index  of  the 
real  exchange 
rate" 
[(l)/(2)]  (3) 
(4) 
1974 100 100 100 100 
1975 595 590 108 109 
1976 1 580 1 920 114 94 
1977 2 607 3 514 121 90 
1978 3 828 5 097 130 98 
1979 4 473 7 735 146 84 
1980 4 715 10 793 166 73 
1981 4 715 11 906 180 71 
1982 6 164 12 907 183 87 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile (1983b); IMF (1982, 1983). 
"For alternative calculations of  real exchange rates, see Corbo (1982: table 1) and CEPAL (1982b: table 16) for  real effective 
exchange rates. 
Table 4 
CHILE: T R A D E A C C O U N T I N D I C A T O R S 
(Rate  of  change) 
1975 1976 • 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982a 
Exports of  goods 
(value) -26.1 33.1 3.3 12.6 55.9 22.7 -18.4 -3.3 
Imports of  goods 
(value) -20.1 -3.1 46.0 34.2 45.2 30.5 19.1 -44.1 
Exports of  goods 
(volume) 1.8 21.5 3.8 7.3 19.1 9.2 -3.7 16.6 
Imports of  goods 
(volume) -34.1 -4.5 31.4 24.1 18.2 4.7 11.1 -39.3 
Terms of  trade -39.6 7.4 -10.3 -2.8 7.3 -8.3 -21.2 -10.8 
Source: CEPAL (1982b: 25, table 17). 
"CEPAL estimates. 
The exchange rate policy, reinforced  by the overabundant inflows  of  capital, created 
a price substitution effect  in favour  of  the consumption of  tradeable goods but against 
their production. This asymmetric result can also be explained by the fact  that the signals 
to release resources from  importable goods production and to stimulate their 
consumption (generalized and increasing doubts regarding the maintenance of  both the 
low tariffs  and the pegged exchange rate) were more clearly and quickly perceived by the 
economic agents in this sector than in the exportable sector. Furthermore, there is strong 
evidence of  a repressed demand for  imported goods at the end of  1973. On the other hand, 
the instability of  the exchange rate in the early years and its continuous deterioration 
afterwards,  coupled with extremely high interest rates andl an inconsistent wage policy, 
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squeezed the exports sector profits  and therefore  its growth potential. Finally, the 
revaluation of  the dollar vis-a-vis other major currencies during 1980 and 1981, also 
contributed to the loss in competitiveness of  the Chilean economy. 
Foreign sector liberalization reforms  and the opening up policy can be better 
identified,  in the Chilean case, with import liberalization than with export promotion. In 
fact,  given the neutrality of  government and the extreme confidence  in comparative 
advantages, no explicit export promotion policy was implemented. Even though non-
traditional exports expanded substantially during the period under analysis, their share in 
GDP grew by five  points between 1970 and 1980 (Ffrench-Davis  and Arellano, 1981: 9), 
and given their small initial importance they did not play a major role as a source of 
growth for  the Chilean economy. In fact,  with 1976 the exception —the only year when 
the current account was in surplus— GDP growth of  non-tradeable goods always 
exceeded that of  the tradeables sector (Corbo, 1982: 26, table 3). 
The above-mentioned evolution of  exports ancl imports of  goods and non-financial 
services led to a trade deficit,  which increased from  US$ 267 million in 1977 to an annual 
average of  US$ 640 million in 1978-1979, rose to US$ 1 056 million in 1980, and peaked 
at US$ 3 366 in 1981. 
From a global and macroeconomic perspective, the most important lesson from  the 
Chilean commercial opening up policy is that if  the purpose is to increase the integration 
of  the economy to the world markets (and not only that of  imports), more attention 
should be given not only to velocity and timing and the final  level and composition  of  the 
tariff  structure, but also to the appropriate time path of  the real exchange rate and other 
major "macro" prices, such as interest rates and wages. 
Financial  liberalization 
While the trade reform  took place relatively rapidly, and was based essentially on the 
dismantling of  all non-tariff  barriers and the use of  price as a rationing and resource 
allocation scheme, the financial  opening up had very different  characteristics because the 
economic authorities were worried about the eventual inflationary  and balance of 
payments effects  if  the capital account opened suddenly (Tapia, 1979). This turned out to 
be worrisome after  the domestic financial  system was quickly liberalized by mid-1975. 
The latter reform  consisted of  the privatization of  the majority of  the Chilean banks, the 
elimination of  selective and quantitative restrictions on bank credit, and stimulation of 
competition within the financial  system by removing barriers to entry for  both domestic 
and foreign  banks as well as for  non-banking financial  enterprises (financieras,  fondos 
mutuos, etc.). Complementing these measures, interest rate controls were eliminated, 
with interest to be determined by market forces. 
As a result of  domestic capital market liberalization —in an economy with high 
rates of  actual and expected inflation,  with efforts  by authorities to apply restrictive 
monetary policies (selling to the private sector an appreciable number of  State 
shareholdings), and with the country having little global access to foreign  savings— the 
real interest rate increased enormously: between 1976 and 1978, ex-post annual loan 
interest rates were higher than 50% in real terms. This was accompanied by substantial 
spreads between active and passive rates as a consequence of  inflation,  large reserve 
requirements, high operational costs of  some financial  intermediaries, and the profits 
made by the financial  system during the first  years of  the reform.  Rates to depositors, 
while positive, were much lower than lending rates (see table 5). 
The differential  between the domestic dollar-denominated interest rate and the 
international rate was so large (using the LIBOR rate, the differential  was 112% in 1976, 
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Table 5 
CHILE: 30 DAY BANK INTEREST RATES 
(Annual  percentage  domestic  rate) 
Nominal  Real" Nominalb 
(pesos)  (pesos)  (dollars) 
Charged Paid Margin Charged Paid Margin Charged Paid Margin 
1975 411.3 267.4 143.9 16.0 -16.6 32.7 0.4 -27.9 28.3 7.2 
1976 350.7 197.9 152.7 64.3 8.6 55.7 118.5 44.4 74.2 6.1 
1977 156.4 93.7 62.7 56.8 18.4 38.3 58.4 19.6 38.8 6.4 
1978 85.3 62.8 22.6 42.2 24.9 17.3 51.1 32.7 18.4 9.2 
1979 62.0 45.0 16.9 16.6 4.4 12.2 40.5 25.9 14.7 12.1 
1980 46.9 37.4 9.4 11.9 4.8 7.2 46.9 37.4 9.4 14.0 
1981 51.9 40.8 11.1 38.7 28.6 10.1 51.9 40.8 11.1 16.6 
1982 63.1 47.8 15.3 35.1 22.5 12.7 -12.1 -20.4 8.2 13.6 
Source: Central Bank of  Chile (1982b), (1983b). 
"Methodology similar to Zahler (1980: table 8). 
Methodology similar to Zahler (1980: table 9). 
52% in 1977, and 42% in 1978) that the fear  of  massive capital inflows  and their impact 
on the Chilean economy led the authorities to delay and then implement the financial 
opening up reform  gradually (Zahler, 1980).20 
Opening up in the financial  field  was not only slower than the tariff  reform,  it also 
differed  drastically from  the general approach followed  in almost all other areas of 
economic policy. There was a different  treatment, especially until mid-1977, for  banks in 
relation to natural persons and non-bank enterprises. The latter sectors engaged in 
foreign  financial  transactions under Article 14 of  the Ley de Cambios Internacionales, 
with important restrictions that have varied through time regarding the size of  the loans 
as well as minimum time periods for  borrowing external funds.  The banks' capital and 
reserves restricted their access to foreign  financing  and their capacity to issue guarantees. 
Only in the second quarter of  1979, and then only partially, price restrictions were 
introduced in the form  of  a deposit in the Central Bank, whose rate was inversely 
proportional to the period of  the loan. In June 1979, global limits to external borrowing 
were eliminated, but there still were limits on the minimum period for  Article 14 loans as 
well as on the banks' capacity to issue guarantees. 
The way in which the gradual financial  opening developed meant, in practice, that 
quantitative controls on imports of  financial  capital prevailed through almost all the 
period, with a tendency towards its gradual liberalization. As a consequence of  these 
policies, one does not find  high global foreign  indebtedness during the first  years of  the 
programme. Following the general pattern of  privatization of  economic activities, 
however, the access of  public enterprises and the Central Government (the sector that 
usually gets the best terms) to foreign  financing  was strictly limited, and a very important 
change in the composition of  foreign  debt took place (see table 6). The differential  access 
by the government and by groups within the private sector to the (restricted) foreign 
financing  had important redistributive consequences and are analysed below. 
During 1975-1981, the public sector's foreign  debt increased by 5% per year, while 
that of  the Chilean private sector grew at a rate more than ten times that figure.  In 1974, 
the private sector's foreign  debt was 14% of  total foreign  debt; by 1981, its share had 
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increased to 65%. More important, perhaps, is that in terms of  flows,  nearly 90% of 
capital inflows  in 1981 were received by the Chilean private sector. It is interesting that in 
this area the public sector was discriminated against in relation to the private sector by 
not having equal access to less costly (foreign)  funds  and through the stabilization policy 
pursued.21 While some groups of  the private sector were stimulated to borrow from 
abroad and fueled  inflationary  pressures through the monetization of  international 
reserves, the main burden of  the stabilization policy fell  with excessive force  on the public 
sector —directly through programmes designed to reduce its deficit  and indirectly on the 
labour sector— through high rates of  unemployment. 
From 1975 until 1978, as the global capital account was relatively closed and as the 
country's creditworthiness was low, total foreign  debt increased moderately at an average 
annual rate of  12%. But in 1979, financial  opening up accelerated. The abundant 
availability of  private international liquidity, low exposure of  foreign  banks in Chile, 
persistence of  big interest rate differentials  between the Chilean and the international 
capital markets, the exchange rate policy, and the quite general expectations of  a "Chilean 
economic miracle", facilitated  and stimulated the supply as well as the demand of 
international capital to and from  Chile. 
From 1977 until 1981, capital inflows  more than compensated for  the current 
account deficits  and allowed for  steady increases in the country's international reserves. 
Nevertheless, foreign  debt also was increasing. It rose to US$ 15.6 billion in 1981 from 
US$ 4.9 billion at the end of  1975 and, at the end of  1982, it was near US$ 18 billion. 
Foreign debt increased during 1979 by 27% and rose by 31% and 40% in 1980 and 1981 
respectively; during 1980-1981, it represented around 50% of  GDP. For 1982, it is 
estimated that amortizations plus interest payments represented 85% of  Chilean 
exports. (During 1975-1980, this figure  averaged 42%, rising to 55% in 1981.) 
The increasing foreign  debt —contracted primarily with private international 
banks at variable interest rates— and the higher international interest rates explain the 
growing gap between the trade and the current account deficit.  The latter, above 4% of 
Table 6 
CHILE: E X T E R N A L DEBT" BY SECTORS 
(Millions  of  dollars) 
Public  debt  Private  debt  _ . . . 
Total  debt 
Total Percentages Total Percentages 
1973 December 2 984 80.0 749 20.0 3 733 
1974 December 3 788 86.0 615 14.0 4 403 
1975 December 4 068 83.8 786 16.2 4 854 
1976 December 3 762 79.7 958 20.3 4 720 
1977 December 3 917 75.3 1 284 24.7 5 201 
1978 December 4 709 70.7 1 955 29.3 6 664 
1979 December 5 063 59.7 3 421 40.3 8 484 
1980 December 5 063 45.7 6 021 54.3 11 084 
1981 December 5 490 35.3 10 077 64.7 15 567 
1982 December 6 660 34.4 10 487 65.6 17 153 
Source: Apiolaza (1982: 42). 
"The external debt figures  refer  to sums actually disbursed outstanding at the end of  each year. They include traditional 
debt and other liabilities, compromising suppliers' credits and financial  credits to the private sector, as well as short-term 
lines of  credit. Debt with the International Monetary Fund is not included. 
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GDP during 1974-1979 (in the 1960s it was 2.6%), rose to 7.9% in 15*80 and more than 
doubled that figure,  peaking to 16.5% of  GDP in 1981. There have been different 
interpretations as to whether the huge inflows  of  capital in 1980, and especially in 1981 
' —representing 13 % and 17 % of  GDP respectively— were a cause or a consequence of  the 
increasing current account deficit. 
Even though the soundness and stability of  the Chilean foreign  sector and 
maintenance of  the fixed  exchange rate were major questions, the economic authorities' 
interpretation was extremely simple. Given the country's structural transformation 
generated by the new economic policy, the fact  that the public sector budget was 
equilibrated and even generated a surplus, that interest rate were market-determined, and 
that it was mainly the private sector which was in debt abroad, it was assumed that the 
current account deficits  reflected  a healthy and growing economy, with plenty of 
profitable  investment projects. In any case, as the bulk of  the increasing foreign  debt 
represented private obligations, the domestic authorities and some financial 
international institutions believed that the nationality of  those agents was unimportant. 
Only public international borrowing should require governmental preoccupation, but 
foreign  debt addressed to the Chilean private sector was not worrisome and even 
welcome, given that sector's assumed rationality and efficiency.22 
Reality proved to be different  from  the official  theoretical paradigm. In spite of  the 
domestic capital market liberalization and the acceleration of  financial  opening up, 
Chilean experience never approached "interest rate parity". During 1976 to 1981, the 
annual average LIBOR rate was 11%; comparable domestic rates were 33% (for  deposits) 
and 61% (for  loans). In 1980-1981, when Chile received massive capital inflows, 
domestic deposit rates more than doubled and loan rates more than tripled the LIBOR 
rate. Although financial  repression (a la McKinnon) disappeared, real interest rates 
became so high and erratic that it should have been obvious that investment and 
prospects of  growth in the Chilean economy were seriously curtailed. 
Real annual lending rates averaged 38% during 1976-1981 and experienced huge 
fluctuations  ranging from  12% in 1980 to 64% in 1976. Imperfections  of,  and especially 
segmentation between, domestic and international capital markets, arbitrage costs, the 
oligopolistic nature of  the domestic banking industry, expectations of  devaluation and of 
inflation,  the existence of  non-tradeable assets and the fact  that small countries do not 
face  infinitely  elastic supply curves of  financial  capital contribute to explain the high 
levels of  and the big spreads between interest rates. In addition, domestic demand for 
credit expanded greatly and artificially  mainly as a consequence of  the needs of  some 
conglomerates which used "financial-bicycle"  techftiques  to increase their size and power 
or to finance  their non-banking enterprises.25 
The prospects for  profit  opportunity, derived from  the spread between domestic 
and international rates, stimulated capital inflows  in a manner that the traditional 
monetary approach does not consider. Therefore,  an unexpected result of  the country's 
increasing financial  integration to the world economy was the reduction in the dynamic 
growth of  exports and the stimulation of  enormous inflows  of  imported goods with the 
obvious consequences to balance of  payments, employment, and production. The 
argument that "the current account doesn't matter", and only the global balance of 
payments and international reserve movements should be the appropriate determinant 
and mechanism through which the economy adjusts, proved in this case to be incorrect if, 
as it happened, no adequate evaluation took place of  the effects  of  the spillover of  the 
excess supply of  reserves, and consequently, of  domestic money. There is an obvious 
difference  between an export-obtained dollar and one deriving from  foreign 
indebtedness; also significant  is the use given by the country to foreign  exchange. Once 
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again, excessive trust in theoretical assumptions of  the model (naive interpretation of  the 
monetary approach to the balance of  payments and the uncritical acceptance of  the "good 
behaviour of  free  markets"), as well as in assumptions of  an ideological nature (whatever 
the private sector does is well done), led to passivity of  the economic authorities in areas 
and situations which eventually became crucial obstacles to economic activity. 
By the end of  1981, Chile became the fifth  largest LDC debtor to private 
international banks. Foreign savings, however, instead of  complementing domestic 
savings, financed  a big proportion of  consumption expenditure. Another part of  foreign 
capital was being used by the major private economic groups to buy already existing real 
assets and to finance  the group's non-bank enterprises at much lower costs than domesic 
interest rates. 
These three elements —external disequilibria, low investment, and the role of 
economic groups in relation to access and use of  foreign  financing—  played a major role 
in the general outcome of  the financial  liberalization process. The fact  that no adequate 
control was implemented by the economic authorities allowed the emergence and 
development of  questionable bank management, which resulted in unsound banking 
practices. In late 1981 and 1982, the international recession amplified  the problems of  the 
Chilean economy, also contributing to an explanation of  the increasing proportion of  bad 
loans which were undermining the already weak foundations  pf  the Chilean financial 
system. 
\ Finally, there was a dichotomy between official  announcements regarding the rules 
of  the game in the financial  sector and actual government policies. Early in 1977, when 
Banco Osorno y La Union was in trouble, the government intervened with no loss to 
depositors or creditors. Following the failure  of  a big sugar company (CRAV) in May 
1981, the government supported banks and financieras  which were heavily involved in 
CRAV. Finally, in November 1981, the Central Bank intervened four  banks and some 
financieras  because of  their financial  problems. Those actions admitted the crucial failure 
of  the economic model: the market had not assigned efficiently  the available loanable 
funds.  Since the government did not allow bank failures,  a "non-neutral" policy was 
implemented favouring  foreign  creditors, national savers, and deposit holders. 
With the first  devaluation in mid-1982, exchange controls and other restrictions 
were implemented along with different  exchange rate policies. This, added to the 
magnitude of  the Chilean crisis affecting  the country's creditworthiness, and the general 
uncertainty surrounding international banking has lowered foreign  capital inflows 
significantly:  during 1982, they decreased by more than 70% of  their 1981 value and 
international reserves decreased by US$ 1.5 billion. In January 1983, given the imminent 
possibility of  widespread bankruptcies, the government intervened massively in the 
banks and financieras,  leaving 70% of  the Chilean financial  sector under State 
management. This was a definitive  blow to the whole idea and implementation of  the 
financial  reform. 
The absence of  adequate government control in the Chilean capital market 
regarding both agents and practices, the use of  foreign  financing  by a few  economic 
groups accentuated by the different  speed and nature of  the domestic capital market 
reform  and the financial  opening up, an erroneous exchange rate policy, and government 
policy regarding the real (as compared to the theoretical) treatment of  the financial  sector 
rescuing the majority of  depositors and de facto  guaranteeing foreign  private sector debt, 
were the main elements that explain the failure  of  the Chilean financial  liberalization 
reforms. 
In short, the way financial  reforms  were implemented did not increase the volume 
of  domestic savings. Further, investment has been much lower than in the recent Chilean 
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past, the financial  system is technically bakrupt, and forcing  debt has reached extremely 
high levels. The confidence  in privatization and unregulated markets —the basic rules of 
the game associated with the years of  the economic boom— has been shaken, and the 
extreme dogmatism and naiveté of  the economic model have had serious consequences 
for  the Chilean economy. 
VI 
Other results of  the new economic policy 
Growth, investment  and savings 
The accumulated annual growth rate of  Chile's gross domestic product during the 1974-
1982 period was 1.5 %. This compares poorly with the average Latin American growth of 
GDP amounting to 4.3% and to the country's performance  during the 1960s, when Chile 
grew at 4.2% (see table 7). In average per capita terms, there has been no growth during 
these years in the Chilean economy. These results differ  markedly from  the advocates' 
claim that the new economic policy would make the country grow at much higher rates 
than in the previous thirty years, which experienced an annual average rate of  4.0%. As 
expected, different  sectors show very different  growth paths. During the 1974-1981 
period, value added by the commercialization of  imports and by the financial  sector grew 
annually, on the average, at 16.2% and 13.6% respectively while total GDP, excluding 
these sectors, increased by less than 2.0% (Ffrench-Davis.,  1982: table 3). Since imports 
have been financed  more by debt than by increasing exports, and the rise in value added by 
the financial  institutions responds basically to large spreads between loan and deposit 
interest rates (Ffrench-Davis,  1982: Part 3) and both of  these elements cannot be 
sustained at their past levels, important questions arise in relation to the country's 
medium and long-run capacity to achieve high growth rates and to serve the foreign  debt. 
In a related area, where policymakers believed that the country would give a big 
push through a better allocation of  resources, reality clashed again with the theoretical 
model. From 1974 to 1981, gross capital formation  did not reach 16% of  GDP and was 
25 % less than the average value for  the 1960s. These investment figures  are also very low 
compared to the well-known, recent "success cases" in East Asia where the gross capital 
formation  averaged 30%. 
The Chilean high economic growth rates between 1976 and 1980 were explained by 
the authorities as an improvement in investment allocation, but it can more properly be 
interpreted as a recovery from  the huge fall  in output during 1975, and by the fact  that the 
characteristics of  the leading sectors of  the Chilean economy were such that high growth 
rates could persist for  some time with little new capital formation. 
The reasons for  the low investment figures  are numerous. First, direct foreign 
investment was never really important in spite of  policies designed to encourage it and 
expectations that in a liberal environment there would be good opportunities in the 
export sector.24 In fact,  foreign  investment was relatively small, and financial  flows 
completely dominated capital movements. Although this last phenomenon was common 
to most LDCs in recent years, it seems that the Chilean overvalued exchange rate was a 
major drawback for  the realization of  direct foreign  investment. 
On the domestic front,  the public investment that traditionally has been important 
in public enterprise, infrastructure,  and housing also fell  abruptly —partly due to the 
stabilization policy, but mainly due to the ideological bias against government 
expenditures. Government investment (excluding that of  public enterprises) that at the 
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end of  the 1960s was near 9% of  GDP, decreased gradually to an average of  6.7% from 
1974 to 1977, and to less than 4% of  GDP in 1978-1979.25 
Private domestic investment did not compensate for  the fall  in government capital 
outlays. There were principally three causes for  this. First, an important part of  the 
private accumulation effort  went to buy existing real or financial  enterprises, a process 
which was stimulated by the privatization programme. Second, the persistence of  high 
and erratic real interest rates throughout the period was a major deterrent for  private 
enterprises to engage in important investment projects. Third, the financial  reform  did 
not generate adequate long-term financing,  a crucial element for  the development 
process: the great majority of  loans and deposits were only for  30 days and almost never 
exceeded a time-span of  180 days. 
Another element that needs to be mentioned refers  to an important change in 
import composition that took place during this period and affected  the process of  capital 
accumulation. When the commercial opening up was implemented, the economy 
presented an evident excess demand for  consumer goods, especially durables. 
Furthermore, the imports of  investment goods carried very low (if  any) tariffs  before  the 
Table 7 
GROWTH, INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS 





growth  rate 
percentages) 
Latin  America 
(annual 
average 
growth  rate 
percentages) 
Gross investment 
(as  percentage 
of  GDP) 
Domestic  savings 
(as  percentage 
of  GDP) 
Domestic  saving, 
(as  percentage 
of  gross 
investment) 
1961 4.8 4.3 30.0 10.1 50.6 
1962 A.l 3.5 21.4 10.6 49.3 
1963 6.3 7.3 23.1 11.2 48.2 
1964 2.2 5.1 21.4 15.1 70.5 
1965 .8 A.l 19.9 16.4 82.5 
1966 11.2 4.5 18.5 21.1 114.1 
1967 3.2 6.9 18.3 18.2 99.8 
1968 3.6 7.1 19.3 18.6 96.4 
1969 3.7 6.8 19.6 21.1 107.7 
1970 2.1 6.7 20.4 21.6 105.9 
1971 9.0 6.8 18.3 17.8 97.4 
1972 -1.2 7.0 14.8 10.4 69.9 
1973 -5.6 8.3 14.7 9.5 64.7 
1974 1.0 7.0 17.4 25.3 145.6 
1975 -12.9 3.8 15.4 8.5 54.9 
1976 3.5 5.4 12.7 15.4 121.6 
1977 9.9 4.8 13.3 10.7 80.2 
1978 8.2 5.1 14.5 11.6 80.5 
1979 8.3 6.5 15.6 14.7 88.0 
1980 7.5 5.9 17.6 15.5 87.1 
1981 5.7 1.5 19.1 8.5 44.2 
1982" -14.3 -1.0 14.0 
Source: CEPAL (1983); Central Bank of  Chile (1982a). 
"Preliminary estimates. 
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reform,  and long-run subsidized credit had been available for  importing capital goods all 
along. Therefore  the tariff  reform,  coupled with abundant credit for  general use, was not 
neutral in relation to the incentive to import capital vis-a-vis consumer goods. As 
compared to the prereform  situation, consumer goods imports became relatively cheaper 
than capital goods; during the period 1975 to 1981, the accumulated (nominal) growth of 
imports of  capital goods was 150% while that of  consumer goods increased by 130%. 
From the point of  view of  the supply of  loanable funds,  besides the short-run nature 
of  deposits the Chilean experience is striking. In spite of  interest rates having reached 
positive real values, total national savings as a proportion of  GDP averaged 12% from 
1975 to 1981, while in the 1960s this figure  was above 16%. Even though financial 
savings increased, expected because of  the capital market liberalization, non-financial 
savings decreased more. Related to this was the greater availability of  relatively low-
priced imported consumer goods, which stimulated consumption expenditures, especially 
in 1980 and 1981. Furthermore, not only was there no interest in encouraging long term 
institutional saving (for  housing, health and education) with the purpose of  promoting 
physical or human capital investment but, on the contrary, such investment was 
systematically minimized due to the high level of  government participation in pre-
reform  savings institutions. Finally, perhaps the most important reason was that foreign 
savings did not complement, but rather substituted domestic savings, financing 
consumption rather than investment; while from  1965 to 1970 domestic savings financed 
all investment, from  1975 to 1981 this figure  fell  to 80%, and then to less than 44% in 
1981. 
Employment,  real wages, and wealth redistribution 
One of  the most critical areas during the Chilean experience has been the evolution of  the 
labour market (Cortázar, 1982a; 1982b). Before  1974, the unemployment rate was around 
6%. From 1974 to 1981 it more than doubled, averaging 13.3% (see table 8). If  the 
workers in the Minimum Employment Plan (PEM) —an emergency programme 
designed to alleviate the effects  of  massive unemployment with salaries up to US$ 30 per 
month— are included, unemployment in the 1974-1981 period was three times the 
historical figures.  During 1982, the open unemployment rate reached 22.1%. If  PEM 
workers are included, then nearly a third of  the labour force  was without productive 
employment during that year. 
It is clear that the economy could not generate adequate employment for  the 
Chilean labour force,  an area of  widespread criticism not only for  its economic 
implications but also for  its social and ethical consequences. Furthermore, the evolution 
of  wages shows a clear regressive income distribution picture for  this period. Real wages 
from  1974 to 1981 were 25% less than their 1970 levels. Although they increased 
between 1976 and 1981, they never reached their 1970 level. In the twelve months from 
December 1981 to December 1982, it is estimated that real wages fell  by nearly 14%. 
The economic authorities considered unemployment transitory. Policies to lower 
wage costs for  entrepreneurs because of  the drastic reform  of  the Social Security System 
would change factor  prices, stimulating employment that required wage policy to be 
consistent with the whole scheme. In other words, in spite of  the very low real wages (low 
by historical standards), economic authorities estimated that due to institutional and 
political reasons unemployment was high because real wages did not appropriately adjust 
to market forces.  Until 1982 nominal wages could not increase by less than past inflation; 
since the latter showed a decreasing tendency throughout almost the entire period, this 
was the main mechanism for  a steady recovery in real wages until 1981. 
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Alternative explanations, however, point at the economic model as the main cause 
of  unemployment. For example, it is argued that labour force  participation rate increased 
because of  the magnitude of  unemployment and the expectations generated by the 
economic policy, which would constitute a circular cause-effect  process reinforcing  high 
unemployment rates. Labour demand, on the other hand, with incentive from  the factor 
price substitution effect,  could not compensate for  the low investment, contraction in 
public and import-substitution sectors and, in general, for  the depressive impact of 
restrictive monetary and fiscal  policies. That real wages did not fall  even more may be 
explained by not only the "wage floor"  institutional constraint, but also by the dramatic 
change in the wage structure during those years due to labour market segmentation, non-
homogeneous labour supply, and the change in the composition of  labour demand. Real 
wages in the financial  sector reached extremely high levels even for  international 
standards, while construction workers and unqualified  labour force  in general received 
very low real wages. 
Although there are still a number of  unresolved issues in relation to 
unemployment, it appears that during the first  years and especially from  1975 to 1976, 
open unemployment of  almost 17% and depressed real wages were caused by the so-
called shock monetarist stabilization policy, when the f  iscal deficit  was reduced from  10% 
to less than 3 % of  GDP.26 It is also argued that the very restrictive fiscal  policy, together 
with the privatization of  public enterprises, greatly contributed to unemployment, given 
the labour-intensive characteristics of  public sector activities. Low investment 
expenditures, and the fact  that most enterprises with foreign  credit were characterized by 
their large size and their use of  relatively capital-intensive technology, also have been 
perceived as explanations for  the depressed labour market. The commercial opening up 
Table 8 













Stock  prices 
(in  real  terms) 




1960-1970 6.0 - - -
1974 9.6 - 65.0 -
1975 16.2 2.4 62.9 55.6 
1976 16.8 5.0 64.9 19.3 
1977 13.2 5.8 7.4 106.9 
1978 14.0 4.3 76.0 65.8 
1979 13.6 3.9 82.3 39.8 
1980 11.8 5.4 89.3 43.9 
1981 11.1 4.6 97.3 -31.2 
1982c 22.1 9.2 96.9 -26.0 
Source: Columns I and 2: CEPAL (1982b). 
Column 3: Cortázar (1982a). 
Column 4: Central Bank of  Chile, Monthly  Bulletin  (various issues). 
"In Santiago, simple average of  the values far  March, June, September and December. 
'Minimum Employment Plan: percentage of  persons in PEM as a proportion of  total labour force. 
'Estimates. 
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contributed, at least in the short run, to unemployment.27 Faced with the change in 
relative prices caused by the trade reform,  it appears that activities that contracted 
adjusted more quickly than those that expanded. This was aggravated by the exchange 
rate policy, which strengthened foreign  competition vis-a-vis domestic import-
competing goods production. 
On wealth redistribution there is indirect, although strong, evidence regarding 
both the direction and the magnitude involved. The privatization of  State-owned 
enterprises during a relatively short period of  time coincided with a serious recession of 
the Chilean economy. Those factors,  together with restricted access to foreign  financing, 
were important causes of  the undervalued price at which those assets were sold, 
consolidating the principal Chilean business conglomerates (Cortázar, 1982a; Dahse, 
1979; Zahler, 1980). 
The financial  reform,  which led to a huge spread between domestic and foreign 
interest rates, stimulated foreign  borrowing. Given the characteristics of  financial  reform 
and of  the government minimizing its financing  abroad, only a few  economic agents 
—mainly big groups which managed a diversified  portfolio  of.  real and financial  assets — 
were the beneficiaries  of  the "import quotas" of  financial  capital. 
The intermediation role played by these conglomerates from  1975 to 1979 in 
directly buying State enterprises, medium and small private firms,  or indirectly lending 
domestically at rates that were on the average five  times the foreign  rates contributed 
decisively to the extreme concentration of  assets during this period in the Chilean 
eonomy.28 It has been estimated that between 1976 and the first  half  of  1979, private 
economic groups made de facto  financial  profits  of  at least one billion dollars, which was 
more than twice the value of  all public enterprises that were sold to the private sector 
(Zahler, 1980: table 14). 
It is interesting to note that the segmentation created by the type of  financial 
opening up resulted in a situation almost identical to that of  traditional repressed 
domestic financial  markets. The problems associated with the latter case, which were 
almost exactly reproduced by the Chilean situation from  1974 to 1982 when no 
"repression" affected  the domestic  capital market, have been neatly described as follows: 
"A policy of  holding interest rates below market levels requires some extra-market 
system of  allocating credit. This often  takes the form  of  favoured  access to credit for  large 
firms  and companies with political connections and severe restrictions for  smaller 
companies, new and relatively unknown firms,  or rural sector activities outside of  the 
usual span of  urban lending agencies. Activities which could have high social returns but 
do not involve good connections get blocked, while the favoured  borrowers may use the 
resources on projects of  so low a return that they would have been screened out if  interest 
rates had been at market clearing levels... Those firms  which have the connections and 
can get the credit have a special competitive advantage which may give them dominance 
over more efficient  rivals, and they also have and added encouragement for  capital-
intensive production techniques even in conditions of  high unemployment. Urban 
activities are favoured  over rural, larger firms  over small, and, in general, the wealthier 
borrowers over the poorer". (Sheahan, 1980: 275.) 
A third major structural change affecting  wealth concentration relates to Social 
Security Reform,  which was radically transformed  in recent years to privatize the system. 
By the end of  1982, 75% of  the social security contributions were deposited in private 
institutions belonging to the two major business conglomerates. Given the magnitudes 
involved, it is estimated that by 1987 these two groups would have received deposits of 
around US$ 2 billion, nearly 10% of  GDP (Cortázar, 1982). 
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Additional evidence regarding wealth redistributions relates to the large increase in 
the price of  capital, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the evolution of  the 
labour market (see table 8). Together with depressed employment and real wages, the 
red/price of  capital increased at an annual average rate of  31% during the years from  1976 
to 1982, and higher than 65% in the years from  1976 to 1980. Furthermore the bias in 
favour  of  financial  capital, as compared to real capital (and more notoriously to labour), 
has been evident since mid-1981, when the economy went into a deep recession from 
which it still has not recovered. When banks did not get their loans repaid, the 
government did not allow bankruptcies in that sector and transferred  resources of  more 
than US$ 3 billion. When the peso devalued in mid-1982, special treatment was given to 
those economic agents (including banks, conglomerates, and activities in the exportable 
and import-substitution sector) that were indebted in dollars: they have had access to 
dollars below the official  exchange rate in order to service their debt, implying a further 
subsidy of  more than US$ 1 billion. Finally the renegotiation of  the foreign  debt in 1983 
indicates that in spite of  the official  statements, the government will guarantee de facto 
the Chilean private foreign  debt.29 
In sum, during the first  years of  the experience, the ideological bias in favour  of 
"neutrality" and non-intervention accentuated the income and wealth regressive 
distributive results deriving from  the economic model. Later, the government intervened 
explicitly, given the perspectives of  widespread failure  of  the banking system. While 
capital gains were privatized during the boom, capital losses of  the private sector are now 
being paid by the country as a whole. 
The  current situation 
Until mid-1981, there was a feeling  of  enthusiasm in certain sectors regarding the 
Chilean economy's performance  both abroad (especially in the international financial 
community) and domestically. For nearly four  years the economy had been growing at 8% 
in annual terms, inflation  was slowing down, the fiscal  sector was in surplus, 
unemployment —while still very high— was decreasing slowly, and the majority of  the 
structural reforms  were very advanced, if  not completed. 
In certain areas, however, the economy showed signs of  weakness and vulnerability. 
How long could the economy grow at the recent rates with such low investment 
coefficients?  The external disequilibrium was also a matter of  concern: in 1980 the 
current account deficit  represented 7.9% of  GDP and foreign  debt had increased by 31 %. 
Furthermore, with the revaluation of  the dollar in late 1980 and early 1981 vis-a-vis the 
major currencies and the fixed  exchange rate, improving the foreign  payments 
imbalances seemed difficult.  The effects  of  these two elements were reinforced  by inflows 
of  foreign  financial  capital and the decreasing tendency in the rate of  interest, giving a big 
stimulus to aggregate expenditure (domestic expenditure during 1980 increased by 9.4% 
while GDP grew by 7.5%). 
The tendency to spend in excess of  income was also present during 1981, when 
domestic expenditure increased by 10.8% while GDP grew at 5.3%. The current account 
deficit  was equivalent to 16.5% of  GDP (88% of  exports), part of  which could be 
attributed to a deterioration of  the terms of  trade and to an increase in world international 
interest rates. It was officially  estimated, however, that two-thirds of  that year's current 
account deficit  had its origin in domestic economic policies (Lüders, 1982). 
Another situation was generating a different  sort of  disequilibrium. Overly 
optimistic expectations based on economic utopia, together with the falling  (although 
still high) real interest rates and increasing real wages,50 stimulated demand for  assets. 
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Prices for  land, industrial assets, buildings, and so on reached extremely high levels. The 
real price of  land in 1978 was 200% higher than in 1965-1970 (Universidad Católica de 
Chile, 1979: 4, table 1) and the real stock prices had increased by more than 1 000% 
during the period 1976-1980 (see table 8). In other words, Chilean economy inflated  like a 
bubble during those years, and people felt  richer and increased spending accordingly. 
This not only contributed to enlarging current account deficits,  but it also 
stimulated financial  permissiveness, with foreign  and domestic banks offering  loans 
against overvalued collateral, business and consumers expanding their demand for  credit 
against unrealistic expectations of  future  incomes. This was accompanied by the "related 
loans" to the bank owners' enterprises and "financial  bicycle" techniques by business 
conglomerates, which would generate a huge problem for  the domestic capital market 
first  and for  the economy as a whole afterwards.  It was becoming increasingly clear that 
the foundations  of  the Chilean financial  system were extremely weak. With Central Bank 
intervention in four  banks and some financieras  in November 1981, it was learned that 
funds  had been assigned many times with no serious project evaluation, and that 
important loans were given to enterprises whose basic merit was that they were owned by 
the banks themselves. 
World recession and problems of  the international banking community together 
with the weakness of  the domestic financial  system and the disequilibrium of  the Chilean 
balance of  payments, questioned the country's creditworthiness and slowed down foreign 
capital inflows  during the last quarter of  1981. This, together with an increase in 
international interest rates, the fall  in domestic inflation,  and a prepayment of 
government foreign  debt (with the consequent impact on liquidity), made domestic loan 
interest rates rise from  12% in real terms in 1980 to nearly 40% in 1981. The higher 
interest rates, together with the overvalued peso, and to a much smaller extent, the rise in 
real wages, contributed to squeeze the exportables and import substitution sector profits 
and further  to stimulate imports. For the first  time since 1975 the country started to lose 
international reserves and the money supply began to fall.  At the end of  1981 a severe 
recession was under way, with GDP falling  in the second semester by 1.5%. 
During the first  semester of  1982, authorities insisted on following  an adjustment 
process with a fixed  exchange rate system, helped by a wage law reform  making salaries 
more flexible  downwards.51 As a consequence, the trade balance improved and home 
goods inflation  during the first  semester was below the international one. The real 
interest rate continued to increase, given the much smaller capital inflows  (falling  from 
US$ 400 million per month in 1981 to US$ 100 million in 1982), and the almost zero 
inflation  rate. The automatic adjustment mechanism, similar to a gold standard textbook 
case, did not require any active monetary, credit, fiscal,  nor exchange rate policy. It 
assumed that the fall  of  the money supply as a consequence of  balance of  payments deficits 
and the rise of  interest rates would lead to lower expenditures; but that mechanism did 
not work with the required speed. For deflation  to be successful,  however, price 
inflexibility  —together with the magnitude of  the overvaluation of  the peso— implied an 
extremely long-term policy. The major and immediate impact of  this policy was felt  in the 
increasing unemployment rates and losses of  production: 1982 performance  was even 
worse than the 1975 stagflation:  GDP fell  by 14%, and the open unemployment rate 
peaked to 22%. 
Given the inability of  the government to proceed with this type of  adjustment 
process, the peso was devalued by approximately 18% in June 1982, followed  by a number 
of  exchange rate restrictions. Confidence  dwindled and the Central Bank had to intervene 
in the foreign  exchange market, reducing the country's level of  international reserves by 
US$ 1.5 billion. 
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On the financial  side, the domestic recession and the magnitude of  "insider" loans 
(for  some banks they have been estimated to represent around 40% of  the total loans) 
created problems and complicated bank recovery even of  pre-recession and pre-
devaluation "good" loans. Furthermore, since collateral was valued at pre-crisis prices, 
neither the banks nor their clients wanted to incur severe capital loss associated with 
difficulty  in selling goods or assets at much lower prices than their original value. It was 
estimated at the end of  1982 that the unpaid loans represented nearly three times the total 
value of  the capital and reserves of  the Chilean banking system. It was evident that the 
Chilean bubble economy had to disinflate  and the country had to bear the burden of 
returning to its real dimension. The magnitude of  the capital loss has created a "hot 
potato" problem, which the debtors have tried to pass to banks, and the banks to the 
government, which in turn would like to pass part of  it to foreign  banks. Until now the 
capital loss was absorbed mainly by the owners of  the many firms  that went bankrupt, by 
the shareholders of  some banks and financieras  that were intervened. More important 
the loss was absorbed by the country as a whole, through huge transfers  of  resources from 
the Central Bank to the financial  system and also through a subsidy that was given to 
those economic agents that were indebted in dollars and who, after  the devaluation, were 
given access to a "preferential"  dollar rate. 
In view of  the widespread failures  and eventual crash of  the private financial 
system, a massive government intervention took place in early 1983, de facto 
nationalizing it. Given the degree of  firms'  indebtedness to the banking system, the 
implementation of  the Chilean economic model has created a new, original, "free  market" 
road to socialism. 
Important questions regarding this issue arise: How will the government face  this 
situation? Will it privatize the assets once more? At what price? Who —nationals or 
foreigners—  will buy the assets? Will new conglomerates emerge? The capital loss issue 
is also unresolved: How will the debt be "cleaned"? Will a decision be taken to "wipe the 
slate clean"? If  so, on what resources and selectivity will it be based? Which mechanisms 
will the country use to absorb asset losses? Will depositors of  the financial  system have to 
pay the cost? Or will the coming generations have to pay, through decapitalization of  the 
social security system? Will higher inflation  or even higher foreign  debt, or a very slow 
recovery during the next years be mechanisms through which the country will realize the 
capital loss? Will foreign  banks pay part of  the bill? 
Early 1983 developments show the government signing a stand-by agreement with 
the IMF, requesting a 90 day moratorium and renegotiating the foreign  debt (where it will 
almost surely have to guarantee all private debt). A new "rescue package" was announced 
that included 10% increases in import tariffs,  cuts in fiscal  expenditures, financial 
subsidies to the private sector, and devaluation of  the peso according to domestic 
inflation. 
The economic recovery, with its beneficial  impact on unemployment, and the need 
for  productive investment —the two major requirements for  overcoming the Chilean 
economic crisis— seem to have very little prospect without an adequate refinancing  of 
Chile's foreign  debt and direct government spending. Although devaluation and falling 
real wages and real interest rates (nominal deposit rates have been controlled since the 
end of  1982) should, from  the firms'  perspective, stimulate economic recovery, the 
potential restrictions associated to the Fund's Programme, the financial  burden on 
production costs, and the general uncertainty regarding the rules of  the game are of  such 
importance that it is extremely doubtful  whether reactivation could come from  the 
private sector. An expansionary fiscal  policy, however, would imply a radical departure 
from  current economic policy. Also, it is not incorporated in the emergency programme, 
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which gives higher priority to restoring foreign  sector imbalances than to reactivating the 
internal economy. In spite of  the fall  in GDP during 1982 and the magnitude of  resource 
unemployment, it is estimated that output will fall  again in 1983. 
VII 
Final comments and conclusions: lessons 
from  the Chilean experience 
The Chilean economic experience of  the last nine years has failed.  The economic growth 
of  the period from  1976 to 1980 proved to be a transitory recovery from  the serious 
stagflation  of  1975. What was thought to be a new economic miracle was, in fact,  a bubble 
economy sustained by huge inflows  of  capital, much of  it as irresponsibly obtained and 
spent as it was irresponsibly given. With the exception of  the reduction of  inflation,  the 
control of  the public sector deficit,  and the expansion and diversification  of  non-
traditional exports, all other macroeconomic indicators point in the direction of  a 
dramatic failure  of  what has been known as the most orthodox economic experience of 
the Southern Cone, if  not of  all LDCs, in recent years. 
The basic assumption of  the economic authorities was that resources would be 
efficiently  allocated and that the country would grow at higher rates than in the past. In 
fact,  what happened was that during all the period, unemployment was nearly three times 
its historical values and GDP per capita in 1982 was at the 1973 level. 
Although the causes of  this outcome may be many, in relation to the country's 
historical standards, the region's recent economic development and expectations of  all 
those who defended  the "economic model", Chile's stabilization cum liberalization 
programme has had a dramatically poor performance.  All evidence points to a basic 
failure  of  the model and not to implementation problems. It is difficult  to imagine 
another historical situation in which an economic utopia could be applied with so little 
institutional, political, and social control as in the Chilean case from  1974 to 1982. Even in 
that environment, and with an extremely homogeneous and well-prepared economic 
team, the experiment failed  not because of  the 1981-1982 international recession or 
because liberalization did not go far  enough, or because policies were sound but too 
abruptly implemented and needed to be gradual, but because reality was different  from 
what was postulated by the underlying theoretical framework.  The Chilean economic 
policy went from  one extreme (1971-1973) in which ideally the State should undertake all 
economic activities, to the other extreme (1974-1982) in which private sector activities 
alone were to increase economic and social welfare.  Ironically, the result of  the latter 
version of  a free  market experiment is a stagnant economy, in which the financial  system 
and an important part of  the country's real resources are on the verge of  socialization. 
It is difficult,  given the economic situation at the end of  1973 and the interaction of 
short-term stabilization policies with more ambitious economic and institutional 
reforms,  to identify  rigorously the causes of  this outcome. Given the importance of  the 
subject, however, we will try to point out the main problems, policy issues and principal 
lessons from  the Chilean experience. 
A comment should be made on the international scenario. In the Chilean case it has 
played an ambiguous role regarding its impact on the country's economic performance. 
While the terms of  trade during this period deteriorated, international liquidity available 
to Chile was extraordinarily affluent.  Regarding international interest rates, the country 
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enjoyed very low real rates for  five  years, and nominal rates should have been expected to 
adjust to world inflation  after  a certain lag; this was particularly important for  a country 
whose foreign  indebtedness increasingly came from  floating  interest rates (in mid-1982 
this debt represented 78% of  total foreign  debt, while in 1975 it was only 22%). In 
relation to the adverse effect  of  the dollar revaluation on Chilean international 
competitiveness, that problem should more properly be assigned to a domestic cause — 
mainly the inflexibility  in the exchange rate policy which did not adjust to the situation. 
Finally, the 1981-1982 world recession naturally affected  Chile's economic situation, but 
the magnitude of  its effect  was amplified  by Chile's policy of  openness to the international 
economy, and the country went into a much deeper recession than did the rest of  Latin 
America. 
Regarding the domestic front,  during this period the transition and adjustment 
process characterized the dynamic time paths of  certain variables —issues on which both 
the literature and the empirical evidence have been scanty. It is striking that in spite of 
this, Chilean economic policy was pegged to a very naive and dogmatic combination of 
orthodoxy and monetarism, both associated with long-run equilibrium conditions. Also it 
was always assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that unregulated free  markets assign 
resources efficiently  and there was a systematic bias against government intervention and 
a more active role of  the State in economic affairs,  given the complete confidence  in the 
private sector as the basic dynamic economic agent. 
The excessive attachment to "long-run" orthodoxy and the above-mentioned 
ideological bias impeded policymakers from  recognizing that social prices may have 
differed  importantly from  market prices. Indeed, the anti-internvention bias worked 
against some of  the model's objectives, since many market prices gave erratic and 
erroneous signals to the private sector, stimulating consumption rather than investment, 
speculation instead of  production, imports more than exports, and the transfer  of  existing 
assets instead of  the generation of  new sources of  productive wealth. Under these 
circumstances, some type of  government intervention is urgently needed to promote 
socially efficient  resource allocation. 
A striking result of  the Chilean experience is that even though the public sector 
budget was equilibrated, the private sector, given the increasing opening up to world 
financial  markets and the abundant international credit, eluded its domestic budget 
constraint spending in excess of  income through foreign  financing.  This was the main 
reason for  the balance of  payments disequilibrium and the rise in foreign  debt, which 
contributed to affect  negatively the country's creditworthiness. 
Only the government could face  the necessary refinancing  of  the foreign  debt, and 
once again reality was different  from  theoretical assumption. Experience shows that 
contrary to the Chilean economic authorities' expectations, foreign  banking did not 
distinguish between the private or public sector, which became indebted internationally. 
When the country regularly paid its external commitments everything was all right, but 
once the country, for  whatever reason, had to renegotiate its debt, then foreign  banks 
required that basically all the debt be publicly guaranteed. As a result, the country as a 
whole will have to pay now and in the future  for  the private sector mistakes during the 
Chilean "economic miracle". 
The magnitude of  the adjustment for  the country is related to the inadequate and 
unrealistic legislation related to the financial  system, which allowed all kinds of 
speculative and unsound banking practices and, together with the belief  of  certain circles 
that the country was experiencing an economic boom, contributed to generate one of  the 
most serious problems of  the Chilean economy. Assuming high growth rates of  future 
income streams, the supply and demand for  loans increased dramatically, overshooting 
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the value of  the capital stock, overpricing the collateral to loans, and artificially  inflating 
the economy with insufficient  real investment or productive effort  behind it. Evidently, 
expenditures exceeded income for  some time. When the external disequilibrium needed 
to be corrected, the real situation of  the Chilean economy was exposed: the short-lived 
economic miracle had been sustained only be overly affluent  capital inflows.  The 
authorities' belief  that the external loans were being used wisely for  profitable 
investment projects clashed, once more, with reality. Interconnection between the banks 
and the non-banking activities of  the private conglomerates, although officially  ignored 
until recently, had extremely serious implications on the use of  the foreign  funds  by those 
groups and the weakening of  the financial  system. In fact,  the country is now facing  and 
will have to face  a substantial capital loss, the magnitude and distribution of  which will 
have important economic and political consequences. 
The question still remains: Where did all the foreign  savings go? Consumption 
loans, the transference  of  resources to the government to pay the privatization of  State-
owned assets (the government's use of  those funds  still remains to be answered) and 
private sector investment, with —contrary to official  expectations— low social 
profitability,  partially answer that question. The main result was that foreign  savings 
substituted instead of  complemented domestic savings. This outcome could have been 
different,  but given the anti-interventionist bias, the amount, cost and use of  the inflows 
of  capital to the country were never appropriately evaluated nor efficiently  controlled. 
Excessive confidence  in an efficient  allocation of  funds  by the market proved to be, 
once more, overly simplistic, contrary to reality, and the main cause of  the financial 
system's failure  as intermediary between creditors and borrowers. In fact,  the financial 
"liberalization" reform  transformed  a financially  "repressed" market into a nearly 
completely bankrupt, one that has shaken the foundations  of  the Chilean economy. 
Added to the above-mentioned considerations is the extreme importance of 
designing internally consistent policies, especially when markets are being liberalized. In 
this respect the Chilean experience is again illuminating. If  the exportable sector was to 
be profitable,  it was inconsistent to have increasing real interest rates and real wages 
while the real exchange rate was appreciating. This occurred because the exchange rate 
was used as a non-traditional instrument to repress inflation,  while overabundant capital 
inflows  created an excess supply of  foreign  exchange which financed  the overvaluated 
peso. It is probable that if  this experience had not coincided with the excess liquidity in 
international markets, the exchange rate policy would have had to be radically different, 
and the economy probably would not have "boomed" but would have developed along a 
much more realistic and stable growth path. 
Three lessons can be learned from  this. First, exchange rate, wage, and interest rate 
policies should be coherent and carefully  designed. Second and more specifically,  much 
more care has to be taken when designing exchange rate policies. In general, this 
experience suggests that it seems desirable to incorporate some degree of  flexibility,  not 
only because of  implications for  changes in the international values of  the major 
currencies, but also because the exchange rate level affects  the trade account while its 
expected rate of  change is a basic determinant of  the capital flows.  Further, the stability of 
the relationship between the current and capital account may depend on the 
implementation of  the exchange rate policy. Third, even though one of  the unresolved 
issues of  the Chilean experience involves the high real interest rates —in spite of 
increasing inflows  of  credit in periods when the capital movement's controls had 
weakened— the abrupt change from  negative real rates to permanently high real rates 
should have indicated that these were ex-ante  rates, and adequate financial  policies should 
have been taken. Experience shows that it is not enough even for  prices as important as 
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interest rates to clear partial markets, as this does not ensure their consistency with 
overall equilibrium or with global economic objectives. 
The success in bringing inflation  down had such a high cost in terms of 
unemployment and rising foreign  debt that it is questionable whether it was correct to 
give such high priority to the stabilization policy throughout the entire period. This was 
particularly true during 1981 and 1982, when authorities tried to handle the required 
adjustment to the balance of  payments deficits  through the "automatic mechanism", 
which implied no active monetary, fiscal,  financial,  or exchange rate policy. The fear  of 
inflation  and the "hands off"  policy generated a slow and extremely costly process both 
economically and socially, finally  causing the programme to collapse. The devaluation 
that followed  shows that when relative prices are in disequilibrium with output falling 
and unemployment at high leveles, it does affect  relative prices andls-not reflected  in a 
general price increase only. 
Regarding the alleged neutrality and non-discretionality of  government economic 
policy during these years, the fact  was that the application of  neutral rules, when unequal 
market power or very heterogeneous initial wealth distribution prevailed, produced non-
neutral results. The unemployment rate was systematically much higher than in the past, 
and real wages never recovered their 1970 levels. The timing, speed and characteristics of 
the privatization of  assets, financial  opening up, and Social Security Reform  contributed 
to a more skewed distribution of  wealth in favour  of  a few  business conglomerates in the 
private sector. And when non-neutral rules and special treatment were given to certain 
groups and sectors (intervention of  the banking system, preferential  dollar for  those 
indebted in foreign  currency, guarantee on the private foreign  debt, and so on), they 
generally had a clear regressive redistributive effect. 
Finally, in spite of  this criticism, it would be incorrect to conclude that all the 
economic policies and reforms  during this period were doomed to failure.  It is obvious 
that many of  the liberalization reforms  had important ingredients of  economic rationale. 
If  implemented under a less rigid, orthodox, and naive approach, without the extreme 
biases found  in the Chilean experience, and the trade-offs  between different  objectives 
were appropriately evaluated, many of  these policies, when applied with adequate 
government control (especially in the financial  area), may still prove a useful  ingredient 
in designing economic policy. 
NOTES 
'For a more comprehensive analysis of  the recent Chilean experience, see Flisfisch  (1983), Foxley 
(1982), Moulian and Vergara (1980) and Zahler (1982). 
2 For two very different  approaches regarding this issue, see the illustrative references  cited by Blejer 
(1982: point 5). 
5 Beside Chile's official  sources, extremely optimistic views on the Chilean economic policy can be found 
in Harberger (1983), IMF (1981), World Bank (1980) and Wall Street Journal (1980). 
4 These latter two also refer  to the failure  of  the recent Argentine economic policies. 
5 This section refers  mainly to technical and, to a lesser extent, ideological and historical considerations. 
We do not develop here the arguments based on interests of  groups or classes and their importance for  the 
appearance, design, and implementation of  the Chilean economic model. The latter interpretation and 
analysis may be found  in Flisfisch  (1983), Moulian and Vergara (1980), O'Brien (1981) and Remmerand 
Merkx (1982). 
6 It is interesting to note, however, that many of  these new industrialized countries (NICs) engaged in 
quite a selective opening up process of  their economies, with an active role of  government intervention, 
especially in export promotion. Neither of  these characteristics has been present in the Chilean experience. 
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7 In fact,  since 1973 there has been a profound  change in the financing  of  LDCs* balance of  payments. 
The relative importance of  credit, particularly from  private banking sources, has increased greatly as 
compared to direct foreign  investment (Massad, 1976; Massad and Zahler; 1977 and Swenson, 1982). 
"Defenders  of  the economic model in Chile have been identified  with the term"neoliberals". For an 
analysis of  these views see Flisfisch  (1983), Foxley (1982) and Zahler (1982). According to Sergio de Castro 
(1975), "The economic policy of  the Allende Government consisted in radicalizing the theories, the model 
that was implemented in Chile around the 1930s and that with very few  and unimportant interruptions, had 
prevailed until 1970. The new economic policy implemented by the military government was the correction 
of  half  a century of  economic mistakes in Chile". Similar official  statements on this interpretation can be 
found  in de Castro (1976a, 1976b, 1978, 1981) and Lüders (1982). 
'This paragraph refers  to the situation that started with the Programa de Recuperación Economica in 
April 1975 and currently continues. 
I0One of  the main criticisms of  the Chilean Neoliberals on the role of  the State in recent decades has 
been, besides its interference  with market forces,  its redistribution of  wealth in favour  of  powerful  pressure 
groups. This resulted in higher unemployment, inflation,  and foreign  debt. Ironically, its is precisely in this 
area where one of  the main criticisms to the actual economic model has been made. 
"According to Cauas (1975a), the "Programa de Recuperación Económica" had "the fundamental 
purpose of  eradicating the inflation  that has affected  our country for  more than seventy years". He added: 
"The main objective of  this programme is ...to put a brake on inflation  by the end of  this year ...These 
(government outlays) reductions will be implemented at any cost, including the dismissal of  any functionaries 
who are unable to understand that the reduction of  inflation  receives top priority in the economic policy 
...Experience in our country, as in so many others, indicates that as long as there is inflation,  there will never 
be guaranteed employment and an adequate standard of  living. We are going to stop inflation  and as a result, 
the country will grow, employment will increase and the standard of  living will improve ...The economic 
phase which we are initiating today will lead necessarily to the end of  the struggle against inflation  and then 
to a period of  development heretofore  unknown in this country". 
The economic authorities' argument can be found  in Cauas (1975a, 1975b), ODEPLAN (1977), many of 
the articles contained in Méndez (1979: especially 293-296), and de Castro (1981). 
12This section refers  to the economic policies starting with the "Programa de Recuperación 
Económica" in the second quarter of  1975 (Cauas, 1975a). During the first  18 months of  the military 
government, there was no clear-cut homogeneous official  "economic team". That, together with public sector 
administrative and managerial disorder, explains the delay in facing  clearly and strongly the basic 
macroeconomic disequilibria. 
1 5 In his "Report of  the State of  Public Finance" on October 1975, the minister of  finance  stressed that 
"the imminent crisis in the balance of  payments required a more drastic economic policy. The need to 
continue with the stabilization policy and the depth of  the world crisis obliged the government to adopt the 
policy to the new conditions ...Thus, we had to reduce the deficit,  and at the same time decrease inflation,  and 
maintain the basis for  a policy which would permit rapid growth in the future"  (Cauas, 1975a: 169). As stated 
in the text, however, the shift  in policy directed to restore external equilibrium was coincidental with that 
aiming for  price stabilization ("reducing government spending and increase in public revenues, so as to create 
a restrictive situation which would diminish the pressure of  demand for  national as well as imported goods" 
(Cauas, 1975a, 170). 
14Given the highly repressed inflation  at the end of  former  government, price rises overshot in the 
months following  liberalizations. For a very interesting analysis, see R.amos (1975, 1980). 
"This was accompanied by changes in the composition of  government expenditure —principally 
through the introduction of  a value-added tax and strict measures against tax evasion. 
16For a detailed analysis of  this situation, see Zahler (1980: section 2). 
1 7 Financial assistance to some banks and "financieras"  at the end of  1981 and the prepayment of  official 
foreign  debt during that year showed that monetary policy was not totally passive. 
1 8 A more detailed analysis on the commercial opening up can be; found  in Cauas and De la Cuadra 
(1981) and Ffrench-Davis  (1979,1980); the financial  opening up is discussed at length in Ffrench-Davis  and 
Arellano (1981) and Zahler (1980). Work on domestic financial  reform  can be found  in Ffrench-Davis 
(1982), Mathieson (1982), and Zahler (1980). 
"This increase is still more notorious for  non-traditional exports. A more detailed analysis should 
include the behaviour of  both the price of  copper and the evolution of  aggregate demand and supply in Chile 
during this period. 
2 0 Note, however, that other alternatives could have included measures such as a more gradual 
liberalization of  the domestic capital market and/or taxes on interest rate differentials  to socialize those 
rents, increasing the cost of  foreign  financing  for  domestic borrowing. 
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2 1 During the 1975-1978 period, the net inflow  of  foreign  financial  capital to the private sector 
represented nearly 60% of  the flow  of  high powered money, and therefore  it became one of  the main 
mechanisms through which liquidity was provided to the economy. 
22In April 1981, the president of  the Central Bank of  Chile wrote: "What role should the economic 
authority play in foreign  debt decisions? None. That is a problem exclusively between private partners: that 
which offers  the loan and that which receives it ...It is clear, therefore,  that the rise in foreign  debt reflects  a 
healthy economy that is growing normally and in which there are plenty of  profitable  investment projects to 
be implmented" (De la Cuadra, 1981: 1 025). A similar position in terms that only publicly guaranteed 
foreign  debt "matters", has been expressed by the former  director of  the Western Hemisphere Division of 
the IMF (Robichek, 1981). 
2 3 Another interesting characteristic of  the financial  market during this period, in addition to the high 
levels and variability of  interest rates, is the extremely big spread between domestic loans and domestic 
deposit rates. For alternative explanations, see Cortés (1982), Ffrench-Davis  (1982), Mathieson (1982) and 
Sjastaad (1982). 
2 4 In fact,  legislation regarding foreign  investment was so liberal that it seems many potential investors 
saw it as too risky. Also, the delay in the implementation of  a new mining law has been given as an argument 
for  the low figures  of  direct foreign  investment. 
2 5 A complete analysis of  public expenditure during the 1970s and data related to the text can be found 
in Marshall (1981). 
2 6 A very interesting interpretation of  this situation is given by Ramos (1975). 
27For a theoretical analysis of  this case, see CEPAL (1982a). 
28This subject is discussed in more detail in Peñaranda (1980), Zahler (1980: section 3), and Dhase 
(1979). 
2 9 A recent study related to the redistributive issue asserts that government transfers  in favour  of  the 
financial  and entrepreneurial sector, estimated near US$ 7 billion, exceed by more than 20 times the 
government's economic effort  to reduce unemployment (Pérez de Arce, 1983). 
30Although they were still at a lower level in 1970. 
3 1 Alternative and complementary policies could have included a change in monetary policy, which 
would have had to go together with exchange controls; in financial  policy, since financial  costs were much 
more important than labour costs in the production cost structure due to the rise in debt and in the interest 
rate, or in the exchange rate policy, but the authorities believed that devaluation would not modify  relative 
prices. 
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THE REAL COST OF THE EXTERNAL DEBT 
I 
Introduction 
The external debt of  the non-petroleum-exporting developing countries, and, more 
recently, even that of  the petroleum exporters, has been growing very fast.1  A start has 
only just been made however, on systematic research into the real cost of  the debt 
measured in terms of  the transfer  of  real resources required to service it. One of  the 
problems posed by evaluation of  the real cost of  debt servicing stems from  the fact  that 
the points of  view of  the creditor and of  the debtor do not necessarily coincide. What 
matters to the debtor is to ascertain the amount of  real resources that will have to be 
allocated to the generation of  means with which to pay the debt. For example, if  the 
international price of  its export products falls,  ceteris paribus, the burden of  debt 
servicing will be heavier for  the debtor country; it will have to earmark a larger 
proportion of  its products for  payments of  the debt and a smaller share for  imports. 
The creditor, on the other hand, is concerned with the purchasing power of  the sum 
loaned and of  the interest on it in his own market. The aim of  the present article is to 
explore these two points of  view and propose methods of  measuring the real cost or 
benefit  of  the external debt both for  creditors and for  debtors. 
II 
The creditor's point of  view 
The creditor will normally take into account the alternative use of  his financial  resources 
in his own countrys' market. Albeit this does not appear valid for  creditors located in 
financial  centres where the non-financial  market is small (such as Panama or Hong 
Kong), it often  happens that the leading creditors are really institutions with their head 
offices  in the United States and other industrial countries. 
The range of  options for  the use of  financial  resources outside the creditor country's 
market is enlarged as the proportion of  total loans represented by international loans 
increases. Nevertheless, despite this enlargement, loans abroad still constitute only a 
modest fraction  of  the total loans issued by financial  institutions in industrial countries. 
For example, of  the total amount of  credit granted by banking institutions located 
in the United States, less than 10% represented external assets at the end of  1981.2 This 
figure  includes assets placed all over the world outside the United States. 
Thus, the option of  lending abroad, although open, is probably not regarded as an 
alternative possibility for  permanent use of  their financial  resources by individual loan 
institutions operating in the international market. It seems more reasonable to suppose 
that such institutions, individually considered, will invariably take into account the option 
of  using their resources in their own market; and this notwithstanding that in the 
aggregate they may always keep a certain volume of  funds  placed abroad. 
Now, if  the annual rate of  interest charged on a loan is equal to the corresponding 
rate of  inflation,  the purchasing power of  the capital lent will remain constant. And in so 
far  as the rate of  interest diverges from  the rate of  inflation,  a loss or gain will occur in the 
purchasing power of  the capital lent by the creditor country. 
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The debtor countries, for  their part, do not only obtain loans from  the creditor 
countries but also leave in them large sums on deposit, on which they earn interest. The 
purchasing power of  the capital deposited is of  course also affected  by inflation. 
From the standpoint of  the creditor, inflation  in his own market reduces the 
purchasing power of  the deposits in question. 
Thus, while the creditor loses on loan capital through inflation  (with a given rate of 
interest), he gains on the foreign  capital deposited. Although the rates of  interest charged 
on a loan are generally different  from  those payable on deposits, a first  approximation 
whereby the two foregoing  considerations can be taken into account consists in 
subtracting from  the total amount of  loans extant at a given date the deposits existing at 
the same time. This difference  will be called here the Global Net Debt (ND, or, for  the 
purposes of  the following  formulae,  DN). 
1. The  method 
If  the growth of  the Global Net Debt in the course of  the year is linear, it may be assumed 
that the annual interest paid corresponds to a level of  debt midway between those 
recorded at the end of  one year and at the end of  the next. The difference  between the two 
end-of-year  figures  constitutes the annual increase in the debt of  net flow  of  annual 
indebtedness (F). 
The average between the two end-of-year  figures  will represent the Mean Net Debt 
on which interest is payable (DNF). 
DNF, = D N ' - + P N ' 
or again 
DNF, = DNi-i + — 
where the subindex "t" represents the year concerned. 
If  the interest paid in each year by the debtor country, minus the interest received 
on its deposits abroad, or effective  net interest (IEF), is divided by the Mean Net Debt, the 
result obtained is the average net interest rate effectively  paid (iEF). 
iEF, = I E F ' 
DNF, 
This effective  rate is compared with the pertinent rate of  inflation  to determine 
whether the capital loaned by the creditor maintains its real value or whether this value 
increases or decreases. 
Obviously, the real value of  the Mean Net Debt, like other factors,  will rise, remain 
the same or decline according to whether the effective  interest rate exceeds, exactly 
matches or falls  below the rate of  inflation. 
A change in the real value of  the Mean Net Debt signifies  a variation in the debtor's 
commitment to transfer  real resources to the creditor in payment of  the debt. The method 
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employed here measures this commitment in terms of  the purchasing power which is of 
interest to the creditor, but which does not necessarily correspond to the cost in terms of 
real resources that is implied for  the debtor by the generation of  external resources for 
payment purposes. 
In accordance with Fisher's equation (1 = p) (1 = e) == 1 + i, were "p" is the expected 
rate of  price variation, "e" the real interest rate and "i" the nominal rate, 
_ 1 + i , e = -1 
1 + p 
where "e" would represent the real transfer  of  resources from  or to the creditor country. 
Positive values for  "e" would indicate a transfer  of  resources to the creditor, while 
negative values would correspond to a transfer  from  the creditor to the debtor, as the 
creditor looks at it. 
Application of  the rate "e" to the Mean Net Debt will give the amount of  resources 
transferred  annually (R/). 
The total amount of  resources transferred  in the past will represent the cumulative 
sum of  the annual values of  "R", duly adjusted year by year in accordance with price 
variations. This procedure assumes that over the long term the real interest rate is zero; 
otherwise, real interest would have to be added to price adjustments in order to determine 
the value of  the cumulative transfer  of  resources. 
Should the said real rate be positive, the procedure used underestimates the 
cumulative amount of  resources transferred. 
2. The  data 
An attempt has been made to cover the twenty-year period ending at the close of  1980, 
with reference  to the Latin American countries, excluding the four  Caribbean countries 
(Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica), Venezuela and Panama. The last-
named country was left  out because it is a financial  centre where the economic significance 
of  the "external debt" is completely different  from  what it means for  the other countries. 
A sub-group of  countries has been set apart as comprising the region's major debtors, i.e., 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
To calculate the Global Net Debt, the short- medium- and long-term debt was 
taken, irrespective of  whether it was or was not officially  guaranteed; and from  this were 
subtracted the deposits, both public and private, maintained abroad by the debtor 
countries. The latter data were obtained from  the 1974 to 1980 publications of  the Bank 
for  International Settlements, Basle (BIS), and for  earlier years the foreign  exchange 
reserves maintained by debtor countries, according to information  supplied by IMF in 
International  Financial  Statistics,  were taken as deposits abroad. 
This procedure underestimates the amount of  deposits abroad prior to 1974, 
although this underestimation approaches zero as one goes farther  back in time; the 
reason is that private holdings of  foreign  exchange abroad acquire significance  only from 
the end of  the 1960s onwards. 
The figures  for  the global debt from  1974 to 1980 are those estimated by ECLAC, on 
the basis of  information  furnished  by the World Bank and by BIS. For previous years 
World Bank figures  were used for  the medium- and long-term debt, and the short-term 
debt was calculated as the cumulative sum of  the net flows  of  such loans annually recorded 
in each country's balance of  payments. For the purposes of  this accumulation it was 
assumed that there were no short-term loans before  1950. 
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For the rate of  inflation  use was made of  the data on the consumer price index and 
wholesale price index of  the United States, since this country is the leading creditor in the 
case of  the debtor countries analysed. The rates of  inflation  represent average annual 
rates (percentage variation between annual price indexes). 
3. Results 
Tables 1 and 2 reflect  the results obtained with two alternative measurements of 
inflation:  the United States consumer price index and the wholesale price index for  the 
same country. The total period has been subdivided into quinquennia and decades so as to 
show trends rather than sporadic short-term variations. 
The columns in the two tables show the difference  between the two measurements 
of  the rate of  inflation  and the interest rates effectively  paid. If  inflation  is measured by 
the variations in the consumer price index, it will be noted that both Latin America as a 
whole and the six major debtor countries transferred  real resources abroad in the course 
of  the borrowing process, through payments of  interest; the remaining countries, on the 
other hand, paid out net real resources during the first  decade and received them in the 
second. 
During the twenty-year period ending in 1980, the transfer  of  accumulated real 
resources to Latin America's creditors represented an amount equivalent to 7.6% of  the 
debt at the close of  1980; this figure  is even higher for  the six major debtor countries, 
rising to 9.3% of  their external debt at the same date. 
It makes little difference  to these results if  variations in the United States wholesale 
price index are applied as the measure of  inflation.  In the case of  Latin America as a 
whole, and also in that of  the six major debtor countries, transfers  of  real resources abroad 
for  payment of  interest on the debt continue to occur, and the cumulative figure  at the end 
of  December 1980 reaches 4.1 % of  Latin America's debt and 6.4% of  that of  th six major 
debtor countries. In this case, however, the situation in the quinquennium 1971-1975 
appears unfavourable  to the creditors, since the tempo of  the upward movements in the 
United States wholesale price index is speeded up, whereas interest rates do not yet 
exhibit the marked increases subsequently observable. 
Table 1 
L A T I N AMERICA"  A N D SIX MAJOR D E B T O R C O U N T R I E S : R A T E S O F 
I N F L A T I O N A N D R A T E S O F I N T E R E S T P A I D A B R O A D ,  1961-1980 
(Averages  for  quinquennia and decades,  as percentages) 
Period 
Rates of  inflation Rates of  interest  paid 
CPI WPI Latin America 
Six  major 
debtorsb Others 
1961-1965 1.3 0.3 4.1 4.4 2.7 
1966-1970 4.2 2.7 5.4 5.7 3.5 
1971-1975 6.8 9.6 7.4 7.7 5.0 
1976-1980 8.9 8.9 10.0 10.4 7.1 
1961; 1970 2.7 1.5 4.8 5.1 3.1 
1971-1980 7.8 9.3 8.7 9.1 6.0 
"Excluding the four  Caribbean countries (Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Jamaica), Venezuela and Panama. 
* Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
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Table 2 
L A T I N AMERICA"  A N D SIX MAJOR D E B T O R C O U N T R I E S : REAL 
I N T E R E S T R A T E S P A I D A B R O A D ,  1961-1980 
(Averages  for  quinquennia and  decades,  as percentages) 
Period 
Latin America Six majors debtorsb Others 
CPl WPI CPl WPI CPl WPI 
1961-1965 2.8 3.8 3.1 4.1 1.4 2.4 
1966-1970 1.2 2.7 1.5 3.0 -0.7 0.8 
1971-1975 0.6 -2.2 0.9 -1.9 -1.8 -4.6 
1976-1980 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 -1.8 -1.8 
1961-1970 2.1 3.3 2.4 3.6 0.4 1.6 
1971-1980 0.9 -0.6 1.3 -0.2 -1.8 -3.3 
"Excluding the four  Caribbean countries (Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Jamaica), Venezuela and Panama. 
'Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
All this is only another way of  saying that in the period 1961 -1980, both the rate of 
interest received by the external creditors of  the Latin American countries as a whole 
(excluding the four  Caribbean countries, Panama and Venezuela), and the rate obtained 
by the creditors of  the six major debtor countries, were positive in real terms. These real 
rates averaged about 1.5% per annum, a figure  very similar to the average recorded for 
the United States during the same period. In constrast, for  the creditors of  the Latin 
American countries other than the major debtors interest rates were negative, averaging 
about 0.8% per annum; and this notwithstanding the fact  that in the decade 1961-1970 
the rate was positive in real terms. 
Estimates prepared for  1981 suggest that the trends indicated sharpened during 
that year. The real interest rates paid by Latin America as a whole were close to 5 % per 
annum. This figure  also holds good for  the six major debtors, while that applicable to the 
rest of  the region remains negative. 
These trends may reflect  the industrial countries' and the international 
organizations' policy of  increasingly concentrating the available soft  resources in the 
countries with the lowest per capita income. 
II 
The debtor's point of  view 
In order to cover debt servicing, including both amortization and interest payments, the 
debtor country needs to use present or future  real resources in order to generate the 
necessary means of  payment in foreign  exhange. It uses present real resources when it 
provides for  the servicing of  its debt out of  a trade-balance surplus. In contrast, it uses 
future  real resources when it serves its debt by means of  a surplus on capital account, i.e., 
by increasing its external debt, which it will repay in future  periods. In conditions of 
equilibrium, the present value of  the future  real resources required to pay the debt, 
discounted at the social discount rate, will have to be equivalent to the value of  the 
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resources needed for  payment of  the debt at the present time. The same thing is true of 
present or future  debt servicing. 
The problem to be resolved is that of  determining how much it costs the economy, 
in terms of  real resources, to generate one unit of  foreign  exchange. This cost will 
represent the real social price of  foreign  exchange, or social exhange rate,3 the magnitude 
of  which will depend upon such factors  as external export and import prices, the level of 
international reserves, the degree of  resource mobility as between tradeable and non-
tradeable goods, etc. 
When external import and export prices show appreciable variations which are 
maintained throughout long periods, they tend to take a predominant place among the 
various factors  that help to determine the social exchange rate, and, consequently, the cost 
of  external debt servicing measured in terms of  real resources. 
Accordingly, a first  approximation to the real cost of  debt servicing, from  the 
debtor's point of  view, consists in looking for  some way of  taking export and import 
prices into account in the valuation of  debt payments. 
1. The  method 
Obviously, a rise in the external prices of  a country's exports will reduce the cost of  debt 
servicing. Such an increase would mean that for  every unit of  real resources allocated to 
production for  export more foreign  exchange will be obtained than before,  so that to 
generate one unit of  foreign  exchange fewer  real resources will be required. 
On the other hand, a rise in the external prices of  imports implies that to maintain 
the same level of  imports in real terms, more foreign  exchange must be expended than 
before,  and therefore  more real resources must be earmarked for  generating it, at 
progressively higher costs in terms of  sacrificing  production of  other goods and services. 
Thus, ceteris paribus, an improvement in the terms of  trade will bring down the 
cost of  debt servicing measured in internal real resources, in relation to the base period. A 
deterioration in the terms of  trade will of  course produce the opposite effect. 
Debt servicing comprises amortization and interest, so that 
(1) S = A + I 
where debt servicing, S, is measured as the sum —in terms of  United States dollars— of 
the nominal values of  amortization A, and interest I, paid abroad. To measure the terms 
of  trade, an index of  the unit value of  the country's exports is divided by an index of  the 
unit value of  its imports, both expressed in United States dollars 
Vx 
(2) T = — 
Vm 
where T represents the terms of  trade index and Vx and Vm the indexes of  unit values of 
exports and imports, respectively. If  T > , this implies that the unit values of  exports 
increased more than those of  imports, so that the cost of  debt servicing, measured in 
terms of  real resources, will be less per unit than in the base year. 
The difference  between the cost of  debt servicing assessed in terms of  real resources 
in the debtor country and the nominal amount of  the service will be a measure of  the 
increase or decrease in this cost generated by the terms of  trade, VC. 
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(3) J§_-s = VC 
T 
or again 
(4) S ( 1 ~ T ) = VC 
T 
Lastly, to express this variation per unit of  debt, it follows  that 
^ s . (WEI.  = vc_ 
D T D 
where D is the average nominal global debt for  the corresponding year. 
VC 
The term has a dimension comparable to an interest rate, and may be in-
terpreted as a surcharge or relief  in respect of  the nominal interest rate, caused by 
variations in the terms of  trade in relation to a given base period. 
This interpretation calls for  certain reservations. In the first  place, the variation in 
the terms of  trade measures changes in average export and import prices; it is therefore 
very strongly influenced  by the staple and often  traditional products which each country 
trades on the international market. In all probability, the marginal variation of  the terms 
of  trade, which will generally correspond to that of  the non-traditional products traded, 
will be different  from  the mean, and it is this variation that should more properly be 
considered in the present analysis. In other words, an index of  the marginal terms of  trade 
would need to be defined  and calculated as a means of  more accurately reflecting  the 
changes in the cost of  external debt servicing measured in terms of  real resources. 
In the second place, the calculation would show the cost of  debt servicing if  the debt 
were effectively  serviced. As the stock of  debt generally tends to be enlarged, the new sum 
borrowed obviously more than covers the amortization payments and on occasion even 
the interest on previous debts. This means that a future  servicing cost is being incurred 
whose equivalent in terms of  real resources can only be calculated at the time of  its 
effective  payment. At all events, the method proposed permits of  an approximation to 
the calculation in question at any time; and also makes it possible to establish that it is not 
in a country's best interest to pay its debt when the terms of  trade are unfavourable  to it. In 
such circumstances, ceteris paribus, it is better to refinance  or renegotiate than to pay, 
although the normal attitude of  creditors is precisely to collect at times when the terms of 
trade are most disadvantageous. 
2. The  data 
As in the preceding case, the twenty-year period up to 1980 is considered, and is divided 
into quinquennia so that trends rather than occasional changes may be assessed. The 
calculation was made with reference  to Latin America, excluding the countries mentioned 
above, and to the six major debtor countries. To determine the variation in each country's 
terms of  trade, use was made of  indexes of  unit values of  exports and imports, with 1970 
as the base year. The terms-of-trade  index figures  for  each year are those estimated by 
ECLAC; debt servicing data are taken from  each country's balance of  payments, and the 
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sum indicated for  external interest payments is net of  interest received on deposits 
abroad. Debt amortization figures  are also net of  amortization received, but the latter is 
quantitatively insignificant  in the countries considered. 
The rates of  surcharge or relief  in respect of  the nominal interest rate were 
calculated year by year and the geometric average per quinquennium was then worked out 
for  each country. To calculate the average for  the six countries as a whole, unit values were 
obtained for  the group by means of  adding up their exports and imports in terms of 
current and constant values, the latter at 1970 prices. And the same method was applied 
to Latin America as a whole. 
3. The  results 
Tables 3 and 4 present the results obtained by application of  the method described above 
for  estimating the surcharge or relief  on the nominal interest rate for  the global external 
debt implied by changes in the terms of  trade. The overall results do not show a very 
heavy surcharge, although on certain occasions it has amounted to more than 35% of  the 
nominal interest rate paid on the debt. For some countries, at all events, both the relief 
and, where relevant, the surcharge are on a substantial scale. 
Chile is undoubtedly the country that was hardest hit, with a surcharge averaging 
26.6% for  the quinquennium 1976-1980. This means that in paying amortization and 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA - SIX MAJOR DEBTOR COUNTRIES: REAL 
RATE FOR DEBTOR 
(Averages  for  quinquennia and decades,  as percentages) 
Geometric 
averages Argentina Brazil Chile" Colombia Mexico Peru 
Six 
countries 
1961-1965 -1.6 0.8 6.3 0.8 1.3 4.6 1.6 
1966-1970 -0.9 1.8 1.1 1.2 1.0 2.4 1.0 
1971-1975 -3.2 1.2 5.8 0.8 -0.5 0.3 0.3 
1976-1980 3.2 4.1 26.6 -3.9 -4.0 -1.2 1.4 
"If  copper is excluded from  the calculations relating to Chile, the figures  are: 4.8; 3-6; 4.0 and 15.5. 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA - SIX MAJOR DEBTOR COUNTRIES: REAL 
RATE FOR DEBTOR 
(Averages  for  quinquennia and decades,  as percentages) 
Geometric 
averages Argentina Brazil Chile" 
Colombia Mexico Peru Six countries 
1960-1965 1.0 5.4 11.4 5.3 7.2 7.7 6.0 
1966-1970 5.2 8.0 5.1 6.4 7.0 9.2 6.7 
1971-1975 6.5 10.3 11.2 6.7 6.4 8.3 8.0 
1976-1980 13.1 15.0 38.1 3.6 6.9 7.0 11.8 
"If  copper is excluded from  the calculations relating to Chile, the figures  are: 9.9; 7.6; 9.4 and 27.0. 
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interest on its debt, Chile had to disburse 26.6% more in real resources than it would have 
had to expend if  the terms of  trade had been the same as in 1970. If  the incidence of  copper 
prices on the terms of  trade is eliminated, the surcharge is 15.5%; at all events nearly four 
times as much as the corresponding figure  for  Brazil, the country which comes next after 
Chile in respect of  the negative effect  under discussion. 
At the other extreme is Mexico, with a 4% relief  during the quinquennium 1976-
1980. 
On the basis of  these results, an estimate can be made of  the real rate of  interest 
looked at from  the debtor country's viewpoint, i.e., measured in terms of  real 
resources required^to pay debt amortization and interest in relation to the nominal 
global external debt outstanding. As regards the six countries considered apart, the 
maximum rate —38.1%— is shown by Chile in the quinquennium 1976-1980, while 
the minimum —1%— falls  to Argentina in the first  quinquennium of  the period 
under study. In the six countries as a whole, the rate follows  an upward trend 
throughout the four  quinquennia, reaching almost 12% in the last five-year  period 
analysed. This reflects  several factors,  including the variation in the debt and in its 
amortization, the increase in nominal interest rates and the deterioration of  the terms 
of  trade. 
IV 
Factors intervening in the real cost of  debt 
servicing, from  the debtor's viewpoint. 
A provisional analysis 
To measure the relative importance of  each of  the factors  intervening in the 
determination of  the real cost of  debt servicing, from  the debtor's viewpoint, the 
following  procedure was adopted. 
If  it is recalled that 
(6) y -S = VC 
is the additional cost of  debt servicing attributable to the terms of  trade, the following 
expression may be formulated: 
— - 9 -I- I 
T S 1 _VC + I _ 
(7) ¡5 D p 
where p represents the real cost of  debt servicing, per unit of  debt. This can also be 
expressed as follows,  in accordance with (1): 
( 8 ) p = - L + A + I A + I 
D TD D 
The present stock of  debt D can be expressed as the past period stock, Do, plus the gross 
flow  of  new debt, U, minus the amortization A. Then: 
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(9) p = 1 [ A ± 1 - A 1 
Do + U - A L T J 
If  we differentiate  (9) completly: 
K  ; w dA au ôl 3T 
By virtue of  equation (10), the increase in the real cost of  debt servicing per unit of 
debt can be broken down by the various factors  intervening in its determination: dA, dU, 
dl and dT. 
Totally differentiating  equation (9) as indicated in (10) we have: 
(11) d p = r J_ i di+ r - A±L"| dT+ r A±L"| du + 
L TD J L T2D J L D2 TD2 J 
+ r J_ + AtL- JL- dA 
L TD TD2 D D2 J 
If  its is recalled that A + I = S, we have: 
(12) dp=A -A_.dT+J^.dU+±tîMlzIlzAL.dA 
TD T2D TD2 TD2 
This equation can be written as follows: 
, _ I dl S dT , AT-S U dU , S+D(1-T)-AT A dA 
(13) dp = • • + • • + - - • • 
TD I TD T TD D U TD D A 
where the changes in gross flow  of  debt, amortization, in the terms of  trade and in the 
intrust paid are expressed as percentages. 
Thus equations (11), (12) and (13) make it possible to distinguish the incidence of 
these factors  on the variations in the real cost of  debt servicing, by combining the terms-
of-trade  effect  with the impact of  changes in the flows  of  gross debt, amortization and 
interest payments. 
If  the results obtained in ( 13) are applied to the figures  for  the group formed  by the 
six major debtor countries of  the region, for  the whole of  the period under consideration, 
the following  equation is obtained by regression: 
dp = -0.021 + 0.004 ^ L + 0.043 - 0.237 ^ U A I I 
The coefficients  are significant,  with the exception of  the one corresponding to 
and the signs conform  to the expectations. A 
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Table 5 
REGRESSION  RESULTS 
_ dl'J  dA , dl  , dT General  formula  dp — ai .. + o¡2 —7— + a3 —;— + 04 _ 
U  A 1 I 
ai 012 «3 OÍA R2 D. W. 
Argentina 0.004 0.007 0.042 -0.247 0.58 1.20 
OLSQ (0.932)" (0.623)° (1.400)° (-4.189) 
CORC 0.005 0.010 0.074 -0.217 0.67 1.53 
Brazil -0.006 -0.003 0.055 -0.258 0.85 1.37 
OLSQ (-0.675)° (-0.132)° (2.977) (-6.544) 
CORC 0.000 0.005 0.080 -0.230 0.89 2.05 
Chile -0.003 0.029 0.078 -0.196 0.68 0.50 
OLSQ (-0.121)° (0.854)° (3.673) (-5.437) 
CORC -0.004 -0.015 0.056 -0.167 0.88 2.16 
Colombia -0.000 0.006 0.039 -0.133 0.91 1.91 
OLSQ (-0.055)° (1.977)° (4.547) (-9.892) 
Mexico -0.003 -0.011 0.032 -0.341 0.88 2.34 
OLSQ (-0.368)° (-1.434)" (3.133) (-10.486) 
Peru -0.014 0.007 0.037 -0.366 0.87 2.20 
OLSQ (-2.611) (0.404)° (2.128) (-9.525) 
Total -0.021 0.004 0.043 -0.237 0.91 1.63 
OLSQ (-2.880) (0.319)° (4.480) (-9.968) 
Note: The numbers in ( ) correspond to the value of the t statistic. 
The Cochrane Orcutt estimation procedure has been used when the ordinary first squares method gave a base 
result in the "Durbin-Watson" serial correlation test. 
"Not significant at the 90% level of reliability. 
The increase in the flow  of  gross debt bears a negative sign, i.e., it reduces the value 
dp and, therefore,  represents a relief  in respect of  the cost of  debt servicing. But for  the 
increment in amortization the sign is positive (although not significant),  so that when 
the growth of  the debt generates increases in amortization, the cost of  servicing it will 
rise. The same thing will happen in the case of  interest payments, with the result that the 
relief  afforded  by the augmentation of  the debt is a very short-term business. 
These results once again confirm  the conclusion that the variation in the terms of 
trade plays an important part in the cost of  debt servicing, from  the debtor's point of  view. 
In some individual countries, however, its influence  varies substantially within each of  the 
periods considered. 
Table 5 shows the results obtained for  each of  the countries in the Latin American 
"major debtors" group. 
The cost relief  effect  produced by the increase in gross indebtedness was important 
only for  Peru. The rest of  the countries have coefficients  which are not significant. 
The increase in debt amortization in all countries has a regression coefficient 
equivalent or very close to 0. 
The impact of  the rise in the interest paid was severest in the cases of  Chile and 
Brazil, whereas in Mexico its effect  was much less. The coefficient  for  the remaining 
countries was close to the average for  the six major debtors. 
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The terms of  trade carried most weight in the determination of  the cost of  debt 
servicing. Mexico, Peru and Brazil were the countries in which its cost was most affected 
by this concept, while the coefficient  was lowest in Colombia. 
It is important to bear in mind that inherent in the cost per unit of  debt there is a 
relief,  or negative cost, by virtue of  the increase in the size of  the debt. This is a genuine 
fact,  but, as previously remarked, it must be handled with caution. A debt whose growth 
has been very marked will be bound to generate a considerable subsequent rise in 
amortization and interest; when the level of  the debt is stabilized, this upswing will cause 
an increase, which may be substantial, in the cost of  servicing it. 
V 
Conclusions 
Table 6 summarizes the results obtained. Obviously, real interest rates, from  the 
standpoint of  the debtor, have greatly exceeded those envisaged by the creditor, in 
consequence of  the steep deterioration of  the terms of  trade during the period under 
consideration. 
This discrepancy in the real cost of  the debt from  the two points of  view may 
account for  some of  the facts  observed. In the first  place, the debtor countries have been 
more concerned about the level of  their debt than the creditors.4 The latter have not 
supported the proposals put forward  by some debtor countries for  the improvement of 
the institutional mechanisms that deal with the debt problem: proposals which include 
the possible establishment of  a special refinancing  service in the International Monetary 
Fund. Nevertheless, some creditors are beginning to show signs of  concern as to the "debt 
servicing capacity" of  the debtor countries. This capacity must not be measured by the 
traditional indicators —such as the relation between debt servicing and exports or 
between the level of  the external debt and the national or domestic product—, since these 
have serious short-comings.5 In contrast, there is a direct relation between "debt servicing 
capacity" and the cost of  servicing the debt in terms of  real resources, as seen by the 
debtor. The greater this cost, the less will be the debt servicing "capacity", and the 
stronger the incentive to put off  net payments abroad to better days, through 
renegotiation or refinancing  operations. 
Table 6 
L A T I N AMERICA  A N D SIX MAJOR DEBTOR COUNTRIES: 
REAL INTEREST FOR CREDITORS A N D DEBTORS 
(Averages  for  quinquennia and  decades,  as percentages) 
Period  Rates for  creditors  Rates for  debtors 
CPl  WPI 
1961-1965 3.1 4.1 6.0 
1966-1970 1.5 3.0 6.7 
1971-1975 0.9 -1.9 8.0 
1976-1980 1.5 1.5 11.8 
1961-1970 2.4 3.6 6.4 
1971-1980 1.3 -0.2 9-9 
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The approach adopted to the determination of  the real cost of  debt servicing from 
the debtor's point of  view represents a social rather than a private valuation. This is 
because the currencies of  the debtor countries are not reserve currencies; accordingly, for 
the payment of  the external debt a process of  currency conversion is required which in the 
end involves the monetary authority. It is the latter that in the last analysis has to face  the 
problem of  supplying or withholding the foreign  exchange required to cover balance-of-
payments disequilibria, even if  these disequilibria stem from  transactions conducted by 
the country's private sector. 
The fact  that an increasing proportion of  the external debt is a private-sector debt 
with no State guarantee does not alter this circumstance. 
Again, only two of  the four  variables taken into consideration in the determination 
of  the real cost of  debt servicing can be directly affected  by the economic policy of  the 
debtor countries: the growth rate of  the gross flow  of  debt and the growth rate of  debt 
amortization. The former  is affected  by the internal interest rate compared with the 
external, as well as by expectations of  devaluation and by the element of  risk, both private 
and national; it is also often  influenced  by direct regulations. The second is particularly 
affected  by regulations such as those relating to compulsory cash reserves, differentiated 
according to the length of  time for  which the credit is granted, guarantees of  access to the 
foreign  exchange market, etc. The object of  all these regulations is to change the debt 
maturity profile,  and thereby they affect  amortization payments. 
On the other hand, apart from  the effect  on interest generated by the level of  the 
debt, the debtor country has no direct means of  influencing  interest, since interest rates 
and surcharges are determined abroad. It does, however, have certain indirect ones, such 
as the granting or withholding of  a State guarantee, and the overall situation of  the debtor 
country's economy. 
While for  their part the terms of  trade and variations therein may be affected  over 
the short term by exchange policy, they are to all intents and purposes determined 
externally in the case of  small economies with no monopolistic power in the world 
market. 
The behaviour of  these two variables —interest rates and the terms of  trade— 
although uninfluenced  by the economic policies of  the debtor country, may on the other 
hand influence  them, leading them to create incentives in the appropriate direction. An 
increase in rates of  interest that is expected to take place shortly may act as an inducement 
to use reserves to make external debt payments in advance, whereas a deterioration in the 
terms of  trade should be conducive to longer-term rescheduling or refinancing  of 
payments. 
NOTES 
1 For a first  study in this field,  see C. Massad and R. Zahler, "Inflación  mundial y deuda externa: el caso 
del deflactor  impropio", in Dos estudios  sobre endeudamiento  externo,  Cuadernos  de  la CEPAL  series, No. 9, 
Santiago, Chile, 1977. 
2 See International Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  Washington, D.C., September 
1982. 
'See C. Massad and R. Zahler, op.cit. 
4 Mexico's recent problem has made a notable difference  to this situation. 
5 See Alvaro Saieh, Un  análisis  sobre la posibilidad  de  evaluar  la solvencia  crediticia  de  los paises en 
desarrollo.  Cuadernos  de  la CEPAL  series, No. 36, 1980. 
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EXTERNAL FINANCING IN LATIN AMERICA 
I 
Introduction 
The difficulties  that Latin American countries experienced in obtaining many products 
from  abroad during World War II contributed to the stimulus already provided by the 
Great Depression to develop domestic economic production in many areas. By the end of 
the war, Latin American countries had accumulated foreign  exchange reserves that under 
normal conditions would have facilitated  a policy of  opening up their economies to world 
trade. However, external markets were in practice limited to the United States. Western 
Europe and Asia were in no position to import Latin American products actively or to 
offer  a varied supply of  goods to the region. Latin American countries thus found  it 
necessary to improve the organization of  their productive efforts  through economic 
planning and selective policies that emphasized industrial expansion as the main engine 
of  growth. Foreign trade and exchange rates were strictly controlled. 
For a time, previously accumulated foreign  exchange reserves provided the 
financing  necessary to cover the trade imbalances. That resulted from  rapid industrial 
growth. But their depletion in some cases and the post-war recession of  the late 1940s 
demonstrated that domestic savings were insufficient  to finance  the desired rate of 
economic growth. Thus an important role appeared for  foreign  savings. Different 
countries' policies varied within this general context, particularly with respect to official 
attitudes towards government deficits  and domestic price stability. Changes in a country's 
terms of  trade and in national fiscal  equilibrium probably explain most of  the problems in 
the foreign  trade imbalances and domestic inflationary  pressures that surfaced  during this 
period. 
At the time, private banking had no role in international finance  except in the form 
of  trade-related, short-term operations. Medium- and long-term financing  was 
undertaken principally through official  institutions (mainly government-to-government 
credit) and direct foreign  investment. Government-to-government loan operations 
typically involved fixed,  subsidized interest rates and long maturities, so neither interest 
rates nor amortization periods raised particular problems. Direct investment was strictly 
linked to the exploitation of  mineral resources (copper, oil, tin, iron and so on) and the 
production of  agricultural commodities (coffee,  fruits,  sugar, cocoa and so forth). 
Several years after  World War II, direct foreign  investment began to flow,  at a rapid 
rate, into Central America, Venezuela and Ecuador. These countries then opened up their 
economies and followed  a development model that emphasized the exportation of 
primary products and the importation of  a wide variety of  manufactured  goods. Because 
of  domestic political problems, exchange controls, and/or less favourable  treatment of 
foreign  investment, other Latin American countries did not become important recipients 
of  foreign  capital. They continued to pursue a development strategy based on relatively 
high protection for  domestic industries and specific  stimuli to some sectors of  the 
ecomomy, placing greater emphasis on foreign  borrowing than on foreign  investment. 
By the mid- 1960s most Latin American countries evidenced rapid rates of  economic 
growth, so their attractiveness as borrowers was substantially enhanced. At the same 
time, foreign  investment in Latin America began to ebb as new investment opportunities 
appeared in other areas and nationalization became a real risk. Moreover, as Latin 
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America's per capita income levels came to exceed substantially those of  other developing 
areas, both international organizations and industrialized countries shifted  their 
concessional resources toward other regions. Within the World Bank this process became 
known as "graduation", and through it some developing countries found  their access to 
the Bank's resources increasingly limited. The United States government's growing 
skepticism regarding both foreign  assistance and United States contributions to 
international and regional organizations stimulated and sustained this general tendency. 
At the same time, world private financial  markets developed rapidly in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Foreign investment lost its importance in the financing  of  current 
account imbalances and reserve increases in Latin America and foreign  borrowing in the 
form  of  loans from  private sources grew rapidly. By the mid-1970s, direct foreign 
investment as a share of  total net capital inflows  had dropped to 17% compared to 44% 
ten years earlier. Table 1 shows the size and composition of  Latin America's foreign  debt 
from  1970 to 1983-
In early 1984 the total foreign  debt of  Latin American countries probably exceeded 
US$ 340 billion. This figure  includes both private and public debit from  all sources, 
covering all maturities. The US$ 337 billion reported in table 1 is an estimate that 
excludes several kinds of  debt: non-publicly guaranteed suppliers credits, loans from 
Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA A N D THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DEBT, 1970-1983" 
(Outstanding  and disbursed  at end of  each year) 




Official sources Private  sourcesb 
Billions 
of  dollars 
Percentage 
of  total 
debt 
Billions 
of  dollars 
Percentage 
of  total 
debt 
1970 23 8 36 15 64 
1971 26 9 36 17 64 
1972 30 10 34 20 66 
1973 40 12 28 28 72 
1974 56 14 25 42 75 
1975 75 16 22 59 78 
1976 98 18 18 80 82 
1977 116 21 18 95 82 
1978 152 25 16 127 84 
1979 184 27 15 157 85 
1980 229 31 14 198 86 
1981 280 34 12 246 88 
1982 314 39 12 275 88 
1983e 337 47 14 290 86 
Source: IBRD, World  Debt Tables,  1982-1983 and 1983-1984 edition; BIS, Annual Reports,  various years; IDB, External 
Debt and Economic Development  in Latin  America, Washington, January 1984. 
" Estimates include long-, medium- and short-term debt as well as unguaranteed debt with financial  institutions that report 
to the Bank of  International Settlements. Unguaranteed debt with other financial  institutions and unguaranteed 
suppliers' credits are not included. Latin America and the Caribbean include the follow  ing countries: Argentina, Barbados, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
* All short-term debts are assumed of  Private Source. 
'Preliminary estimate. 
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Table 2 
L A T I N A M E R I C A  A N D T H E C A R I B B E A N :  I N D I C A T O R S O F 
I N D E B T E D N E S S I N 1983 
(Percentages) 
DebB/GDP 
Interest/export  of 




(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) 
Medium countries 
(Chile, Colombia, Peru) 
Smaller countries" 
Six oil-exporting countries'" 
Non-oil-exporting countries' 
Opening-up countries 
















Source: CEPAL, Balance Preliminar  de  la Economia Latinoamericana  en 1983; IMF, Balance of  Payments  Yearbook,  1983; 
World Bank, Informe  sobre el  Desarrollo  Mundial,  1984. 
"Includes the rest of the 24 Latin American countries not considered bigger or medium, or Venezuela. 
'Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
'The rest of the 24 Latin American countries not considered oil-exporting countries. 
banks other than those reporting to the Bank of  International Settlements, and some 
direct firm-to-firm  loans. This figure  also excludes foreign-owned  non-bank deposits in 
Latin American banks.1 
The estimated US$ 340 billion of  foreign  debt represented approximately 47 % of 
total Latin American gross national product, and interest payments represented some 
35% of  Latin American exports in 1983. Table 2 provides data on these two indicators for 
several groups of  Latin American countries based on published (but underestimated) 
figures.  There are practically no exceptions to the finding  that both foreign  debt and 
interest payments have grown substantially in the last five  years in relation to these 
indicators. 
The remainder of  this essay explores the main reasons for  the recent increase in 
debt levels in the region, considering both the demand and supply sides of  the issue. The 
essay also examines the impact of  increased indebtedness on Latin American countries' 
domestic policies and economic stability, and the prospects for  future  resource transfers 
to the region. It also evaluates the terms-of-trade,  interest rate, and foreign-financing 
conditions that would, make high and growing debt levels bearable. Finally, the essay 
examines the domestic and international policy options that are available to debtor and 
creditor countries if  these conditions are not fulfilled. 
Why did Latin America's foreign  debt grow so fast? 
With practically no exceptions, foreign  indebtedness to private sources increased very 
rapidly in Latin America in the 1970s. Debt levels increased both in countries that opened 
up their economies by reducing barriers to trade and capital movements and in countries 
that did not follow  policies such as these. Debt increases were registered in oil-exporting 
II 
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countries as well as in non-oil-exporting countries. With very few  exceptions, both large 
and small Latin American countries showed rapid growth in overall indebtedness.2 A 
systematic examination of  this generalized phenomenon must begin by considering those 
"demand" and "supply" elements that gave impetus to increases in indebtedness. 
1. Demand elements influencing  foreign  indebtedness 
Demand for  foreign  borrowing is not necessarily connected to a country's foreign  trade 
operations. Of  course, an increase in imports and/or exports necessitates increased use of 
short-term, trade-related commercial credit. But increases in regional imports and 
exports accounted for  a relatively small proportion of  the total increase in Latin 
America's demand for  foreign  debt in the 1970s. More important factors  included interest 
rate differentials  between domestic and foreign  capital markets and deficit  spending in 
some sectors of  the Latin American economies. 
a) Interest  rate differentials 
There are two aspects to the problem posed by interest rate differentials,  first, 
differences  between domestic and foreign  rates persisted over a prolonged period. 
Second, domestic rates tended to be higher than foreign  ones, in some cases reaching 
unprecedented levels. 
Most theoretical analyses assume that interest rate differentials  among countries 
are rapidly eliminated by capital movements. However, empirical evidence does not 
support this assumption. Interest rate differentials  tend to persist even among 
industrialized countries that permit subtantially free  capital movements. (This is the case 
after  allowing for  expected changes in exchange rates as measured through foreign-
exchange futures  markets or covered rate differentials.  ) Latin America is no exception to 
Table 3 
SELECTED L A T I N AMERICAN  DOMESTIC A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L 
INTEREST RATES, 1977-1982 
(Annual  rates,  percentages) 
Domestic  interest  rate" 
Argentina Chile Uruguay 
International 































Source: Roberto Zahler, "Recent Southern Cone Liberalization Reforms  and Stabilization Policies: The Chilean Case 
1974-1982"; in Journal  of  Inter-American  Studies  and  World  Affairs,  November 1983, pp. 509-562. International 
Monetary Fund, International  Financial  Statistics,  April 1983; Central Bank of  Argentina, lists of  financial  data, 
series 484; United Nations Economic Commission for  Latin America, Estudio  Económico, Uruguay  1981, 
November 1982. 
"Domestic interest rate in US dollar equivalent. 
'LIBOR for  operations in US dollars; rate for  180 days, London. 
'London Inter-Bank Offer  Rate. 
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this situation, and in several countries domestic interest rates (expressed in terms of 
foreign  exchange equivalents) have deviated substantially from  foreign  rates. Table 3 
provides indicative data regarding domestic and foreign  interest rates (both expressed in 
terms of  dollars) in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay during the period from  1977 through 
1982. 
Two hypotheses have been advanced to explain the origins of  this phenomenon in 
Latin America (apart from  the usual one of  capital movement regulation): financial 
market segmentation and tradeable versus non-tradeable securities. Segmented domestic 
financial  markets emerge because not all those seeking credit have access to foreign 
borrowing. In practice, it is the larger enterprises and those involved in foreign  trade that 
have such access. Most other credit demanders have access to foreign  loans only through 
domestic intermediaries. These intermediaries effectively  prevent foreign  and domestic 
interest rates from  coming together by capturing all or most of  the differences  in rate. 
Because most borrowers have no direct access to foreign  borrowing, they are unable to act 
through this market mechanism to force  a reduction in the spread between domestic and 
foreign  rates. Thus market segmentation in part explains the failure  of  domestic and 
foreign  interest rates to converge rapidly under conditions of  free  (or nearly free)  capital 
movements.3 
Interest rate differentials  also exist because of  controls on capital outflows  and 
inflows.  The maintenance of  such controls encourages the issuing and trading of 
securities that are not tradeable internationally (because of  the nature and form  of  the 
securities, the risk involved, or simply inadequate or costly information  about them). 
Domestic securities do not become tradeable instantaneously as capital controls are 
dismantled. Because there are costs involved in this shift,  the process is likely to take some 
time, perhaps years.4 
Of  course, market segmentation and the non-tradeability of  securities are related. 
Market segmentation exists only insofar  as some domestic securities cannot be sold to 
foreign  leaders (that is, insofar  as some domestic borrowers are precluded from 
borrowing abroad). Both market segmentation and the existence of  non-tradeable 
securities explain why domestic interest rates may diverge from  foreign  rates even under 
conditions of  free  capital movements. But other factors  explain why domestic rates in 
Latin America have been higher than foreign  rates during recent years, thus providing an 
incentive to borrow abroad. This differential  resulted from  both short-term and 
structural economic policies and from  the behaviour of  important groups of  large, 
interrelated enterprises. 
The first  factor  was the generalized counterinflation  effort  pursued in Latin 
America in the 1970s. As external inflation  accelerated during this period so did domestic 
inflation  rates. Governments necessarily gave high priority to resisting this trend. In an 
environment such as this, policies favoured  monetary restrictiton, which produced higher 
interest rates and/or excess demand for  credit. As domestic rates increased relative to 
foreign  rates, the incentive to borrow abroad grew. At the same time governments 
reduced restrictions on such borrowing, with obvious consequences. 
Interest rate differentials  also persisted because of  structural economic policies in 
the region. During the last decade, several Latin American countries undertook policies 
intended to effect  major changes in economic structure and incentives Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela all deregulated trade, capital 
movements, and financial  systems and they introduced important changes in tax and/or 
social security systems. Apart from  their long-term implications, these reform  policies 
changed short-term relative prices and encouraged the movement of  resources from 
activities whose relative prices decreased to those that registered an increase. Although 
3 5 9 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND EXTERNAL FINANCING 
imports provided some cushion, in those sectors in which relative prices rose, there was 
still a stimulus to expand domestic production that implied additional demands for  credit. 
Those activities that were expected to contract did so only slowly, in the expectations that 
policy changes would be transitory. Business in these sectors were willing to borrow in the 
meantime, even at high real rates of  interest, to maintain some minimum level of 
operations until circumstances changed. Therefore  structural economic reforms 
increased the total demand for  credit (domestic or foreign),  thus pressing domestic 
interest rates upward without an overheating of  the economy. 
In many cases this tendency was accentuated by links between domestic banks and 
non-financial  firms.  Where these ties exist, there is no independent evaluation of  non-
financial  firms'  policies, and their mistakes do not necessarily result in their being 
rationed out of  the financial  market. Moreover, these firms  may not be required to 
provide as much collateral for  loans as other firms,  thus allowing them to work with a 
higher debt-capital ratio. The higher this ratio, the lower the risk for  the firm's  owners, 
and hence the higher the interest rate they are willing to accept (insofar  as they can 
finance  it) to stay in business in difficult  times. 
Foreign-exchange policy also contributed to interest rate differentials.  If  the 
exchange rate is fixed  in nominal terms when inflation  is rapid, nominal domestic 
interest rates (which tend to reflect  expected inflation  rates) may become extremely high 
in dollar terms.5 For example, a nominal domestic interest rate of  25% per year with an 
annual domestic inflation  rate of  25 % is equivalent to a real domestic interest rate of  zero 
but to a dollar rate of  25 % because the price of  the dollar is fixed.  Under these conditions, 
a foreign  interest rate of  15% per year would imply a gain of  10% per year for  a borrower 
who obtains financing  abroad rather than from  domestic sources. A situation of  this kind 
has prevailed in several Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Mexico, 
and Peru). Of  course, a similar but less extreme incentive to borrow abroad exists when 
the exchange rate moves at slower speed than the domestic inflation  rate. This was the 
case for  some time in Brazil and Colombia. 
b) Excessive  spending 
A second major cause of  Latin America's growing external debt in the 1970s was 
excessive spending by the public and private sectors. 
The problem of  excessive public sector spending is well known, and it has been 
carefully  examined by economists and international financial  institutions. The problem is 
an orthodox case of  excessive spending. The public sector, under pressure to improve 
living conditions, expands its expenditures until they exceed current receipts, and the 
difference  is financed  through foreign  and/or domestic borrowing. Foreign borrowing 
produces a direct increase in official  foreign  debt, while domestic borrowing results in less 
direct growth in foreign  indebtedness. 
When the public sector borrows domestically, money (and/or "quasi-money") is 
created over and above the quantity in demand. The excess supply of  money has a 
counterpart of  an excess demand for  goods and services and for  securities, taken together. 
Such excess demand is satisfied  through a deficit  in external payments with the 
consequence that international reserves are depleted. The policy reaction of  government 
financial  officials  is to borrow abroad and the official  external debt increases. 
Excessive spending by the private sector explains cases of  rapid increase in 
indebtedness in those Latin American countries in which the public sector maintained 
equilibrium (or near-equilibrium) in its own accounts. Most analysts have assumed that 
private sector spending can be effectively  regulated by government control over the 
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expansion of  domestic credit. However, if  alternative sources of  financing  are available 
abroad, the private sector can also overspend. 
Insofar  as excessive private sector spending is concentrated in tradeable goods (that 
is, goods that can be imported or exported), it will be reflected  in a current-account deficit 
in the balance of  payments and financed  by a corresponding inflow  of  capital as the 
private sector borrows abroad. If  there is also excess demand for  non-tradeable goods, 
part of  the external borrowing will produce an increase in reserves, and the prices of  non-
tradeable goods will rise relative to the prices of  tradeable items —which is equivalent to a 
revaluation of  the currency.6 Private sector expectations might then accelerate the pace of 
foreign  borrowing. With fixed  exchange rates the nominal prices of  tradeable goods will 
remain stable while the prices of  non-tradeable items continue to rise. Domestic price 
indexes will reflect  a higher inflation  rate. Nominal domestic interest rates remain 
inflated  and become extremely high in dollar terms, thus encouraging further  borrowing 
abroad. As a result, foreign  debt increases as a component of  the economy's liability 
structure. 
This chain of  events will produce the need for  adjustment in the balance-of-
payments current account at some point, in much the same manner that excessive public 
expenditures eventually require adjustment. However, this unorthodox case of  excessive 
spending is more difficult  to detect. Its symptoms are all considered to be positive 
indicators: increased capital inflow,  larger reserves, and perhaps-rapid rates of  economic 
growth. But because there is insufficient  investment, this process is as unsustainable as 
that generated by excessive public spending. 
In cases in which excessive private spending dominates the picture, most of  the 
increase in foreign  indebtedness can be traced to the private sector. In cases in which 
excessive public sector spending predominates, official  debt is usually the principal 
component in total foreign  indebtedness. 
2. Foreign  lending: the supply side 
The demand for  additional external borrowing in Latin America during the 1970s 
coincided with an increased supply of  foreign  credit. The oil shocks of  1973-1974 and 
1978-1979 generated large current-account surpluses for  oil-exporting countries. A 
significant  share of  these surpluses was deposited in private banks that operate actively in 
the international financial  market, thus expanding substantially the available resources of 
the international banking system.7 At the same time, oiMmporting countries registered 
large balance-of-trade  deficits  that required increased foreign  borrowing. 
Because Eurocurrency deposits are not subject to reserve requirements, the capacity 
of  this market to expand is quite substantial.8 In fact,  the total supply of  credit in this 
market is essentially determined by the demand for  it. The total foreign  assets of  banks 
reporting to the Bank of  International Settlements (net of  inter-bank deposits) grew at an 
average annual rate of  20% between 1974 and 1982. 
The financial  commitments of  U.S. banks to Latin American countries also grew 
rapidly during this period. These loans represented substantial proportions of  the banks' 
total equity (net worth), which became a source of  some concern to U.S. comptroller 
authorities. Table 4 shows the "exposure" of  some U.S. banks in Brazil, Mexico, and 
Venezuela. 
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III 
Consequences of  increasing indebtedness and 
changing debt composition 
Both demand and supply factors  contributed to Latin American countries' growing 
indebtedness during the 1970s. The main sources of  loans were private banks, particularly 
U.S. banks. Thus as indebtedness increased, the relative importance of  debts owed to 
private banks rose. This change in debt composition had several important implications. 
First, debt became more expensive, and repayment periods were shortened as the relative 
significance  of  concessional loans declined and commercial terms became the norm. 
Second, the number of  creditors increased substantially, making negotiations more 
complicated in the event of  a debt crisis. Third, interest payments were increasingly based 
on floating  rates whose changes affected  the total debt stock rather than just the flow  of 
new borrowing. Fourth, lenders' "exposure" became a major concern, and "country-risk" 
analysis attracted increasing attention. Finally, because there is no established market in 
which lenders can liquidate their portfolio  assets, a market valuation of  these assets 
cannot be made. Portfolio  classification  thus becomes an exercise that requires the active 
participation of  the national comptrolling authority. 
The changing composition of  foreign  debt also has other dimensions. Private 
bankers are not expected to be politically motivated in their decisions to lend —at least 
insofar  as total indebtedness does not exceed lenders' perceptions of  reasonable limits, 
measured in proportion to borrowers' gross domestic product and export earnings. As 
debt levels rise relative to borrowers' economic size and foreign-exchange  resources, the 
risk of  default  increases, and lenders become more and more interested in the borrowing 
country's macroeconomic policies. This is particularly true for  very large lenders, which in 
the case of  Latin American countries are mainly U.S. banks. 
Table 4 
D E B T EXPOSURE IN SELECTED L A T I N AMERICAN  COUNTRIES 
FOR T E N U N I T E D STATES B A N K S 
(Outstanding  loans in US$  billions) 
Total  of  3 
countries 
Total  as 
Brazil Mexico Venezuela percentage  of 
bank's  equity 
Citicorp 4.4 3.3 1.1 8.7 180 
Bank of  America 2.3 2.5 2.0 6.8 148 
Chase Manhattan 2.4 1.7 1.0 5.1 183 
Manufacturers'  Hanover 2.0 1.7 1.1 4.8 174 
Morgan Guaranty Trust 1.7 1.1 0.5 3.3 122 
Chemical Bank 1.3 1.5 - 2.8 143 
Bankers Trust 0.9 0.9 0.5 2.2 143 
Continental Illinois 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.6 96 
First Interstate 0.5 0.7 - 1.2 64 
Security Pacific 0.5 0.5 - 1.0 68 
Source: "The American Banker" quoted by The  Economist,  p. 13, 30 April 1983. 
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This situation affects  Latin American countries in three major ways, although the 
consequences are less severe for  those countries that have used foreign  borrowing to 
increase significantly  their productive and export capacity. First, the level of  indebtedness 
and its maturity structure impose restrictions on domestic policies. The shorter the 
average maturity of  the debt stock, the larger the share that matures each year. Unless a 
country is willing to accept a transfer  of  real resources abroad by reducing its foreign  debt, 
these maturities must be financed.  If  the transfer  of  resources is to favour  the debtor 
country, total indebtedness must rise —further  taxing the country's capacity to borrow. 
Because banks evaluate a country's creditworthiness on the basis of  indicators such as 
foreign-exchange  reserve levels, the balance of  trade, and the ratio of  debt-service 
obligations to export earnings, a country is bound to adopt policies that produce positive 
effects  on those indicators. This implies that monetary policy, exchange rate policy, 
interest rate policy, fiscal  policy, and so forth  are in fact  constrained even if  banks do not 
place formal  restrictions on a country's domestic policies. Obviously, the higher the level 
of  indebtedness for  any given maturity structure, the greater the amount of  gross new 
borrowing that is required each year. Interest payments also require financing,  and they 
are determined not only by overall indebtedness but also by foreign  interest rates levels. 
A second consequence of  higher indebtedness is the increased probability of  an 
eventual (reverse) transfer  of  real resources from  borrowers to creditors. As an external 
loan is drawn upon, the borrowing country receives a transfer  of  real resources. These 
resources are repaid in the form  of  interest and amortization payments. However, if  new 
borrowing exceeds amortization and interest payments, the borrower continues to 
receive a net transfer  of  resources. As indebtedness grows in relation to standard 
indicators such as a country's gross domestic product and export earnings, the probability 
of  obtaining new net loans decreases, and the likelihood of  being forced  to transfer  real 
resources abroad increases. The magnitude of  this transfer  is linked to variables such as 
interest rates, terms of  trade, and external inflation.9 
Third, the increasingly commercial character of  debt stocks establishes a new 
mechanism for  the transmission of  external shocks to Latin American economies and 
thus increases their vulnerability. As debt from  private sources grows, the proportion of 
the total debt stock that is subject to floating  interest rates increases. Changes in interest 
rates then become an important source of  current-account imbalances. For Latin America 
as a whole in early 1983, a 1 % rise in interest rates over the course of  a year implied 
additional interest payments of  about US$ 2.4 billion. Of  course, interest rates may rise or 
fall.  But the main point is that interest rate fluctuations  introduce a new source of 
instability in the balance-of-payments  situation when the level of  indebtedness is high. 
They join terms of  trade, export volumes the effect  of  interest rates on domestic 
expenditures and investment, and exchange rate fluctuations  as vehicles for  the 
transmission of  international disequilibria to Latin American economies. 
A further  complication arises because interest rates fluctuations  are often 
associated with shifting  terms of  trade and changes in the exchange rate value of  an 
intervention currency vis-a-vis other currencies that are important in international trade. 
Changes in these different  areas require adjustment policies that work in the same 
direction so that their effects  reinforce  each other. Moreover, fluctuations  in interest rates 
tend to affect  the quality of  lending bank portfolios.  Higher interest rates erode porfolio 
quality because investments made on the basis of  lower interest rates become 
unprofitable,  and borrowers' debt burden becomes less bearable. Conversely, lower 
interest rates improve the quality of  bank portfolios.  Thus changes in interest rates affect 
banks' willingness to lend in a way that reinforces  the destabilizing effects  described 
above. 
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IV 
Can current levels of  indebtedness be sustained? 
Over the long run, foreign  savings will have an important role to play in the economic 
development of  Latin American countries. United States Department of  Commerce 
figures  show that the average yields of  U.S. investment in Latin America are more 
favourable  to investors than those in other areas of  the world.10 This finding  suggests that 
a portfolio-composition  model applied to countries that are net suppliers of  savings 
would result .in a sustained capital inflow  to Latin America. Such a model also indicates 
that even if  yield and variability were equal all over the world, .capital movements would 
still produce a net inflow  to those areas with a smaller capital stock.11 
1. Foreign  investment and  foreign  debt  as forms  of  capital  mobility 
However, foreign  investment and foreign  debt differ  in their political and economic 
implications for  Latin America. Although the political dimensions of  this issue will not be 
developed here, investment and debt differ  in the kind of  foreign  presence they imply in a 
country. Foreign investment, particularly when it is important in relation to the size of 
the economy or the particular sector involved, stimulates foreign  attention to 
micropolicies and the exercise of  power. Foreign debt is generally free  of  these 
characteristics. 
From an economic perspective, foreign  investment usually involves foreign 
ownership of  real assets, while external debt by definition  involves foreign  ownership of 
financial  assets. Direct foreign  investment provides the investor with a flow  of  income 
that can only be estimated with some probability and that is subject to economic 
fluctuations  in the sector concerned. In contrast, debt provides the lender with a flow  of 
interest payments at a rate that is either fixed  at the beginning of  the operation or that 
floats  in relation to some reference  rate in international markets or in the lender's 
domestic market. Investment profits  can usually be remitted abroad as they are generated. 
These remittances tend to vary, ceteris paribus, with the relative success of  the business 
involved. Interest payments, however, are not subject to such variations except in the 
extreme case of  the borrowing enterprise's failure  if  the loan is not guaranteed. An inflow 
of  resources in the form  of  direct foreign  investment is directly connected to capital 
expenditures, while an inflow  of  resources in the form  of  debt may not be directly related 
to an increase in a country's productive capacity. On the other hand, loan principal 
remittances are made on a previously agreed-upon schedule, while capital investment 
remittances are usually not subject to such limitations. In practice, though, capital 
remittances from  direct investment take time because they require that the investment 
itself  be liquidated. 
As previously noted, over the last decade the bulk of  foreign  capital flowing  to Latin 
America has been in the form  of  debt. Given the region's continuing development needs, 
net additional flows  of  foreign  capital will be required if  Latin America's economic 
growth rate is to recover to the level of  the 1970s. The debt-servicing problems that a 
large number of  Latin American countries encountered in 1982 and 1983 underscore the 
need to examine the circumstances that would make possible a sustained transfer  of  real 
resources from  abroad through foreign  borrowing. 
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2. The  conditions  for  an increasing foreign  debt 
A level of  indebtedness that increases over a long period of  time can be sustained so long 
as creditors perceive that they will eventually be repaid. If  this perception is widely held, 
creditors have no inclination to demand the payment of  outstanding principal. Indeed, 
their main concern is with maintaining a secure flow  of  interest payments. For this 
reason, increasing indebtedness is acceptable so long as: the borrowing country's 
productive capacity continues to expand; this expansion produces an increased volume 
and value of  exports relative to imports; interest payments do not place an excessive 
burden on the balance-of-payments  current account; and foreign  financial  markets 
develop relatively smoothly. In short, increasing indebtedness is sustainable insofar  as the 
current-account imbalance is not greatly disproportionate to exports and gross domestic 
product. 
To what extent does foreign  borrowing expand the debtor country's productive 
capacity? Medium- and long-term borrowing from  official  multilateral sources usually 
goes to investment projects that include both foreign  and domestic financing,  so that 
increased borrowing abroad also implies the commitment of  additional domestic 
resources to investment. Under these conditions, foreign  borrowing consitutes an 
addition to domestic savings, and the borrowing country's debt-servicing capacity 
increases along with its total investment. However, when private foreign  banks become 
the principal source of  foreign  credit, the link between external borrowing and domestic 
investment weakens. 
Of  course, the debtor country's domestic economic policies are crucial to the 
determination of  the investment rate and the growth of  productive capacity. But world 
economic conditions also play an important role, especially in decisions such as the 
allocation of  resources to the production of  tradeable versus non-tradeable goods. A 
vigorous world economy and expanding international trade provide the basis for 
increased export volumes and more stable export prices. Raw material exports are more 
susceptible to sharp price fluctuations  than manufactured  products because their supply is 
generally quite inelastic in the short run, while their demand is determined by demand for 
final  products. A global economic downturn negatively affects  developing countries' 
terms of  trade, in part because raw materials constitute a major proportion of  their total 
exports. Thus if  the world economic growth rate declines, there is first  a sharp drop in 
developing countries' terms of  trade, which recover somewhat later on as the world 
economy stabilizes at a new, lower level. Similarly, if  the international economy's growth 
rate increases, developing countries' terms of  trade improve sharply and then deteriorate 
to a new, stable level. Fluctuations in the terms of  trade introduce substantial instability in 
developing countries' balance of  payments, which are more severe the more important 
raw materials are in a country's total exports. 
Part of  this effect  in recent years has resulted from  protectionist tendencies in 
industrialized countries that are associated with declining world economic growth and 
slowing international trade. Furthermore, the deterioration in non-oil-exporting Latin 
American countries' terms of  trade has coincided with increases in nominal (and real) 
external interest rates. Both declining terms of  trade and rising external interest rates 
have increased borrowing countries' debt burden.12 
Given the size of  the U.S. economy, the influence  of  U.S. domestic policies on the 
world economy is far  stronger than that of  any other individual country. Indeed, U.S. 
economic policy is perhaps the single most important factor  in determining economic 
conditions the world over. For this reason, the United States' economic policies are a 
matter of  great interest for  debtor countries regardless of  the source of  their external 
financing. 
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To what extent do developments in international financial  markets affect  debtor 
countries' capacity to borrow? For any given maturity structure, gross financing 
requirements increase with the total debt stock. Debtors need additional amounts of 
foreign  financing  just to prevent their debt stock from  falling.  As indebtedness grows, 
more and more resources must be devoted to repayment if  the level of  debt is ever to be 
reduced. Interest payments also increase with additional borrowing, unless interest rates 
fall  at a faster  rate than the growth in overall indebtedness. For all these reasons, as the 
level of  indebtedness rises it becomes increasingly important for  debtor countries that 
international financial  markets expand smoothly. Any serious market dislocation might 
cause major problems for  debtor countries. In turn, these problems are likely to 
reverberate through international financial  markets in a vicious circle. 
3. The  fulfillment  of  the conditions 
The above discussion shows that foreign  borrowing is sustainable insofar  as it contributes 
to the expansion of  debtor countries' productive capacity and export potential; as long as 
growth rates and other conditions in the world economy facilitate  export expansion and 
reasonably stable terms of  trade; and if  international financial  markets continue to supply 
funds  on a regular basis. To what extent are these conditions likely to be fulfilled  for  Latin 
America during the 1980s? Recent information  indicates that trends in all three areas are 
unfavourable  to future  external borrowing. First, a preliminary United Nations 
Economic Commission for  Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) study of  nine Latin 
American countries over a twelve-year period shows that in five  cases, foreign  savings 
were substituted for  domestic savings so that available investment resources grew less 
than the debt stock.13 Further analysis is required to determine whether foreign  and 
domestic savings are substitutable or complementary. However, the ECLAC study clearly 
indicates that growing indebtedness has in several cases been associated with major 
increases in consumption. In these cases higher debt levels have improved at least some 
groups' present welfare,  but without contributing to the expanded productive capacity 
that is necessary to sustain future  consumption and debt repayment. 
Second, terms of  trade have recently moved strongly against Latin American 
countries. Here it is necessary to distinguish between the region's oil-exporting and non-
oil-exporting countries. Until 1980 terms of  trade moved against non-oil-exporting 
countries and in favour  of  oil exporters. But during 1981 -1983, terms of  trade deteriorated 
for  both groups of  countries, showing only a slight recovery in 1984. Real interest rates 
increased at the same time, and the combined negative effects  have been substantial for  all 
Latin American countries. 
Table 5 shows the effects  of  deteriorating terms of  trade and rising interest rates on 
the current-account balances of  eighteen non-oil-exporting Latin American countries. If 
the terms of  trade had been those prevailing in 1965-1969, and if  interest rates had been 
at 1978-1979 levels, the total current-account balance for  this group of  countries would 
have been a surplus of  over US$ 3 billion rather than the actual deficit  of  US$ 15.5 billion. 
Of  course, if  terms of  trade and interest rates had been different,  other conditions might 
also have changed. Nonetheless, these data provide some indication of  the relative 
importance of  terms of  trade and interest rates in current-account imbalances and the 
affected  countries' need for  additional financing.14 
How much of  the existing imbalance should be eliminated through adjustment 
policies and how much should be financed  are open questions. If  at least some of  the 
factors  producing terms-of-trade  and interest rate problems are transitory rather than 
permanent, financing  might be more reasonable than adjustment. Furthermore, 
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Table 5 
E S T I M A T E S O F T H E EFFECTS O F T E R M S OF T R A D E A N D I N T E R E S T R A T E S 
O N T H E C U R R E N T  A C C O U N T B A L A N C E O F 18 N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G 
C O U N T R I E S O F L A T I N A M E R I C A 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
Current  account 
balance 
Terms  of 
trade  effect" 
Interest  rate 
effecth 
Adjusted  current 
account balance 
1975 -10.6 -3.6 0.1 -7..1 
1976 -7.1 -1.7 0.3 -5.7 
1977 -5.4 0.9 0.5 -7.0 
1978 -8.2 -1.9 0.5 -6.8 
1979 -14.3 -4.7 -0.5 -9.1 
1980 -24.0 -9.5 -1.4 -13.1 
1981 -28.1 -15.8 -4.6 -7.7 
1982 -27.5 -17.7 -5.5 -4.3 
1983 -15.5 -15.6 -3.1 3.2 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of  IMF data, Balance of  Payments, April 1984; IMF, Internationsl  Financial  Statistics,  April 
1984. 
"Estimated by comparing effective  trade balance with 1965-1969 priced trade balance multiplied by the industrial countries 
consumer price index. 
'Estimated on the basis of  the coefficient  net interest paid to net global debt (includes long-, medium-, short-term debt 
minus debtor countries' deposits in international banks). The coefficient  was considered "normal" in the period 1978 and 
1979, any values over that average have negative effects. 
protectionist tendencies are proliferating  in industrialized countries. Even though they 
have not yet had a major impact on Latin American exports, these pressures discourage 
the allocation of  additional resources to export activities and thus affect  future  export 
growth rates. 
Finally, several factors  have introduced instability in international financial 
markets in recent years: the behaviour of  smaller banks, which tend to be relative 
newcomers to international business; the sharp fluctuations  in the price of  oil; and the 
deterioration of  private banks' asset portfolios.  Large private banks increased their 
capacity to lend abroad as the international financial  system expanded in the 1970s. They 
improved their methods of  evaluating country risk, and they expanded their network of 
branch offices  and correspondent banks so as to establish closer ties with prospective 
borrowers. As interest rate spreads grew, smaller banks also found  foreign  lending 
attractive. However, because they were not able to establish their own country-risk 
evaluation capacity, and because they were not in close contact with prospective clients, 
these smaller banks generally entered the market in the footsteps  of  larger banks. They 
increasingly participated in syndicated loans. As a result, as table 6 shows, both large and 
small banks substantially increased their international commitments between 1972 and 
1982. 
However, smaller banks' exposure in foreign  lending is sufficiently  reduced to 
permit sharp reactions to changing economic and political conditions. Whereas a bank 
that is highly exposed would have to consider its own interest very carefully  before 
curtailing sharply its foreign  lending, a bank with limited exposure can withdraw 
unilaterally without serious consequences for  its own portfolio.  Smaller banks generally 
do not have the necessary staff  or the required information  to evaluate the overall 
consequences of  such an action. When danger signs appear, smaller banks curtail their 
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lending at the same time without considering the impact that this pursuit of  narrow self-
interest may have on international financial  markets. 
Apart from  the attitudes of  lending banks, the global economic recession of  the 
early 1980s reduced the supply of  savings and credit available in international financial 
markets. World demand for  petroleum contracted sharply, producing serious difficulties 
for  oil-exporting countries because of  the size and allocation of  production quotas. The oil 
supply cartel could not be sustained effectively,  and petroleum prices dropped rapidly. 
This price decline altered the distribution of  current-account surpluses and deficits  in the 
world. Oil-exporting countries' surpluses disappeared, and an important source of 
additional liquidity in international financial  markets dried up. 
Global recession and high real interest rates in the early 1980s also eroded banks' 
domestic and foreign  asset portfolios.  Although national authorities can take steps to 
Table 6 
THE G R O W T H OF I N T E R N A T I O N A L  PRIVATE  B A N K L E N D I N G " 
Banks in 
Europe 





Offshore  branches 
of  USA  banks 




1972 182.2 24.0 9.2 9.4 224.8 
1973 224.4 29.4 15.2 23.5 312.5 
1974 279.4 34.5 34.7 36.1 384.7 
1975 239.9 34.2 48.3 51.1 463.5 
1976 385.6 39.0 69.6 74.9 569.1 
1977 466.2 39.9 92.6 91.1 689.7 
1978 611.4 56.1 119.2 106.5 893.1 
1979 776.0 71.0 136.4 127.6 1 111.0 
1980 903.0 101.2 176.8 141.0 1 321.9 
1981 998.4 122.8 256.6 172.9 1 549.7 
1982 1 022.8 129.7 363.4 172.8 1 688.8 
1983 1 027.2 150.9 396.0 179.8 1 753.9 
b) Rates of  annual growth  (percentage) 
1973 34.1 22.5 65.2 150.0 39.0 
1974 14.4 17.4 128.3 53.6 23.1 
1975 18.1 -0.9 39.2 41.6 20.5 
1976 16.9 14.1 44.1 46.6 22.8 
1977 20.9 2.3 33.0 21.6 21.2 
1978 31.1 40.6 28.7 16.9 29.5 
1979 26.9 26.6 14.4 19-8 24.4 
1980 16.4 42.5 29.6 10.5 19.0 
1981 10.6 21.3 45.1 22.0 17.2 
1982 2.4 5.6 41.6 0.5 9.0 
1983 0.4 16.3 9.0 4.0 3.8 
Source: BIS, Annual Report,  June 1977 to 1983 and Review, April 1984. 
"Refers  to banks operating in Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Canada, Japan and the United States, and Switzerland and offshore  branches of  United States banks in the Caribbean and 
the Middle East. These figures  contain a large amount of  double-counting arising out of  interbank transactions within the 
respective areas. This amount has been estimated to approximately 40% of  the total. However, for  the purpose of  this 
table the amount has not been deducted, nor has an estimate been done, of  the amounts not included in the total. 
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support domestic firms  in financial  trouble (thus indirectly strengthening domestic 
banks' assets), firms  located in foreign  countries are usually beyond their jurisdiction. The 
only real means of  responding to a probable weakening in banks' external assets is to 
regulate the foreign  exposure of  domestic banks. Bank comptrolling authorities in the 
United States thus became stricter in their evaluations in an effort  to limit the 
consequences of  economic problems in other countries. 
4. What  can Latin American governments  do? 
These events —the withdrawal of  smaller banks from  the international lending market, 
the reduction and elimination of  oil-exporting countries' current-account surpluses, and 
the deterioration of  banks' asset portfolios—  created an environment conducive to a 
drastic reduction in the flow  of  additional resources to financial  markets. This situation is 
dramatically clear in table 6. These events significantly  affected  developing countries, 
particularly Latin America. 
Can Latin American governments do anything to alter this situation? Of  the three 
conditions described here as necessary for  Latin American countries' continued foreign 
borrowing, only the first  is partially within the purview of  Latin American governments. 
Incentives to increase productive capacity and to allocate additional resources to the 
production of  tradeable goods are basically linked to domestic policies and to the stability 
of  such policies. However, developments in the international economy also exert an 
influence  on these questions. Foreign interest rates influence  domestic ones, and export 
expansion is linked to the growth rate of  the world economy and to trade policies in the 
main markets. The availability of  foreign  financing  also influences  domestic investment 
levels. However, all these factors  are of  secondary importance in comparison with the 
domestic allocation of  resources between investment and consumption. In this area, 
domestic policies predominate. This is not merely a question of  investment as a 
proportion of  gross domestic product; the efficient  evaluation of  alternative investment 
projects and their efficacious  completion are also required. 
V 
Current approaches to the debt crisis 
The conditions necessary to sustain current-account deficits  through substantial capital 
flows  to Latin America are unlikely to be fulfilled,  and there are now significant  pressures 
to eliminate or reduce subtantially these deficits  rather than to finance  them. Latin 
American countries' adjustment efforts  and costs have already been substantial: the 
region as a whole ended 1983 with an even lower per capita income than in 1982, and in 
several cases income per capita fell  by more than 7%. (In the case of  Chile, per capita 
income fell  in 1982 by nearly 23%.) Unemployment level in many countries reached 
record highs.15 
Too much emphasis on adjustment presents several dangers. First, the costs of  very 
strong adjustment policies are likely to be sufficiently  high to discredit policy approaches 
pursued since the mid-1970s (including an opening up of  trade and financial  relations), 
with important long-term consequences. Second, the current economic recession in Latin 
America, if  accentuated by excessive emphasis on adjustment policies, is likely to produce 
a feedback  effect  on the world economy that will slow global economic recovery. This 
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effect  may be particularly pronounced in the United States. Rapid adjustment generally 
involves a decline in imports that is faster  than the increase in exports, at least in the 
short run. Latin American imports from  the United States amount to US$ 40 billion per 
year and are concentrated in machinery and transportation equipment, which together 
are nearly 50% of  Latin America's total imports. Third, excessive emphasis on 
adjustment will further  erode the value of  lending banks' asset portfolios,  giving further 
impulse to a retrenchment in foreign-bank  lending to the region. 
Finally, it is not clear that adjustment policies alone are an adequate response to 
present difficulties.  At least some of  the factors  that have contributed to the current crisis 
are transitory in nature. For example, there are good reasons to believe that the world 
economy has already begun to recover. Interest rates are likely to return to more 
customary levels, although some time may elapse before  they do so, and terms of  trade 
cannot be expected to remain at present levels indefinitely.  Thus one might argue that 
excessive emphasis on adjustment policies is not only deleterious but also unnecessary. 
However, one factor  shaping the present crisis is lasting: the level of  indebtedness. 
For this reason, strategies to address the debt crisis should involve both adjustment and 
financing  as part of  a multifaceted  approach intended to cope with both transitory and 
long-term elements. 
1. Adjustment  policies and  the IMF 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) plays a leading role in promoting adjustment 
policies as a condition for  additional financing.  Countries request IMF assistance when 
their own reserves cannot sustain a balance-of-payments  deficit.  Under normal 
circumstances, adjustment policies in deficit  countries attempt to expand exports, reduce 
imports, and stimulate net capital inflows  without significantly  affecting  either other 
countries or the world economy. The burden of  adjustment falls  on the deficit  country, 
whose own "misbehaviour" and errors are assumed to be the sources of  the problem. The 
IMF has no means, other than moral suasion, to induce surplus countries to adjust. If 
financing  were amply available, the asymmetry in IMF actions —strong stimuli for  debtor 
countries to implement adjustment policies, and only moral suasion on creditors— would 
not be very important because countries could finance  rather than adjust a large share of 
their deficits.  But when additional financing  is not readily available from  the market, the 
situation is quite different.  IMF powers are decisive in influencing  debtor countries' 
policies because the resources available to the Fund can be essential in smoothing out the 
adjustment process. Unless these financial  resources are easily accessible in sufficient 
amounts, adjustment costs become unbearable. This is what has happened as world 
economic recession, the interruption of  financial  markets' expansion, and the shortage of 
IMF funds  have all coincided. 
The IMF has been quite conscious of  this dangerous coincidence of  events. Faced 
with widespread liquidity problems, IMF authorities have given strong backing to debt 
renegotiation efforts  in countries such as Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. This 
support has included prodding major banks not only to reschedule debt maturities but 
also to increase their net lending to the countries involved. However, these initiatives 
have emerged as part of  a debtor country's commitment to pursue adjustment policies 
above and beyond those adjustment efforts  already underway. 
The Fund has found  its own resources severely stretched. As a result, IMF 
authorities requested an increase in the size of  member quotas. Member States approved 
an increase of  47.5% after  protracted bargaining between the United States and most of 
the other countries. This increase means that by 1984 the IMF had about US$ 15 billion in 
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additional loanable resources —which is equivalent to only 15% of  the 1981 current-
account deficits  for  all non-oil-exporting developing countries. Continued severe resource 
constraints will probably constitute an incentive for  the Fund to promote very strict 
adjustment policies that place a heavy economic burden on debtor countries. The 
recessionary bias in such policies and the concentration of  the adjustment burden on 
debtor countries are clearly reflected  in the conditionalities attached to IMF loans. This 
situation is likely to continue to result in mounting resistance by debtor countries to 
accept, or to abide by, IMF prescriptions. 
2. The  private banks and  the liquidity  crisis 
Apart from  the resources that are available to debtor countries, Fund financing  is 
especially important because private banks believe that IMF evaluation and policy 
prescriptions substantially improve the creditworthiness of  borrower countries. Indeed, a 
pattern seems to have emerged in recent debt renegotiations. The IMF provides its seal of 
approval for  the debtor country's adjustment policies, and it agrees to provide additional 
financial  resources on the condition that private bank creditors do likewise. The creditor 
banks agree to be represented by a committee composed of  the largest institutions, whose 
task is to reach agreement with the debtor country on the general conditions for  debt 
rescheduling and additional financing.  Further negotiations are then necessary between 
the country and indiviual creditors to formalize  the agreement. Amortization payments 
are not made while negotiations are going on, in a kind of  "moratorium by mutual 
agreement" between debtor and creditors. The whole process takes several months to 
complete, but a liquidity crisis is thus averted. 
Renegotiation has become a costly process for  debtor countries in both political and 
economic terms. In political terms, debt negotiations are a burden because it usually takes 
a relatively long time for  an agreement to materialize, while public opinion closely 
follows  the negotiating process. In economic terms, until early 1984 renegotiations 
usually increased the debt burden because banks used the opportunity to increase interest 
rate spreads and to add other commissions —on top of  real interest rates that in the early 
1980s were the highest in more than fifty  years. Increased spreads and other debt costs 
after  renegotiation might be justified  by arguing that a country that must renegotiate its 
debt constitutes a greater risk for  creditors. However, if  renegotiation involves the 
extension of  government guarantees to portions of  the debt that were not previously so 
covered (as has often  been the case for  Latin American countries), this justification  is 
weakened or invalidated. Moreover, a risk premium was included in the cost of  all 
previous borrowing, and it is not clear why that premium should be increased when the 
event covered by such payments actually occurs. Fortunately the tendency to increase debt 
burdens during renegotiations abated in 1984. 
Borrowers countries' perceptions of  debt costs also increase the likelihood of  future 
problems as high interest rates persist. Although individual banks may not be aware of 
this phenomenon, private banks as a group should realize the dangers that this situation 
presents, especially if  they exercise their bargaining power jointly. Actions that increase 
the economic burden for  debtor countries are self-defeating  in character. In fact,  the 
quality of  lenders' asset portfolios  is closely and directly linked to borrowers' debt costs, 
because an increase in the debt burden implies a reduced probability of  eventually 
repaying creditors. In practice, then, debt burden and the quality of  asset portfolios  are 
two sides of  the same problem on which the interests of  borrowers and lenders coincide. 
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VI 
Bases for  a possible solution to the debt problem 
A long-term strategy to resolve the debt crisis must include both financing  and 
adjustment measures because both transitory and permanent factors  are involved. Care 
should be taken that short-term policies support longer-term reponses. To begin with, 
the problem of  short-term liquidity should involve three different  steps: the 
renegotiation of  debt maturities coming due during the current crisis period and in the 
near future;  IMF borrowing under terms that take into account recessionary pressures in 
the world economy; and additional borrowing from  private creditors already involved in 
debtor countries. These three measures are closely interrelated and should be undertaken 
similtaneously. It does not seem practical to search for  new, longer-term sources of 
financing  under emergency conditions. 
1. Reactivation of  the world  economy 
As previously noted, world economic recovery would in itself  do much to resolve present 
problems of  foreign  debt. Sustained growth in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, 
and socialist countries would improve terms of  trade and reduce real interest rates. To 
facilitate  such growth, action should be undertaken in three areas. First, a substantial new 
allocation of  IMF special drawing rights (SDRs) would increase world liquidity and 
redistribute somewhat the adjustment burden among countries. Since private financial 
markets are not expected to expand substantially in the near future,  SDRs take on 
renewed importance as a source of  additional liquidity. 
Second, a more symmetrical adjustment process would contribute significantly  to 
the reactivation of  the world economy. Forcing the adjustment burden on debtor 
countries alone will prolong recessionary tendencies. However, if  creditor countries 
pursue more expansionary domestic economic policies, adjustment will occur in a more 
balanced fashion.  International institutions can play an important role in achieving this 
goal, even though they can use little more than moral suasion as an instrument. 
Third, domestic economic policies in creditor countries could also make other 
contributions to global economic recovery. By altering the domestic policy mix so as to 
reduce interest rates, these countries could reduce the debt burden on borrower countries 
without sacrificing  their own goal of  price stability, while at the same time strengthening 
the quality of  lending banks' asset portfolios.  By giving additional support to their own 
banking systems, creditor countries would contribute to a steady, even (though somewhat 
reduced) flow  of  private resources to financial  markets. This support could take the form 
of  liquidity insurance systems that would recognize that present portfolio  problems are 
not due to mismanagement or misbehaviour but rather to factors  that affect  the world 
economic system as a whole. Also, bank comptrollers could carefully  review their 
portfolio  classification  criteria so as to take into account IMF agreements and World Bank 
or regional development bank support for  debtor countries. 
2. Debtor countries'  economic policies 
Debtor countries' long-term policies must recognize that debt levels have reached a point 
at which interest rate fluctuations  are highly significant  in provoking changes in their 
current-account balance. Although short-term adjustment policies negotiated with the 
IMF can help avert a liquidity crisis, long-term policies must be devised to reduce the debt 
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burden in the future.  For example, domestic savings must play a larger role in capital 
formation  than they have in the recent past. Incentives for  domestic saving should be 
reviewed with this goal in mind. Perhaps the single most important factor  in this regard 
is fiscal  policy, in its double role of  stimulating savings and discouraging consumption. 
Similarly, external constraints to excessive spending (whether private or public) 
have become more severe as debt levels have risen. Recourse to foreign  borrowing to 
finance  public or private sector imbalances will no longer be as easy as it was before  1981. 
The effects  of  excessive spending will henceforth  need to be managed within national 
borders, and thus they will appear mainly as domestic inflationary  pressures. If  rapid 
inflation  is to be avoided in the future,  domestic spending must be held in check. It is 
important to emphasize that this restraint must apply to both the private and public 
sectors. 
More financial  resources must also be allocated to the tradeable goods sector so as to 
improve the balance-of-payments  current account and reduce the burden placed on the 
capital account. Realistic exchange rates that reflect  these goals are probably the single 
most important means of  achieving this end. 
Latin American countries' efforts  to manage external debt should strive to prevent 
the concentration of  loan maturities in particular periods and to take advantage of 
possible reductions in interest rates or interest rate spreads. As part of  these efforts,  it 
would be useful  to promote periodic exchanges of  information  and points of  view among 
bank comptroller authorities in both creditor and debtor countries so as to improve their 
mutual understanding of  portfolio-classification  systems and loan-review techniques. 
Debtor countries could also expand the exchange of  information  among themselves, and 
they might even consider establishing some means of  co-ordinating their activities in 
financial  markets. 
In particular, debtor countries should seek to alter the composition of  their external 
liabilities by increasing the relative share of  borrowing from  official  sources. In this way 
the cost and variability of  borrowing could be limited and the repayment periods 
lengthened. In addition, the relative share of  direct foreign  investment in debtors' 
external liabilities should be increased. Profit  remittances abroad might be induced to 
move in such a way so as to have a countercyclical effect  in the host country. Imaginative 
efforts  will be needed in this area to limit the political and economic frictions  between 
investors and host countries that in the past have led to nationalizations. 
Finally, debtor countries should also take better advantage of  regional markets for 
trade expansion. Regional economic integration and financial  co-operation can save 
foreign  exchange without misallocating resources. Regional co-operation could also be 
extended to improve debtor countries' bargaining power on trade issues. This is 
particularly important because protectionist tendencies in industrialized country markets 
may limit the success of  export promotion in the tradeable-goods sector. 
3. Institutional  changes 
The debt problem will remain a challenge, though perhaps not in such a dramatic form  as 
in the early 1980s. Some adaptations in international financial  institutions will therefore 
be necessary. These adaptations will unavoidably, involve greater official  participation in 
the management of  external debt. First of  all, a substantial increase in total IMF resources 
is advisable. Even after  the quota increase approved in 1983, the IMF's resources as a 
proportion of  total world trade were about one-fourth  of  what they were in its first  years 
of  operation. Moreover, only about half  of  IMF quotas provide currencies that can be used 
to support its various programmes and facilities.  An expanded IMF will be able to provide 
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better support to countries in debt-repayment difficulties.  As a result, other creditors will 
be more inclined to continue lending. The World Bank and regional development banks 
should also play a larger role in transferring  savings to the developing world, thus 
contributing to debtor countries' efforts  to alter the composition of  their external 
financial  liabilities. 
Even though measures may be taken to reactivate the world economy and to reduce 
borrower countries' debt burden, fluctuations  in world economic activity will not 
disappear. Thus it is likely that another debt crisis will appear at some time in the future. 
For this reason it seems advisable to consider the institutionalization of  debt-
renegotiation arrangements. 
At present two types of  organizations are involved in debt renegotiations: "clubs" 
and "committees". In club-type organizations (the best known of  which is the "Paris 
Club"), creditor governments meet with the debtor-country government to reschedule 
official  loans. The "club" appoints a chairman to act as host and co-ordinator of  the 
negotiations, and all creditor governments participate. The general bases for 
rescheduling are agreed upon, usually with the participation of  the IMF and (at times) the 
World Bank. The debtor country then approaches each official  creditor individually to 
renegotiate its corresponding debt obligation within the framework  of  the general 
agreement. Private creditors are excluded from  the agreement. The club-type 
organization is most useful  in managing problems associated with debts from  official 
sources because the number of  creditor governments involved is small. 
Only private creditors participate in committee-type organizations. These are ad 
hoc committees composed of  the larger individual creditor banks and chaired by the 
largest creditor, which acts as co-ordinator. International organizations do not participate 
in the committee. However, the IMF has played a very active role in stimulating 
negotiations and in providing a "certificate  of  good behaviour" after  an evaluation of  the 
debtor country's readjustment programme, which serves as the basis for  private banks to 
refinance  or reschedule outstanding debt. The Institute for  International Finance has 
been established in Washington, D.C. (financed  by contributions from  a large number of 
banks) to provide information  concerning debtor countries and facilitate  the exchange of 
data and creditors' viewpoints. The "committee" is most appropriate for  debt 
negotiations involving private credit sources. However, these organizations may 
contribute to the formation  of  a creditors' cartel, which would have negative political and 
economic consequences for  developing countries. 
The major international financial  organizations also have an important role to play 
in debt renegotiations by bringing together both private and official  creditors in an 
organized fashion  in a context that takes into account national and international 
dimensions of  the problem. A debt-refinancing  facility  undertaken jointly by the IMF and 
the World Bank might be one way of  addressing this problem. Access to the facility  could 
be established on the basis of  certain objective indicators, while the amount and terms of 
assistance could be determined on a case-by-case basis. The resources necessary to finance 
such a facility  could be drawn from  several sources, including additional borrowing from 
the original private lenders to the country involved. Financial resources could also come 
from  a new allocation of  SDRs. The proceeds accruing to creditor countries could be 
placed at the disposal of  the facility  without cost, as a means of  reducing the debt burden 
on borrowers. 
In this regard it is important to recall that market mechanisms for  distributing debt 
burdens between creditors and debtors no longer operate as they did in the 1930s. At that 
time, foreign  borrowing usually took the form  of  bonds placed in international markets. 
As debtor countries began to experience the effects  of  worldwide depression, the price of 
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these bonds fell  to a fraction  of  their original market value. Debtor countries could then 
buy back their own debt, thus forcing  part of  the adjustment burden on creditors. The only 
way to produce a similar effect  under present circumstances would be to establish a 
secondary market for  bank portfolios,  an idea that does not seem practical unless such a 
market were to be supported by government authorities in creditor countries. If  a debt-
refinancing  facility  were established, it could create an early-warning system so that 
countries and institutions involved in difficult  cases could act before  the situation 
worsened. 
Another necessary institutional change involve the creation of  a means of 
cushioning the economic impact of  international interest rate changes on debtor 
countries. International interest rates reflect  the economic policies of  industrialized 
countries, over which the IMF has no effective  influence.  Debtor countries should be at 
least partially insulated from  interest rate changes that are of  great importance to them 
but completely beyond their control. There are two possible ways of  mediating the effects 
of  interest rate fluctuations:  as part of  a jointly operated IMF and World Bank debt-
refinancing  facility,  through which low-cost financing  could be provided to debtor 
countries to cover interest payments over and above certain limits; or as a separate 
arrangement through which debtor countries make interest payments to creditors up to 
some maximum annual limit. Amounts exceeding this limit would be postponed until 
market interest rates decline. 
Several other proposals have also been put forward  to redistribute the debt burden 
between borrowers and creditors.16 All these proposals demonstrate that there are 
currently no market mechanisms in place to effect  the desired result. Initiatives such as 
these will be unnecessary if  the world economy revives soon, if  terms of  trade become 
more favourable  for  debtor countries, if  real interest rates return to their customary 
levels, and if  private banks and official  financial  institutions resume lending at regular 
rates. However, even the proposals made so far  may be insufficient  if  these conditions do 
not appear. The assumption that time works in favour  of  borrower countries' ability to 
repay their debts, although reasonable, may be proved wrong. The safest  approach is one 
that emphasizes policy and institutional adaptation rather than good luck. 
VII 
Conclusion 
It is unlikely that an action programme as all-inclusive as the one suggested here can be 
implemented. Some of  these proposals are conflictual  in the sense that they do not 
necessarily serve the perceived interests of  all debtors and all creditors. The policy-
making coherence required at both domestic and international levels to implement a 
comprehensive approach to the debt problem is not present in existing institutions. 
Public discussion of  the debt crisis is dominated by fears  and misgivings rather than by 
objective analysis. 
It is worth considering in more detail the kind of  conflicts  that these suggestions 
may produce. For example, although it is generally agreed that the reactivation of  the 
world economy will benefit  all parties involved, there is considerable debate regarding the 
best way of  promoting global economic recovery. A new allocation of  SDRs has been 
opposed by the United States on the grounds that it is likely to have inflationary  effects. 
This effect  would probably be negligible in an environment characterized by unemployed 
resources and very slowly expanding private bank liquidity. However, a more 
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symmetrical adjustment process would force  part of  the adjustment burden onto 
creditors, who will naturally resist it. Similarly, debtor countries' efforts  to allocate 
additional resources to the tradeable-goods sector is likely to clash with protectionist 
tendencies in industrialized nations, which are the principal markets for  the resulting 
additional output. Even efforts  by debtor countries to increase commercial and financial 
co-operation among themselves may be perceived as dangerous, as has happened in the 
past. 
It is also unlikely that increasing international institutions' financial  resources 
(which must come largely from  creditor countries) will find  ready support, as 
demonstrated by recent United States attitudes regarding increased resources for  the IMF 
and the Inter-American Development Bank. Moreover, the institutionalization of  debt-
rescheduling mechanisms involving official  international institutions or officially 
supported private institutions, or other means of  supporting debtor countries or private 
creditors, is likely to be attacked in creditor countries as a "bailout" paid for  with 
taxpayers' money. 
Most of  these conflicts  are more apparent than real, and in some cases short-term 
conflicts  may be resolved in the long run. Given the level of  indebtedness reached in the 
early 1980s, it is clearly in the interest of  both debtors and creditors to achieve a more 
symmetrical adjustment process in which the burden is shared by all parties involve. It is 
also in the different  parties' common interest to avoid sharp fluctuations  in world 
liquidity and to provide for  more orderly liquidity growth. Similarly, all parties would 
benefit  from  debtor countries' restructuring of  external liabilities so as to increase the 
relative importance of  borrowing from  official  creditors. 
More substantive conflicts  of  interest are involved (at least in the short run) in the 
distribution of  the debt burden, the kind of  adjustment process involved, and the 
consequences of  debtor countries' eventual insolvency. In all these cases, however, 
creditors must recognize that an excessive economic burden on debtor countries is not 
politically tolerable and that political tolerance will set limits on the adjustment policies 
acceptable to debtor-country governments. Official  support for  debtors and creditors is 
not simply a "bailout" when the failure  to provide that support could have global negative 
consequences. Debtor countries are in no position to absorb the combined effect  of 
deteriorated terms of  trade, high real interest rates, contracting or slowly growing world 
trade, and retrenchement in the banking system. Latin American debtor countries have 
already undertaken major adjustment programmes, and pressures for  further  adjustment 
may produce domestic political consequences that will certainly be reflected  in these 
countries' attitudes toward creditors. 
Policy-making coherence at both the domestic and the international level has 
certainly not been enhanced by developments since the mid-1970s. Exchange rates have 
been more volatile than expected, and (perhaps as a result) so have interest rates. Sharp 
shifts  in the worldwide distribution of  current-account imbalances and a decline in the 
relative financial  weight of  international institutions also indicate decreasing capacity to 
manage international economic problems. Recent negotiations in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs  and Trade (GATT) have been a disappointment for  developing 
countries, and the 1983 meeting of  the United Nations Conference  on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) also produced few  results. 
More specifically,  borrower countries' efforts  to establish an agreed-upon general 
framework  for  debt negotiations should not be perceived as a menace to creditors. Rather, 
these efforts  are a clear indication that debtor countries' limits of  political tolerance have 
already been reached. Because United States banks are Latin American countries' and 
firms'  principal creditors, there is ample room for  action by United States governmental 
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authorities to both stimulate and support United States public and private financial 
institutions to reach workable (that is, politically feasible)  agreements concerning 
interest and amortization payments on outstanding debt. These agreements should 
include means of  redistributing the adjustment burden between debtors and creditors. 
As with any new and acute problem, the first  reactions to the debt crisis have been 
characterized by fears  and misgivings. More effort  has been devoted to attributing blame 
than to finding  solutions. Typically, too, the importance of  the problem will eventually 
quell these initial reactions, and analysis will take the place of  quarreling. All the actors 
involved in the debt problem will continue to exist in the same world, so it is important 
for  all those concerned to realize that confrontation  will in the long run be more costly 
than co-operation. Given the nature and magnitude of  the debt issue, Latin American 
debtor countries must certainly be part of  any solution, not just part of  the problem. 
Despite the difficulties  involved in implementing a multidimensional strategy for 
addressing the debt problem, this is the most realistic approach. The danger of  the debt 
crisis becoming intractable is too great, and the ensuing consequences too far-reaching, 
for  such a strategy to be ignored. It is perhaps in this negative sense that the debt problem 
can be viewed as having produced a new kind of  interdependence. 
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THE ADJUSTMENT PROCESS IN THE 1980s: THE NEED FOR A GLOBAL APPROACH 
I 
Introduction 
The "adjustment" issue is related to certain basic or fundamental  macroeconomic 
equilibria which need to be under control if  undesirable and disruptive effects  on the 
economy are to be avoided. The literature as well as policy makers have traditionally 
considered two types of  situations which tend to be interrelated: external and internal 
equilibrium. 
The achievement of  external equilibrium refers  to the balance between a country's 
expenditure abroad and its foreign  exchange receipts, and has been perceived as a basic 
ingredient of  a stable world economic system. It is not surprising therefore  that high 
priority has been assigned to the attainment of  external equilibrium in the design of 
economic policy by international institutions and others interested in a global, 
multilateral perspective. The gold standard, prior to the Great Depression, had a built-in 
(automatic) mechanism designed to push individual economies quickly toward 
continuous equilibrium in their balance-of-payments  accounts. If  a country tried to spend 
more than what it sold abroad, its gold holdings would decrease, diminishing the banking 
system's capacity to lend, thus increasing interest rates, depressing domestic residents' 
spending, stimulating exports, curtailing imports, and, therefore,  restoring foreign 
payments equilibrium. 
The system developed at Bretton Woods was also designed with the international 
economy in mind, attempting to obtain external equilibrium at the country level through 
the implicit fiscal  and monetary discipline associated with the maintenance of  fixed 
exchange rates. That process was to be complemented and smoothed by the IMF's 
financing  facilities,  access to which was linked to and conditioned by the country's 
implementation of  adjustment policies aimed at restoring balance-of-payments 
equilibrium. 
But in the 1940s, together with the need to reactivate the world economy along a 
stable path, nationalist tendencies, the impact of  the Great Depression and the 
"Keynesian revolution" gave high priority to the goal of  internal equilibrium. The 
objective was to run national economies at their maximum output potential, which meant 
aiming at full  employment of  resources, and particularly labour. Fiscal policy would pay a 
major role in the attempt to equalize ex ante savings with investment flows, 
complementing private sector economic decisions so as to generate sufficient  "effective 
demand" to "buy" the output associated with full  employment of  domestic resources. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, although in advanced countries unemployment remained at 
low levels, slow but steady inflationary  pressures and foreign  payment imbalances 
stimulated the development of  a "policy-mix" —a combination of  monetary, fiscal,  and to 
a lesser extent, exchange rate and commercial policy tools— aimed at the simultaneous 
restoration of  internal and external equilibrium. 
Macroeconomic policy in the less developed countries (LDCs), since the end of 
World War II, has tended to follow  a similar pattern to the one described above, with one 
major difference:  development objectives and strategies to accelerate economic growth 
have had such high priority that, in general, external and internal disequilibria have been 
381 
LATIN AMERICA: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM AND EXTERNAL FINANCING 
present all along. Latin America's experience between the 1950s and mid-1970s has been 
quite revealing: recurrent balance-of-payments  crises and foreign  exchange bottlenecks 
as well as chronic inflationary  processes have been the norm rather than the exception in 
a number of  countries in the region. Explanatory hypotheses for  these situations have 
ranged from  those that stress that they are the consequence of  structural disequilibria 
inherent to LDCs' economies, to those pointing at basic flows  in economic policy design, 
with "excessive" government intervention, "repressed" inflation,  erroneous pricing 
policies and inefficient  protectionism. In any case, the fact  is that countries have had to 
shift  back and forth  from  policies attempting to solve accumulative foreign,  fiscal  and 
monetary disequilibria to those addressed at trying to run the economy at its full  potential 
so as to better the standard of  living of  the region's increasing population. As a 
consequence of  these "stop and go" policies the stability of  the growth and development 
process and its flexibility  and efficiency  in adapting the region's economy to new and 
changing world and domestic shocks have been seriously undermined. 
In the early 1970s industrial countries, and particularly the United States, 
experienced a slowdown in productivity, stagflation  and mounting balance-of-payments 
problems, which together with the increasing importance of  crowding out, floating 
exchange rates, huge increases in energy prices, speculative capital movements, 
inflationary  expectations and indexation, undermined and questioned very seriously the 
adequacy and relevance of  traditional economic policy and analytical tools to face  these 
new situations.1 
The 1970s also witnessed successive events that contributed to blur the above-
mentioned situation. Privatization of  financial  international relations (a process which 
was already underway some years before),  accelerated with the first  oil price shock in 
1973. The booming role of  private banks, at the expense of  official  international financial 
institutions (mainly the IMF and the World Bank) allowed and stimulated Latin America, 
perhaps the most "natural" client of  the banks, to finance  huge current account deficits.  It 
can be said, to a certain extent, that the region privileged financing  over adjustment of  its 
foreign  imbalances during the 1970s. 
After  the second oil shock, this process came to a halt in the early 1980s, when the 
effects  of  the world recession —the most severe since the 1930s— the deterioration of  #he 
LDCs' terms of  trade and soaring international interest rates created serious debt service 
problems which were amplified  by reduced capital flows  to debtor countries as a 
consequence of  the banks' procyclical behaviour. This has helped to generate a bleak 
scenario, reducing and making very costly, especially for  LDCs the options out of  the crisis. 
In this context, given the magnitudes involved, external financing  constraints, and the 
new international and domestic prevailing circumstances, a reassessment of  the 
traditional views regarding the roles of  adjustment and financing  is required, and this is 
the main purpose of  this paper. 
The next section deals with the main analytical issues regarding the adjustment 
process, stressing options and alternatives available in the abstract. In section III recent 
Latin American adjustment experience is discussed. Next, section IV deals with the actual 
alternatives and options available, both at the international and the national levels, 
pinpointing their advantages, limitations and deficiencies  and examining some recent 
"non-traditional" problems which tend to complicate ways out of  the crisis, challenging 
traditional economic policy design. Finally, section V briefly  summarizes the main 
arguments and presents the conclusions that may be of  interest to policy makers 
concerned with debt and adjustment issues in today's crisis. 
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II 
Analytical considerations 
Internal and external disequilibria, although interrelated, have usually been studied 
separately. Furthermore, the analysis (and policy recommendations) have tended to be 
carried out in the abstract, ignoring the countries' interdependence. While this may be a 
convenient approach when considering "small" countries and/or when no generalized 
payments or trade problems take place, it may lead to partial and sometimes erroneous 
conclusions when the opposite occurs. 
The internal disequilibrium has generally been analysed for  a closed economy or 
under the assumption that no problems arise in the foreign  sector of  the economy. It 
usually refers  to a situation where the output gap —difference  between the optimum and 
actual level of  economic activity— is larger than some normal, natural or structural rate. 
In other words, when resource, and more specifically  labour unemployment reaches some 
critical value, the economy is faced  with an internal disequilibrium which is assumed to be 
caused by an excess supply of  goods (or savings exceeding investment) and/or by 
distortions and imperfections  in labour markets. According to which interpretation 
prevails, action tends to be centered on fiscal  instruments and/or on wage and indexation 
policies. Another sort of  internal disequilibrium corresponds to inflation.  Even though 
structural considerations may be very important, it is recognized that this situation is 
characterized by an excess supply of  money. Therefore,  policy recommendations gyrate 
around the control of  "excessive" internal credit flows  (both to the public and private 
sector) and/or of  the determinants of  the liquidity ratio, mainly inflationary  expectations 
and the "management" of  certain key prices, such as the exchange rate, wages and interest 
rates. 
The external disequilibrium is related to an imbalance in the foreign  sector of  the 
economy. Specifically,  when the current account is in deficit  (surplus), it means that a 
country is spending on foreign  goods and financial  and non-financial  services more (less) 
than what it receives from  abroad. Until recently the literature has focused  the analysis on 
the trade account, assuming a way as exogenous the developments taking place on the 
financial  area. For LDCs this may have been justified  during the 1950s and early 1960s 
when direct foreign  investment and official  capital movements represented the bulk of 
the capital account of  the balance of  payments. In that context both the elasticity and 
absorption analysis of  the balance of  payments stressed the role of  devaluation and 
movements in national income, respectively, on the balance of  payments (narrowly 
defined).  The integration of  these two analytical approaches attempted to trace out the 
outcome of  the "impact" and "multiplier" effects  of  changes in the determinants of 
exports and imports of  goods and non-financial  services on the "balance of  payments" 
and on the level of  economic activity and employment. The analysis allowed, under 
certain restrictive assumptions, for  the simultaneous presence of  internal and external 
disequilibrium, and it was recognized that non-dilemma cases were the combination of 
unemployment and surplus in the trade balance (expansive monetary and fiscal  policies 
being called for)  and inflation  and deficit  (which required restrictive monetary and/or 
fiscal  policies). The combination of  unemployment and deficit  on the one hand, or 
inflation  and surplus on the other, were perceived as dilemma cases which required 
additional policy tools such as changes in the exchange rate. 
The recent revival of  the monetary approach to the balance of  payments shifted  the 
focus  from  the trade account to the overall balance of  payments, concluding, under the 
theoretical assumption that the main developments in the foreign  exchange markets 
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respond to disequilibrium in the domestic money market, that "the current account does 
not matter". In other words, balance-of-payments  flows  are interpreted as one of  the 
main mechanisms to restore equilibrium in the monetary sector. Policy instruments 
emphasize the control of  domestic credit (rather than the more "direct" determinants of 
exports and imports), so as to accommodate it to money demand in such a way as to 
generate a desired balance-of-payments  surplus or deficit;  the latter would basically 
reflect  excess supply or demand for  local money. The precise way in which domestic 
residents try to satisfy  their money demand, by offering  abroad goods or real or financial 
assets, would be of  minor importance. Consequently, adherents to this approach, which 
prevailed in many countries during the 1970s, argued that little importance should be 
given to the huge inflows  of  financing  addressed to some LDCs since they represented the 
"natural" response of  domestic agents to an excess demand for  local currency. 
The magnitude, nature, and persistence of  recent external imbalances and their 
relationship to domestic imbalances suggest that the current theoretical models for 
analysing the balance of  payments are based on various sets of  unrealistic and decidedly 
restrictive assumptions, and have produced piecemeal and at times erroneous 
interpretations and policy recommendations with respect to the developments which 
have occurred in this sphere. In particular, there has been little analysis of  the 
determinants of  private international financial  flows  or of  the external debt's impact on 
the national economy. In addition, given a ceteris paribus assumption in relation to world 
economic activity, international interest rates, etc., policy prescriptions put the burden of 
restoring a balance in the "problem country", with little or no recognition of  the 
interdependence of  the external imbalances among the countries, with respect both to 
their causes and to the responsibility involved. Since the attempt to construct another 
theoretical synthesis clearly exceeds the scope and purpose of  this paper, we will 
concentrate on certain analytical issues which seem especially well suited to helping us to 
understand present foreign  imbalances and to clarify  alternative options and elaborate 
more realistic and efficient  policies. 
A country's deficit  on the current account of  its balance of  payments responds to the 
fact  that domestic residents' expenditure exceeds their income. This may correspond to a 
case where ex ante (desired) investment exceeds public and private domestic savings, 
requiring foreign  savings to close the gap; under certain conditions and within bounds, 
this process can be sustained for  long periods of  time. 
This has been the traditional situation observed in most LDCs, which turn out to be 
net international debtors. Since "young" developing countries have a lower capital-labour 
ratio and higher returns on investment than advanced countries, it tends to be in the 
interest of  both to transfer  resources from  relative capital-intensive countries to LDCs. 
The basic factors  which determine the stability and regularity of  net inflows  of 
capital to LDCs are the availability of  international financing  and the creditworthiness of 
the country. The former  element is independent of  the country's economic policy and the 
latter is usually related to the way in which the country incorporates foreign  savings into 
its economy. In the case where borrowing is used to maintain or increase consumption or 
to finance  low-return investments, not only will the country's creditworthiness be 
negatively affected,  but forthcoming  debt service payments, instead of  taxing future 
growth of  income, will force  a reduction of  consumption levels in the years to come. On 
the other hand, the higher the complementarity between foreign  and domestic savings 
and the more foreign  savings are used to increase productive capacity, especially in the 
tradeables sector, the "better" will be the evolution of  the traditional creditworthiness 
indicators. However, in spite of  "sound economic management", creditors may tend to 
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reduce their loans if  outside factors  (such as an increase in international interest rates, or 
deterioration in the terms of  trade of  debtor countries), negatively affect  their evaluation 
of  the country's debt servicing capacity; naturally, this process by itself  tends to worsen 
even more the debtor's balance-of-payments  position. It should be clear, therefore,  that a 
regular flow  of  foreign  savings may unexpectedly and quickly turn into a foreign  exchange 
bottleneck and an urgent problem in economic policy management, and what in other 
circumstances might have been a "normal" deficit  turns out to be an external 
disequilibrium "problem". 
The determinants of  the current account developments may be classified  as 
"external", in the sense that individual countries are not responsible for  and may be 
unable to offset  them, and "internal" or domestic factors,  which can be attributed to 
consequences of  the country's policy actions, or omissions, affecting  its international 
competitiveness and overall foreign  payments situation. Naturally, this distinction is 
neither exhaustive nor precise or rigorous. However, it sheds light, once empirical 
evidence is available, on the role these factors  have played, or may play in the future,  and 
suggests more efficient  and equitable strategies, at the country and international levels, to 
face  the problem. 
The main foreign  or external factors  negatively affecting  the current account are a 
deterioration in the terms of  trade, reduced demand for  LDCs' exports by advanced 
countries and increases in international interest rates. Fluctuations and procyclical 
behaviour of  capital flows  to LDCs can also help very decisively to worsen an external 
imbalance by reducing the availability of  foreign  financing  to face  a given deficit  on 
current account. 
Besides supply shocks, which although domestic in nature are in a sense 
"exogenous" to policy makers, two main internal factors  can be broadly distinguished that 
may exacerbate foreign  payments disequilibrium. On the one hand, aggregate demand 
management may stimulate excessive spending by the public and/or private sectors. On 
the other, relative price movements may stimulate, through exchange rate, commercial 
interest rate and income policies, non-tradeable goods supply and tradeable goods 
demand, contributing to a loss in international competitiveness. An intermediate 
situation, which has recently been quite important in some countries, relates to the 
combined implementation of  financial  reforms  and stabilization programmes resting on 
exchange rate overvaluation. This may lead to domestic policy inconsistencies which end 
up in a direct stimulus to aggregate demand and current account deficits  through the 
monetization of  financial  flows  stimulated by expectations of  speculative capital gains. 
The former  classification,  while allowing a better appreciation of  the relevant 
factors  explaining an external disequilibrium to be obtained, should be complemented by 
the consideration of  two additional elements. The expected time dimension of  the shock, 
whether foreign  or domestic, plays a crucial role when evaluating alternative solutions: 
temporary effects  should be distinguished from  permanent ones. Although it is 
sometimes difficult  to assess correctly the duration of  a shock, efforts  should be made to 
incorporate that element into the analysis. Another useful  distinction relates to whether 
the shock is of  a "real" or "monetary" nature. Examples of  the first  may be found  in losses 
in productivity, obsolescence in technology or deterioration in "real" terms of  trade (such 
as the one caused in oil-importing countries by the successive increases in fuel  prices). 
Monetary shocks are typically derived from  money market disequilibria. For example, if 
money supply continuously exceeds money demand, attempts to improve the balance-of-
payments position through a once-and-for-all  devaluation will be inefficient  and should 
be complemented by policy tools addressed at the control of  domestic credit expansion. 
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The relevance of  the above-mentioned categorization may be visualized when 
analysing alternative ways to deal with foreign  payments imbalances. 
From a purely accounting point of  view, external imbalances (in a country whose 
currency is not accepted as international money) have to be financed  by running down 
gross foreign  exchange reserves or increasing the stock of  foreign  debt outstanding and 
the level of  payments arrears, or some combination of  them. However, an ex ante 
disequilibrium in the external accounts may be substantially larger than the imbalance 
which is finally  financed,  the difference  being wiped out through adjustment of  the 
imbalance. This latter mechanism consists in domestic policy measures designed to 
produce an expansion of  exports of  goods and services, a reduction of  imports, or some 
combination of  both so as to reduce the projected current account deficit  and the 
consequent need for  additional foreign  finance. 
Adjustment measures have typically focused  on expenditure  reducing and 
expenditure switching  policies. The former  consist in restraining aggregate demand via 
restrictive monetary, fiscal  and/or incomes (including lower wages and higher interest 
rates) policies, with the objective of  directly reducing domestic spending on tradeables. 
Increases in the exchange rate also work in the direction of  reducing domestic spending 
through their effect  on the real money supply, at least in the short run. 
Expenditure switching from  tradeables to non-tradeable goods works through 
relative price changes, typically exchange rate movements and changes in tariffs  and 
other import regulations, as well as different  forms  of  export subsidies. These policies 
tend to depress domestic spending on tradeables and to stimulate resource allocation 
towards tradeables production. 
If  adjustment could be promoted rapidly through changes in relative prices, its cost 
in terms of  output foregone  and higher unemployment might be quite small. However, 
real resource transfers  between sectors and regions take time. Lags and inertia in factor 
mobility, price and wage rigidities, and the uncertainty regarding the temporary or 
permanent nature of  the policy changes contribute to a situation where sectors 
incentivated by price stimulate to contract, do so rapidly, while those stimulated to 
expand generally take an extended period to do so. In the process, global output suffers, 
unemployment and inflation  go up and real wages are negatively affected.  Furthermore, 
traditional policies have placed greater emphasis on reducing aggregate demand than on 
increasing output and changing its composition; therefore,  if  spending is reduced as part 
of  the programme, there will be an added tendency towards output losses and 
unemployment. Experience has shown that when both relative price changes and 
expenditure reductions are promoted by the authorities of  the debtor countries, the 
process of  adjustment in case of  a deficit  involves unemployment and output losses which 
take a relatively long period of  time to disappear. Adjustment, in the sense of  a reduction 
in the external imbalance, may occur relatively rapidly, but at a substantial, and 
prolonged, economic and social costs. 
From an international perspective, when an adjustment process takes place in a 
stagnant world economy and when current account deficits  are not located at a country, 
but at a regional level, the costs of  adjustment policies increase. This is true for  individual 
countries, through the lack of  foreign  demand for  their exports, so that huge relative price 
changes, (with the already mentioned associated costs) are needed in order to better their 
trade balance. But it is also true internationally, since due to the importance of  LDCs in 
world trade and payments, when a region as a whole curtails its imports, it will slow down 
the recovery of  advanced surplus countries. When many countries attempt to increase 
their exports, some expansionary effects  follow  for  the world economy. However, a 
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deterioration in the terms of  trade may occur and protectionist policies in developed 
countries may be strengthened thus worsening the prospects of  recovery through 
adjustment policies in LDCs. 
The above discussion suggests that in many cases countries opt, and should opt, for 
financing  a current account deficit,  which ultimately consists in delaying adjustment for 
the future.2  These two components of  the settlement of  an external imbalance, 
adjustment and financing,  are frequently  interrelated. In most cases of  a large ex ante 
external deficit,  financing  for  this can be obtained if,  and in some cases only if,  adjustment 
measures are taken that reduce the need for  financing  to what creditors consider 
"manageable" or "credible" proportions. In fact,  the International Monetary Fund makes 
its regular resources available, over and above certain limits, only if  the country in 
difficulties  puts into effect  adjustment policies designed to eventually eliminate the 
deficits. 
It is not obvious whether an imbalance should be financed  or adjustment measures 
should be taken, the answer depending on the nature, magnitude and persistence of  the 
deficit,  as well as on the availability of  financial  resources to the country in question. An 
imbalance originating in factors  which are of  a transitory and monetary nature, expected 
to last for  a short period of  time, should generally be financed;  this conclusion is derived 
from  efficiency  criteria. In turn, a deficit  emanating from  real and/or permanent changes 
in the economic environment or from  facts  which, while transitory in character, are 
expected to last for  a prolonged period of  time, requires adjustment. 
From another perspective, when external factors  predominate, it seems reasonable 
on grounds of  equity and in some cases of  efficiency  (i.e., interdependence both in trade 
and payments between deficit  and surplus countries) to argue in favour  of  financing. 
Again, this is especially true when the external disturbance is perceived as temporary and 
is of  a "monetary" nature (e.g., the increase in world interest rates), and less so when it 
appears as more permanent and is based on "real" factors  (e.g., the increase in oil prices). 
However, it is not always easy to determine, at an early stage, whether permanent 
and transitory or monetary and real changes are at work. So, more than a 
"fundamentalist"  approach to external imbalance, a cost-benefit  approach is usually 
taken to determine the policy instruments to be used in facing  a disequilibrium in foreign 
payments. Financing a deficit  has costs measured in terms of  future  debt burden, while 
adjustment implies some current real income foregone  and a transitory increase in 
unemployment and inflation. 
The usual "small country assumption" regarding foreign  financing  implies an 
infinitely  elastic supply of  foreign  credit; the borrowing country determines the amount 
borrowed per year, at the going interest rate and other costs. In this approach, the amount 
of  indebtedness per year is essentially demand-determined, while supply conditions 
determine the cost of  borrowing. This assumption is a useful  one when international 
financial  markets are growing rapidly, as they did up to 1981, and when "country risk" 
perceptions of  the creditors do not limit the supply of  external credit to borrowing 
countries. As financing  reaches its maximum limits, however, a country is not in a 
position to evaluate the cost and benefits  of  alternative ways of  settling the imbalance: it 
is forced  to adjust, whatever the costs. Under these conditions, it is not surprising to find 
in many cases of  external imbalances that countries act unilaterally in the financing  area, 
through arrears in commercial and in other foreign  payments, which may be properly 
dubbed "involuntary lending". 
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III 
Financing and adjustment: recent tendencies 
and the current situation 
As it is well known, world financial  markets expanded at a rapid rate during the 1970s, 
total assets of  banks reporting to the BIS expanded at an average rate of  25% during the 
period, and in no year was the rate less than 19%. Between 1973 and 1981, the net flow  of 
banking credit to non-oil LDCs grew more than fivefold,  increasing from  US$ 10 billion to 
more than US$ 50 billion in 1981, when it reached its historical peak. 
This rapid growth is explained both by institutional and structural factors.  Among 
the institutional factors,  perhaps the lack of  regulation in the Eurocurrency markets, 
including the absence of  minimum reserve requirements and of  mandatory maximum 
debt-to-capital ratios, are the two most important single ones. As regards structural 
factors,  the accumulation of  liquid balances under the control of  countries with a high 
liquidity preference,  such as the oil-exporting ones, is clearly one of  the most outstanding 
characteristics of  that period from  an international financial  viewpoint. If  oil-exporting 
countries had decided, and had been in the position, to accumulate real assets rather than 
liquid funds,  the latter would have gone back to the suppliers of  real assets, and the 
expansion of  the financial  market would have depended on their preferences  as regards 
portfolio  composition. 
Of  course, the working of  the international monetary system lies at the root of  the 
expansion of  the financial  markets. Asset rather than reserve currency settlement would 
have allowed a more moderate, regulated expansion of  reserve currency holdings outside 
the country of  issue. 
At all events, rapid growth of  financial  markets during the 1970s created an 
international capital market largely outside the regulatory controls of  any monetary 
authority or international institution. Capital movements have become more and more 
important in international payments and exchange rate determination, and consequently 
private and especially banking sources of  finance  have increased their importance while 
the role of  official  institutions and governments has weakened in an increasingly market-
based monetary and financial  system. This has resulted in turn in a sharp reduction of 
average maturity as well as in substantial increases in the cost of  borrowing for  LDCs, 
specially those of  Latin America. 
By the end of  1981, and particularly in 1982, the growth of  the financial  markets 
slowed down dramatically in the wake, on the one hand, of  the breakdown of  the oil cartel 
and, on the other, of  the increased perception by international lenders of  the risk of 
deterioration of  their portfolio.  In those years, together with smaller capital inflows  to 
LDCs, banks also increased their spreads, fees  and commissions and shortened the 
maturity of  new loans. 
The fast  growth of  credit implied the rapid growth of  debt, a process which is 
sustainable, as analysed in the preceding section, as long as the debt burden does not grow 
out of  proportion with GNP and exports. This seemed to be the case in a number of  Latin 
American countries during the 1970s: Mexico, for  example, averaged 6.4% growth in real 
GNP from  1970 to 1979 while its exports grew in real terms by 10.9% annually. In the 
same period, comparable figures  for  Brazil were 6.7% and 9.1%. Argentina had a less 
enviable annual growth, 2.6%, but still expanded its exports by 10.7% per year. 
However, a deterioration in the terms of  trade of  debtor countries, or an increase in 
international interest rates could make debt burden unbearable and that was what 
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Table 1 
E V O L U T I O N O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L  E C O N O M I C I N D I C A T O R S 
A F F E C T I N G T H E B A L A N C E OF P A Y M E N T S O F L A T I N 
A M E R I C A N  C O U N T R I E S , 1965-1983 
Terms  of  trade 
Latin  America' Real interest _ b rate 
Industrial Net  inflow  of 
Period (percentage  change) 
countries 
growth  rate' 
capital 
Non-oil- (percentages) (percentage Billions Billions 
Total exporting change) of  nominal of  1983 
countries dollars dollars'1 
Average 
1965-1972 .3 .2 2.82 4.6 3.4 8.8 
1973 13.4 10.6 2.94 6.2 8.1 18.3 
1974 15.8 -7.0 .11 0.1 11.6 23.5 
1975 -13.5 -12.0 -2.21 -0.7 14.5 27.3 
1976 4.6 7.4 -0.22 5.3 18.3 32.0 
1977 6.0 10.7 -0.50 4.3 17.3 28.5 
1978 -10.5 -10.2 1.23 4.5 26.4 40.3 
1979 3.5 -6.7 0.66 3.5 29.0 39.7 
1980 4.2 -7.2 0.86 1.1 29.9 36.1 
1981 -7.3 -13.0 6.11 1.5 38.0 41.5 
1982 -7.0 -7.6 6.91 -0.4 16.5 17.1 
1983' -7.2 -1.6 6.71 1.8 4.5 4.5 
Source: ECLAC, Estudio  económico de  America Latina  1982; Síntesis  preliminar  de  la economía  latinoamericana,  1983; 
IMF, World  Economic Outlook,  1983; OECD, Economic Outlook  1972; IMF, Balance of  Payments  Yearbook 
(various issues). 
"From 1970 on excludes Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador; from 1976 on, Mexico and Peru. 
It refers to three months Eurodollar London interest rate minus United States inflation, as measured by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPl). 
' GNP growth rate of Canada, United States, Japan, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
''Deflated by United States Consumer Price Index. 
'Preliminary estimates. Data for interest rate and United States inflation cover up to October 1983. 
happened in the early 1980s. Although it may be said that many countries in Latin 
America did not adjust to the two oil shocks of  the 1970s and incorrectly perceived the 
growing external financing  available during the decade, as stable and permanent, it can be 
stated that for  many countries the debt service crisis was due less to mismanagement 
and/or unwise borrowing and lending than to high interest rates and a world recession 
that reduced Latin American export earnings. 
As a consequence of  domestic economic policies in industrial countries, the rate of 
growth of  the world economy came to a halt in 1982, real interest rates in international 
markets soared and protectionist tendencies in advanced countries increased; at the same 
time, the terms of  trade moved rapidly against debtor countries, including oil-exporting 
ones. As the recession took hold, both the domestic and international portfolio  of  banks in 
industrial countries suffered.  In the LDCs this process of  bank portfolio  deterioration led 
to financial  crisis in several cases, which compounded the portfolio  problems and risk 
perception of  internationally lending banks (see table 1). 
It is worth noting that domestic policies in some LDCs also provided stimulus to the 
capital inflow  in the form  of  debt, through inconsistent financial  reforms  and exchange 
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rate movements (devaluing at rates substantially below domestic inflation).  Some 
governments believed that high inflationary  pressures and high interest rates in the 
domestic credit markets, as well as tight monetary and (sometimes) fiscal  policies, could 
be avoided by borrowing abroad. Furthermore, in many cases speculative capital 
movements were also stimulated by huge interest rate differentials  between domestic and 
foreign  rates. This situation allowed, during some time, for  the simultaneous presence of 
current account deficits  and overall balance-of-payments  surpluses: a process which could 
only be sustained by an increasing foreign  debt. 
So both from  the supply and demand side the increase in foreign  debt was 
stimulated at rates which made the debt level incompatible with a sharp or prolonged 
world recession. In fact,  the overwhelming importance of  private banking as the main 
source of  the flow  of  new financing,  given its commercial and risk-avoiding nature, has 
helped to amplify  rather than moderate the recessionary tendencies of  the early 1980s. 
Present levels of  foreign  debt are such that changes in interest rates in international 
markets produce a substantial impact on foreign  payments. As an increasing proportion 
of  the stock of  the LDCs debt is subject to floating  rates, the bulk of  the stock, and not only 
new lending, will be affected  by changes in rates. Table 2 shows the effect  of  a 1 % 
increase in interest rates on foreign  payments in non-oil-exporting LDCs. For Latin 
American and Caribbean countries this figure  is some US$ 2.3 billion, which represents 
2 % of  the region's exports of  goods and services. It should be noted that this effect,  which 
has predominated in the 1980s as a consequence of  the rapid increase and changing 
structure of  foreign  debt, as well as extraordinarily high interest rates in world financial 
markets, is substantially bigger than that of  a US$ 1 increase per barrel of  oil. Although 
nominal interest rates in the United States have declined from  their extreme levels of 
1981 and 1982, they have fallen  neither as fast  nor as far  as the (United States) rate of 
inflation  and they remain far  above their real historical levels for  comparable stages of 
previous business cycles. 
Table 2 
EFFECT OF 1% CHANGE IN INTEREST RATES ON FOREIGN 
PAYMENTS OF NON-OIL-EXPORTING LDCs: 1981-1983 
Area 
Amount of 
debt  subject 
to floating 
rates 
(billions  of 
dollars) 
(1) 
1 % interest 
rate change 
(billions  of 
dollars) 
(2) 
Total  exports 






Western Hemisphere6 227.9 2.3 115.2 2.0 
Africa 37.7 .4 54.8 .7 
Asia 76.4 .8 178.4 .4 
Other 73.9 .7 99.5 .7 
Total 415.9 4.2 447.9 .9 
Source: IMF, World  Economic Outlook,  1983. 
"The classification of countries corresponds to IMF, International  Financial  Statistics  from March 1980 on. 
'Western Hemisphere excludes only Venezuela as oil exporter. 
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Table 3 
NON-OIL-EXPORTING LDCs' INTEREST PAYMENTS IN 
1981-1983, BY AREAS 
Area' 
Interest  payments 
(billions  of 
dollars) 
(D 
Exports  of  goods 
and services 






Western Hemisphere' 31.4 115.2 27.3 
Africa 4.4 54.8 8.1 
Asia 9.8 178.4 5.5 
Other 10.0 99.5 10.0 
Total 55.6 447.9 12.4 
Source: IMF, World  Economic Outlook,  1983. 
"The classification of countries corresponds to IMF, International  Financial  Statistics  from March 1980 on. 
* Western Hemisphere excludes only Venezuela as oil exporter. 
Table 4 
INTEREST PAYMENTS AND NEW DEBT OF NON-OIL-EXPORTING 
LDCs IN 1982-1983 
(Billions  of  dollars) 
Area" Interest payments 
Net  external 
borrowing Net  transfer 
Western Hemisphere4 31.4 18.2 -13.2 
Africa 4.4 9.0 4.6 
Asia 9.8 15.6 5.8 
Other 10.0 9.9 -.1 
Total 55.6 52.7 -2.9 
Source: IMF, World  Economic Outlook,  1983. 
"The classification of countries corresponds to IMF, International  Financial  Statistics  from March 1980 on. 
'Western Hemiphere excludes only Venezuela as oil exporter. 
With annual interest rates at nominal levels of  12% to 18% (including spreads) 
between 1981 and 1983, interest payments consume a substantial proportion of  the gross 
export income of  debtor countries. The figures  are shown in table 3. 
Furthermore, interest payments by Latin American and Caribbean countries in 
1982 and 1983 exceeded increases in their net foreign  borrowing, so that a reverse 
transfer  pf  resources from  debtors to creditors was taking place. This would be a natural 
result as the LDCs' economies mature, but it is a heavy burden when it is a consequence of 
world recession rather than a by-product of  the growth process (see table 4). 
In addition to the effect  of  high international interest rates on debt service, they 
have an impact on primary commodities, since they tend to be negatively correlated with 
the terms of  trade of  primary producing countries. Hence, the burden of  high interest 
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rates is amplified  by a deterioration in the terms of  trade, in what has been called the 
"scissors effect",  which has produced the squeeze that nearly caused some major debtor 
countries to default  (see figure  1). 
The mechanisms that explain this negative relation are related to the direct impact 
of  interest rate changes on the trading in, inventories of,  and speculative demands for 
primary commodities (see Padma Gotur, "Interest rates and the developing world", 
Finance  and Development, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 1983). Also, high interest rates 
discourage domestic expenditure, the level of  economic activity suffers  and demand for 
primary products falls.  As most of  these products are sold in highly competitive markets 
and their supply is inelastic, prices tend to change rather sharply with changes in demand. 
The recent international monetary and financial  developments, the 
macroeconomic policies in the industrial countries, and the world recession have been the 
main external factors  that have negatively affected  the LDCs' economies. To this should 
be added some domestic or internal factors  which were quite common in Latin America 
during the second half  of  the 1970s. Overvalued exchange rates, expansive aggregates 
demand policies and stimulus to and inadequate use of  foreign  indebtedness have also 
contributed, although to a lesser extent, to generate the balance-of-payments  crisis that 
started in 1981 and continued during 1982 and 1983. 
The magnitude involved and the adjustments made are quite clear and impressive. 
The deficit  on current account reached a maximum in 1981. Since then the trade balance 
changed from  deficit  into surplus, peaking in 1983 to an extraordinary amount of  more 
than US$ 31 billion, a figure  more than tripled the improvement attained in 1982. The 
balance on current account before  interest payments and profit  remittances improved by 
Table 5 
E X T E R N A L I M B A L A N C E S IN L A T I N A M E R I C A 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Billions  of  dollars 
1. Exports of  goods 
2. Imports of  goods 
3. Trade balance 
4. Non-financial  services (net) 
5. Current account balance before 
69.6 90.5 96.8 88.6 87.5 
69.1 91.5 98.4 78.9 56.3 
0.5 -1.0 -1.6 9.7 31.2 
6.5 8.5 11.4 9.6 6.4 
financial  services 
6. Financial services (net) 
7. Balance on current account 
8. Net capital movements 
9. Foreign global debt 
10. Foreign debt services 
-6.0 -9.5 -13.0 0.1 24.8 
14.2 19.0 29.1 36.8 34.0 
-19.6 -27.7 -40.4 -36.4 -8.5 
29.0 29.9 38.0 16.6 4.5 
166.4 205.2 257.9 289.4 309.8 
37.1 43.2 54.6 69.2 
Percentages 
11. Interest payments as a percentage of 
exports of  goods and services 
12. Current account balance as percentage 
of  gross national product 
17.4 19.9 26.4 38.3 35.0 
-2.8 -3.3 -4.3 -3.9 -0.9 
Source: ECLAC, Síntesis  preliminar  de  la economía  latinoamericana,  1983. 
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Table 6 
LATIN AMERICA:  COST OF ADJUSTMENT INDICATORS 
1976/1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1970 dollars 
Real GNP per capita 930 1 007 997 965 911 
Real GNI per capita 929 1 009 985 938 883 
Percentages 
Change in consumer prices 50 53 61 86 130 
Unemployment median" 7 7 7 9 10 
Source: ECLAC, Síntesis  preliminar  de  la economia latinoamericana,  1983. 
"The median of  annual average rates of  urban unemployment in 10 selected Latin American countries. 
US$ 37 billion between 1981 and 1983, a figure  equivalent to around 4% of  Latin 
America's average GNP in the period. The current account deficit,  as a consequence of  the 
changes affecting  mainly trade, and to a much smaller extent, financial  services, 
contracted abruptly from  US$ 36.4 billion in 1982 to US$ 8.5 billion in 1983: the smallest 
deficit  since 1974 (see table 5). 
Parallel to this, and responsible to a certain extent for  the extraordinary reduction 
in current account deficits,  the Latin American countries suffered  in 1983 a drastic 
contraction in the net inflow  of  capital to the region. Such inflow,  which had already been 
reduced in 1982 to less than half  the historical maximum of  1981, when it reached US$ 38 
billion, fell  again in 1983 to less than US$ 4.5 billion. This is why, in spite of  the huge 
surplus on trade account and the sharp fall  in deficit  in current account, foreign  exchange 
reserves fell  for  the third consecutive year. In terms of  the region's imports, the reserve 
coefficient  was reduced from  an average of  nearly 50% in the period 1973-1979 to about 
one-third in the 1980s, in spite of  the fact  that imports fell  by over 40% from  1981 to 
1983-
The fall  in the net inflow  of  foreign  capital to Latin America, combined with the 
very high remittances in respect of  financial  services, contributed, for  the second 
consecutive year to a net transfer  of  resources from  the region to the rest of  the world, 
amounting to nearly US$ 50 billion during 1982-1983. Obviously, as a consequence of  the 
smaller net capital inflow,  foreign  debt increase slowed down: 7% in 1983 as compared to 
12% in 1982 and the high average figure  of  23% during 1977-1981. Interest payments, 
however, which in 1977 represented 12.4% of  exports of  goods and services, have steadily 
increased, rising to triple that figure  in 1982-1983. Furthermore, interest payments have 
also increased their proportion of  total debt service payments from  35% in 1977-1978 to 
58% in 1982 and a much higher figure  in 1983, due to the postponement of  most 
amortizations in that year. 
But despite generalized devaluations and the implementation of  other measures 
designed to stimulate exports, most of  the adjustment has occurred in the form  of  a drop 
in imports, which fell  29% in 1983 after  having fallen  by 20% the year before. 
This extraordinary fall  in imports caused, and was caused, by a sharp contraction in 
economic activity and other related indicators (see table 6). Latin America's GNP fell 
3.3% in 1983, after  having fallen  1 % in 1982, while the per capita GNP fell  by 5.6% in 
1983 and was nearly 10% lower than the 1980 figure,  reaching only the level attained as 
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far  back as 1977. Gross national income fell  even more than GNP, since for  the third 
consecutive year the region's terms of  trade deteriorated: phenomenon which occurred 
for  six consecutive years in the case of  non-oil-exporting Latin American countries. 
Urban unemployment increased in almost all countries, while inflation  soared to 
unprecedented high rates. 
Perhaps the most illustrative way of  perceiving the magnitude of  what this 
adjustment process has meant for  the region is to recognize that if  GNP had continued to 
grow at one-half  its average rate of  growth between 1970-1980, Latin America would 
have obtained US$ 150 billion in real terms at 1983 prices in additional GNP in 1981-
1983. That amount is equivalent to nearly half  the region's stock of  foreign  debt or to the 
GNP of  Sweden or Switzerland. 
Despite the important external sector adjustment policies adopted by Latin American 
countries in 1982 and 1983, the foreign  exchange generated by this process and by voluntary 
lending was insufficient  to cover external debt payments; and a number of  countries found  it 
impossible to pay not only the principal but in some cases even the interest. Most countries 
had to reschedule their external debt service and tried to reach agreements with the IMF and 
other foreign  editors to meet such debt service charges —not to mention repayment of 
loans coming due— while they have also had to reduce internal spending and apply 
austerity programmes that comply with IMF requirements. 
Under present conditions it cannot be expected that the debt will continue to grow 
as in the past. The flow  of  liquid savings has been substantially reduced, and lenders are 
taking an extremely careful  and selective attitude regarding international operations. In 
fact,  as mentioned, the expansion of  international lending in 1983 has been very much 
lower than the increase in interest payments to the exterior, so that the transfer  of  real 
resources from  debtors to creditors  has reached unprecedented levels even after  allowing 
for  debt renegotiation and for  the fact  that there are now considerable arrears in the 
interest and amortization payments of  some debtor countries. While total international 
assets of  banks reporting to the BIS grew by US$ 22.3 billion in the first  six months of 
1983, as compared to US$  74 billion in the same period in 1982, bank lending to Latin 
America increased US$ 3-7 billion (US$ 12 billion in the first  half  of  1982) and lending to 
all LDCs went up by US$ 5.8 billion (US$ 15 billion in the first  half  of  1982). 
So, regardless of  the transitory and externally caused nature of  the present foreign 
payments deficits  of  Latin America, due mainly to unusually high foreign  interest rates 
and unusually unfavourable  terms of  trade, financing  is playing a very limited role in 
closing the external gap. Traditionally, through its conditional lending, the IMF generally 
included provisions to eliminate involuntary lending, offering  financial  resources in 
exchange. However, when the imbalances are very large, as they have been in 1982-1983, 
IMF resources are not sufficient  and the Fund has been actively promoting the provision 
of  additional funding  from  private lenders to complement its own very limited financing 
possibilities, in order to try to avoid payments crises. 
As already mentioned, banks have reacted, at least until now, very conservatively, 
trying to reduce their exposure with LDCs. Available financing  to those countries is now 
an extremely binding constraint. But in spite of  the new circumstances, the IMF has 
reassumed an attitude similar to its traditional one of  regarding causes of  and cures for 
individual country balance-of-payments  crises as if  they were isolated phenomena. This 
time, however, the financial  shortages have required an extremely restrictive and costly 
adjustment process, which has not ben determined by the nature or causes of  the 
imbalance but basically by available financing.  The latter has overridden cost and benefit 
considerations, or —what amounts to the same thing— above some limited amount, the 
cost of  financing  has become infinite. 
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IV 
Adjustment and debt in the 1980s: options and limitations 
of  existing tendencies, institutions and practices 
1. The  international  scenario 
Until the second half  of  1980, developments in the foreign  sector of  the Latin American 
economy seemed perfectly  under control. It is clear from  the preceding sections that since 
the beginning of  this decade shocks originating in policy actions or decisions in industrial 
countries and in the world economy have played a major role in the generation of  external 
imbalances in the LDCs. In fact  appropriate policy measures in the North are a crucial 
element for  the viability of  the actual adjustment processes taking place in the South. If 
the terms of  trade in Latin America had been similar to those prevailing in 1980 (25% 
better) and if  international interest rates had been similar to those obtained when the 
bulk of  the foreign  debt was contracted (on average four  percentage points below present 
rates), the region would have had available US$ 35 billion more in 1983. With these 
resources the region would have easily fulfilled  its foreign  payment obligations without 
having to reduce dramatically its imports nor needing additional foreign  debt. In other 
words, if  world trade and finance  would only return to "normal" conditions, Latin 
America's foreign  payments commitments could be satisfied  without sacrificing  its 
consumption levels or its growth possibilities. 
Of  course, policies in the LDCs have had a degree of  responsibility in originating 
imbalances, but the correction of  such policies, a responsibility of  the LDCs' authorities, 
has already been carried out —in excess in many places— and has had a painful  effect  on 
both the domestic economy and its social fabric,  raising skepticism about the ability of 
these countries to sustain the effort. 
Current approaches to adjustment present two major problems: they maximize the 
global cost of  the process and they are biased against debtor countries, which are bearing a 
disproportionate share of  the cost. There are four  major aspects of  the international 
economy where action is needed in order to reverse this situation. 
First, high and volatile interest rates have a definite  negative impact on the current 
crisis, for  various reasons. As already mentioned, the debt service payments and terms of 
trade of  the LDCs have been adversely affected.  Interest payments exceed the cost of  oil 
imports in non-oil LDCs. But interest rates have also helped to delay recovery in the 
North and have contributed, through capital inflows  to the United States, to the 
strengthening of  the value of  the dollar vis a vis other currencies. This has affected  the 
LDCs' competitiveness and increased the real cost of  servicing the foreign  debt, which is 
predominantly denominated in US dollars. In relation to this latter point, it has been 
estimated that if  th non-oil LDCs' borrowing from  commercial banks, which amounted to 
about US$ 150 billion between 1979 and 1982, virtually all in terms of  dollars, had been 
diversified  to correspond broadly with the currency composition of  their trade, the 
combined savings to these countries in terms of  lower interest costs and exchange rate 
gains, would have amounted to over US$ 30 billion (see A. Mohl and D. Sobol, "Currency 
diversification  and LDC debt", Federal Reserve Bank of  New York, Quarterly Review, 
Autumn 1983, Volume 8, No, 3). Furthermore, high interest rates (together with 
overvalued Latin Aemrican currencies) have stimulated flights  of  capital to the United 
States which, according to private bank sources, reached US$ 100 billion during 1980-
1983, aggravating the region's debt problems. 
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Macroeconomic policies in industrial countries, and especially fiscal  policy in the 
United States, bear major responsibility for  the high and uncertain interest rate levels. 
Monetization and crowding-out effects  of  the fiscal  deficit,  expectations that the United 
States deficit  is unlikely to disappear even with a strong, long-lasting recovery (due to the 
fact  that spending growth for  both social and defense  programmes will outpace the 
increase in tax revenues), and the fact  that the industrial countries' public sector deficits 
are competing globally for  a relatively weak flow  of  global savings are the major factors 
behind recent current interest rate levels and movements. Furthermore, the impact of 
international interest rates on LDCs is bigger than their effect  on the average United 
States or United Kingdom citizen, since American or British borrowers can write off 
interest rate payments against taxes. 
It should also be noted that banks' earnings depend not so much on the level of 
interest rates as on spreads, so that in principle, the soudness of  the banking system would 
not be at stake and could even be enhanced if  real interest rates could be reduced. 
In summary, the advanced countries' responsibility for  the levels and fluctuations  of 
interest rates —one of  the main determinants of  current balance-of-payments  crises and 
highly costly and inefficient  adjustment process in LDCs— should be clearly recognized 
and action should be taken regarding fiscal  and monetary policy mix, as well as on co-
ordination of  these and exchange rate policies among industrial countries. 
The second international element to consider is that the actual adjustment process, 
based on generating trade surpluses in debtor countries, is being made extremely difficult 
and more costly due to the lack of  sufficient  foreign  demand and protectionist tendencies 
in the North, which have affected  both LDCs' exports and their terms of  trade. 
On average LDCs' products account for  only 3 % of  the industrial countries' market; 
this relative small share should leave ample scope for  further  expansion. However, 
relatively large shares for  some specific  products and protectionist measures against 
imports of  many of  these products suggest only moderate growth ahead. Although it 
should be noted that protectionist measures in OECD countries did not stem the 
dynamism of  the most successful  exporting countries in the late seventies, the export 
environment in the next years will be much more competitive than in the last fifteen 
years. In addition to debtor countries' export promotion policies, strong export growth 
will require not only a healthier world economy but also a restructuring process in the 
industrialized countries' economies, which is an essential aspect of  international 
economic development to which national policies in both industrial and developing 
countries must make a positive contribution (see B.A. de Vries, "International 
Ramifications  of  the External Debt Situation", AMEX Bank Review Special Papers No. 8, 
November 1983). 
Although developments in 1983 and forecasts  for  1984 indicate a recovery from  the 
1982 world recession, and despite the increase in imports into the United States, the 
international transmission of  the recovery is working less well than in the past. The 
growth of  world trade exceeded the growth of  world output by a sizeable margin in the 
two-year period following  the 1975 recession, as it has on average throughout the 
postwar period. For 1983-1984, in contrast, the excess of  trade over output growth is 
likely to be negligible or non-existent, the main reasons for  this being the slower available 
financing,  due to the debt problem, and the proliferation  of  protectionist measures. To 
this should be added the restrictions imposed on imports by heavily indebted LDCs. 
In a dynamic, expanding economy, traditional prescriptions for  a single country to 
adjust by increasing exports and restricting imports have some rational basis. However, 
since every export is someone else's import, a "composition fallacy"  may occur when a 
generalized crisis takes place. As the IMF has leverage with respect to deficit  countries 
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which are in need of  financial  resources but not with respect to surplus countries (or 
reserve currency countries whether in surplus or deficit),  the burden of  adjustment is 
thrown upon deficit  non-reserve currency countries. This fact  increases the cost of 
adjustment for  those countries, and reduces the efficiency  of  certain policy measures, 
especially when the world economy is not growing at a rapid pace. 
Availability  and stability of  foreign  financing  is the third international factor  which 
requires urgent policy measures. 
As mentioned in section III, bank lending to LDCs, and especially to Latin America, 
grew at extraordinarily high rates during the 1970s. In hindsight, although in some 
countries investment rates, and GNP and export growth rates, were high, development 
strategies based on foreign  saving had very weak foundations.  Excessive reliance on 
short-term loans created a serious imbalance between the maturity structure of 
investment and the debt, increasing the countries' vulnerability to debt servicing 
problems. Foreign finance  in some cases took the place of  domestic savings, stimulating 
consumption. The overabundance of  foreign  exchange contributed to overvalued 
exchange rates, putting a brake on export dynamism. Also, attempts to maintain activity 
levels in the face  of  the oil shocks, and the fact  that high United States interest rates and 
domestic exchange rate expectations of  depreciation stimulated speculative private 
capital outflows,  were all factors  that helped to partially offset  the value of  bank lending 
and to militate against its efficient  use. 
The private banks' initial reaction to debt servicing problems in the 1980s was not 
only to try to reduce their exposure with the LDCs, which by mid-1983 was over US$ 330 
billion, but also to charge additional commissions and fees  in the rescheduling schemes 
(which only very recently have tended to diminish slightly), that have added an extra cost 
on already high interest rates. It is evident that because of  their aggressive loan policies, 
together with less than adequate project evaluation and their lack of  awareness of  the 
country and commercial risks involved, banks bear a share of  responsibility in the 
gestation of  the current balance-of-payments  crisis. They tend to argue that due to the 
very competitive supply side of  the market in the 1970s, spreads were low and provisions 
insufficient  to cope with generalized payments crises. However, their current behaviour, 
by trying to suddenly block access of  "problem" countries to financial  markets and to 
impose rescheduling procedures that have increased financial  costs substantially is 
helping to augment external imbalances, throwing practically all the adjustment cost 
burden on the debtor countries. 
Together with higher financial  costs, bank lending has declined and there is little 
reason to expect it will increase in the near future,  except under forceful  IMF pressure. 
However, as real interest rates will probably diminish only slightly and very slowly, if  at 
all, huge and costly trade surpluses of  the debtor countries are still not sufficient  to close 
the foreign  exchange gap, and countries will require additional loans. The only sources 
available would be the advanced countries' governments, which are themselves under 
severe budget constraints, and multilateral institutions which even if  they increased their 
capital and lending capacity to what seems reasonable limits, will still fall  short of 
required needs. Therefore,  although efforts  should be strengthened to ensure that the 
IBRD and IMF play a major role, directly and indirectly, in international financing  it 
appears that no solution to the LDCs' debt problem will be viable unless it includes a 
reduction of  the real burden of  debt. 
A final  element in the international scenario, that has not been sufficiently 
incorporated in current approaches to adjustment policies, is related to the extent to 
which both through trade and finance,  countries and regions tend to be interrelated. 
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As the world has become more interdependent, actions by a group of  countries are 
bound to affect  the rest, positively or negatively. Actions in the same direction by most or 
by all countries will reinforce  each other producing on any individual country an effect 
substantially larger than the one that would have been forthcoming  from  that country's 
policies by themselves. The growing interdependence is likewise reflected  in the fact  that 
if  a country takes adjustment measures to reduce a deficit  at a time when surplus countries 
are applying expansionary policies, the result will be a faster  and smoother adjustment 
process at substantially reduced economic and social cost. However, that is not what is 
happening at present. Thus, a reduction in expenditures in a deficit  country, with the aim 
of  freeing  additional resources for  use in the tradeable goods sector will be defeated  in its 
purpose if  the rest of  the world is also compressing domestic demand because of,  say anti-
inflationary  policies. The case of  import protection is even more clear: policies to 
promote the exports of  deficit  countries will be defeated  if  the rest of  the world prevents 
those exports from  finding  markets. Similarly, if  one country devalues its currency to 
produce a reduction in the external sector gap, it may achieve its purpose. But if  many 
countries producing similar commodities devalue at the same time, the result may not be 
adjustment, but merely a reduction in the prices of  the exports of  those countries, and a 
worsening in their terms of  trade which might even increase the imbalance. 
Excessive reliance on adjustment delays the North's recovery since the LDCs' 
markets for  the industrial countries' exports are no longer of  marginal importance. 
Added to the above-mentioned composition fallacy,  implicit in regional export 
promotion within a stagnant world economy, is the fact  that import cutbacks in the LDCs 
help to feed  the recessionary tendencies in the rest of  the world, delaying economic 
recovery in those same countries. According to Professor  Koren, President of  the 
Austrian National Bank, around 20% of  world trade is affected  by difficulties  in deficit 
countries. Given this situation, it is no longer reasonable to impose economic policy 
conditions on many countries simultaneously while at the same time expecting them to 
raise their exports and lower their imports. If  many countries were to meet those 
conditions at one and the same time, the system could not function  (BIS press review, 27 
October 1983). Up to August 1983 United Kingdom exports to Latin America fell  by 35 % 
relative to the same period in 1982, and some calculations indicate that the fall  in United 
States merchandise exports to Latin America accounted for  over 40% of  the total decline 
in that country's exports in 1982 and was responsible for  the loss of  250 000 jobs in the 
United States in areas where unemployment was generally higher than the United States 
average (see S. Dhar, "United States trade with Latin America: consequences of  financing 
constraints", Federal Reserve Bank of  New York, Quarterly Review, Autumn 1983, Vol. 
8, No. 3). 
On the financial  side, it has been estimated that the LDCs' debt exposure of  the 
major private banks amounts to more than twice their capital and that the annual interest 
owed to such banks by the LDCs is more than the banks' total profits  (see R. Wienert, 
"Banks and Bankruptcy", Foreign  Policy,  No. 50, Spring 1983). 
Consequently, the present approaches to adjustment which throw the burden 
basically on deficit  countries and are strongly biased in the direction of  recessionary 
policies should be complemented by trade liberalization policies in the advanced countries 
and a major new role for  financing  through debt rescheduling on better conditions with 
higher net capital inflows  to LDCs. This is in the interests of  both North and South not 
only through its effects  on higher global output and trade growth but also because it 
minimizes the possible impact of  partial or generalized default  on the international 
banking system and its consequent effects  on an even deeper and more prolonged world 
depression. 
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2. Adjustment  policies at the country level 
Current adjustment policies in the LDCs have been inspired by the traditional IMF 
approach implemented in the 1950s and 1960s with the aim of  improving debtor 
countries' trade balances. Section III showed that an extraordinary effort  has been made 
by most Latin American countries, with huge economic and social costs. Although trade 
balance improvement has been impressive it has not been sufficient  to generate the 
resources needed to fill  the foreign  exchange gap. That is why most countries have had to 
reschedule their foreign  debt and still need higher capital inflows  and/or a reduction in 
the real value of  debt service in order to "finance"  interest payments. 
The adjustment experience during the 1980s has revived the discussion regarding 
its efficacy  as well as the question of  its sharing of  the burden among debtor and creditor 
countries. The Latin american case reveals that certain old criticisms of  traditional 
policies have solid bases and should receive more attention from  multilateral 
organizations and advanced countries. In addition, however, developments in the 1970s 
and the changes that have taken place in international, regional and local scenarios, have 
given rise to new, non-traditional issues and problems which should also be incorporated 
in the analysis and discussion aimed at seeking policies that will allow for  more efficient 
and equitable adjustment processes. 
Adjustment policies recently implemented in Latin America show a clear 
recessionary bias. Improvement in the trade balance has been achieved essentially 
through lowering imports and diminishing the countries' standard of  living, rather than 
by increasing exports. In other words, the reduction in aggregate demand tends to 
outweigh the change in output composition, while supply-oriented policies have proven 
particularly ineffective.  The world recession and the increasing protectionism of  the 
1980s have contributed to this situation as well as the fact  that outward-looking policies, 
when implemented globally are less efficient  (as is implicit in current policy 
prescriptions) than when applied by a single "small" country. 
However, it seems that the traditional approach, applied rather homogeneously to 
a number of  quite different  country cases, which assumes that current account problems 
are derived from  excess demand for  goods, blurs the basic fact  that financial  service 
payments are the major component of  the current account deficit.  Therefore,  given that 
debt was acquired through time and that interest rates are now extremely high, policy 
prescriptions aimed at reducing "excess spending behaviour" and attempting to solve a 
"stock" problem with traditional instruments based on generating an excess supply of 
goods focus  attention on issues and variables that, although related to the problem, are 
not the most efficient  ways of  dealing with it. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in section II, when restrictive fiscal  and monetary 
policies are implemented and devaluation takes place, the exportable and import 
subtitution sectors tend to respond slowly, while imports and economic growth slow 
down or are reduced rather quickly and non-tradeables supply, facing  a scale effect  that in 
the short run is much more important than the relative price effect,  tends to stagnate or 
even to fall.  From a development perspective, traditional adjustment measures present a 
further  problem since the recessionary impact —given the fact  that people will attempt 
to maintain current levels of  consumption— tends to fall  more heavily on investment. 
Finally, inflation  associated with devaluation, together with a decrease in real wages and 
increases in unemployment, generates a regressive domestic distribution of  the burden of 
adjustment, in addition to the costs incurred through the impact of  stabilization policies. 
The above-mentioned factors,  traditionally associated with "orthodox" adjustment 
policies, have been amplified  not only by the international scenario of  the 1980s, 
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especially the world recession, terms of  trade deterioration and higher interest rates, but 
also by inconsistencies associated with new phenomena, which tend to exacerbate 
economic fluctuations  and recessionary effects.  The amount of  adjustment required has 
been amplified  by the fact  that the trade balance has had to improve not only to cover 
higher debt service payments but also to try to compensate for  the smaller net lending due 
to the procyclical behaviour of  the commercial banks. This "overadjustment" tends to be 
self-defeating  since, as relative price changes prove less effective  for  reducing deficits, 
forcing  additional emphasis on restrictive measures, these excessive restrictions damage 
the economic system as a whole and tend to increase the risks of  lending as seen by the 
creditors. 
In a number of  countries, a similar situation to what has happened internationally 
in relation to debt service capacity, has occurred domestically. Much of  the "debt" problem 
is originated not only by the lack of  foreign  exchange but also by the fact  that domestic 
residents, firms  and persons, have been unable to service their domestic  debt. This 
situation, associated with inefficient  resource allocation in previous years, has been 
exacerbated by the "microeconomic" effects  of  the adjustment policies that are being 
implemented. Falling sales and increasing taxes and financial  costs —the importance of 
the latter in the structure of  production costs having increased enormously— squeeze 
firms'  profits  as well as consumers' ability to pay, shaking the soundness of  domestic 
financial  systems and increasing the cost of  the adjustment process as a whole. The need 
for  recovery of  the economy, so that domestic illiquidity and/or insolvency is eliminated 
(a necessary condition for  servicing the foreign  debt) is contradicted by the recessionary 
effect  of  the adjustment policies being actually implemented. 
Closely related to the internal debt issue is the fact  that in a number of  countries in 
the region, especially those which engaged in unrestricted liberalization cum stabilization 
programmes, domestic real interest rates have reached excessively high levels and 
experienced extremely sharp movements. While those developments may have been 
justified  on the basis of  events taking place in the credit markets, their consequences for 
other aspects of  the economy would have required a closer look, and actions, to deal with 
events affecting  those rates so as to achieve better results in overall objectives of  economic 
policy. Similarly, the extraordinary inflow  of  foreign  capital and anti-inflationary  policies 
based on exchange rate management, together with tendencies to integrate the goods 
markets into the world economy by lowering barriers to trade, generated in many cases 
grossly overvalued exchange rates which stimulated, in the wake of  the world recession, 
huge private capital outflows  outside the region. In summary, the behaviour of  certain 
variables, namely exchange and interest rates, as well as real wages, foreign  debt and asset 
prices, as "outliers" has enormously complicated and increased the cost of  adjustment 
policies, since much more drastic changes in relative prices are required which, 
furthermore,  may end up to being in contradition with the overall desired results. 
The behaviour of  asset prices merits special consideration in some Latin American 
economies. In the late 1970s and to a certain extent up to the present, real and financial 
asset prices soared, without adequate capital accumulation effort  having taken place, 
creating a "bubble effect"  which stimulated private expenditure. As the cost of  domestic 
financing  was higher than that of  foreign  financing,  funding  private sector excess 
spending abroad became a profitable  way to circumvent the tight domestic credit or 
money markets. In many cases this was the main domestic cause of  the external 
imbalance. However, the traditional approach to adjustment assumes that it is the public 
sector deficit  which is the principal element behind excess spending, and higher prices for 
public sector services, lower government spending, higher taxes, etc., are therefore  felt  to 
be called for.  Obviously, under these circumstances, although the trade balance will 
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improve, distortions created in the domestic economy, together with an unnecessary fall 
in investment as compared to the desired reduction in consumption, help to increase still 
further  the costs associated with the current adjustment. 
Finally, in more general terms, since the slower growth rates in industrial countries 
and the higher real interest rates in international markets, as well as the smaller increase 
in the foreign  financing  available to LDCs will probably prevail for  quite a long time, it 
would be desirable that the adjustment process in debtor countries should be guided not so 
much by short-run financial  or balance-of-payments  considerations, but rather by long-
run, development objectives. This requires —together with the attempt to minimize and 
better distribute the adjustment cost in the short run— appropriate "intervened" (as 
opposed to automatic) adjustment. In particular, policies aiming at increasing the 
flexibility  of  the domestic structure of  debtor economies are called for.  In this respect, it 
seems that the recent experience of  some of  the Asian NICs, particularly Taiwan and to a 
smaller extent Korea, which have been able to rely less on debt, to increase and diversify 
exports to both advanced and oil-exporting countries, and to substitute imports more 
efficiently,  rather than reduce them, could be quite illuminating. 
V 
Final comments and conclusions. A new proposal 
The economic size of  the developing world, and its linkages both through trade and 
finance  with the industrial countries, indicate the need to give higher priority to a global 
international approach to the balance-of-payments  problems of  LDCs. Even though 
adjustment is required, the prevailing approach considers countries on a case-by-case 
basis and tends to minimize the effects  of  the world economic stagnation on LDCs' 
recovery and to overlook the impact of  their adjustment on the advanced countries' levels 
of  exports and activity. Also the characteristics of  the world economy today are quite 
different  from  those prevailing in the 1950s and 1960s. They require, from  the 
international community, and especially from  the IMF, a new approach to old problems. 
Recent experience shows, however, that apart from  the IMF's role in leading efforts  to 
obtain additional financing  no major effort  is being made in that direction; the 
implementation of  traditional ideas and standard policies in the new international 
scenario is increasing the burden placed on LDCs by problems which urgently require a 
more efficient  and equitable solution than the one currently being pursued. These 
considerations, together with the fact  that developments that have occurred outside the 
LDCs' policies and responsibilities have played a major role in the actual crisis, mean that 
there is now an even greater need for  financing  than during the renegotiation processes 
that have been taking place since August 1982. 
The adjustment and "overadjustment" of  most debtor countries in the past 
eighteen months has been impressive. In spite of  the huge economic and social costs 
incurred in terms of  losses in output and higher inflation  and unemployment, however, 
trade surpluses have not been sufficient  to compensate for  interest payments and smaller 
inflows  of  capital. The monetary authorities and governments in industrial countries, 
together with the IMF and private banks, have helped by rescheduling and consolidating 
existing debt. 
These results, and the magnitude of  the problems yet to be solved, indicate that the 
current approach to adjustment and the efforts  made in that connection by all the 
principal participants have so far  succeeded, at high and not equitably shared costs, in 
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something important but limited: buying time. It is doubtful,  however, whether the 
present arrangements have bought enough time for  all the countries concerned or can be 
used to buy much more in the future. 
Private bankers, especially the smaller ones, are displeased with what they perceive 
as "arm twisting" and increasing official  interference  in their business, although many of 
them would appreciate being bailed out by their monetary authorities. The IMF's 
credibility has been shaken by the many breakdowns in its programmes. The industrial 
countries' concern about eventual tax increases and trade competition from  abroad is 
reducing their governments' policy options. Last but not least, although it is true that 
"there is no such thing as a painless adjustment", the question is whether, over the longer 
term, the current adjustment policies in debtor countries, which tend to maximize cost in 
terms of  output and employment losses and lower investment, will be worth the 
economic and social costs incurred. Many of  the developing countries are concluding that 
adjustment cannot go on for  much longer and are pressing for  a much more equitable and 
development-oriented solution to current problems. Furthermore, they correctly argue 
that over the longer term improved creditworthiness must be based on growth in output 
and exports and not on reduction of  economic activity. 
As already mentioned, economic recovery as well as lower protectionism and 
interest rates in industrial countries would obviously help. However, it seems that even if 
developments in the world economy go in the right direction, neither their speed nor 
their foreseeable  magnitude will be sufficient  to induce urgently needed growth in debtor 
countries. Furthermore, as most of  these countries start from  such high debt burdens they 
probably cannot return to normal market borrowing for  some years to come. Therefore, 
together with a healthier international economy, there is need for  new loans and adequate 
growth of  official  development assistance so as to allow domestic policy changes to be 
appropriately and more smoothly accomplished. 
As lending banks view their exposure with debtor countries as too high by today's 
standards, and given that the external financial  constraint on LDCs is the most pressing 
one, no solution during the near future  seems feasible  without a fall  in real debt burden. In 
this context, a number of  proposals in relation to the debt problem have been advanced, 
which include special treatment of  both amortization and interest payments. (Most of 
these proposals are contained in M. Guerguil, "The international financial  crisis: 
diagnoses and prescriptions", to appear in CEPAL  Review, No. 24.) They range from 
outright purchases of  the loans by governments or official  institutions to the 
establishment of  long grace periods and guarantee schemes which would give both 
lenders and borrowers time to alleviate their problems, while the most extreme ones 
consisting of  exchanging real assets for  debt. 
The main problems regarding the adoption of  most of  these schemes are the 
political implications involved in the capital losses associated with them. Although most 
of  the debt problem is one of  temporary illiquidity and not of  fundamental  insolvency, and 
in spite of  recent and current emergency actions, many LDCs will not be able to service 
their debt, and therefore  its level must be reduced. Someone has to make good the losses. 
In industrial countries the possibilities are reduced to savers or depositors' taxpayers, or 
the banks' shareholders. 
Banks will have to keep lending to debtor countries because otherwise they will not 
even receive interest, or they might have to lower interest rates and/or commissions and 
fees  in future  (unavoidable) reschedulings, thus reducing their earnings. A certain 
amount of  money is likely to be lost, and one possibility is that it will have to be written off 
by the creditors and spread over time, so as to preserve confidence  in the banking system. 
At the other extreme, some proposals suggest that it is the LDCs which should make up 
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for  the capital loss, in addition to current losses in output and employment, by exchanging 
part of  the outstanding debt for  shares in firms  that their governments control (L.A. 
Metzler, Financial  Times,  14 December, 1983). A whole range of  "intermediate" 
proposals have been suggested, including a major role for  SDRs (D. Avramovic,  "The 
debt problem of  developing countries at end-1982", Aussenwirtschaft,  March 1983); 
reconversion of  currencies as loans are rescheduled (M. Zombanakis, Financial  Times,  9 
November 1983); and stabilizing the real value of  debt in terms of  dollars (S. Brittan, 
"World debt: a suggestion", Financial  Times,  29 September 1983). 
Some of  these ideas could not be considered seriously in the atmosphere of 
emergency which has prevailed until recently, when the restoration of  confidence  in the 
banking system and avoiding defaults  by Third World countries had overwhelming 
importance. But now is the time for  all parties concerned (especially governments, 
monetary authorities and commercial banks in industrialized countries, all of  which share 
the responsibility and ought to share the debt burden) to study these proposals and act 
appropriately. 
As indicated above, the fact  that interest rates are substantially higher than their 
previous long-term average, and that these higher rates apply to the bulk of  the external 
debt of  the LDCs, compounds debt service payment difficulties.  For Latin America as a 
whole, amortization and interest payments of  medium and long-term debt after 
renegotiation absorb more than 50% of  exports of  goods and services, and more than 
60% in the case of  five  countries of  the region. A change of  one percentage point in 
external interest represents US$ 2.8 billion per year: a sum equivalent to roughly 3% of 
the total exports of  the region. 
Lenders are normally willing to reprogramme or refinance  amortization payments, 
but there are very few  cases where this willingness extends to cover interest payments. A 
reduction in interest payments below market rates would reduce the operational income 
of  the lending institutions without a corresponding reduction in operating costs. 
Interest rates are not under the control of  borrowers or lenders. They are a result of 
macroeconomic policies, and since these policies are not stable, interest rates cannot be 
expected to stabilize in the short run. Furthermore, the level of  such rates in real terms is 
now five  or six times higher than the longer-term (10 or 20 years) averages. 
But if  interest rates cannot be stabilized at normal levels, interest payments can be. 
A new proposal in this respect is as follows  (C. Massad, "Una proposición para la solución 
de los pagos por intereses" (mimeo), ECLAC, November 1983). 
a) A "reference"  rate in real terms would be established at a level similar to the long-
term average international real interest rates plus normal spreads. 
b) Original debtors could pay interest in their own currencies to their Central Banks, 
at the originally agreed market rates. 
c) The Central Banks would pay creditors interest up to a maximum equal to the 
reference  rate. The difference,  if  positive, would be accumulated in special accounts 
at the Central Bank of  the debtor country and credited to the origirial creditors. 
d) If  negative, the difference  would be paid to the creditors by the Central Bank, 
drawing against the funds  accumulated in the special accounts, in so far  as there 
remain resources accumulated in the accounts. Such resources would accumulate 
when the market rates exceed the reference  rate and would disaccumulate in the 
opposite case. 
e) The Central Bank would assume the exchange risk, but not the commercial risk. 
f)  In their own accounts, creditors could present the amounts accumulated in the 
special accounts of  the Central Bank as credits guaranteed by the Central Bank 
involved. 
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g) The system would operate as long as there are resources accumulated in the special 
accounts. 
h) The scheme would be applied to debt outstanding as of  a given date. 
This proposal could make a very substantial contribution to strengthening the 
portfolio  of  creditor banks and to normalizing the situation in financial  markets. Of 
course, the liquidity problem involved for  creditors (banks pay interest at the going rate, 
but would only get them back over time) could be taken care of  with the support of  their 
own monetary authority. It would be a minimum contribution to the solution of  a 
problem in which all parties involved bear some responsibility. 
Two aspects of  the proposal require global agreements: one is the necessary 
support of  national monetary authorities of  creditor countries to creditor institutions; the 
other is that of  the general characteristic of  the system and the general conditions for  its 
application. The IMF could lead the effort  to achieve such agreements. The proposal does 
not require setting up new institutions, nor does it call for  asset transfers  among creditors 
or between them and international organizations. The proposal also provides a simple 
mechanism for  interest subsidization, if  desired: funds  put at the disposal of  Central 
Banks could be used to reduce the amounts accumulated in the special account. 
Other aspects, such as the precise scope of  the system, rates and spread involved, 
funds  accumulated in the special account and not fully  drawn before  payment of  the debt, 
etc., are matters of  negotiation, but it will be easy to propose some possible options if 
needed. 
Finally, the scheme could run parallel to the rescheduling of  debt amortization 
payments and need not interfere  with it. 
It is very probable that after  the emergency debtor countries will still find  serious 
constraints that will limit the scope for  expansionary policies and will complicate the aim 
of  achieving growth rates similar to those observed in the 1970s. The most important 
constraint will be external financing.  In general, it will not be easy for  governments or 
Central Banks of  advanced countries or for  official  multilateral institutions to compensate 
for  the expected smaller rate of  increase in private bank lending. Improved financial 
management by LDCs, such as diversifying  the currency composition of  debt and using 
new financial  tools and techniques, will be needed to optimize the use of  the limited 
foreign  finance  available. In addition to this, it seems that the relatively smaller amount of 
financial  credits will have to be compensated by resource transfers  from  industrial 
countries in other forms,  mainly direct foreign  investment, whose share in the 1970s 
diminished abruptly in favour  of  bank credits; new thinking is needed in this area also, so 
as to avoid the mistakes of  the past. 
On the internal front,  adjustment and policy measures in debtor countries should be 
designed and implemented with a longer time horizon than is currently being used. 
Greater reliance on domestic saving, and efficient  resource allocation aimed at increasing 
employment and the rate of  growth of  output and exports are required. Recent 
experience in Latin America as well as in some countries in South-East Asia suggest that 
much more attention than in the past should be given to "macroprice management", i.e., 
exchange rate, interest rate and wage policies. Consistent policies in these areas may 
contribute decisively to increasing saving and allocating investment more efficiently. 
This, together with adequate pricing policies and reforms  aimed at increasing market and 
management flexibility,  in a joint effort  by the government and the private sector, should 
contribute decisively to put those countries on a higher growth path based on a dynamic 
tradeable sector (for  export production and import substitution), which at the same time 
can be induced to use labour-intensive technologies. 
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NOTES 
•Naturally, as a result of  alternative hypotheses developed to explain these disequilibria and 
imbalances, different  "structural" changes have been proposed: nature and speed of  reindustrialization, 
supply-side economics, redefinition  of  government intervention in the economic sphere, implications of  the 
size and characteristics of  the "welfare  State" on overall economic performance,  etc. 
2It is implicitly assumed that authorities sterilize the monetary effects  of  the net increase in foreign 
debt; otherwise the fall  in money supply generated by the net inflow  of  foreign  exchange would induce a sort 
of  endogenous adjustment process through its depressive effects  on aggregate demand and expenditure. 
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